

photograph on the front of this book is, in a way, a double symbol. Firstly, it presents the Lvov philosophical milieu around 1925 when its three main figures were Kazimierz Twardowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Roman Ingarden. Secondly, it reflects the tension between the two approaches to philosophy referred to in the title: "Intuition and Analysis."

A central item of the photograph is the couch on which the three gentlemen are sitting. If we do not respect linguistic purism too much, we could say that they are connected by a common theme, with the word "sofa" sounding similar to "σοφία:" wisdom, reason, *ratio*, that is, in technical terms, anti-irrationalism. However, the ideal of wisdom may be realized differently and these three tensions appear despite general agreement.

Each of the three men is sitting differently: Twardowski and Ingarden have their legs crossed over their ankles; body language experts would perhaps say that they are restraining their "boiling" sensitive emotions. However, in Twardowski, this is paired with self-confidence (legs spread), while in Ingarden – uncertainty (legs joined). Indeed, Ingarden preferred "deep" phenomenology over Twardowski's "small" analysis but could not feel safe near the Lvovian master of clarity.

Ajdukiewicz, relaxed with his legs and arms crossed, distances himself from them both: he is sitting close to his colleague Ingarden but turned sideways, away from him. He looks with respect at his teacher and father-in-law Twardowski, but sits at a "safe" distance from him. Indeed, Ajdukiewicz's "sharp-logical" attitude towards philosophical problems differed both from Ingarden's approach and the "soft-logical" program of Twardowski.

The three philosophers are surrounded by their students; some of them (for instance, Izydora Dąbal, Leopold Blaustein) are also central figures in this book.

The interpersonal and intertextual relations between Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School examined in this book are not only of a historical character. Even now, they may serve all truth-lovers by reminding their own way of dealing with philosophical problems.

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INTUITION and ANALYSIS

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Roman Ingarden and the School
of Kazimierz Twardowski



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EDITED BY
ANNA BROŻEK & JACEK JADACKI



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Publishing review

Prof. Edward Świdorski

Front cover

Micha Duława

The photo on the front cover shows Roman Ingarden (seated 3rd from the left) and Kazimierz Twardowski (5th) surrounded by their students. It was taken in Lvov, in 1925, and comes from the collection of Jacek Jadacki.

Typesetting

Artur Figarski

This volume was prepared partly within the project 2016/23/B/HS1/00684 “Kazimierz Twardowski’s place in Polish culture and European philosophy”, financed by the National Science Centre (Poland).



ISBN 978-83-7886-655-8

First edition

Kraków 2022



**Copernicus
Center
PRESS**

Editor: Copernicus Center Press Sp. z o.o.
pl. Szczepański 8, 31-011 Kraków, Poland
tel. (+48) 12 448 14 12; 500 839 467
e-mail: marketing@ccpress.pl
www.ccpress.pl

Printing and binding: Totem.com.pl Sp. z o.o.

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Preface

In 2020, we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the death of Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century and a leading representative of phenomenology. Ingarden was strongly associated with the Lvov-Warsaw School (hereinafter, briefly: LWS), a school founded by Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov in 1895. Although Ingarden is not considered a member of the School, there are some interesting connections between him and Kazimierz Twardowski, as well as other members of the LWS. Firstly, before Ingarden began his studies under the supervision of Edmund Husserl in Göttingen, he had studied for a year in Lvov under Twardowski. Secondly, in 1933 he got the Chair of Philosophy in Lvov, where Twardowski's students were active at the time. Thirdly, after World War II, Ingarden became close to some of Twardowski's students and colleagues; at the Jagiellonian University he cooperated with Izydora Dąmbska, one of Twardowski's former student and his last assistant. Ingarden also shared a scientific ethos with the LWS, which was probably motivated by common tradition and intellectual origin: both Twardowski and Husserl were students of Franz Brentano.

All these facts form an interesting historical background of the interactions and tensions between Ingarden and the members of the LWS, and, more broadly, between early analytic philosophy and the phenomenology movement. These relations and tensions are explored in this book.

In the "Introduction," the editors of the volume sketch out the general picture of the relations between Ingarden and the members of the LWS. First, the close personal ties between Ingarden and Twardowski as well as his pupils are presented. Second, the research program of the LWS is compared with the program formulated by Ingarden. Both programs involve the use of some specific research methods. It is demonstrated that despite the undoubted differences between the research methods declared and actually applied by Ingarden and by representatives of Twardowski's School, both kinds of methods may be counted as analytical.

Chapter 1 (by Jan Woleński) may be considered an exposition and justification of the counter-thesis: that Ingarden's philosophy was radically opposed to that represented by Twardowski and his students. Thus, there was no possibility of a compromise between both styles of doing philosophy. Both sides, Ingarden as well as members of the LWS, stressed this situation. Yet there are many shorter or longer passages in Ingarden which can be understood as direct or indirect criticism of the LWS, particularly of logic and its role in philosophy. Similarly, some fragments of the writings of the LWS might be interpreted as critical allusions to Ingarden, for instance, concerning *a priori* or intuition as the devices applied in the cognition of the essences.

Contrary to chapter 1, chapter 2 (by Jacek Wojtyśiak) can be considered a "relief" for the view expressed in the "Introduction," however with the proviso that Ingarden developed non-standard methods of analysis. As examples of these methods, the author gives: the analysis of the historical philosophical concepts (e.g., the analysis of the concept of form), which enables Ingarden to clarify and order philosophical terminology; ontological analysis (e.g., the analysis of existence), by means of which Ingarden discerns, in the analyzed entities, the aspects, factors, moments, *etc.* that can be grasped only by means of 'higher order abstraction'; metaphilosophical combinatorial analysis (e.g., the analysis of the possible solutions to the realism-idealism controversy) using which, and drawing on other types of analysis, Ingarden establishes lists of non-contradictory possibilities that correspond to all philosophical positions concerning a given question.

In the "Introduction" and chapters 1 and 2, there are numerous references to Ingarden's metaphilosophical views. Chapter 3 (by Ryszard Kleszcz) also refers to Ingarden's metaphilosophy, beginning with the observation that in his works, we find essential statements regarding the nature of philosophy, its relation to science, or the specificity of its methods. These metaphilosophical remarks were formulated in the systematic works as well as in texts of a fragmentary nature. The author of the chapter provides a comprehensive reconstruction of Ingarden's metaphilosophy, projecting it on the one hand against the background of Brentano's thoughts, and on the other – comparing it with Kotarbiński's views as well as with the main metaphilosophical assumptions of a logical positivist from the Vienna Circle.

Part II of the volume focuses on a comparative analysis of Ingarden and individual representatives of the LWS, emphasizing differences rather than similarities. We used the terms "confrontation" and "convergence" in

the title of this part because, in our opinion, these terms are perfect for describing the historical process that took place in the development of relations between Ingarden and the representatives of the LWS. The starting point was a confrontation, but it was a confrontation between two fractions within one current, namely within that of so-called scientific philosophy. Both fractions strongly emphasized differences between them, especially in the research METHODS used. Over time, however, there has been an ever greater convergence: the gradual alignment of research RESULTS. In our opinion, such a convergence was fostered, among other things, by the fact that the differences in the (methodological) starting points were not as great as the adversaries had thought.

Chapters 4 (by Adam Olech) and 5 (Janusz Maciaszek) concern the opposition: Ingarden *versus* Ajdukiewicz.

In chapter 4, the polemic of Ingarden with Ajdukiewicz is analysed, the subject of which was the meta-epistemological project of the semantic theory of cognition by Ajdukiewicz, on the basis of which he conducted a critique of Rickert's transcendental idealism. The core of this polemic was the dispute over the role of language in cognition and knowledge (understood as the product of the cognitive processes), as well as the dispute over the way of understanding the term "cognition." Two different meta-epistemological concepts clashed in this polemic – the analytical and the phenomenological concept, i.e., the analytical concept understood narrowly and understood broadly. Despite exposing the differences between Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz (as a "pure" analyst), the author is inclined to conclude that phenomenology is also an analytical philosophy, with a broad understanding of analyticity.

The author of chapter 5 is not limited – as the title would suggest – to the juxtaposition of Ingarden's and Ajdukiewicz's conceptions of meaning and to indicating their common inspirations. In this chapter, it is about how these conceptions deal with the problems of contemporary philosophy of language, such as the semantics of empty names, the controversy between millianism and descriptivism over the nature of proper names, the problem of substitutability in intensional contexts, meaning holism, compositionality, and the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. In light of these analyses, the assessment of Ingarden's conceptions (which are the main focus of this chapter) is ambiguous.

Chapters 6 (by Dariusz Łukasiewicz) and 7 (by Wojciech Rechlewicz) are related to each other in so far as, although Ingarden's "partner" in the first chapter is Czeżowski, and in the second chapter – Twardowski, it is

commonly known that Czeżowski was one of the most congenial students and followers of Twardowski.

It is rather obvious that neither Ingarden's nor Czeżowski's doctrines imply any theistic metaphysics containing the thesis on the existence of the personal Absolute. The aim of chapter 6 is to investigate whether these doctrines are in any case compatible with such a classical theism. Such a situation is generally permissible on the basis of the belief shared by Twardowski and his students that (simplifying) philosophical theses and worldview theses are logically independent from each other. The answer to the main question of the chapter requires the reconstruction of two philosophical parts of the doctrines of both philosophers: their conceptions of values and their views on so-called metaphysical cognition. After making such a reconstruction, the author of the chapter comes to the conclusion that the positive answer is more justified than the negative one. This indirectly justifies the opinion that also that Ingarden's and Czeżowski's general views on the philosophy-worldview relationship are also basically similar.

In chapter 7, a certain thread is expanded, already mentioned in the "Introduction," namely concerning Ingarden's reaction to one of Twardowski's program articles: "On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style." Ingarden accepted the postulate to write philosophical works clearly which was issued by Twardowski in this text. He also agreed with Twardowski's statement that unclearness of thoughts results in the work being unclear. However, Ingarden emphasized that considering a given work unclear may result from the reader's lack of the appropriate competences. He also rejected Twardowski's recommendation to give up guessing the thoughts of any author that writes unclearly. Let us add that both of Ingarden's arguments in this discussion had some personal subtexts.

The last two chapters of part II – chapters 8 (by Aleksandra Horecka) and 9 (by Witold Płotka) – are connected not only by the fact that Ingarden is juxtaposed with Blaustein in them. The point is that in these chapters their authors emphasize not the opposition between Ingarden and Blaustein, but mutual influence of these philosophers.

Pursuing the intention to identify these mutual influences on the Ingarden-Blaustein line in terms of aesthetics, and more specifically in their theories of image, the author of chapter 8 begins with a detailed presentation of these theories and the course of how these philosophers exchanged thoughts about their concepts. It turns out that although both philosophers often had similar sources of inspiration, and although, for example,

Blaustein often quoted Ingarden's writings, it is difficult to conclude that he was a continuator of Ingarden's thought.

The author of chapter 9, influences and reinterpretations of Ingarden's philosophy – especially in the theory of consciousness – in Blaustein, comes to similar conclusions. The fact that he was a student of both Twardowski and Ingarden gives some researchers of Blaustein a reason to classify Blaustein as an “analytic phenomenologist,” who combined the tradition of the LWS with phenomenology. The chapter shows the limitations of this classification. It is argued that Blaustein represented rather a psychological trend of the School, and for this reason his use of “strict” analysis was limited.

While part I of the volume has a clearly historical character, and part II can be described mainly as “comparative”, part III is primarily critical. In this part, certain detailed Ingardenian theoretical proposals have been considered according to the standards adopted in analytical philosophy, and in particular in the LWS, or (as in chapter 10) to illuminate the underlying presuppositions in Ingarden's position by drawing on several later examinations of the relevant topics. The critical analysis, carried out in chapters 10 (by Paweł Rojek), 11 (by Jacek Jadacki), and 12 (by Anna Brożek), assumes that these analytical standards may be applied to Ingarden's views, regardless of whether he is aptly considered an analytical philosopher or not.

In chapter 10, the object of criticism is Ingarden's “realistic trope theory,” concerning the ontic status of particular properties and universal ideas. The fundamental objection against such a theory is that according to it, universals are transcendent forms, and such forms, arguably, cannot be true universals. The author argues that Ingarden's theory of universals is, in fact, a kind of “hidden nominalism.” Then he tries to show that although Ingarden's ontology cannot be reinterpreted in a true realistic way, some of its elements might be used to formulate a more appropriate theory.

The criticism provided in chapter 11 is much more radical; in this chapter, four types of ontic subordinations are analyzed, namely: heteronomy, derivativeness, non-self-reliance and dependency; they constitute the key cell of Ingardenian ontology. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the concepts constructed by Ingarden are either logically incorrect, or are not sufficiently explained, or refer not to ontic but to semantic relations. The criticism contained in this chapter is “negatively” destructive, i.e., the author does not propose a “positive” correction of Ingarden's solutions.

It is different in chapter 12, in which Ingarden's conception of an ontic category and the essence of music composition is criticized internally (from the point of view of Ingarden's own assumptions) and externally (when the very assumptions are revised). Ingarden bases his investigations on the elitist analytic corpus (he considers only outstanding works of Western Music) and employs liberal ontological assumptions (he allows many different categories of objects). With these assumptions in place, Ingarden reaches his solution, namely that the work of music is a schematic, purely intentional object. This seems optimal. The perspective changes if we go beyond the elitist corpus or accept more restrictive ontological assumptions.

We believe that three parts of this book do justice (to use one of Ingarden's favourite words) to his "analytical" successes and failures.

Perhaps many readers would point out that in the "Ingarden trial" only "analytical" prosecutors participate, and there are no "phenomenological" defenders; it is difficult in such a "trial" to obtain an objective judge's verdict. We have two excuses. The first is of a "personal" nature: it is not easy to find defenders of phenomenology willing to appear in a trial in which analysts "accuse;" this lack is partially weakened by the fact two of our authors are genetically connected with Ingarden as students of his students: Jacek Wojtysiak (PhD supervised by one of Ingarden's successors: Antoni B. Sępień) and Paweł Rojek (his "Ingardenian" line of PhD supervisors includes Jacek Szymura and Michał Hempoliński; he also worked under two "half-Ingardenians": Władysław Stróżewski and Jerzy Perzanowski). The second excuse is of a "technical" nature: while analytical tools are rich enough to analyze phenomenological methods and results, phenomenological tools do not have such technical "power;" it is symptomatic that Ingarden himself, when he entered into polemics with his analytic partners, transformed himself *nolens volens* into an analyst.

The work is largely historical in nature. Therefore, in the bibliographies for individual chapters, we give as indicators the dates of the first original editions of individual texts (with the exception of ancient ones), as it is important for tracing the filiation of ideas between authors. If we use quotations from existing English translations, we identify them in the bibliographic description by the publication dates of these translation.

Anna Brożek & Jacek Jadacki.
Warsaw, 14.06.2021.

Anna Brożek & Jacek Jadacki

Introduction

Interpersonal and Intertextual Relations between Roman Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School

*It is a valuable property of the effort of human minds
that even if they focus on different aims and in different disciplines
they encounter the same or related problems,
they reach the same or similar results,
which support each other,
and perhaps verify each other in a way.*

Izydora Dąmbska (1976)

Among the students of Franz Brentano, an outstanding “teacher of philosophers” were Kazimierz Twardowski – the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, and Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. Roman Ingarden was a student of both Twardowski and Husserl, and thus a scientific “double grandson” of Brentano. Moreover, Ingarden, throughout his scientific career, kept in touch with Twardowski’s circles and those of Husserl. And yet, despite this coexistence with the LWS, and despite the common “Viennese” roots, Ingarden was never considered a member of Twardowski’s School, nor did he ever “officially” join it.

