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Edited by

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CHAPTER 1

Good Work in Philosophy

Jacek Jadacki

Abstract

Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, formulated the following postulates for research that met the criteria of good work in philosophy: syntactic postulates, namely clarity, lapidary and systematicity; semantic postulates, namely intelligibility (including clearness, distinctiveness and monosemity), precision and authenticity; pragmatic postulates, namely substantiveness, thoroughness and criticality. Syntactic postulates are directed against chaos, semantic postulates – against enigmatism, and pragmatic postulates – against symbolomania and pragmatophobia.

The author of the paper analyzes the content of these postulates and shows how they were implemented in practice by Twardowski and his students.

Keywords

authenticity – clarity – criticality – intelligibility – Twardowski – lapidarity – Lvov-Warsaw School – precision – substantiveness – systematicity – thoroughness

1 Introduction

Combined with the unique civilization barbarism, the Swedish aggression against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the 17th century, and then, in the second half of the 18th century, the partition of Poland between three allied neighbours – Russia, Prussia and Austria – interrupted the continuity of Polish culture for decades.

This affected, among others, science – philosophy in particular. The latter, due to the closure of Polish higher education by the invaders, could only be practiced by non-academic dilettantes, except for short episodes of the activity of universities in Cracow, Warsaw and Vilna at the beginning of the 19th century and in Warsaw in early 1860s. The situation began to change only at the end of the 19th century – in the Austrian Partition – in connection with the political liberalization of the imperial-royal empire.

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In this atmosphere, Kazimierz Twardowski, taking over, in 1895, the Chair at the University of Lvov, presented a program of good work in philosophy – and then successfully implemented this program.

This is how the witnesses of this "teacher's miracle" described it.

> [Twardowski was] an extraordinary man whose work style influenced the forms of activity of the broad circles of intelligentsia spiritually created by the University of Lvov in the years 1895–1930.
>
> KOTARBIŃSKI 1959, 1

> Twardowski used to say that [...] he must first of all teach students to work, teach them good work in general, by his own example of good work as a professor of philosophy.
>
> KOTARBIŃSKI 1959, 2

> Twardowski [...] created a school [...] of honest thinking.
>
> AJDUKIEWICZ 1959, 32

> Students under his [i.e. Twardowski's] direction could be taught? [...] A reliable method of scientific work.
>
> AJDUKIEWICZ 1959, 31

> He [*scil.* Twardowski] managed to develop in a generation of younger Polish philosophers – and also in the general consciousness of an enlightened society – a vivid and lasting belief that ONE CAN AND SHOULD MADE PHILOSOPHY IN AN INTELLECTUALLY AND MORALLY RESPONSIBLE WAY, and that such philosophizing CAN AND MUST HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON HUMAN LIFE
>
> INGARDEN 1938, 265

Twardowski treated what he did as a special, consciously undertaken, mission. He said to his students:

> I have tried tirelessly to breathe into your souls what is the best part of my own soul: sincere love of work, passionate love of truth and arduous pursuit of justice.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1930, 459

He fulfilled this mission perfectly. Many of Twardowski's students absorbed this "best part of the soul" of their teacher: Władysław Witwicki and Jan Łukasiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Tadeusz Czeżowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Izydora Dąmbska...

2 Philosophy and Ideology

Twardowski distinguished (scientific) philosophy from ideology (i.e. general view of the world and life) (Czeżowski 1938, 477), which lies on the border between science, art and religion (Łukasiewicz 1915, 37). Here is what Czeżowski wrote about ideology:

> The philosophical view of the world and life, which is a pre-scientific stage of response to momentous life questions, provides particular sciences with ideas and concepts useful for the scientific worldview they are developing; for their part, scientific discoveries and scientific theories affect the formation of a philosophical view of the world and life – but the process of approaching both worldviews will never end. According to this broad concept of philosophy, Twardowski conceived of the ideal of the philosopher as a sage with thorough scientific preparation, who at the same time understands ideological problems, is sensitive to aesthetic values and is steadfastly guided by ethics in his activity. He also implemented this ideal in his own life.
>
> CZEŻOWSKI 1965, X[1]

Twardowski had the world available to scientific research for the sphere of philosophical research, and the analytical method for the philosophical research method. By the analytical method he meant giving real definitions of the objects studied, deriving from these definitions analytical consequences and confronting these consequences with facts from the relevant sphere. Such an analytical method was more closely characterized by Czeżowski:

> This method differs fundamentally from the genetic analysis method introduced to philosophy by Locke, who – treating science from the psychological point of view – tried to reduce all cognition to primitive psychic elements. However, the discussed method is used in the methodology of sciences to analyse and describe the methods of scientific research in general, e.g., when describing varieties of proof or verification, types of scientific theories, etc. It is basically similar to the analytical method used by Galileo in mechanics (however, without introducing quantitative relations and a mathematical apparatus), and consists in looking for, based on a few simple examples, the so-called analytical definitions by which the examined objects are defined, the theorems are derived from

1 See also: Łukasiewicz 1915, 37.

these definitions (again referred to as analytical) and finally the theorems are verified empirically in the examined field.

CZEŻOWSKI 1965, VII–VIII

3 The Ideal of the Philosophical Text

The results of scientific research, and of philosophical research in particular, find their expression in statements. Twardowski pointed out explicitly or implicitly the following postulates, which should be fulfilled by philosophical statements if they are to be testimony of a good work in philosophy.

(A) Syntactic postulates:
  (1) clarity (Ajdukiewicz 1959, 32; Kotarbiński 1959, 3) (*scil.* simplicity (Kotarbiński 1959, 4);[2] versus brilliance (Witwicki 1938, 488), floweriness (Witwicki 1938, 488));
  (2) lapidary/conciseness (*scil.* brevity; versus circumlocution) (Jaworski 1971, 54);
  (3) systematicity (Kotarbiński 1958, 28) (*scil.* order (Kotarbiński 1959, 4), regularity (Kotarbiński 1958, 28), unification, readiness (Kotarbiński 1959, 3); versus chaos (Kotarbiński 1958, 28; Kotarbiński 1959, 3; Jaworski 1971, 54), confusion, underdevelopment, immaturity, semi-finished product *in statu nascendi* (Kotarbiński 1959, 3)).

(B) Semantic postulates:
  (4) intelligibility[3] (*scil.* comprehensibility (Witwicki 1938, 487; Kotarbiński 1959, 3; Kotarbiński 1965; Kotarbiński 1973, 6), effectiveness (Kotarbiński 1973, 6); versus gibberish (Kotarbiński 1965, VI)):
    (a) clearness (versus darkness) (Ajdukiewicz 1948, 58; Kotarbiński 1958, 28; Kotarbiński 1959, 3; Jaworski 1971, 54; Kotarbiński 1973, 6);

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2 Here and later I give synonyms and antonyms used by Twardowski and his students, which shed additional light on the connotation of relevant terms.

3 Ajdukiewicz formulated this postulate as follows: "Think in such a way that you know well what you are thinking about; speak in such a way that you not only know well what you are talking about, but also in such a way that you can be sure that the one you are talking to, listening carefully to you, will think the same as you" (Ajdukiewicz 1959, 31).

(b) distinctiveness (Kotarbiński 1965, v; Kotarbiński 1973, 6) (*scil.* transparency (Kotarbiński 1965, v; Dąmbska 1971, 481; Jaworski 1971, 55), specificity (Kotarbiński 1959, 4); versus turbidity (Witwicki 1938, 490; Kotarbiński 1958, 28; Ajdukiewicz 1959, 32; Kotarbiński 1959, 3; Jaworski 1971, 54; Kotarbiński 1973, 6), fogginess (Kotarbiński 1959, 3), indeterminacy (Kotarbiński 1959, 3; Kotarbiński 1973, 6), "exciting depth appearances" (Ajdukiewicz 1959, 32));

(c) monosemity (Kotarbiński 1959, 4) – including literalness (Kotarbiński 1973, 6) (versus metaphoricity, rhetoric (Witwicki 1938, 488)).

(5) precision (Ajdukiewicz 1948, 60) (*scil.* accuracy (Czeżowski 1938, 477; Witwicki 1938, 489; Kotarbiński 1958, 28));

(6) authenticity (*scil.* honesty) (Witwicki 1938, 490; Kotarbiński 1973, 6).