There are two kinds of reasons for this. Firstly, the complicated personal and social relations between Ingarden and LWS members were a factor. Secondly, there were certain “program” differences between Ingarden and Twardowski and his students, related to the general methodological attitude and the methods applied in philosophical research.

Personal animosities are a historical fact which a historian of philosophy can only regret, as they certainly hampered positive cooperation between Ingarden and some members of the LWS. On the other hand, the methodological differences do not seem, from today's point of view, as deep as they seemed a hundred years ago. It turns out that certain common points in Ingarden's and the LWS's methodological programs allowed for productive intellectual contact between them.

The first part of this presentation of the Ingarden-LWS relationship is devoted to interpersonal relations, which we reconstruct mainly on the basis of preserved correspondence. The second part concerns the intertextual – and therefore substantive – relations between Ingarden and the LWS, and their main focus on methodological matters.

1. Interpersonal relations

1.1. The dignity of the university and human passions

Entering the main entrance to the building of the University of Warsaw Library today, one passes a colonnade of philosophers; the tops of four huge columns are concrete statues of four of the most significant members of the LWS: Kazimierz Twardowski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski and Alfred Tarski.

At the *Collegium Novum* of the Jagiellonian University there is a “lonely” plaque devoted to Roman Ingarden, with an eloquent caption: “Roman Ingarden, professor of the Jan Kazimierz University and the Jagiellonian University, philosopher and scientist, in whose life and works truth and responsibility found their shape.”

Both the statues of the Lvov-Warsaw philosophers and the plaque devoted to Ingarden in Cracow convincingly express the dignity of the university, which was undoubtedly personified by the figures to whom these artifacts were dedicated. But one would be wrong to take this dignity for impassivity. Analysis of the documents preserved in Ingarden's archives and those of LWS members (as well as their publications) shows that the environment was boiling with passion.

The beginnings of the LWS date back to 1895, when Twardowski, a young private lecturer at the University of Vienna, came to Lvov to take the chair of philosophy there. Soon, he began to give regular university lectures



"The dignity of the University."¹

The Colonnade of Philosophers
at the University of Warsaw Library.
From the left: Kazimierz Twardowski,
Jan Łukasiewicz, Alfred Tarski,
and Stanisław Leśniewski

Plaque dedicated to Roman Ingarden
in *Collegium Novum*
at the Jagiellonian University.

in all philosophical disciplines, and also founded a seminar in which he introduced his students to independent work. Twardowski was a charismatic teacher; he also found a large number of very gifted students in Lvov whom he could infect with a philosophical passion. A few years after arriving in Lvov, the first doctorates were written under the Twardowski's supervision – by Piotr Pręgowski (1900), Władysław Witwicki (1901) and Jan Łukasiewicz (1902), and ten years later, in the “golden year” of 1912, by Stanisław Leśniewski, Stefan Baley, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz.

Twardowski studied in Vienna under Franz Brentano, whose style and method of practicing philosophy he decided to plant in Polish soil. Twardowski took over psychologism from his Viennese teacher: the belief that

¹ This is an allusion to Twardowski's text “On the Dignity of the University” (Twardowski 1933).

descriptive psychology, i.e. the psychology based on a detailed description of psychological phenomena, is a fundamental philosophical discipline. However, from the very beginning, Twardowski considered logic to be the second pillar of philosophy. It is also significant that the first two of Twardowski's aforementioned PhD students, Witwicki and Łukasiewicz, specialized in psychology (the first) and logic (the second). The problems that Twardowski brought to Lvov and that he offered to his students were interdisciplinary. Thus, the Twardowski's School studied representations and judgments and their relationship with speech, the processes of reasoning and their logical representations; they undertook the theory of the object in relation to its linguistic expression. Probably due to this "interdisciplinary tendency" of Twardowski himself, his students undertook research in many different areas of philosophy. Moreover, the common elements of their studies were not some theses but some methodological assumptions. (cf. part 2).

Twardowski was a professor of philosophy in Lvov for thirty-five years. At that time, he supervised dozens of outstanding students; he also became the main pillar of the philosophical movement on Polish soil, and after 1918, in the reborn Poland. In the second decade of the twentieth century, four of Twardowski's above-mentioned students, Witwicki, Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, and Kotarbiński, as well as Władysław Tatarkiewicz, recognized as a member of the School (although not being a student of Twardowski), became heads of departments at the University of Warsaw. Thus, the Twardowski's School obtained its second, Warsaw branch. In the interwar period, Twardowski's disciples also showed up at university departments in Cracow and Vilna, and after World War II and the border change, also in Poznań, Łódź, and Wrocław.

Several currents can be distinguished in the extensive community of Twardowski's students. The first of them is a psychological trend, co-created in Lvov by Twardowski and Witwicki (before leaving for Warsaw), joined, among others, by Stefan Błachowski, Stefan Baley, Leopold Blaustein (Witwicki and Baley had later their chairs in Warsaw, and Błachowski in Poznań). Descriptive psychology was practiced in this trend, with an emphasis on the precise formulation of statements and the humanistic aspect of research. An experimental psychology laboratory was also established in Lvov. In turn, Łukasiewicz, along with the slightly younger Leśniewski, initiated the logical and mathematical branch. Their taking over departments in Warsaw initiated the famous Warsaw School of Logic, the results of which – multi-valued logics and metalogical studies by Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski's systems,

Tarski's semantics, *etc.* – soon became known throughout the world of logic. It should be emphasized that although some members of the LWS practiced “pure” psychology and logic, they primarily applied various tools for philosophical problems, where psychological tools were gradually replaced by semiotics.

There were also philosophers in the Twardowski's School who are difficult to assign entirely to one of the aforementioned branches. Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Czeżowski (PhD under Twardowski in 1914) certainly belong here, and to some extent also Kotarbiński.

Ingarden came into contact with the circles created by Twardowski when he began his studies in philosophy in Lvov in the academic year 1911/1912. At that time, Leśniewski, Kotarbiński and Ajdukiewicz were also studying in Lvov. For one academic year, Ingarden attended lectures by Twardowski and Łukasiewicz (who, after receiving his habilitation, was a Privatdozent in Lvov). According to Ingarden², the subject of Twardowski's lecture was introduction to philosophy, and Łukasiewicz's lectures concerned Aristotle's logic³ and modern epistemology. Ingarden did not like these lectures, mainly because they were... too elementary, and the “academic regime” of Twardowski excluded the participation of students in higher courses without passing the lower courses. In this situation, Twardowski – who had apparently learned of the young Ingarden's talent – advised him to go to Göttingen, where there was no such “regime.” Ingarden found himself there in the next academic year and soon became a student of Husserl, who became his philosophical mentor.

The impression that Husserl made on Ingarden must have resembled the impression that Brentano had made on Twardowski – and as a consequence Ingarden decided to “instill” in Poland his thought and method of philosophizing, as Twardowski had previously decided to do with the thought and method of Brentano. After returning to Poland, however, neither the implementation of this goal nor Ingarden's scientific career in general went as he expected.

Ingarden received his PhD under Husserl in 1918 and his habilitation in Lvov in 1924; however, he did not get the chair of philosophy in Lvov

² We provide this reservation because there is no introduction to philosophy on the list of Twardowski's lectures which we know from that year.

³ His important dissertation *On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle* had just been published a year before (Łukasiewicz 1910).

until 1933. For almost twenty years he had to carry out scientific work while working as a junior high school teacher. Although this was a normal career path for many of Twardowski's students (e.g. Zygmunt Zawirski, who defended his doctorate in 1906 and received the chair only in 1928, previously also served as a junior high school teacher; Bronisław Bandrowski, Izydora Dąmbaska, *etc.*, were secondary school teachers for many years), it was the ambitious Ingarden who experienced this long period of waiting for the appointment as personal harassment. Similarly, he attributed the fact that he could not find enthusiasts of phenomenology in Poland for a long time to the reluctance on the part of Twardowski's *milieu* – reluctance rooted in “blind” ignorance.



Roman Ingarden with a portrait of Edmund Husserl in the background.

The picture somehow symbolizes the fact that Husserl was the point of reference for Ingarden's views.

World War II marked the end of Ingarden's five-year work at the chair of philosophy in Lvov and took away jobs from all of Twardowski's students (he himself died in 1938 and, fortunately, did not see the tragic end of the Lvov philosophical center, which he had been building with such difficulty). Not only the course of the war, but also its end was tragic for Poland: the shifting of the borders to the west by the decision of the victorious Big Three (Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin) and putting Poland under the authority of the communist party and Soviet guardianship.

During World War II, some LWS members died and others emigrated. The survivors had to face a new reality. The official ideology of Polish universities was Marxism-Leninism. Many LWS members were forced to teach exclusively “neutral” logic, and others (including Tatarkiewicz, Dąmbska, Maria and Stanisław Ossowskis) were removed from university positions altogether at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s.

Initially, right after the war, Ingarden received the chair of philosophy at the Jagiellonian University. Soon, however, he was also hit by repressions and recognized by the ideological agencies of the communist party as an idealistic philosopher and “enemy of the party” to the same extent as the aforementioned LWS members. He was removed from teaching in 1950-1957. Unexpectedly, Ingarden found himself on the same side of the barricade as at least some of Twardowski’s heirs. Ingarden regained the chair in 1957 and remained a professor of philosophy at the Jagiellonian University until 1962, when he retired. During this period, the faculty of philosophy at the Jagiellonian University was also given over to Dąmbska – Twardowski’s student and his last assistant. The successful scientific cooperation, and soon also the personal friendship between Ingarden and Dąmbska, is a testimony to a “convergence of positions” towards the post-war reality.

It is worth noting that Ingarden was head of university’s departments of philosophy for a total of fifteen years: first for five years in Lvov, then for a total of ten years in Cracow. Of these, however, the first five years ended with a war, the second four years passed in the political uncertainty of the post-war period, and the final six years, with increasing ideological pressure and deliberate administrative difficulties on the part of the authorities. Could it be possible to create a school similar to Twardowski’s School from the “most reactionary, clerical elements” gathered around Ingarden, as the communist supervisors of the Jagiellonian University at the time called it? Twardowski was head of department from 1895 to 1930, a total of thirty five years. Both during the “Austrian” the and “Polish” Lvov period, he was esteemed by the authorities; virtually the entire Polish scientific community respected him.

And yet, in our opinion, one can and should talk about the Ingarden's School, and its members should perhaps be called “Ingardenists” (similarly as it is said, for example, about Twardowski’s disciples, that they were Twardowskianists). The PhDs he promoted were certainly Ingardenists: Jan Leszczyński (1948), Maria Gołaszewska (1956), Michał Hempoliński (1961), Janina Makota (1962), Fr. Józef Tischner (1963), Andrzej Półtawski

(1964) and Adam Węgrzecki (1967)⁴. To some extent, philosophers whose habilitation theses were co-reviewed by Ingarden were also Ingardenists, such as Zdzisław Augustynek (habilitation 1962), Danuta Gierulanka (1962), and the present nestors of Polish philosophy: Antoni B. Stępień (habilitation 1964) and Władysław Stróżewski (habilitation 1968).

The awareness that the “spirit of the LWS” penetrated into the Ingarden's School is evidenced, i.a. by a recent statement by Stróżewski:

I do not feel I was a student of the Lvov-Warsaw School, and yet thanks to reading the texts of the philosophers who came from there, and through my personal contact with Prof. Dąmbska, I consider myself a man steeped in that spirit – especially when it comes to such matters as clarity of thinking and speaking [and] precise language (Stróżewski 2016, pp. 265-266).

Jerzy Perzanowski was a figure shaped as much by the spirit of the LWS, represented by Izydora Dąmbska, as by Ingarden's philosophy. The future historian of the LWS, Jan Woleński, also participated in Ingarden's classes. Unlike Perzanowski, however, he clearly distanced himself from Ingarden⁵.

Some say in general that it was the infiltration of this spirit of the LWS – and especially the “clarity tendency” present in Twardowski – that made Ingarden's philosophical style over time more and more “clear:” much clearer than the philosophical style of most other phenomenologists.

1.2. Twardowski on Ingarden

Ingarden's abandonment of studies in Lvov did not interrupt Ingarden's contacts with Twardowski: they continued, with varying intensity, until the

⁴ Ingarden was also the supervisor of Jan Pawlica's doctorate (1963); Pawlica was the only one of his PhD students to betray both the scientific and civic ideals of Ingardenism.

⁵ “I was not very attracted to his philosophy” (Woleński 2020, p. 322) – he confessed recently. It is significant, however, that although when asked to what extent he was influenced by Ingarden, he replied: “Medium.” He then indicated ... three (important!) Ingarden inspirations: “I liked his concept of formal ontology very much. [...] Moreover, I applied the stratified concept of a literary work to analyze opera as a musical work. I was also inspired by Ingarden's criticism of the empiricist concept of meaning (Woleński 2020, p. 323). Woleński is not among the contributors of *Philosophical Sketches* as a gift to Roman Ingarden (Żarnecka (ed.) 1964), but he was a member of their Editorial Committee.

latter's death. They had social, organizational, academic, and scientific contact – varied and intertwining.

The preserved correspondence between Ingarden and Twardowski from the beginning of the 1920s proves that Twardowski in some way “supervised” Ingarden's preparation for his habilitation. In the end, Ingarden's habilitation dissertation took the title “On Essential Questions” (Ingarden 1925). As part of the aforementioned “supervision,” Twardowski prepared (let us add – a masterful and approved of by the author) summary of this dissertation, which he presented at a meeting of the Scientific Society in Lvov in 1924, which was one of the requirements of the habilitation “procedure.” Ingarden was aware of the role of Twardowski in bringing his habilitation thesis to a happy end. In a letter of March 20, 1925, he wrote to him:

The thing [...] which I am the most thankful for [...] is the kindness shown to me by the Dear Professor, and the cordial spirit of his whole relationship towards me. I greatly appreciate this spirit (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 325).

In addition, the active role that Twardowski played in Ingarden's habilitation “surprised” Twardowski's Warsaw students, who were prejudiced against phenomenology (cf. Ingarden 1999, p. 191).

The combination of various, sometimes not entirely clear, circumstances meant that Ingarden received the chair of philosophy only in 1933 – after the resignation of Mściśław Wartenberg, the second most important professor of philosophy, after Twardowski, at the University of Lvov at that time. Among these circumstances, there were Twardowski's efforts to ensure that Ingarden's assumption of the chair would not interfere with the academic career in Lvov of Ajdukiewicz, one of Twardowski's favorite students (and let us add – his beloved son-in-law), and the intrigues of Leon Chwistek, a Cracow philosopher who at that time held the chair of mathematical logic at the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences of the University of Lvov, who himself hoped to receive the post-Wartenberg position.

Additionally, character clashes, perhaps intensified by ambitious questions, were probably significant for these unpleasant perturbations.

Twardowski was angry with some of Ingarden's habits. The reasons for his emotions in this regard were scrupulously noted in his *Diary*:

October 17, 1930. I have long been irritated by the unceremonious way he joins me when I walk out of the university with someone else. [...] He acts as if there were no doubts that his company must always be desirable for everyone. Well, I undoubtedly like to talk to him, but only when talking to him does not interfere with my conversation with someone else (Twardowski 1997, p. 166).