(C) Pragmatic postulates:

(7) substantiveness (*scil.* matter-of-factness (Czeżowski 1938, 477), sense of reality (Łukasiewicz 1915, 35); versus phrases simulating depth (Ajdukiewicz 1959, 32); verbalisms – talking about words instead of things (Jaworski 1971, 54));

(8) thoroughness (versus shallowness Ajdukiewicz 1959, 32);

(9) criticality (Dąmbska 1971, 481)[4] (*scil.* legitimacy (Czeżowski 1938, 477)).

By formulating these postulates Twardowski opposed chaos (syntactic postulates), enigmatism (semantic postulates) and symbolomania and pragmatophobia (pragmatic postulates) in philosophy and generally in science.

4 Chaos

The condition of avoiding chaos in philosophy is, according to Twardowski, the correctness of argumentation, classification and definition procedures. The criteria for this correctness are a matter of logic – hence the importance of knowledge of logical theories.

4 Ajdukiewicz formulated this postulate as follows: "Whatever you say, affirm with such firmness that the logical power of your argument allows" (Ajdukiewicz 1959, 31). See also Witwicki 1938, 491.

The arguments for knowledge of logic as a condition of good work in philosophy and in general in science were succinctly formulated by Łukasiewicz:

> In order to [...] find out if a theory has scientific value, it is necessary to derive its consequences and to compare these consequences with facts, and therefore to REASON. Being able to reason is necessary to properly understand the structure of science and be able to work on its progress. [...] [Therefore] one needs to TAKE CARE OF THE ABILITY OF REASONING.
>
> ŁUKASIEWICZ 1915, 37

> Everyone who [...] wants to work scientifically should learn logic because it will improve the accuracy and methodology of his thinking.
>
> ŁUKASIEWICZ 1915, 37

And Twardowski added:

> "Ethical" and "aesthetical" papers [...] [would look quite different, if their authors had] a logical background – like a detailed knowledge of the conditions under which an a priori method may be applied or the need to define notions in a precise way.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1919, 55

5 Enigmatism

As particularly harmful to philosophy – Twardowski had the view that "it is impossible to write clearly about certain philosophical matters and issues" Twardowski 1919, 257); that if the subject of the study is complicated, statements that realize the results of the study of this subject cannot be comprehensible: clear, distinctive, monosemic; that the more intricate the object is, the more incomprehensible the statements about this subject must be.

Here is (my) explication of this superstition:

> $\forall z$ [(z is an intricate object) $\rightarrow \sim \exists x$ (x talks – *scil.* speaks or writes – about z comprehensibly)].

According to Twardowski, it is different:

> $\exists z$ [(z is an intricate subject) $\wedge \exists x$ (x talks – *scil.* speaks or writes – about z comprehensibly)].

The facts speak in favour of this solution. NB. Twardowski and his students were able to speak comprehensively about complicated objects. Witwicki wrote about Twardowski's classes:

> Unbelievable rumours spread around the city [*scil.* Lvov] that during these lectures and exercises you can understand everything you hear and talk about. There is no rocking and initial jargon. Each word is explained and you always know what's going on, even in the case of difficult and unpopular problems. This attracted larger and larger crowds to his lectures. Some attended them out of curiosity whether it was possible at all to understand philosophical problems without being a specialist and whether one could speak about these matters comprehensively as a specialist. Both have proved possible.
>
> WITWICKI 1938, 487–488[5]

> When he was asked why he was speaking so unusually clearly, he replied that otherwise he himself would not understand what he was saying.
>
> WITWICKI 1938, 488

What then makes some philosophers speak incomprehensibly? Twardowski's answer was that "some philosophers' unclarity of style [...] has its source in the muddled and vague character of their thinking" (Twardowski 1919, 257–259); "the author who is unable to express his thoughts clearly also does not know how to think clearly" (Twardowski 1919, 259). "Whoever has a clarified thought will find words for it simple and comprehensible" (Jaworski 1971, 43). So it was the following answer:

> $\forall x \forall z$ [(x thinks about z comprehensibly) $\rightarrow \Diamond$ (x talks about z comprehensibly)].

Twardowski justified this answer as follows. "Human language [...] is not just [...] an external manifestation of thought, but is also that instrument of thought which makes abstract thinking possible for us; when thinking, we think in words – that is, via language" (Twardowski 1919, 258). So we have:

> $\forall x$ [(x thinks about z) $\leftrightarrow \exists$'p' (x is convinced of z that p)].
> $\forall x$ [(x talks about z) $\leftrightarrow \exists$'p' (x talks 'p' about z)].