February 16, 1934. Ingarden was at my place to talk about the telephone in my room, paid for by his seminar department. The conversation [was] very unpleasant at times, as was the fact that Ingarden raised the matter in general. In purely formal terms, it is, to be sure, perfectly fine. But apart from the formal one, there are also other aspects. I couldn't help but let Ingarden know it (Twardowski 1997, p. 329).

May 29, 1934. I found out [from Ajdukiewicz] about Ingarden's behavior regarding his MA exams, which again proves his lack of delicacy, and even decency. This is not the first example of this kind (Twardowski 1997, p. 343).

Secondly, it irritated Twardowski that he was not an "absolute" authority on scientific matters for Ingarden. The fact that Ingarden preferred the "dark" Husserl to his own bright lectures certainly did not appeal to the Lvov professor. In addition, Ingarden "dared" to publicly criticize the scientific texts of Twardowski himself, such as the article "On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style" (Twardowski 1919/1920), which was, incidentally, accurate criticism, as Twardowski himself had to admit indirectly in one of his letters, or papers by students he appreciated, such as Tadeusz Witwicki (cf. Twardowski 1997, p. 342).

These personal animosities were probably the main reason for the often unfair appraisal of Ingarden's scientific work. Admittedly, this was not publicly articulated by Twardowski. In general, Twardowski did not disregard the direction which Ingarden had taken. He wrote, i.a.:

Since phenomenology [...] is now gaining more and more influence worldwide, and not only in the philosophical sciences, and because phenomenology claims to provide the basis for all sciences, it seems useful to critically examine its theoretical foundations (Twardowski 1927, p. 273).

Meanwhile, in works published during Twardowski's lifetime, there is no mention of Ingarden. In his *Diary*, on the other hand, there is a negative

– and often tinged with a bitter “negative” satisfaction – tone of opinions expressed about Ingarden:

June 11, 1929. Wartenberg is of the opinion that, although Ingarden meets the conditions [of taking the chair after Twardowski] in terms of science, he is very unclear in what he writes and lectures. I confirmed this view (Twardowski 1997, pp. 76-77).

October 18, 1929. Ingarden’s lecture in the Polish Philosophical Society „On Functional Names and Expressions.” Weak; animated discussion. Kazik [*scil.* Ajdukiewicz] noted that the lecture did not bring anything new (Twardowski 1997, p. 96).

January 16, 1931. [Ajdukiewicz] asked me what I would do if I had to decide for myself on the selection of a candidate [after my departure]. I replied immediately that I would try as hard as I could to bring Władysław Witwicki to Lvov. Ajdukiewicz replied: “But Witwicki is so naive in philosophical matters; look what he wrote in his *Psychology!*” I replied: “But he would fertilize the minds here, animate, move and encourage the youth to philosophy, and Ingarden will deter them from it!” (Twardowski 1997, p. 188).

The prospect of Ingarden taking over the chair after him, which did not ultimately come to pass, as well as the subsequent takeover after Wartenberg, was even understood by Twardowski as some kind of personal defeat in his life. He confided in his *Diaries*, somewhat mysteriously:

January 16, 1931. [At the meeting of the Faculty’s Philosophical Commission] regarding filling the position, which had opened up because of my retirement, [...] an event occurred [...] which was very significant in my life, and filled me with a sense of a certain tragedy. [...] [It looks like] Ingarden will take over the chair “after me.” I do not want to write about it – what I said above, that I feel tragic in my soul, is enough! (Twardowski 1997, p. 188).

December 12, 1933. Ingarden [...] told me that his appointment as associate professor of philosophy had already arrived from Warsaw: he had succeeded Wartenberg. This appointment fills me with various reflections. [...] But it is better not to write about all this (Twardowski, 1997, p. 317).

All these animosities did not prevent Twardowski and Ingarden from maintaining relatively close social contacts or cooperation in some fields. Ingarden often visited the Twardowskis and also met at mutual friends’

houses, at dinners in the George Hotel in Lvov, for coffee in the famous “Szkocka” cafe (but also in Warsaw cafes when they were both in the capital). It also happened that Twardowski stayed at Ingarden’s outside of Lvov (e.g. Lublin, where Ingarden was working in a certain period).

Two other natural meeting places, not only of a scientific nature, were the meeting room of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov (where Ingarden headed the Epistemology Section for a long time) and, naturally, the seat of the university. In 1932, a new plane emerged: Ingarden initiated the publication by the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov of a periodical intended for foreigners, which eventually assumed the title *Studia Philosophica*. Twardowski and Ajdukiewicz supported this initiative and joined the editorial board with Ingarden. Editorial work, as it turned out, was very absorbing for the three of them, and also “consolidating.”

1.3. Ingarden on Twardowski

It must be acknowledged that what Ingarden said about Twardowski is marked by the pursuit of what he himself called “doing justice” (to the assessed thinkers). This is most clearly visible in his speech at Twardowski’s Funeral Ceremony held in Lvov two months after his death.

Ingarden was, first of all, far from accepting the stereotype which was already widespread during Twardowski’s lifetime, even among his direct students, that the main contribution of Twardowski concerned not philosophy, but rather teaching it. Naturally, this does not mean that Ingarden did not appreciate Twardowski’s teaching achievements. He perceived the essence of this last output as follows:

In a generation of Polish philosophers younger than himself, as well as in the general consciousness of an enlightened society, he managed to form a vivid and lasting conviction that PHILOSOPHY CAN AND SHOULD BE CULTIVATED IN AN INTELLECTUALLY AND MORALLY RESPONSIBLE WAY, and that such philosophizing CAN AND MUST HAVE A GREAT INFLUENCE ON HUMAN LIFE (Ingarden 1938, p. 265).

Ingarden saw Twardowski’s main achievements, however, in his philosophical achievements, not in teaching. The impression that Twardowski’s scientific achievements were poor was, according to Ingarden, due to the

fact that knowledge about these achievements was at that time very irregular:

What can be said today about the philosophical achievements of Prof. Twardowski and his role in the historical process [of the development of philosophy] must be incomplete and in many respects hypothetical. A significant part of Twardowski's scientific achievements has not yet been published. The legacy of his manuscripts includes nearly one hundred smaller treatises and articles, and several dozen extensive booklets of lecture notes, known only to those who once had the opportunity to listen to them (Ingarden 1938: pp. 253-254).

The gradual publication of Twardowski's legacy, which started after World War II and has been more intense lately, fully confirmed Ingarden's diagnosis: that Twardowski "was not an imitator or copier," but "was a pioneer in a number of problems" (Ingarden 1938, p. 261).

However, the assessment made in Ingarden's aforementioned speech on the basis of Twardowski's publications from before 1938, primarily his habilitation thesis, was very positive, although he located its value differently from where others generally have for many years:

We usually hear that the most important merit [...] of [Twardowski's habilitation thesis] is distinguishing between the act, the content, and the object of the presentation. [...] Twardowski is clearly influenced by Kerry and Robert Zimmermann [...]. Therefore, it can be said that Twardowski only generalized the discussed distinction and justified it more deeply [...]. It is not so much [...] in the exact distinction of the content and object of the presentation, but in certain statements made in relation to it, where the importance of the part of the book in question is revealed.

The first is that there are no pointless presentations. [...] According to the second, there is a NECESSARY relationship between the presentation and its object. [...]

However, Twardowski's considerations on [...] the formal structure of the object are much more significant than the distinction between the content and the object of the presentation. [...] As far as I know – since the times of scholasticism and then the *Ontology* by Christian Wolff – this has been the first consistently developed and solid theoretical whole constituting a theory of the object. [...]

Twardowski's theory [...] pushed forward new research in this field (Ingarden 1938, pp. 256-258, 260-261).

Ingarden mentions Leśniewski's theory of object and Kotarbiński's realistic conception as examples of such research coming from certain difficulties that arise from Twardowski's conception.

It is very interesting that, according to Ingarden, Twardowski, when constructing his conception of the object, used a quasi-phenomenological method – before Husserl, and thus, independently of him. It is worth quoting Ingarden in this matter, as he was Husserl's disciple after all, and he devoted a great deal of attention to him until his death:

Twardowski analyzes experiences and their objective counterparts, not caring about extra-phenomenal or other external causes or their physiological conditioning. Consciously excluding these matters from the scope of his research, he takes a neutral stance towards the metaphysical problem of the existence of the world, and at the same time is convinced that the results of his psychological analyses are independent of the solution to this problem. When this peculiar way of studying experiences was later duly realized and methodically developed by other scholars, it finally took the form of phenomenology (Ingarden 1938, p. 259).

A proof of his high esteem for *Zur Lehre...*, and Twardowski in general, was Ingarden's post-war initiative to publish a Polish translation of this book. He wrote in a letter of October 31, 1947, to Izydora Dąmbska:

Would you undertake translating Twardowski's *Inhalt und Gegenstand* into Polish? I raised the problem of the re-publication of this book at the Board of the Polish Philosophical Society. I even stated that I was ready to translate it myself, but I was so overwhelmed with work that it would take a long time for me. What happened to the translation that you and your colleagues did several years before the war? Is it lost or perchance, do some of you have it? Perhaps it could be adjusted? (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, pp. 169-170).

However, the presentation of Ingarden's assessment of Twardowski would be incomplete if we ignored a little-known text that Ingarden wrote about Twardowski during his lifetime – on the occasion of awarding him

the scientific award of the city of Łódź. First, Ingarden reconstructs Twardowski's program (the emphasis comes from Ingarden):

[Prof. Twardowski's publications] are only MONOGRAPHS ON narrow DETAILED TOPICS. This is not a coincidence, but merely the external result of the researcher's conscious will. In resolute opposition to the creators of extensive philosophical systems, Twardowski wanted to present only treatises on clearly delimited, one might say – ISOLATED problems, consciously putting aside large, but not clear, theoretical complexes. The will to obtain the greatest possible clarity of research, as well as scientific responsibility for every statement made, is at the fore in all his scientific and pedagogical activities. It manifests itself positively, above all, in the concern to create precisely formulated concepts, in making subtle linguistic and factual distinctions, in an effort to ensure that the utterances are unambiguous and strictly justified. On the other hand, it is expressed negatively in the rejection of all vague theories and concepts, in the exclusion of all unsolved questions from philosophical research, or at least in temporarily refraining from working out problems for which there is no sufficient basis for solving in the current scientific results. The rejection of all metaphysics, the removal of traditional epistemological problems and the tightening of philosophical research almost exclusively to the detailed problems of descriptive psychology, logic (or semantics) and the general theory of the object go hand in hand with all this (Ingarden 1936b).

He continues to (respectfully) criticize this program, and especially, so to speak, the distortions of this program on the part of some of Twardowski's students:

It should be emphasized that [...] eliminating [...] the fundamental problems constituting the nerve of philosophical inquiries, treating the problems in isolation while losing sight of the extensive connections between problems, propagated as a permanent method of proceeding in philosophy, covered up [...] a certain danger for the further development of research as evidenced quite clearly by the vicissitudes of Polish philosophy. Where, as in logic or psychology, it is possible to work on at least some problems in isolation, results were obtained in the circles of Prof. Twardowski's students, undoubtedly valuable and noteworthy ones; while the problems important for philosophy were pushed more and more into the shadows over the years, until the theory

was even developed that these are “apparent problems,” or “meaningless problems” (Ingarden 1936b).

It may be assumed that Ingarden meant here, i.a. Łukasiewicz’s program of the “logicization” of philosophy (supported, among others, by Łukasiewicz’s students: Jan Drewnowski and Fr. Jan Salamucha), the program of “philosophical synthesis” by Zygmunt Zawirski, and the program of the “dehipostasis” of philosophy and even of the entire humanities formulated by Kotarbiński. Ten years earlier, had Ingarden argued against Kotarbiński’s views on what was called “internal experience” (cf. Kotarbiński 1922 and Ingarden 1922) and wrote with clear disapproval about Kotarbiński’s program in relation to, for example, psychology:

Prof. Kotarbiński believes that any psychological description can be “reduced” to a “sensual” description, in other words, if you prefer, to a description of the external world” (Ingarden 1922, p. 522).

The general assessment of Twardowski’s position in European and Polish philosophy was positive despite Ingarden’s lack of acceptance of the postulate of practicing, as Kotarbiński said, “little philosophy,” rather than creating, as Józef M. Bocheński stated in turn, “all-encompassing syntheses,” and thus, despite the objection of avoiding “basic problems:”

The solutions [...] presented by [...] [Twardowski] were often a stimulus for further research by a number of Polish and foreign scientists (especially from the Austrian School – i.e. Brentano’s students), although it is true that the research of these scientists later brought results sometimes going much further and often radically different from the claims of Prof. Twardowski. [...]

However, regardless of whether we agree with his main claims, whether we adhere to his philosophizing methods, or whether we would like to direct them to a different path, we must all confess that if it were not for [...] the forty years of persistent and eager intellectual work of Prof. Twardowski, the face of Polish philosophy would look quite different today (Ingarden 1936b).

It is amazing that having thus praised Twardowski’s contributions to philosophical minimalism – Ingarden reached the point where thirty years later he refused Twardowski the name of a “philosopher” at all, saying:

Twardowski [...] in fact was a descriptive psychologist throughout his life, although he considered himself a philosopher (Ingarden 1967, p. 194).

In fact, it is difficult to justify the view that Twardowski's works such as the dissertation "On So-Called Relative Truths" (Twardowski 1900), or such valuable short works as "What Does 'experimental' Mean?" (Twardowski 1912), "What Does 'Physical' Mean?" (Twardowski 1919/1920), "Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia" (Twardowski 1921) or "*A priori*, or Rational... Sciences *etc.*" (Twardowski 1923), printed during his lifetime, belong to descriptive psychology, not to mention numerous unpublished works. On the other hand, Twardowski himself most rightly described the treatise "Actions and Products" (Twardowski 1912a) as works FROM THE BORDERLINE of psychology and other disciplines. Another thing is that elsewhere, when discussing the content of *Zur Lehre ...*, he wrote that this work "stimulates thinking about, perhaps, the most difficult problems of ontology" and that "it is not 'psychological' at all". (Ingarden 1966: 35).

The fact that Ingarden was the only philosopher from outside the LWS who joined the Editorial Committee appointed to publish the writings of the Lvov professor (Twardowski 1965) is also a kind of symbol of Ingarden's "mature" attitude to Twardowski.

1.4. Twardowski's students on Ingarden

When we wrote above about the animosities between Ingarden and the LWS, we meant primarily the Warsaw, logical branch of the School from the interwar period, namely, in particular: Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, and Kotarbiński. Their disrespectful attitude towards Ingarden was expressed in ignoring his *oeuvre*: in publications and even in correspondence with Twardowski, rather than in public remarks.

The situation was different in the case of other LWS members.

Zawirski, for example, in the unfinished, and unpublished, *Philosophical Dictionary* (the incomplete manuscript of which is in the Twardowski Archives in Warsaw) included an entry devoted to Ingarden, in which he wrote, among other things:

Ingarden [...] is the most prominent representative of Husserl's phenomenological position in Poland, also appreciated in Germany; he does not,

however, approve of the change that took place in Husserl's position by coming closer to neo-Kantianism. He fought effectively against the neo-positivism of the Vienna Circle at the International Philosophy Congress in Prague in 1934, forcing his opponents to be more precise in their thoughts⁶ (Zawirski *Ined.*).

Especially after World War II, Tatarkiewicz considered himself Ingarden's friend. He wrote in "Notes to Autobiography:"

I was friends [...] with my peers: [including] the philosophers – [...] Ingarden, Florian Znaniecki, and Czesław Znamierowski (Tatarkiewicz 1969, p. 174).