5 See also: Dąmbska 1971, 481.

This is an explanation of Twardowski's view that we "think in words". Łukasiewicz earlier expressed the view in a more cautious, and, to a certain degree, more radical way:

> In order for a thought to [...] belong to science, one must dress it in a sensually noticeable robe, so express it in words. Thought, even the most brilliant, but closed in the mind of one man, does not belong to science, because it is inaccessible to scientific control. Therefore, if you want to become a researcher, you must be able to express your thoughts in words. This is easiest to do in your native language; therefore, one should cultivate one's native language not only for PATRIOTIC reasons, but for SCIENTIFIC reasons.
>
> ŁUKASIEWICZ 1915, 34

It is not, therefore, that someone has an understandable conviction in terms of content, and there is no such sentence that would express this content intelligibly. Let us suppose that e.g. 'p' is such a 'q'. Therefore:

> $\forall x \forall z \forall$'$p$' {[($x$ is convinced of z that p) $\wedge$ ('p' is comprehensible)] $\rightarrow \exists$'q' $\Diamond$ [(x talks 'q' about z) $\wedge$ ('q' is comprehensible)]}.

On this basis, Twardowski formulated a practical directive that studying incomprehensible statements is not worth it.

> If the above remarks are to the point, they free us to a considerable extent from wracking our heads over what the philosophical author who writes in an unclear style is actually thinking. [...] His thought [...] do not merit the effort we exert to decipher them.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1919, 258–259

6 Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia

Twardowski considered symbolomania and pragmatophobia as one of the sins against pragmatic postulates, and in particular, against the postulate of substantiveness.

The use of symbols (as a tool of knowledge) has four phases:

(a) assigning symbols to objects and concepts of an examined domain;
(b) assigning operations on introduced symbols to operations on objects and concepts of an examined domain;

(c) performing certain operations on symbols;
(d) juxtaposing results of operations on symbols with states of affairs of an examined domain.

Here is how Twardowski himself described these phases:

> In order to make use of this device in research [*scil.* symbolization], we must first establish or adopt symbols for the concepts and objects to be investigated. We must also select symbols for the operations that we are to effect, and articulate those operations by well-defined rules. In proceeding to operate with symbols, we abstract from the concepts and objects symbolized by them, and abstract altogether from the fact that the symbols symbolize something; instead of concepts and objects, we have before us their symbols. We arrange and transpose these symbols in various ways by effecting a series of operations on them, and in this manner arrive at particular results. But these results, appearing as they do in symbolic form, require interpretation.
>
> Hence, after performing the operations we may no longer abstract from the fact that the symbols, in the form of which the results of the operations show up, do symbolize something. One must then make the transition from the realm of symbols into the world of concepts and objects symbolized by them; one must once again turn from the signs to what they mean and designate. Not until we have done this, do we reach the goal which the symbols and the operations performed on them were supposed to make easier to attain – or even make it possible to attain.
>
> It follows that in using symbols and operation with them, we must continually reckon as conscientiously as possible with the fact that they play the role of a means intended to lead us to the mentioned goal. We must therefore be as precise as possible in adapting the symbolism (for brevity, we here encompass with this term both the symbols themselves and the operation performed on them) to the concepts and objects symbolized, and submit it repeatedly to rigorous inspection in order not to become susceptible to difficulties in the final interpretation of the results that are acquired with the aid of the symbolism and expressed in its language.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1921, 261–262

Here is (my) simple illustration of these phases:

(a) we assign variable symbols '*p*' and '*q*' to any sentences, e.g. sentences "He got sick" and "He died";

(b) we assign the constant symbol '∧' to the propositional conjunction "and";
(c) we combine the symbols 'p' and 'q' by means of the symbol '∧' and (based on the relevant rules) we state that the expression '$p \wedge q$' is equivalent to the expression '$q \wedge p$';
(d) after substituting the sentences "got sick" and "died" for the symbols 'p' and 'q' in the formula obtained in phase (c) – we get the equivalence of the formulas "He got sick and died" and "He died and got sick," which in the English natural language are not equivalent, because the propositional conjunction "and" has sometimes a temporal aspect in this language (namely, it signals time sequence).

symbolomaniac is someone for whom symbols are "the object of fervent ve", and a pragmatophobe – one who feels "aversion to things".

> The symbols and the operations performed on them, originally the means to an end, become for them [*scil.* symbolomaniacs and pragmatophobes] an end in itself, an object of ardent affection and the source of treat intellectual delight [...]. This transformation into an end of something that is originally a means, familiar from numerous examples, is all the more easily accomplished, and all the more imperceptibly, the more intimate the bond between means and end in other respects. And such is the case with symbol and the concept or object that it symbolizes. Indeed, the symbol represents the concept or object symbolized by it; whence the illusion easily arises in which the former replace the latter. But representation is not after all the same as replacement: an ambassador is a representative of his nation's government, but he is not its surrogate (substitute); the deputy chancellor, on the other hand, is a surrogate (substitute) for the chancellor, and is not his representative
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1921, 262.

> Algebraic logic, or logistics [...] also exposes its advocates to the danger of falling into symbolomania and pragmatophobia.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1921, 267

> Indeed symbolomania and pragmatophobia may wreak the most havoc when they encumber the training of those young ones who aspire to be scientists. Young minds are easy prey for the mystique that every symbolism spread about itself [...]. They are attracted by the relative ease with which one can operate with symbols, whereas various difficulties are experienced when one encounters the things themselves face to face.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1921, 269

Twardowski pointed out that precision, which is achieved thanks to symbols, can also be achieved without them: e.g. using a suitably improved natural language. And again, he confirmed it by his own practice. As Witwicki wrote:

> He always wrote in ordinary Polish, which we speak every day. Just more precisely.
>
> WITWICKI 1938, 489

7 Characterological Predispositions

Twardowski believed that good work is favoured by some characterological predispositions, in particular:

(a) self-discipline – internal and external (obedience, dutifulness) (Czeżowski 1938, 477; Kotarbiński 1959, 3; Kotarbiński 1965, v);
(b) meticulousness (*scil.* diligence, perseverance, accuracy) (Czeżowski 1938, 477; Kotarbiński 1959, 3);
(c) concentration (*scil.* "resistance ... to siren chants of other possible interests") (Jaworski 1971, 58);
(d) consistency (in pursuit of a intentionally chosen goal) (Kotarbiński 1965, v);
(e) cumulativism (*scil.* focus on using the achievements of others (Czeżowski 1938, 477)); after all, "no person is in possession of all the truths but if one directs us forward it in any way, we shall readily and gratefully accept it" (Twardowski 1895, 43);
(f) cooperativism (*scil.* focus on cooperation with others) (Kotarbiński 1959, 4).

Twardowski tried to develop these predispositions in his students – including by setting his own good example in these respects (Kotarbiński 1959, 3).

8 Practice

According to Twardowski, good work skills in philosophy can be learned by familiarizing oneself with logic (*scil.* the theory of good work) and with particular scientific disciplines (*scil.* the practice of good work), and in particular with mathematics (using deductive and constructive methods) and some empirical and humanistic science (using inductive and analytical methods) (Twardowski 1919, 56; Twardowski 1920, 57–58).

Twardowski justified the necessity of non-philosophical knowledge to studying philosophy as follows:

> One needs to be aware of three things. Firstly, non-philosophical PARTICULAR SCIENCES often provide philosophy with data subjected to philosophical analysis; any further generalizations formulated within particular sciences may be considered within philosophy. Secondly, some particular sciences serve an auxiliary role toward philosophical science. Thirdly, the need for methodological role toward philosophical science. Fourthly, the need for methodological correctness within philosophical sciences may be satisfied solely by accepting methodological rules which are valid within particular sciences. Hence there are three reasons why philosophers need to obtain scientific education beyond philosophy itself. Therefore, it is clear that philosophical education cannot be based on only one isolated science, whether it be humanistic, physical or mathematic. Philosophers should be educated within these three branches of human knowledge.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1920, 58

> As philosophical questions are usually of a highly abstract nature, they require skill and proficiency in studying them, which cannot be acquired by study alone. Anyone who is not prepared to conduct scientific research and who begins to study philosophy with the intention to acquire scientific methods in practice, will find themselves conducting non-methodical philosophy.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1910, 55

As one of the most important ways of exercising the correct formulation of sayings – Twardowski recommended:

(a) paraphrasing one's own and other people's sayings (e.g. by summarizing them (Witwicki 1938, 490; Kotarbiński 1958, 28; Kotarbiński 1959, 3–4; Jaworski 1971, 44));
(b) confronting one's own sayings in discussions with other researchers (Kotarbiński 1973, 6).