In 1958, Roman Ingarden and I had a beautiful trip by car: Venice – Ravenna – Urbino – Orvieto – Viterbo – Rome (Tatarkiewicz 1979, p. 170).

Błachowski, who stayed with Ingarden while studying in Göttingen, wrote to Twardowski in a letter of May 7, 1912:

He is in my opinion – very intelligent, and he is also extremely diligent, so the future looks good for him.



In the first row, from the left: Jan Łukasiewicz (3), Kazimierz Twardowski (4), and Władysław Witwicki (5). In the second row, from the left: Zygmunt Zawirski (4) and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (6). On the third row, from the left: Roman Ingarden (1).

⁶ Cf. (Ingarden 1934).

Czeżowski's assessment was equally high:

I was lucky that among my peers and colleagues there were many who often surpassed me in their abilities, knowledge and achievements, and from whom I could draw a lot of mental stimulation: Kotarbiński, Tatarkiewicz, Leśniewski, Ajdukiewicz, Ingarden, Znamierowski, and many others. I am deeply grateful to them for that (Czeżowski 1977, p. 439).

It is worth adding that the personal relations between Czeżowski and Ingarden must have been more than civil after World War II, since several times (in 1953 and 1954) during his visits in Cracow, Czeżowski was staying in the Ingardens' apartment.

Ajdukiewicz assessed Ingarden in a more cautious but deeper way. They met in Lvov, and later also in Göttingen, where the former was particularly influenced by Hilbert, and the latter, of course, by Husserl. Their personal relationships were close, even friendly after the Göttingen era. Ingarden wrote in a letter from April 6, 1920, to Twardowski:

I made friends once [in Göttingen] with Ajdukiewicz (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 179).

Later, Ingarden was a guest in the Lvov apartment of the Ajdukiewicz family; sometimes they went on holiday trips together.

However, Ajdukiewicz spoke with great restraint about Ingarden's scientific achievements. Even before World War II, Ajdukiewicz wrote about Ingarden's *Das literarische Kunstwerk*:

Important works by phenomenologists in [...] the [humanities] include a book by a Polish author, [...] Ingarden [...], one of Husserl's most outstanding students, devoted to the phenomenological analysis of the literary work. This book gained great fame in Poland and beyond and had a significant impact on works in the field of literature theory and criticism (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 254).

He considered Ingarden to be "one of the most outstanding students of Husserl," but it does not follow from this assessment that he definitely considered him an outstanding philosopher. *Das literarische Kunstwerk* "gained

a lot of fame” and “had a significant impact,” but that does not necessarily mean that he considered it a well-deserved fame – and a positive impact⁷.

The representatives of the LWS half a generation younger had a decidedly positive opinion of Ingarden.

Fr. Bocheński wrote directly that for him Ingarden is “the most outstanding thinker that Poland has produced so far” (Bocheński 1993, p. 101)⁸. He noted with satisfaction Ingarden’s reaction to the enunciations of the members of the Vienna Circle at the Philosophical Congress in Prague, also mentioned by Zawirski, describing in more detail what Ingarden’s “anti-Viennese” argument was:

Unlike others, who usually kept their heads down when they saw the mathematical armor of the Viennese, Ingarden attacked them frontally, namely by sharply criticizing one of their fundamental propositions that a sentence for which there is no method of verifying is meaningless. His reasoning was simple. You say that a sentence for which there is no method of verifying is meaningless. But what you are saying is that sentence. So what you say is meaningless. I was in the room during the almost two-hour discussion and saw with satisfaction that the Viennese had not come up with any remarkable answer. By the way, it was relatively easy to answer, using the distinction between language and metalanguage. But Tarski’s epochal work, introducing this distinction, was not published in German until a year later, and the Viennese did not know it (Bocheński 1993, p. 101).

Similarly, Fr. Jan Salamucha had earlier appreciated Ingarden’s criticism of neo-positivism.

Prof. Ingarden [...], who formulated a very penetrating and strong critique of the doings of the Vienna Circle, at the same time expressed clear reservations about the possibility of applying logic in philosophy. [...] If one claims, together with Prof. Ingarden, that all and only those problems belong to philosophy which concern either (a) “pure possibilities or necessary

⁷ It is also worth referencing an anecdote that when Ingarden moved permanently to Lvov, Ajdukiewicz was reported to have said sarcastically that even the water in the taps became ... cloudy.

⁸ Similarly, Perzanowski called Ingarden “the greatest philosopher in the Polish nation” and “one of the greatest ontologists in history” (Perzanowski, Pietruszczak 2003, p. 5). Perzanowski, incidentally, considered himself a student of Dąmbska and Ingarden.

relations between possibilities” and “the real essence of both entire domains of being and their particular elements,” where the main stress is laid upon the objects (a), then one will have to accept – at most with some small reservations – that the methods of particular sciences, and hence also the deductive method, will have no application to philosophy [...]. If in the philosophy which is so understood there is no place for the deductive method, then also logistic, which is a logic of deduction, will not have an application in it (Salamucha 1937, p. 84).

It must be remembered that these words were spoken by an enthusiast of formal logic in general, and of its application in philosophy in particular.

Dąmbska began her text devoted to Ingarden, after his death, by stating that he was “one of the greatest Polish philosophers” (Dąmbska 1970, p. 503).

Stefan Swieżawski, Ajdukiewicz’s student and assistant for some time, who also admitted to intellectual apprenticeship with Ingarden, was equally flattering about Ingarden when the news of his death reached him:

One felt that one of the great masters of philosophy had passed away. I went to the funeral in Cracow and at the cemetery I was wearing a gown (as a representative of the Catholic University of Lublin), as was the representative of Louvain, Fr. Herman van Breda. I was also at the church of St. Anna at a mass for Ingarden’s soul. It was celebrated by Cardinal Wojtyła, who delivered a very beautiful homily, emphasizing that seeking the truth and treating it as an absolute value was the deepest part of this genuine philosopher’s life. So once again someone who I consider one of my teachers has gone (Swieżawski 1993, p. 71).

Six years before his death, Ingarden was presented with a volume of *Philosophical Sketches* (Żarnecka (ed.) 1964). It also included the works of the above-mentioned “Twardowskianists,” with the exception of the late Błachowski and Fr. Salamucha – as well as Fr. Bocheński, who was in exile at that time, and was object to strict political censorship in communist Poland.

1.5. Ingarden on Twardowski's students

Ingarden's relations with Twardowski's students were even more complex than his relations with Twardowski himself. Initially, Ingarden's general image of the LWS was as follows:

[In Lvov], despite Twardowski, there was a quite positivist philosophical atmosphere, because some of Twardowski's students (mainly Łukasiewicz) had been influenced by Russell and Ernst Mach. Another group of Twardowski's students practiced only descriptive psychology as understood by Brentano, while Twardowski had always considered Brentano a "psychologist." At that time, philosophy was no longer much trusted. The beginnings of the latter logic school were being initialized (Ingarden 1968, p. 9).

Later that picture changed. This change is visible, among others places, in the text "Reminiscences about Prof. Zawirski" (Ingarden 1948). In this text, Ingarden distinguishes three currents in the Twardowski's School, which could be called successively: "psychologizing" ("Lvovian"), "logicizing" ("Varsovian"), and "methodologizing" ("Poznanian-Cracovian"). This is both original and important from a historical and philosophical point of view; therefore, we will quote its important fragments *in extenso* (highlights are ours):

[Zawirski] obtained his PhD [...] in 1910 on the basis of the dissertation "The Number of Laws of Associating Presentations." Both the subject of this dissertation and the method of its preparation categorize Prof. Zawirski as a student of the Lvov School, and only the later years of his work gave his research a slightly different character.

[...] Twardowski was himself a student of [...] Brentano and, according to his teacher, he considered descriptive psychology to be the basis of all philosophical investigations, while his attitude towards natural sciences and mathematics was rather loose. His students partly chose this PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGIZING direction of research, but partly broke away from the influence of their teacher and, under the guidance of [...] Łukasiewicz, took up MATHEMATICAL LOGIC [...].

On the other hand, Prof. Zawirski differs from both of these groups in that his main interests went towards METHODOLOGICAL investigations of modern natural science, in particular physics, as well as the philosophical consequences of certain physical views. Therefore, the history of his thought

is closely related to the changes that took place in 20th century physics and in the methodological foundations of modern mathematics. Therefore, it was necessary to deal with logic in more detail. However, even in his studies that dealt with logic, Prof. Zawirski worked out these problems in advance in terms of methodological problems and POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF LOGIC TO PHYSICS, and not in a PURE THEORETICAL MANNER, BREAKING FROM OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. And in this respect, Prof. Zawirski chose a path of research separate from the inquiries of the majority of the Lvov-Warsaw group.

Prof. Zawirski's methodological considerations [were] related to the development of 20th century physics. [...] Apart from changes in modern physics, Prof. Zawirski was interested in the efforts of mathematicians to axiomatize mathematics and its final methodological grounding. Therefore, he began to attempt to apply the axiomatic method in physics. And since the axiomatic method is only a detail in the general structure of contemporary logic, it is no wonder that over time, Prof. Zawirski dealt more and more with mathematical logic and its relation to mathematics, as well as the three- and many-valued logic of Prof. Łukasiewicz. He also tried to connect the many-valued logic with the problems of probability theory and its application in natural sciences, in particular in physics (Ingarden 1948).

As we can see, the Twardowski's School had at least three trends in Ingarden's eyes and he assessed these trends differently. He was very critical of the achievements of representatives of the Warsaw logical trend. As early as in 1919, they had already made the worst impression on him – as future colleagues. He described these impressions as follows:

In Warsaw, people who were only a few years older than me – but having their chairs – Leśniewski, Kotarbiński, when you listened to them, you had the impression that they had probably spent decades in their lofty positions, that they had a whole library of their own volumes behind them – so much ruthlessness, so much self-confidence. Meanwhile, for example, Leśniewski had two small articles of rather dubious scientific value in *Ruch Filozoficzny*. It was still possible to speak with Witwicki, but he also had periods of unprecedented bluntness⁹. When I saw how incredibly little these people know about

⁹ The relationship between Witwicki and Ingarden must have been very close, however, since Witwicki called Ingarden in his letters "Dear Romek" and Ingarden suggested that

philosophy, how narrow the circle of their problems is, how difficult it is for them to understand things that had long ago been elaborated on extensively abroad – this proud self-confidence harmonized quite well with this ignorance (Ingarden 1999, pp. 185-186).

This bad impression quickly turned into a grudge as he found grounds to believe that, “ruled” by students of Twardowski – Marian Borowski (doctorate from 1904) and Kotarbiński, *Przegląd Filozoficzny* had rejected one of his early works. Here is what he wrote on this subject in his letters of October 26 and 31, 1919, to Twardowski:

I have had a bad experience with the lecture presented to [...] [*Przegląd Filozoficzny*] from spring 1919¹⁰ in the Psychological Society on “Conditions for the Possibility of Cognition Theory.” This is part of one of the chapters of my work on Bergson. [...] Husserl once praised this thing very much. [...] I was also promised by the Editorial Board of *Przegląd* that a given article would be published in the next issue of *Przegląd*; meanwhile, two issues have already appeared, and the third one is in the printing house. [...] In addition, there seems to be a great mess there, because Mr. Borowski claims that he gave the manuscript to Mr. Kotarbiński, and Mr. Kotarbiński that he gave it to Mr. Borowski (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, pp. 172-173).

A few days ago I saw Mr. Kotarbiński, who found the manuscript and read it. However, he claims that he does not understand it and is therefore against printing. As a result, I suggested to Mr. Borowski, who, as far as I know, was to take over the editorial office of *Przegląd*, that he return it to me. However, Mr. Borowski asked me to leave it for him because he wanted to read it himself. So for now, the case is on hold (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 174).

Ultimately, this work was never published.

The problem was additionally aggravated by frustration stemming from the fact that in Ingarden’s opinion, the followers of the logicizing trend were ignoring his works. Ingarden complained about this in letters to Dąbbska written in 1952. Moreover, although – as you can see – Ingarden was aware of the internal diversity of the Twardowski’s School, he tended to identify the LWS with its Warsaw trend:

Witwicki should become the godfather of one of his sons (Ingarden (jr.) 2000, pp. 51, 125).

¹⁰ The lecture took place on March 3rd, 1919.

The members of the Warsaw-Lvov School¹¹ [...] instinctively resist phenomenology, which [...] prevents [them] from even starting to read my books (Dąmbska & Ingarden 2018, p. 225).

Dąmbska argued against Ingarden's opinions:

I think that you are wrong in judging that the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School do not read you. I think so myself – after all, I am a poor and unimportant member of the Twardowski's Lvov School, so hated today [by the communist authorities] – however, I know many of your earlier works, and I read your *Controversy [over the Existence of the World]* before you were so kind as to give this book to me. Of course, I am far from having good knowledge of the *Controversy* and many other works of yours, but I think that both I and other members of the Lvov School have read you (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, p. 227).

But even a few years later – according to Ingarden – nothing had changed. In a letter of August 14, 1956, we read:

I was quite angry with what was happening at the [...] [Logical Session of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw]. The same banal, and moreover, old jargon of the so-called Lvov-Warsaw School, without any attempt to critically look at all this work, which is so far from the truth. At the same time, they consistently do not read anything that has come from outside of this “school,” are raising a new generation in a completely one-sided way in the same imperfect conceptual schemes, and constantly avoid overcome difficulties by simply avoiding the problem.

It made me quite grim. Same as the previous session. I believe that all my work, which I announced only in Polish, was wasted due to the consistent, several dozen years of theoretical boycott: not reading or mentioning that anything other than the denominations of the “school” (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, pp. 305-306).

The fact that Ingarden's bitterness obscured the actual picture of philosophy practiced in the LWS is also evidenced by this fragment of a letter to Dąmbska:

¹¹ The phrase “Warsaw-Lvov School” looks like a mistake; however, it is possible that Ingarden meant to distance himself from the Warsaw branch of the Lvov School.

It was the height of being unreasonable [on my part], that is, the lack of sense for – so to speak – business, to be a phenomenologist in Poland for 35 years, surrounded by neo-positivists. Oh well. You don't live to make a career, but to know something and do something. Anything else is inconsequential (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, p. 249).

First of all, in the LWS there simply was not a single neo-positivist, that is, not a single philosopher that would advocate the claims shared in the Vienna Circle, as Ajdukiewicz clearly stated during the 8th International Philosophical Congress in Prague in 1934 (Ajdukiewicz 1934, p. 397)); moreover, as demonstrated above, philosophers associated with the LWS applauded Ingarden's critique of neo-positivism. Secondly, even if we included figures such as Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński, or Leśniewski as "neo-positivists," there were too few people to effectively "surround" a figure of Ingarden's caliber. It cannot be ruled out that Ingarden felt the lack of attention from these very few people so much because it was their personal recognition that he cared about the most. Thirdly, it is also not clear what this "career" that Ingarden mentions here would consist of – it is difficult to say that any of the Polish "neo-positivists" had significantly more impressive careers than Ingarden himself.

From among the members of the logical wing of the LWS, Ingarden spoke only of Łukasiewicz with reverence. After the former's death, Ingarden wrote in a letter of October 27, 1956, to Dąmbska:

Yesterday I found out from some newspaper that [...] Łukasiewicz has died. He was my last professor of philosophy; others had died long ago. I was upset (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, p. 298).

His assessment of Kotarbiński – in a letter of October 23, 1952, to Dąmbska – was far from giving him "justice" and was saturated with personal aversion.

I have been reading a bit recently in relation to the problem of causality, which is related to the third volume of *Controversy*, but new stimuli were added by a discussion with Kotarbiński, whose amusement during my speech again shows the limitations of his philosophical education, not to mention other aspects (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, p. 226).

This contrasts with the post-war assessment of Tatarkiewicz, about whom he wrote in his letters to Dąmbska of February 22 and 27, 1956, and of March 2, 1957:

The meeting of the [Editorial Committee of the *Library of the Classics of Philosophy*] will be a “jubilee” meeting due to Kotarbiński’s 70th birthday. [...] But Kotarbiński is not alone in turning 70. The same applies to Tatarkiewicz, for whom this date coincides with the 40th anniversary of his professorship at the chair in Warsaw. Officials “do not remember” about Tatarkiewicz, but a group of people close to him would like to express their reverence and positive feelings towards him (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, p. 296).

I believe that his scientific merit is certainly greater than that of the other jubilarians, and that his civic position in science suits me better (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, p. 297).

I would prefer you [*scil.* Dąmbska] at the head of the *Kwartalnik* than on the advisory team of the journal edited by Kołakowski and Company. [...] If this is to be a continuation of the unfortunate *Mysł Filozoficzna* with its journalism and propaganda of materialism, I do not see Tatarkiewicz or you there (Dąmbska, Ingarden 2018, p. 320).

Finally, let us add that on the subject of Ingarden and Twardowski’s proponents, there were also some tensions over who had first announced certain ideas.

This includes, for example, the controversy over the theory of questions and the concept of conditionals between Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz. As for the latter – there is no doubt whatsoever. The earliest publication by Ajdukiewicz on the analysis of conditionals is the paper read in the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on November 7, 1936, “Conditional Sentences in Ordinary Speech and in Logistic” (Ajdukiewicz 1938a); while Ingarden’s “Analysis of Conditional Sentence” – presented on December 13, 1935, in the Poznań Society for the Advancement of Arts and Sciences and repeated in a modified form on February 15, 1936, in the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov – appeared in 1936 (Ingarden 1936). As for the theory of questions, it is true that Ajdukiewicz’s earliest mention in this field is the lecture delivered in the Polish Film Institute on February 17, 1923, “On the Intention of the Question ‘What is *p*’” (Ajdukiewicz 1923), delivered before Ingarden’s lecture “On Essential Questions” (Ingarden 1925), presented by Twardowski on May 13, 1924, in the Scientific Society in Lvov

(Twardowski 1924), but careful reading leaves no doubt as to the direction of filiation.

Both Ingarden and Blaustein were in favor of the stratified concept of a work of art (cf. the text by Aleksandra Horecka – in this volume). Moreover, Czeżowski openly admitted that there were similarities between his own and Ingarden's views on literary works. He mentioned the following analogies: Ingarden's quasi-judgments are presented judgments in the sense of Twardowski (Czeżowski 1966: 224); Ingarden's "underspecified world" is Czeżowski's sketchy world (Czeżowski 1966: 225), and Ingarden's concretizations are Czeżowski's semantic models of literary works (Czeżowski 1966: 225).

Finally, there are similarities for which it is difficult to determine the direction of filiation; perhaps they have a common source in the views of other philosophers. In Łukasiewicz and Ajdukiewicz, for instance, we find the distinction between constitutive and consecutive properties (the latter being "consequences" of the former); this is a distinction analogous to Ingarden isolating the individual character of the properties that make up the constitutive nature of that individual and other properties.

2. Intertextual relationships

2.1. The program of the Lvov-Warsaw School in Ingarden's view

Twardowski's students were not united by common views on particular philosophical problems, but by a common philosophical program and methodological approach. Therefore, in the reconstruction of the substantive relations between Ingarden and the LWS, it is appropriate to focus on the problems of the program and the methods used in philosophical research.

We would like to name the relationship between the program and the LWS research method¹² and Ingarden's research program and method "intellectual diffusion." It is also an unusual diffusion: reversed and one-sided. Philosophical ideas – including the meta-philosophical ideas of particular

¹² The program and research method of the LWS have been the subject of studies by Anna Brożek and her team in recent years. The following volumes constitute the results of these studies: (Brożek 2020) and (Brożek et al. 2021).

interest to us – penetrated mainly in one direction: filiation flowed from the LWS to Ingarden.

In the LWS, philosophy was considered a science, at least in the broader sense of the word “science.” Therefore, an LWS philosopher had to adhere to the elementary postulates of science. The most important of these were the following three: clarity of expression, appropriate justification of the views expressed, and honesty of discussion, which, in the opinion of LWS members, was an important means of “reaching the truth” in every science, but especially in philosophy.

The postulate of clarity is directed against all manifestations of ambiguity as the cause of misunderstandings and endless disputes, especially those haunting philosophy. The weapon in the fight against ambiguity is primarily linguistic analysis, because language is a tool of thinking and cognition – and interpersonal communication.

It is not enough, however, for scientific claims to be clearly stated. If they are to be recognized, they must also be properly justified. In accordance with the postulate of appropriate justification in force in the LWS, the views expressed cannot be recognized with greater force than the degree of their justification allows.

Finally, in accordance with the postulate of honesty of discussion – i.e. an exchange of thoughts which has a clearly defined goal (theoretical or practical) and in which participants treat their statements as justified – two types of criteria should be met: logical (it should be communicative, substantive, and conclusive) and parliamentary (it should be planned, authentic, and constructive); the more a discussion meets these criteria, the more reliable it is.

We will take a closer look at the above-mentioned postulates as objects of intellectual diffusion between the LWS and Ingarden. We will precede this by pointing out that in his 1936 lectures on Brentano, Ingarden stated the following:

In philosophical research, we should seek statements that are as strictly formulated and responsibly justified¹³ as we require them to be in the so-called science (Ingarden 1936a, p. 201).

¹³ It was no accident, then, that Ingarden devoted a separate paper to the analysis of justification (Ingarden 1962).

Still, he added immediately:

We usually go much further in the interpretation of this postulate, also demanding the use of various special methods applied by particular sciences (in particular, empirical), as well as striving to fulfill the same tasks that guide these sciences (Ingarden 1936a, p. 201).

It is clear that Ingarden himself did not go that far, because the goal of philosophy (in phenomenological terms) is to describe the content of an idea, and the research method by which such a description is achieved is the phenomenological method, the most important element of which is ideation.

Let us now look at how Ingarden referred to the postulates of clarity and justification accepted in the LWS.

It is sometimes said that Twardowski introduced a “tendency of clarity” into his school. He himself was famous for being able to clearly present any philosophical problem. Leśniewski and Łukasiewicz (the order of surnames here is not accidental, as Łukasiewicz *expressis verbis* admitted that he followed in Leśniewski’s footsteps in this domain) enriched the postulate of clarity with the postulate of exactness – which could be implemented with the help of logical tools.

In the manifesto “On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style” Twardowski made a diagnosis: if x writes vaguely, then x also thinks vaguely. In the face of unclear thoughts, it is impossible to take an attitude of recognition or rejection. We do not therefore need to try to understand obscure philosophical texts; they are not worth the effort. As Tatarkiewicz added later: “Fortunately, there are enough clear books to read” (Tatarkiewicz 1979, p. 176).

Ingarden reacted “officially” to this manifesto in printed form (cf. Ingarden 1919/1920), but he also discussed this problem with Twardowski “privately” – in letters. He wrote, i.a. to Twardowski in a letter of June 2, 1920:

I would like to [...] explain why I was convinced that you consider the feature of clarity (or vagueness) of the work to be an absolute feature. This is not literally stated in your article. However, I suppose I could have had a reason to assume this position. [...] In my small article, I tried to draw attention to the conditions that must be met by the reader in order for [...] [ambiguity] was not the defect of [...] [a philosophical work], assuming the fact

of the philosopher-author's clear thinking. My point was to emphasize that certain special philosophical works require special skills on the part of the reader in order to be clear. And I meant it because I have often encountered the fact that certain works were considered "incomprehensible," while they were only "misunderstood."

I am very glad that as for the fact that the vagueness of the work is a relative feature, I am of the same opinion as you. You may, admittedly, accuse me of the fact that I could assume in advance that you cannot have a different opinion, because you are obviously right, and that you tacitly assumed that you spoke about the unclarity of the work only in cases when the reader is completely qualified to understand it. But on the other hand, I was allowed to suppose that you have arguments in favor of unclarity not being a relative feature. Therefore, the article does not fail to mention an almost obvious thing, but it aims to present the matter differently. In that case, the arguments in favor of it were extremely interesting for me. That is why I wrote this small article to examine these arguments (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, pp. 182-183).

It turned out that both – Twardowski and Ingarden – shared the view that unclarity is a relative feature of the text, and Twardowski wrote about the work's unclarity "only in those cases when the reader is fully qualified to understand it."

However, there is a suggestion between the lines that Twardowski did not notice that the diagnosis should be more cautious: if x writes vaguely for y – then x thinks vaguely or y is not properly "qualified" to understand what x writes. It seems that Ingarden himself considered himself inadequately "qualified" when he first studied Twardowski's dissertation *Zur Lehre ...*, since at the end of his life he said about it (our emphasis):

I do not disregard it at all. It is difficult, NOT AT ALL AS CLEAR AS HAS BEEN CLAIMED FOR THE LAST SEVERAL DOZEN YEARS, but it is also not devoid of a series of very important true claims (Ingarden 1966, p. 35).

As far as the postulate of appropriate justification is concerned, the assessment of whether a given philosopher fulfills it depends on what methods of justification we consider admissible and what force of argumentation we assign to these admissible justifications.

In the LWS, basically two sources of knowledge were recognized: experience (extraspection or introspection) and reasoning. Ingarden believed

that there was another source of direct experience – let us call it for the time being “phenomenological intuition.” This experience is to open direct access to the realm of ideas. However, a question arises as to the intersubjectivity of phenomenological intuition and the relationship between the data of this experience and language. (As we remember – according to Twardowski and his followers, there is no non-linguistic cognition.) We will return to these matters below when dealing with comments on the phenomenological method. At this point, we will limit ourselves to quoting a fragment of Twardowski’s letter of February 6, 1923, to Ingarden, in which Twardowski reveals his exceedingly skeptical attitude to phenomenological intuition:

I am very curious as to what you are going to write in the report [from the 6th volume of *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*] about the tragedy of the phenomenological method revealed in Conrad-Martius’s text¹⁴ (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 237).

Ingarden responded to this after all provocative question in a letter of February 18, 1923:

As for the review from the 6th volume of *Jahrbuch ...*, I am eager to do it – unless you are able to find someone more suitable for this purpose. But [...] it would be difficult for me to do it before my habilitation. Besides, I suppose the matter is not so urgent (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 240).

Ultimately, no review of this *Jahrbuch* volume... appeared in *Ruch Filozoficzny*; Ingarden himself did not publish any such review anywhere ...

2.2. The phenomenological program

We will now attempt to reconstruct Ingarden’s research program – that is, more generally: the phenomenological program – as it looked for Ingarden and for the LWS members.

Ingarden – encouraged to do so by Twardowski – outlined this program in the article “The Aims of Phenomenologists,” published in 1919. In our

¹⁴ This is about the article entitled “Realontologie” (Conrad-Martius 1923).

opinion, this article is written in a way that basically meets the criteria of good philosophical work adopted in the LWS. Here are the “guiding principles” or “postulates” of phenomenological research listed in this text ¹⁵:

[I] THE ULTIMATE BASIS OF ALL COGNITION, ALL THEORY, IS DIRECT EXPERIENCE (Ingarden 1919, p. 134).

[II] THERE ARE MANY BASICALLY DIFFERENT KINDS OF OBJECTS AND [...] THESE OBJECTS CAN ONLY BE COGNIZED IN DIFFERENT CORRESPONDING COGNITIVE ACTS (Ingarden 1919, p. 136).

[III] IN ALL SPHERES OF OBJECTS, ONE SHOULD [...] ATTAIN DIRECT DATA ON THE OBJECTS OF RESEARCH AND [...] DESCRIBE THEM IN SUCH A WAY AND WITHIN THE SAME BOUNDARIES AS THE DATA PRETEND TO BE. [...] Instead of talking about “direct data,” we can say that by direct experience we mean any such cognitive act in which the object is bodily self-present (Ingarden 1919, p. 137).

[IV] On the basis of the results of [...] interacting with [an object], one should create as clear and adequate concepts as possible, and not remain within the sphere of concepts about objects, or only by means of blindly formulated concepts reach objects and see them as *sub specie* of the latter [...] [that is, perform] conceptual mythology (Ingarden 1919, pp. 141, 137).

[V] A phenomenologist cannot start with [...] a system of definitions. [...] The most important subjects of philosophical research – such as, for instance, all “categories” [...] – are quite SIMPLE. How then can we demand that they be subject to definition [in the classical sense]? [...] It is absurd to demand that ALL the words used be defined. [...] The definition [...] only has value insofar as it is strict on the one hand, i.e. faithfully, comprehensively and unambiguously reflecting the constitutive features of the object, and on the other hand, understandable (Ingarden 1919, pp. 144-145).

[VI] The appropriate field of work [for a phenomenologist] lies in *A PRIORI* COGNITION OF THE ESSENCE OF OBJECTS (Ingarden 1919, p. 315).

[VII] THE ESSENCE OF A GIVEN REAL OBJECT [...] [is] A SET OF ITS ABSOLUTE FEATURES WHICH, BEING NON-SELF-EXISTENT IN RELATION TO EACH

¹⁵ We quote the original version of the article (from *Ruch Filozoficzny*), as it was mainly this version that was known to the LWS members who are referred to in this text. The numbering of the individual items in this presentation comes from us. NB. We list only those “aims of phenomenologists” which, as it may be assumed, were also the aims of Ingarden himself.

OTHER, TOGETHER MAKE UP A CERTAIN SIMPLE *QUALE*, WHICH MAKES THE OBJECT WHAT IT IS AND WHICH IT WOULD NOT BE WITHOUT THEM (Ingarden 1919, p. 323).

[VIII] The objects of direct *a priori* cognition are [...] IDEAL OBJECTS and the relationships between them. They do occur NEITHER IN TIME NOR IN [...] REAL SPACE. [...] The relationship between an ideal object and the real object that is its embodiment (if it can and does *de facto* exist) is that the range of the objective features of an ideal object is the ESSENCE of the former (Ingarden 1919, pp. 322-323).

[IX] [Direct *a priori* cognition takes place in] THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE, [...] [i.e.] the attitude of a specific COGNITIVE RESERVE, [...] 0 \$ [consisting in] [...] abstaining from making a claim, NEUTRALIZING A CONVICTION [...] on the existence of a relevant state of affairs of an object [...] contained in every observation (Ingarden 1919, pp. 338-339).

[X] The certainty of direct *a priori* cognition is not conditioned by the certainty of any other *a priori* or empirical cognition – it is absolute and cannot be shaken by any new cognition (Ingarden 1919, p. 325).

[XI] *A priori* cognition draws [...] the boundary of the possibility for the actually established nature of a real object, as well as for the coexistence of certain features, and finally for natural laws. [...] If it is also possible to find, apart from the essential features of an object, accidental features, it is only because the essence of a given object allows it to have them and precisely determines the scope of “possible” random features and their variability. Here, then, *a priori* cognition draws the limits within which experience must be contained (Ingarden 1919, p. 336).