He recommended abstracting for the following reasons:

> After all, if you want to summarize someone else's thought, you have to express it in your own words, and for that you need to understand it well. However, in order to understand someone else's thought it is often

> necessary to clarify it, to dismember it and to express it more often and more accurately than the author of the summary work did. By clarifying other people's thoughts behind his lead – one's own thoughts were clarified.
>
> KOTARBIŃSKI 1973, 6–7

In turn, he demanded that discussions be factual. The main factors standing in the way of a matter-of-fact discussion are fierceness, in the background of which there are personal animosities of the debaters, their religious prejudices and political preferences – and especially the threat of repression by the authorities for voicing views that are not in line with the authorities' expectations (Kotarbiński 1973, 6–7).

9 Philosophy and History of Philosophy

Twardowski's included logic, ontology, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics into philosophy. He distinguished the philosophy understood in such a way not only from ideology, but also from the history of philosophy – and he warned against mixing philosophical studies with philosophical-historical studies. This confusion was explained by the lack of "universally accepted results" (Kotarbiński 1973, 4) in the area of philosophy.

Łukasiewicz wrote bluntly about it:

> Philosophers, even the greatest, do not use the scientific method to create philosophical systems. The concepts they use are mostly unclear and polysemic, the statements are the most often incomprehensible or unjustified, the reasoning almost constantly erroneous. It is enough to recall proofs of the existence of God in DESCARTES or his definition of substance, the pseudoscientific deductions of SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ's fantasies about monads and harmony established in advance, KANT's critique of pure reason, inquiries of idealistic post-Kantian philosophers. All these philosophical systems probably have considerable significance in the history of human thought, often have great aesthetic or ethical value, they even contain some accurate, intuition-based observations; but they do not have any SCIENTIFIC value. From this, it comes that philosophy not only has not yet come, like other sciences, to some established and universally accepted truths, but it has not even managed to formulate its problems strictly.
>
> ŁUKASIEWICZ 1928, 41

That is why Twardowski was opposed to starting the study of philosophy from the study of the history of philosophy. He further justified it as follows:

> Someone wishes to study mathematics or biology. Do they begin with familiarizing the history of mathematical and biological science, or with reading companions and textbooks which present a broad view of these science? They reject first approach, as there is no point in reading sources which concern the history of a science with which they are not yet familiar. They reject the second, [as] [...] they [...] [would remain] on the surface of the science without understanding its deeper core.
>
> Admittedly, one may point out differences in the relationship between the history of philosophy and philosophy, the history of mathematics and mathematics or the history of biology and biology. Despite this objection being sound, it does not support the claim that the study of philosophy should BEGIN from the study of the history of philosophy. Yet what follows from this objection is that the study of philosophy has to be RELATED to the study of the history of philosophy. Meanwhile, one may be an outstanding mathematician and still have no knowledge of the history of mathematics.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1910, 53–54

The very history of philosophy can be studied in two ways. Kotarbiński called them the "global imitative method" and the "(co)creative interpretation method", respectively (Kotarbiński 1959, 4). The first method was characterized by him in these words:

> Supporters of the global imitative method, like historians of research thought, set themselves the task of imitative empathizing into the world of the mental and verbal style of the author whose works they study, trying to think and speak like him. [...] Such reporting expertise does not advance philosophical problems alone; it does not directly contribute to their clarification and resolution.
>
> KOTARBIŃSKI 1973, 4

The second method – recommended by Twardowski – has the following form:

> Adherents of creative interpretation try [...] to understand the problem better than the examined thinker managed to achieve by thinking, because this meansimitating his attitude in a significant way. [...] In this way, they do not only notify about the content of forwarded writings, but

> also advances, in a way, instead of the author studied, the very philosophical problems. They set themselves an ambitious task to understand a given thinker more clearly and deeper than he understood himself.
>
> KOTARBIŃSKI 1973, 5[6]

> The task in the latter case is not to "make yourself a 100% follower of specific doctrines" but to "extract the truth" from the interpreted texts. Hence the emphasis on "source studies" rather than on "stopping at textbook generalizations and simplifications".
>
> KOTARBIŃSKI 1973, 7

> The scientific way of approaching the history of philosophy [...] is available only to those people who are able to read principal, basic philosophical texts in Greek and Latin.
>
> TWARDOWSKI 1920, 59

10 Implementation of Ideals

It is worth noting that in the background of the postulate to study philosophical texts by creative interpretation there is the belief that texts studied are not the result of good work. In the latter case:

> The student is to receive the finished product and go further from the point where the master brought him.
>
> KOTARBIŃSKI 1958, 28

Twardowski was such a master.

> Twardowski's lectures were always prepared as carefully as possible, clearly structured, comprehensible to everyone who listened to them carefully. The effort of Twardowski's thought was constantly and inseparably coupled with a concern for its clear and distinct expression [...]. On his own example, the Professor taught how to think, how to co-think with others, how to co-inquire, and, on the material of this craft, he simply taught how to work.
>
> KOTARBIŃSKI 1965, V

6 See also: Kotarbiński 1958, 28.

It was similar with his students. Here is what Kotarbiński wrote about Łukasiewicz:

> Łukasiewicz's word [...] can be safely compared to a crystal, and his lecture, in speech or in writing – to buildings made of crystals. Everything was perfectly transparent, everything was uniform. Anyway, another comparison will do. Listening to Łukasiewicz's lecture, one felt as if a subtle machinery had been set in motion, whose gears overlapped each other perfectly, and the movement was carried out without friction, with smooth transmissions... It seemed so easy. Because the whole effort of overcoming snags was taken by the author and the speaker himself, without burdening the listener with the obligation to finish the unfinished fragments. One can argue about what gives better education, whether it is providing recipients with ready-made, perfect works, or rather treating them with a rough draft, so that they can make a fair copy of them themselves... But it is certain that perfection patterns are invaluable in a flood of such didactic drafts. Students view an embodied ideal of a lecture and know what they have to imitate.
>
> JAWORSKI 1971, 55–56

The Lvov-Warsaw School provided a lot of such „embodied ideals". The successors of the School also implement these ideals.

11 Aim of Good Work

Knowledge is always knowledge about how things are. Thus it can be said that knowledge is ascertained in true sentences. If philosophy is knowledge, it is also ascertained in true sentences, as a set of certain truths.

Good work in philosophy is not an end in itself. Kotarbiński warned in the epigram "On Logic" (in my translation):

> Wherever you look around, faults spread.
> Logic! Breadwinner! Kill them till end!
> Later; I will soundly deal with weeds.
> And now? – I sharpen myself, as yet.

The postulates of good work in philosophy say how to improve philosophical research tools – but they do it only in order to make proper use of these tools, namely to acquire some knowledge, to achieve certain philosophical truths.

Of course, one can discover a truth with a "flash of brilliant intuition" or hit it "accidentally". But such truths are not knowledge yet or, in any case, scientific knowledge. As Łukasiewicz put it:

> In order to form a science of set of facts, these facts must be ORDERED; one has to give them some FORM. [...] This is the role of each scientific THEORY [...], which includes laws and hypotheses [...]. A given theory is [...] connected with sentences stating facts by a logical node in such a way that laws and hypotheses are reasons of sentences of facts. [...] Therefore, if one wants to check whether a theory has any scientific value, one needs to deduce consequences from these laws and hypotheses and to compare these consequences with facts, so you need to RATIOCINATE.
>
> ŁUKASIEWICZ 1915: 35–36

Philosophers ratiocinating wrongly put themselves at risk that the theory they propose will fall apart like a house of cards. This also – and maybe even above all – applies to philosophical theories. Let's quote Łukasiewicz again:

> No creative thought, even the most brilliant, has scientific value until it is included in WORDS [...]. Let all [...] scientific creators learn to express their thoughts in words [...] and try to write [...] simply and clearly, with inexorable logical accuracy.
>
> ŁUKASIEWICZ 1912: 32–33

The postulates of good work in philosophy are aimed at ensuring that the way of putting philosophical theories into words has these qualities. Without them, it is easy to fall into the trap of falsehood or irresponsible fantasy.

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