For the time being, let us comment on points [V], [VI] and [IX]. In 1961, Ingarden added the following footnote to point [V]:

I encountered the postulate [...] [of starting with a definition] almost constantly in my talks with members of the so-called Lvov School, especially those who promoted logistic in Poland in the period immediately after World War I. Without such definitions, they argued, no conversation could be held. They replied to all attempts to circumvent this essentially nonsensical postulate, when one wants to apply it in general, with the famous “I don’t understand,” with which they tried to shut the mouths of all their opponents (Ingarden 1919 (version Ingarden 1963), p. 302).

In Ingarden's view, this seems like a moment of discrepancy between the aims of phenomenologists and the "rigid" position of the LWS.

Concerning point [VI] – and in particular *a priori* cognition – let us first quote Ingarden's comment from 1919, which is very telling (at least for "*a priori*" skeptics), and which was omitted in a later version of the text, i.e. from the version included in the volume *Studies in Contemporary Philosophy* (our highlights):

Phenomenology consciously strives to obtain such knowledge wherever possible. We will not cite relevant research [...] by phenomenologists here. WE ASSUME THAT [formal- and] MATERIAL-*A PRIORI* COGNITION IS POSSIBLE (Ingarden 1919, p. 317).

Secondly, Ingarden expressly provides the justification (of the necessity) of accepting the existence of ideas: the point is that "arguments against the existence of ideal objects [do not] withstand criticism" (Ingarden 1919, p. 316)¹⁶.

Two things are important with regard to point [IX]. Firstly, in the later version of the text, instead of the certainty of *a priori* cognition, it is only said that it is built over the data of empirical experience, but epistemologically independent from it. Secondly, in the original version (from *Ruch Filozoficzny*), Ingarden places the following footnote here:

It is usually said that *a priori* cognition is universally important and necessary. This is also the position of the phenomenologists. However, we do not mention this matter in the text, because the mentioned term is ambiguous. Its strict formulation would require a series of complex analyses both of the construction of an ideal object and of the essence of necessity, which would go far beyond the scope of this small essay (Ingarden 1919, p. 325).

¹⁶ Ten years later, Ingarden (following in Husserl's footsteps) gave three reasons for the existence or, to be more conservative, for assuming the existence of ideas: (1) without it the intersubjectivity of language is impossible (Ingarden 1933, p. 509); (2) logic cannot be built ("grounded") without it (Ingarden 1933, p. 512); (3) without it there is a risk of falling into conventionalism (Ingarden 1933, pp. 512-513). It is worth emphasizing that Ingarden was an implacable enemy of conventionalism and skepticism.

We will present the phenomenological program (in Ingarden's version) in the view of LWS members in Tatarkiewicz's, Ajdukiewicz's, and Fr. Bocheński's interpretations¹⁷.

Let us start with a reconstruction of Tatarkiewicz's approach, about whom Ingarden expressed the following opinion in "The Aims of Phenomenologists" (in the original version):

In Poland, Tatarkiewicz wrote on phenomenology in a sketchy fashion, but it is evident that he understand relatively well the main aims in this direction (Ingarden 1919, p. 160).

Here are the "features distinguishing the phenomenological position from other philosophical positions" indicated by Tatarkiewicz (Tatarkiewicz 1913, p. 66) (Tatarkiewicz's numbering – our emphasis).

(1) It is fundamental for phenomenology to distinguish between that which is GIVEN and that which is constructed, distinguishing between THE OBVIOUS and theory (Tatarkiewicz 1913, p. 67).

(2) Obviously, neither deduction nor induction can be a method of phenomenological research on what is directly provided. [...] Phenomenological cognition is INTUITIVE (Tatarkiewicz 1913, p. 67).

(3) Phenomenology does not study specific phenomena, but their ESSENCES. [...] This requires going beyond the "natural attitude" and carrying out "phenomenological reduction." [...] The content of such intuition is called [...] a phenomenon (hence the name of phenomenology) (Tatarkiewicz 1913, pp. 67-68).

(4) The first task of phenomenology, then, is to grasp entities in all their diversity. It applies THE METHOD OF DISTINCTION, distinguishing between entities, distinguishing types of entities, meanings, contents, objects, acts, and beings. It applies a comparative analysis and recognizes as different that which is ascribed different features (Tatarkiewicz 1913, p. 68).

(5) Having found "entities" in all their diversity, the second task of phenomenology is to establish the relationships between them (Tatarkiewicz 1913, p. 69).

¹⁷ A more complete reconstruction of the "aims of the phenomenologists" is contained in (Jadacki 1988), which also belongs to the analytical trend.

Note that although points [I], [VI] and [VIII] of Ingarden's views correspond more or less consecutively to points (2), (3), and (5) of Tatarkiewicz's, the remaining points of both approaches do not have adequate equivalents in the second approach.

Let us add two more remarks by Tatarkiewicz, both of which are veiled critiques of phenomenology: that its language is not always clear and that its program is not as original as the phenomenologists themselves would like to see it:

Husserl's arrangement of problems, wording, and terminology obscure his thoughts and impede his introduction into phenomenology. Dissertations by younger researchers, very special and direct, introduce one into the workshop of phenomenological work better than Husserl's deliberations on the program (Tatarkiewicz 1913, p. 66).

Just as phenomenology is not absolutely new historically, it is also not completely new in contemporary thought. It finds common points everywhere (Tatarkiewicz 1913, p. 70).

The list of basic phenomenological principles in Ajdukiewicz's approach from the 1930s (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 253-254) is as follows (phrases in quotation marks are quotes):

(1) The goal of "proper" philosophy (or phenomenology) is "to inquire into the essence of things."

(2) The essences of things are "ideal entities."

(3) The essences of things are known "in the process of *Wesenschau*, an insight into the essence of things, in which the ideal object [...] becomes self-present, just as with ordinary perception (as opposed to non-visual thinking) the perceived object becomes present for us."

(4) Insight into the essence of things results in "*a priori* cognitions that are not definitional tautologies."

In this approach, Ajdukiewicz actually takes into account only three points of Ingarden's "aims:" Ingarden's points [III] and [V] correspond to Ajdukiewicz's points (3) and (4), while Ingarden's points [VI] and [VIII] correspond to Ajdukiewicz's points (1) and (2).

Ajdukiewicz's assessment of the phenomenological program is carefully expressed, but it is in fact more flattering than Tatarkiewicz's assessment. He writes:

The works of [...] [the phenomenologists] more than once contributed to the clarification of the basic concepts that certain natural sciences dealt with, often eliminating ambiguities, sometimes introducing subtle, almost scholastic distinctions. [...]

[Some] phenomenologists, using the method of phenomenological analysis [*sic!*], managed to build metaphysical systems [...] [actually being ontological systems] which distinguish a number of layers in the realm of being and [...] [describe] their categorical structure (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 254).

After World War II, Ajdukiewicz described individual points of the phenomenological program in a way even closer to Ingarden's "self-presentation."

In his work *The Methods of Contemporary Thought*, Fr. Bocheński first discussed (albeit relatively briefly) the phenomenological method (Bocheński 1954). He justified it in the "Introduction" as follows:

In the domain of the direct acquisition of knowledge, there are certain methods which have now been developed technically [...]. The PHENOMENOLOGICAL [method] occupies an important place among them. It is a method of intellectual observation and of the description of what is observed. But it comprises many rules which apply quite generally to all kinds of thinking (Bocheński 1954, p. 13).

Here is Fr. Bocheński's approach to the phenomenological method – which, according to him, is the quintessence of the phenomenological program – "divided" (by us) into points (quotations from (Bocheński 1954, pp. 16-17) are in quotation marks):

(1) "The phenomenological method [...] consists essentially in an intellectual observation of the object, i.e. it is based on INTUITION."

(2) "This intuition refers to the given" ("phenomenon").

(3) Reaching – through intuition – that which is given requires abstracting from ("eidetic reduction," "exclusion"):

(a) "subjectivity;"

(b) "all theoretical knowledge, such as hypotheses and proofs derived from other sources;"

(c) "all TRADITION, i.e. of everything that others have taught about the object in question."

(4) The analysis of the given requires abstracting from:

(a) “the EXISTENCE of the thing” (“It is also possible to deal with objects which are merely imagined”) (Bocheński 1954, p. 25);

(b) “everything INESSENTIAL” within the given.

From Ingarden’s list of “aims” we have Fr. Bocheński’s equivalents: points [I] and [II] in the form of point (1), point [III] in the form of point (2), and point [IX] in the form of points (3) and (4). What is striking is the position he grants in these last points to the abstraction procedure.

What can generally be said on the basis of the above examples and other statements of LWS members about the attitude of the latter to individual items of Ingarden’s phenomenological program?

In some simplification, it can be said that points [I]-[III] and [VII] were accepted by the LWS, while points [IV] and [V] were not recognized because Twardowski and his students – unlike Ingarden – believed that there was no extra-linguistic cognition. In addition, Twardowski’s students who were proponents of logicism firmly removed insight *à la* Husserl and Ingarden (as well as understanding *à la* Dilthey and Ajdukiewicz) beyond the realm of science.

They believed them to be MYSTERIOUS procedures which should be replaced with OPEN conventions.

In 1911, Leśniewski wrote:

Linguistic conventions are [...] the necessary condition of any scientific procedure [...]. The need that these conventions be formulated precisely remains unnoticed when these of other demands of “linguistic intuition” are sufficient for mutual understanding among scholars. It is, however, inevitable to appeal to linguistic conventions when some doubts arise as to the way in which an object can be symbolized or as to the way in which an expression can be understood (Leśniewski 1911, pp. 35-36).

A similar position was held by Leśniewski’s student, Tarski. He explained it clearly using the example of the question “What is psychology” (emphasis is ours):

Answers to [this] [...] question [...] may be of very different kinds. In some cases, we may give an account of the prevailing usage of the name of science. Thus in saying what is psychology, you may try to give an account of what most people who use this term normally mean by “psychology.” In other cases, we may be interested in the prevailing usage, not of all people who use

a given term, but only of people who are qualified to use it – who are expert in the domain. Here we would be interested in what psychologists understand by the term “psychology.” In still other cases, our answer has a normative character: we make a suggestion that the term be used in a certain way, independent of the way in which it is actually used. Some further answers seem to aim at something very different, but it is very difficult for me to say what it is; people speak of catching the proper, true meaning of a notion, something independent of actual usage, and independent of any normative proposals, something like the Platonic idea behind the notion. This last approach is so foreign and strange to me that I shall simply ignore it, for I cannot say anything intelligent of such matters (Tarski 1966, p. 145).

It is worth noting that both Leśniewski and Tarski distanced themselves from all intuitive acts that made it possible to grasp the “meaning of a concept,” but they themselves did not provide any answer to the question about the ontic status of concepts and their “meanings,” or to the question of the details of the epistemic procedure leading to their description.

On the other hand, Ajdukiewicz and Fr. Bocheński attempted to at least “demystify” these acts in LWS circles.

Ajdukiewicz wrote:

[Phenomenologists accept] that there is [...] [a] form of experience in which as directly as physical phenomena are given in sense-experience and mental phenomena in introspection, certain entities are given which do not belong to either the physical or the mental world. [Ajdukiewicz 1949, p. 42]

[They have in their minds] “intuition of essences” [...], in which the essences of things are purportedly given to us [...]. On the basis of this intuition of essences we can [...] arrive at assertions which are indubitable, but which we could not arrive at through sense-experience. [...] When I look at the red cloth covering my desk, I perceive this concrete thing with my senses but at the same time my mind is aware of what the essence of redness consists of (Ajdukiewicz 1949, p. 43).

Whereas Fr. Bocheński stated:

At first sight, phenomenological observation seems to be something quite simple, and to consist merely in keeping one’s intellectual eyes open, and where appropriate putting oneself in a suitable position for getting a good view of the

object by making various external movements. A special method for regulating the movement of thought itself seems at first to be quite unnecessary.

But it is necessary, and for two reasons. (1) Man is so constituted that he has an almost incorrigible disposition to see, in what he looks at, extraneous element which are not contained in the object itself at all. These extraneous element are either introduced into what is actually seen by our subjective emotional attitude (thus a coward sees the enemy's strength as twice what is actually is), or they are put into the object by knowledge acquired elsewhere. We project into the given object our own hypotheses, ideas, theories etc. Now the whole point of the eidetic reduction is to see the given object and nothing else at all. To attain this it is necessary to apply a carefully developed method. (2) No object is simple: every object is infinitely complex, consisting as it does of various components and aspects which are not all equally important. Man cannot grasp all these elements at once – he has to consider them one after the other. This too requires a carefully devised method.

For these reason not only is there a phenomenological method, but also it is NECESSARY to master it in order to see correctly (Bocheński 1954, p. 17).

What do we actually learn from Ajdukiewicz and Fr. Bocheński about ideation? We only learn from Ajdukiewicz that it “makes present” to us the essence of things, and from Fr. Bocheński that it consists in “activating the spiritual power of seeing;” it is as if someone was explaining to us what visual perception is, saying that in order to perceive the moon, one must look in its direction on a cloudless night...

As for point [VIII] of the phenomenological program, i.e. the existence of ideal objects – there was a clear difference of opinion in the LWS: there were those who strongly rejected this existence (e.g. Leśniewski and Kotarbiński), but there were also those who at least allowed it (e.g. Łukasiewicz).

As for point IX, i.e. reduction, Fr. Bocheński put the greatest emphasis on what he called phenomenological reduction, the scope of which he extended, but on the other hand, he theoretically “popularized.” However, he made a reservation:

The phenomenological method [...] contains many principles which are valid independently of any particular philosophical point of view. Almost all the rules of the phenomenological method might even be represented as

general scientific rules, though to do so would run counter to the intentions of the phenomenologists themselves (Bocheński 1954, p. 18).

Regarding point [X], i.e. the certainty of ideation – and the fact that it sets the “limits of the possibilities” to sensory experience – let Ajdukiewicz speak once again:

The intuition of the essence of redness provides us with the certain knowledge that redness is inseparable from extension and, therefore, that every red thing must be extended. The assertion that what is red is extended is a general assertion and cannot be based on a particular sense-perception because that could support only the assertion that this red thing is extended. Nor is our assertion arrived at in an inductive way from many sense-perceptions, because inductive conclusions are not certain whereas our assertion is indubitable. The assertion that what is red is extended is not based on the analysis of the meaning of the terms that are contained in it, it is not therefore an analytic assertion. It is thus an assertion independent of sense-experience and, consequently, an *a priori* assertion, yet, at the same time, it is not as analytic assertion and so it is synthetic *a priori* (Ajdukiewicz 1949: 43-44).

Ajdukiewicz wrote about the content of point [XI], i.e. the anti-conventionalism of Ingarden (and the entire phenomenological movement):

By means of [i.a. mathematical] axioms we do not construct – phenomenologists insist – any ideal entities as some people suppose. Ideal entities can no more be created by human decree than real objects. The world of ideal entities subsists independently of our thought [...]. The axioms themselves are not plucked out of thin air, are not established by convention, but are the expression of the knowledge of ideal mathematical objects gained by the intuition of essence which is prior to all deduction (Ajdukiewicz 1949: 44).

Ajdukiewicz's diagnosis was based on numerous statements by Ingarden himself. On the other hand, ideation can be built up not only over sensory perceptions, but also over reminders (memory images) or “imaginary” presentations. In the latter case, the road from the reconstruction to the CONSTRUCTION of concepts opens up, despite the fact that Ingarden officially rejected the existence of constructive elements in learning the content of ideas (i.e. the equivalent of the content of concepts in the sense of the LWS).

2.3. The problem of analysis

It is noticeable that Twardowski's program – as it has been described above – does not explicitly say WHAT philosophers are to research, but HOW they are to conduct their research regardless of what it might be. It is different in Ingarden's program: point [VI] states that a philosopher should investigate ideas. Admittedly, more precisely, this is said to be the task of a phenomenologist; however, it may be assumed that, according to Ingarden, a "real" philosopher is precisely a phenomenologist.

However, Ingarden's program says not only WHAT, but also HOW something needs to be studied. Thus, one can compare the entirely methodological program of Twardowski with the methodological part of Ingarden's program – especially if one adopts Fr. Bocheński's hypothesis (which seems to us to be accurate, although it would probably be contested by some phenomenologists) that a significant part of this methodological part can – and even should – be applied to philosophical research, whatever it may be.

If that is the case, then – as we think – it can be concluded that the methodological programs of the LWS and Ingarden do not stand in such conflict with each other as initially seemed to be the case for the interested parties themselves. What's more: we get the impression that these programs overlap to some extent, and to some extent they are complementary. Let us try to justify this thesis, relying on the declarations of the abovementioned interested parties.

Let us begin with Tatarkiewicz's observation:

In [...] systematically and consistently making distinctions, [the phenomenological method] seems to me to be close to the method used by Prof. Twardowski and the Lvov School. Meinong, Twardowski, Stumpf and Husserl left [...] Brentano's school; thanks to this common starting point, they and their students form one large philosophical group, despite the considerable differences that separate them today (Tatarkiewicz 1913, p. 70).

Let us now look at Ingarden's statements. In the postwar work *Foundamentals of the Theory of Knowledge*, Ingarden called his method „purely descriptive.” Here is what he wrote about it:

The task [...] of the purely descriptive method [...] is to detect in the appropriate experience (direct cognition) the characteristic features or properties

of the object of study that appear visually and to “describe” them, that is, to indicate or name these features and ascribe them to this object in sentences which do not prejudge any properties not given in experience or merely derived from one or another purely mental theory. Thus, this method avoids all purely conceptual hypotheses or assumptions; it also avoids – at least until the moment when cognitive descriptive results are obtained – all purely conceptual reasoning or inferences, therefore it is limited to stating and describing only what is given “directly” in appropriate visual experience (Ingarden 1971, pp. 232-233).

He added in a footnote:

This method was proposed for psychology by [...] Brentano first, and it was taken up in Poland by [...] Twardowski, and abroad, Husserl, along with others [...] applied it to research in various fields (Ingarden 1971, p. 233).

Let us add what Ingarden wrote in a letter of February 18, 1923, to Twardowski, which is an extension of point [VI] of our reconstruction of Ingarden’s program:

As for the “essence of philosophy,” [...] I believe that philosophy is a systematic study – primarily through direct knowledge – of the essence of all kinds of objects, and what connects individual branches of philosophy into a whole is, on the one hand, the fact that all the essences of objects form a sphere separated from other spheres of objects, and on the other hand, the fact of the occurrence of multiple relationships between particular domains of entities (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 240).

Examination of Twardowski’s research practice (and in general: LWS members) indicates that the equivalent of Ingarden’s “systematic study [...] of the essence of all kinds of objects” and “numerous relationships” between them – as the goal of philosophy – is the procedure described in the LWS as “analytical description of objects,” “analysis (and construction) of the concept,” and “shaping definitions of terms.”

The term “analysis and construction of the concept” was used by Łukasiewicz in 1906, when presenting the results of his research on the concept of a cause. Ajdukiewicz did not hesitate to use it, writing in 1937:

[The Twardowski's School], emphasizing the need for clear thinking, turned its main efforts towards conceptual analysis (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 252).

Czeżowski – the greatest Polish Brentanist and one of Twardowski's most faithful students – spoke about the “analytical description of the object,” the result of which was to be an appropriate definition or system of general statements about the studied field of knowledge:


[The analytic] description PROVIDES the analytic definition of a described object through its specific or typical qualities (even if it is not a sentence in the form characteristic of a definition) and it is, therefore, a semantic analysis of the name of the described object (Czeżowski 1956, p. 45).

Let us note that concepts in the LWS were identified with the content (connotations) of the terms that are provided in definitions. Due to the above, even when philosophers skeptical of concepts (and there were many of them) found themselves in Twardowski's environment, the above procedure could basically safely be applied, simply treating it as a method of making definitions. This is the philosophical background of, for example, Tarski's definition of truth resulting from the analysis of “the concept of truth in the deductive sciences.”

It is safe to say that the analysis of concepts, as well as objects and meanings of terms in various forms was practiced by all LWS members. This was the common goal of their philosophical work, even though they had different views on the status of the analyzed objects. What is more, the shape of the analytical procedure was relatively stable in the LWS and survived, without major changes, both the semiotic turn and the methodological transition from descriptive psychology to logic as the basis of philosophy.

Let us now take a closer look at this procedure in an attempt to get around the difficulties we encounter due to terminological differences. Let us then suppose that we want to analyze a concept, for example, the concept of human (i.e. to describe a human analytically or provide a definition of the expression “human”).¹⁸

¹⁸ According to psychologists, most people (about 60%) are visualizers. Even if there are relatively fewer of them among the philosophers, there are enough of them to present some essential and complicated cognitive structures that we are talking about here in the form of diagrams.



THE MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION "HUMAN"

Such an analysis – if it is to be carried out in the LWS style – consists of the following stages:

(1) The starting point is to indicate the corpus of the analysis. There are two types of such corpora: material and verbal. The material corpus is made up of selected instances of the concept, and the verbal corpus is made up of selected contexts in which the concept's carrier occurs. In the case of the concept of human, the "material" corpus would be real human persons, and the verbal corpus would be the contexts in which the expression "human" appears.

It should be added here that, in the LWS, it was common practice to use a small material corpus, limited to "typical" cases (Czeżowski sometimes even emphasized that the starting point in an analytical description may be one selected object). At this stage, limiting ourselves to typical, model cases makes it easier to carry out the next stages of the analysis.

As for the verbal corpus, various sources were used. In addition to colloquial contexts, usually serving to demonstrate the ambiguity of the medium of a concept, analysis was often based on the philosophical tradition, that is, on the existing definitions of terms that were subject to revision.

(2) The elements of the corpora are then compared to indicate the components of the concept that are being sought. An important link in comparative research is establishing the category of the ontic instance of a concept and/or the semantic category of its carriers.

(3) The next stage is the selection of appropriate tools for analysis (which may be elements of set theory or classical logical calculi, semiotic distinctions, *etc.*). The conceptual background is also indicated or created, i.e. the system of concepts into which the analyzed concept is to be included.

(4) In the next stage, a provisional definition is constructed, listing the elements of the analyzed concept. This is the stage in which three above-mentioned components must be put together: the selected corpus, the conceptual background and the analytical intentions. This provisional definition takes many forms; contrary to traditional habits – the classical definition is suitable for this role only in special cases.

According to Czeżowski, a provisional definition is achieved through a kind of generalization.


The act of generalization, which takes place in the analytic description, is undoubtedly a specific cognitive act, which is based on the analysis of the qualities of a described object and performed by selecting certain elements from among them. While establishing specific or typical qualities of a described object, e.g. of a mental phenomenon of reasoning, we make this generalization by selecting some of the distinguishable qualities and excluding others. Not always is this choice correct and the generalization appropriate; the accurate result can be achieved through the method of trial and error, which is well illustrated by the history of science (Czeżowski 1956, p. 45).

(5) When we already have a provisional definition, it is time to check whether it meets the adopted criteria, e.g. whether it covers all and only the elements of the corpus, whether it has appropriate formal values and whether it fits well into the selected conceptual grid.


If the check is positive, we accept the provisional definition as final. If not, we repeat stage (4) or, if necessary, the earlier stages – sometimes up to replacing the corpus.

Before juxtaposing the above outlined “Lvov-Warsaw” analysis procedure with Ingarden’s counterpart, we must emphasize that the reconstruction of the latter is also highly hypothetical, because: (a) Ingarden often changed it and/or modified the terminology in which he spoke about his method; and (b) in many sensitive matters – contrary to the aims of Ingarden himself – his statements left much to be desired in terms of accuracy.

Now consider a certain individual human . and include this human . in Ingarden’s rich ontology – and epistemology – as follows:



Let us now join the two diagrams (having previously simplified Ingarden's diagram) and "read" from them the similarities and differences that interest us.



The declared goal of research in the LWS was to determine the content of concepts (or definitions of terms), e.g. the concept of a human (or the meaning of the term “human”). The step in this direction is to analyze: the material corpus (individual human beings) and/or the verbal corpus (the expression “human” in different contexts). Cognitive access to both corpuses is provided by sensory perception (we see individual people; we see or hear the contexts of the phrase “human”). According to the majority of LWS members, we do not have direct cognitive access to the concept of a human: we do not perceive the content of this concept.

The declared goal of Ingarden’s research (and more broadly: in phenomenology) is to establish the content of an idea, e.g. the idea of human. Ingarden claims to have direct cognitive access to the idea of a human: he „sees” the content of this idea. The appropriate cognitive activity is, let us recall, ideation. However, when we follow Ingarden’s reflections in which he reports on the path which he followed to establish the content of this or that idea, it turns out that there is always a step in this path which includes performing “ordinary” acts of observation directed at individual human beings, and even at the contexts of the expression “human,” and also a comparison of the products of these observations. This fact – which is hidden under Ingarden’s formulation

that acts of ideation are “built on” acts of “ordinary” perception – leads us to conclude that Ingarden also deals with analytical work. What is certainly common to the “Lvov-Warsaw” analysis and Ingarden’s analysis is the analysis of the material corpus; in the LWS, a verbal corpus is added to it (let us accept Ingarden’s declaration that he does not use it¹⁹), and in Ingarden’s case (and also Łukasiewicz’s in certain periods) – a corpus that could be called an “ideal corpus” (most LWS members denied the existence of such a corpus at all). Let us note that a similar diagnosis was made twenty years ago by Jerzy Perzanowski, who wrote about the way in which Ingarden practiced philosophy:

First of all, [Ingarden] understood the *a priori* nature of philosophical cognition more broadly. After all, he often used the principles of combinatorics, including the scope combinatorics of concepts, and the principles of linguistic analysis as well as logical analysis. He also used the results of the detailed sciences: psychology, biology, physics and mathematics. Sometimes logic (Perzanowski 2003, pp. 363-364).

If Perzanowski is right – and we believe so – then Ingarden’s ideation was closer to reasoning, and thus to acts of indirect cognition, than to perception or other acts of direct cognition. This is additionally supported by the fact that Ingarden himself, when describing ideation, combined it with variations, i.e. considering what will happen to the examined object when we imagine that it does not have certain properties²⁰.

How does the declared goal of research in the LWS relate to the declared goal of research for Ingarden? The juxtaposition of the content of the

¹⁹ This is a declaration from which Ingarden derogates. In *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, for example, he considers the claim that “properties themselves have no properties, even though linguistic practice does not forbid acknowledging that they do” (Ingarden 1947, p. 105). In the dissertation “On Justification” we read: “We do not know [...] yet what “justification” is or “justification of something by something,” and this is what we want to explain. In natural speech however, we use these words in the belief that we are using them correctly. This application must therefore be the starting point for our considerations, even if it later turns out to be inaccurate. [Besides], I don’t want to do a far-reaching “linguistic analysis” here – as is often done now” (Ingarden 1962, p. 429). Moreover, Ingarden wrote on another occasion: “The [...] planned method of philosophical research is different than the actually used method in one’s own research” (Ingarden 1939, p. 396).

²⁰ Leszek Sosnowski highlighted this link between ideation and variation in his entry: “Ideation – variation” from *Dictionary of Roman Ingarden’s Philosophical Concepts* (Nowak, Sosnowski (eds.) 2001, pp. 96-98)

concepts analyzed in the LWS with the content of the idea “grasped” by the phenomenologists authorizes us if not to identify both contents, then at least to state that Ingarden’s every statement about the components of the content of an idea can be translated into a certain “Lvov-Warsaw” statement about the content of the relevant concept. The difference here would lie in the granting of a different ontic status to these contents and in the way of their (re)cognition – only through reasoning in the LWS²¹.

Could the LWS analysts and Ingarden limit themselves to the analysis of the corpus they share, i.e. the material corpus? Twardowski’s students would basically approve of that; Ingarden would not. Ingarden is a prisoner of excessive expectations towards the product of analysis: it is supposed to be indisputable and strictly general. The analysis of the material corpus does not provide this, unless it is a complete corpus (which is extremely rare).

This seems to be an example of the intellectual diffusion between the LWS and Ingarden that we mentioned above.

Let us add a remark concerning the epistemological difficulties encountered by probably every analytical work. This is about the difficulties related to cognitive access to individual corpora of analysis.

We have already discussed the charges against “mysterious” phenomenological ideation. However, similar accusations can be made regarding access to the “Lvov-Warsaw” verbal corpus. The point is that when using contexts of expressions to establish the content of the concepts corresponding to those expressions, it is not enough to refer to “ordinary” sensory perception: to perceive the visual or acoustic shape of these contexts. After all, we need to get to the meaning of these contexts.

Ajdukiewicz introduces two epistemological categories: understanding expressions and “intuiting” their meaning.

Understanding expressions occurs in the context of different ways of acquiring knowledge. Ajdukiewicz lists three such methods: perception, reasoning and understanding. They are to designate, respectively, three types of sciences: empirical, a priori, and humanistic. About the meaning of expressions, we learn the following:

It consists in the fact that the image of a given utterance is accompanied by a certain thought, which is the psychological meaning that the utterance has for the person who understands it [...], and it merges with this image into

²¹ On the details of this translation – cf. (Jadacki 1974).

one experience known to everyone from their own experience (Ajdukiewicz 1938, p. 306).

Note, however, that when we say of someones that they understand a certain expression, we are saying nothing more than that they know the meaning of the expression. But knowing meaning is no cognitive activity; it is a state resulting from some procedure that the term “understanding” does not describe.

On the other hand, Ajdukiewicz reduces the phenomenological “insight into the essence” to the intuiting the meaning of expressions (Ajdukiewicz 1949, p. 44), indicating that he is demystifying the latter procedure. However, is Ajdukiewicz’s intuiting the meaning of expressions a less mysterious activity than Ingarden’s ideation?

2.4. Ingarden on formal methods

The analytical procedure described above was the main, but not the only, procedure used in the LWS. The school also gained fame mainly due to the use of formal methods in philosophy. Axiomatization and formalization of theory in the LWS were not often used in philosophy itself (as these procedures are rarely needed at all, only at the final stage of theory construction), but they were certainly always promoted in logical circles.

In his program of the logicization of philosophy, Łukasiewicz wrote:

The scientific philosophy of the future must begin its construction from the very beginning, from the foundations. To begin from the foundations is to review the philosophical questions first and to select from among them only those that can be formulated comprehensively, and discard any others. In this preliminary work, mathematical logic can already be useful because it has established the meaning of many expressions in philosophy. Then one must start trying to solve those philosophical problems that can be formulated comprehensively. The most appropriate method to be used for this purpose seems to again be the method of mathematical logic: the deductive, axiomatic method. One should rely on sentences, if possible intuitively clear and certain, and take such sentences as axioms. Expressions whose meaning can be comprehensively explained on the basis of examples should be selected as primary, that is, undefined concepts. One should try to minimize the number

of axioms and primitive concepts, and they should all be carefully enumerated. All other concepts must be unconditionally defined on the basis of primitive concepts, and all other theorems must be unconditionally proven on the basis of axioms and with the help of the rules of proof adopted in logic. The results obtained in this way should be constantly confronted with the data of intuition and experience, and with the results of other sciences, especially the natural sciences. In the event of inconsistencies, the system should be corrected by formulating new axioms and selecting new original concepts (Łukasiewicz 1928, p. 42).

On the other hand, Ingarden not only did not use axiomatization, but also warned directly against using it.

It is interesting that Twardowski suggested to Ingarden that he try his hand at formal logic. Ingarden's reply was negative. In a letter of June 22, 1917, he wrote:

As for my possible work in the field of formal logic, no problem has arisen for me yet, and I do not have much courage to get down to business, because the object itself – formal and logical problems – and its formal treatment, are in fact unfamiliar for me; so I would have to perform longer studies first to understand this type of work and these types of problems (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 162).

This does not mean that Ingarden would not be able to cope with the application of the formalization procedure. This is evidenced by a fragment of his letter of June 2, 1920, to Twardowski, in which he explains to him his position on the problem of (un)clarity, using the semiformal technique²², or more precisely, pre-formal:

Let us consider it quite formally: It is about giving the cause (*P*) of the feature (*C*) of the object (*S*). If the only condition for *C* to belong to *S* is to be *P*, and there is no mention of other conditions that must be met for *C* to qualify for *S*, then it must be concluded that *C* is entitled to *S* regardless of any conditions related to the non-causal relations of the object *S* and other objects $S_1, S_2, \dots S_n$. And I consider the feature *C*, which belongs to *S* regardless of all relationships of *S* to $S_1, S_2, \dots S_n$, to be an absolute feature. I also

²² On the gradability of formalization – cf. (Jadacki 2020).

consider features C_1, C_2, \dots of object S to be absolute, since, although they became features due to the existence of a causal relationship between S and S_q (where I call the fact of having P by S_q “the cause”), they are, however, not conditioned by any other non-causal relationships (which S potentially enters into with S_1, S_2, \dots) in their belonging to S , and can cease to be ascribed to S only due to the occurrence of a new causal relationship between S and S_1, S_2, S_3 , which will cause their removal from the range of features of object S (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 182).

The similarity of such pre- or semi-formalization to this method of formalization is striking; it was successfully applied later – starting in the 1930s – by Janina Kotarbińska²³.

After World War II, Ingarden devoted much attention to assessing the philosophical value of formal logic. In this matter, he did not change the assessment in “Aims” contained in point [IV]. It was very harsh. Ingarden’s main objection to formal logicians boiled down to the fact that, deprived of “phenomenological intuition,” they construct their formal systems “blindly” and, consequently, these systems do not find application in the description of reality.

Interestingly, Ajdukiewicz, who was close to the logical wing of the LWS, noticed (perhaps under the influence of Husserl and Ingarden?) not only the need, but also the great importance of pre-axiomatic analyses, which included for him the use of the phenomenological method. He wrote:

Before formulating the axioms, some serious thought work, which is neither empirical research nor deduction, has to be performed. Before our thought reaches the degree of precision that allows for a clear formulation of the axioms, we already somehow have this concept, the development of which this axiomatic system will constitute, as given in a vague and indistinct manner. To get out of these difficulties, we need a serious mental effort, which cannot be called mental poetry by any means. Much of the work of philosophers lies in this pre-axiomatic realm. It may not be called „scientific work,” but it cannot be denied its value for scientific cognition (Ajdukiewicz 1946, 28).

²³ Cf. e.g. (Kotarbińska 1957).

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PART I.

**INGARDEN AND THE LVOV-WARSAW
SCHOOL:**

MUTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

1. Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School

1. General remarks on the Lvov-Warsaw School

The Lvov-Warsaw School was established by Kazimierz Twardowski at the end of the 19th century, when he became the professor of philosophy at the Lvov University²⁴. He wanted to create a philosophical school in Poland which could be compared with leading movements present in the world. Twardowski studied in Vienna in 1885–1891, obtained PhD in 1891 and Habilitation in 1894. He was strongly influenced by Brentano and continued his ideas. Twardowski's metaphilosophical program can be summarized in the following points: (1) the method of philosophy is the same as other academic sciences; (2) scientific philosophy is possible; (3) philosophers should operate by clear and justified propositions; (4) descriptive psychology in Brentano's sense and logic as the general technology of thinking form the foundations of philosophy; (5) mental acts are always intentional, that is, they refer to objects; (f) philosophy should avoid speculative problems; (6) philosophy is independent of world-views, particularly political and religious; (7) analysis *via* logic *sensu largo*, that is, semiotic (Twardowski did not use this label), formal logic and the methodology of science, is the proper philosophical method; (8) ethics and aesthetics can be done in the scientific manner – this thesis assumes objectivism and absolutism (the latter at least to some extent) of values.

In general, he recommended a kind of minimalism contrasted with the tendency to build great systems of philosophy, but, on the other hand, he

²⁴ The name “Lvov-Warsaw School” (more precisely, “l'école de Lwów et Varsovie”) used (probably) Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in his welcome address delivered at the Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935. On LWS, cf. (I only mention books in English): (Skolimowski 1967), (Woleński 1985), (Jadacki 2003), (Garrido, Wybraniec-Skardowska (eds.) 2018), (Drabarek, Woleński, Radzki (eds.) 2019).

did not preclude dealing with most of traditional problems considered by philosophers of the past.

Twardowski was a charismatic teacher – he trained more than 30 full university professors, mostly in philosophy, but also in psychology, linguistics, history of art, history of literature, *etc.* However, his understanding and doing of philosophy favoured problems of semantics, formal logic and the methodology of science, that is, logic in the wide sense. And although the group of his students was considerably diversified according to their interests, many of them became attracted by logical problems. The most important “logical” names include Jan Łukasiewicz (one of the first Twardowski’s students), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Stanisław Leśniewski and Zygmunt Zawirski. All graduated before 1914 and constituted the first generation of LWS. In fact, it was still a community limited to Lvov (its members they used the label “the Lvov Collegium”). In 1916, Warsaw University was reactivated²⁵. Leśniewski, Łukasiewicz and Kotarbiński became professors of this university – it was the beginning of LWS in which the logical orientation dominated (sometimes LWS is limited to its logical wing by commentators, but it is a wrong picture). In particular, the Warsaw logical school was established by Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski, professors at the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences – they trained a group of logicians with Alfred Tarski as the most famous person (perhaps the most distinguished member of the entire LWS). Also Kotarbiński the professor at the Faculty of the Humanities popularized logic among students of philosophy. Twardowski (retired in 1930) and Ajdukiewicz (professor since 1928) remained in Lvov, Czeżowski taught in Vilna, Zawirski in Poznan and Cracow (since 1937). However, Lvov and Warsaw were the main centres of LWS. The above description of LWS is very schematic and general, and restricted to its logical part (LWS in the narrow sense). Perhaps the following characterization should be added:

The philosophers of the Lvov group were not united in by any common doctrine, by a unified world-view. Not the content of philosophy but rather the method of philosophizing and the common language were the factors

²⁵ This university was established in 1816 and closed in 1831. Tsarist authorities organized the Imperial University in Warsaw (with Russian language as official). Russian troops left Warsaw at the beginning of World War I and the city was controlled by Germans. They allowed to re-open the Polish university.

which formed the foundation of the spiritual community of those people. This is why the school could produce spiritualists, and materialists, nominalists and realists, logicians and psychologists, philosophers of nature and art theorists²⁶ (Dąmbska 1948, p. 17).

This characterization of Lvov Collegium as pluralistic can be extended to the entire LWS.

Twardowski strongly insisted that his students should be open for ideas coming from contemporary philosophy. He warned against being influenced by one and only one philosophical movement or tradition. Of course, it does not mean that all ideas were treated in LWS as equivalently important. For instance, due to Twardowski's heritage, Brentanism provided several important influences for LWS. In particular, the thesis that mental acts are intentional was commonly accepted and combined with semantics – the semantic reading of the thesis of intentionality consisted in the view that linguistic expressions refer to items which exist outside language. Furthermore, the thesis that the content of a mental act is evidently given was transformed into the claim that meanings of expressions are essentially obvious for every competent user of a language. These both views had an importance for the development of semantics in Poland. Yet LWS rejected the position that descriptive psychology is the basis for philosophy – one of the most characteristic Brentano's views. Logicians worked in the tradition of Frege, Russell and Hilbert. Ajdukiewicz was influenced by French conventionalism in his thinking on knowledge and science. What about phenomenology? Twardowski limited his initial psychologism under Husserl's influence. Łukasiewicz repeated Husserl's criticism of psychologism dressing it in a more logical form – laws of logic cannot be entailed by psychology, because *a priori* propositions do not follow from empirical premises. Ajdukiewicz and Czeżowski accepted Husserlian theory of meaning-intention. Leśniewski, Ajdukiewicz and Tarski developed Husserl's conception of semantic categories. However, the majority of members of LWS did not agree with fundamental insights of phenomenology concerning direct knowledge of essences *via* phenomenological reduction. As far as the problem concerns philosophers of the past, Aristotle was highly appreciated not only as philosopher deserving historical studies, but also as someone inspiring substantial

²⁶ Izydora Dąmbska was Twardowski's student in Lvov – she studied in the 1920s. She worked in logic *sensu largo*, mainly semiotics and the methodology of science.

matters (Łukasiewicz and many-valued logic, Tarski and the classical theory of truth). Some members of LWS (Józef M. Bocheński, Jan Salamucha) tried to modernize Thomism by logic. Neo-Kantianism was well-known, but rather as an occasion for polemics with transcendental idealism.

Perhaps relations between LWS and logical empiricism are the most important from the historical point of view, also because Polish analytic school is frequently perceived as a branch of neo-positivism. This last account is dubious, because LWS arose earlier than the Vienna Circle. Clearly, both schools had important common features as sharing a negative attitude toward speculative metaphysics and the belief that logic is a source of effective philosophical analysis. Yet LWS did not propose any general criterion of a distinction between science and metaphysics. Hence, many problems qualified by logical empiricists as meaningless, were considered in Lvov and Warsaw as subjected to a scientific analysis, for example, the problem of determinism treated as substantial, not verbal as in the Vienna Circle. Another difference consisted in seeing the nature of logical analysis – logical empiricists views it syntactically (at least until the middle-1930s, but LWS semantically. Twardowski and his followers rejected emotivism, the view that norms and evaluations exclusively express subjective emotions. Consequently, LWS recognized rational arguments in ethics, contrary to the Vienna Circle that normative ethical argumentation is persuasive in its nature. In general, Polish philosophers considered the metaphilosophy of logical empiricism is too restrictive and unjustified. Of course, there were some similarities in particular questions, for instance, between physicalism and Kotarbiński's reism. Ajdukiewicz frequently applied the method of expressing philosophical problems in metalanguage, indicating that this way was suggested by the Vienna Circle. Influences of logical empiricism on LWS were much stronger in the case of the second generation (e.g. Maria Kokoszyńska, Janina Kotarbińska, Henryk Mehlberg) than in the first group of Twardowski's students – it is not surprising, because views of the latter were formed before the rise of the Vienna Circle. Various similarities became observed by both schools very soon. It resulted in mutual visits (Carnap in Lvov and Warsaw in 1930, Tarski in Vienna in the same year). Poles were invited to conferences and congresses organized by the Vienna Circle. It was important for increasing the international reputation of LWS. One should also remember that Tarski's writings played an essential role in transformation Carnap's views to more semantic.

2. Few words on Roman Ingarden

Roman Ingarden entered Lvov University in 1911 – he studied philosophy as the primary subject and mathematics as the secondary. After the first semester, he moved to Göttingen to study philosophy with Husserl – he also attended Hilbert's lectures in mathematics. In 1914/1915 lived in Vienna, where he participated in activities of Polish scientific community acted in this city and cooperated with Twardowski (the rector of Lvov University, moved to Vienna in 1914, due Russian occupation of Lvov). Ingarden returned to Germany, to Fieiburg in 1916, where Husserl became appointed as the professor. Ingarden obtained PhD (under Husserl's supervision) he presented the dissertation on intuition and intellect in Bergson. He returned to Poland in 1918 and defended his habilitation, on the base of the book *On Essential Questions* (published in German), in Lvov in 1924. Ingarden's monograph *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft* appeared in 1931 and very soon gained a remarkable international recognition. Ingarden became the professor of philosophy at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov in 1933. When Soviet Army occupied Lvov, the university was reorganized as Ukrainian (and named Ivan Franko University). Ingarden was moved to the Department of German Language and Literature. In the years 1942-1944 (during German occupation), he taught mathematics in a secondary vocational school for Poles and also participated in Polish underground university teaching. In 1944, he moved to Cracow and became the professor of Jagiellonian University in 1946. In 1950, he was suspended in teaching by the authorities (it was a result of Stalinist policy in Poland). Ingarden returned to university in 1957, was retired in 1963 and died on June 14, 1970, in Cracow.

Ingarden became one of the most distinguished students of Husserl, particularly among representatives of realistic phenomenology. He shared fundamental principles of phenomenological metaphilosophy (philosophical methodology), namely, (a) philosophy is persuppositionless; (b) science, in particular logic requires a philosophical justification, and cannot serve as the foundation of philosophy; (c) antipsychologism; (d) consciousness is intentional; (e) the role of phenomenological reduction; (f) reduction is a kind of experience but of a different kind than in British empiricism or Kant; (d) philosophy is *a priori*; (g) experience presents its objects originally (the principle of all principles); (h) philosophy is a science, but

different than natural or logic; (i) philosophy must be formed as a system and its task is maximalistic, not minimalistic; (k) basic moral and aesthetic values are objective; (l) philosophy and world-views do not cross each other. Husserl's influence is obvious at every point (a)-(l)²⁷. Ingarden studied with Husserl when the latter gradually moved to transcendental phenomenology – it happened at the end of the Göttingen period and culminated in Freiburg. Ingarden never accepted transcendental phenomenology. Although he understood and exceptionally clearly presented Husserlian motives which led his master toward transcendentalism, he argued that realistic phenomenology is able to solve all problems registered by Husserl in such writings as *Ideas of Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913), *Cartesian Meditations* (1931), *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) or *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (1936). The key problem in the Ingarden-Husserl controversy concerned the existence of the real world. Roughly speaking and not entering into various subtle problems, according to Husserl, the world is constituted by the pure transcendental consciousness, but, for Ingarden, the reality exists independently of the transcendental mental sphere²⁸.

3. Personal-professional relations between Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School

Relations between Ingarden and LWS can be considered in two planes, personal-professional and scientific, both mutually interfered. I will begin with an outline of the former. Ingarden decided to initiate and continue his academic carrier in Lvov, that is, in the environment of Twardowski and one of the main centres of LWS. Ingarden's habilitation passed without major difficulties, he obtained so-called *veniam legendi* (the right to lecturing at university) and could teach as a docent (associate professor). His ambitions were greater – he wanted to be the full university professor. Ingarden hoped to satisfy this task in 1928, but he lost rivalry with Ajdukiewicz. Ingarden

²⁷ A detailed presentation of Ingarden's philosophical views (as well as an extensive primary secondary bibliography) and can be find in (Nowak, Sosnowski (eds.) 2001).

²⁸ Ingarden defended his view in his *opus magnum*, *Controversy over the Existence of the World* (Ingarden 1947-1948).

was very disappointed by this failure²⁹. The next opportunity for Ingarden appeared when Twardowski became retired in 1930 and the problem of his successor had to be solved. Twardowski himself was not satisfied by the perspective of Ingarden's appointment – he preferred someone from his students and thought about Kotarbiński or a psychologist Władysław Witwicki, but the former did not like to leave Warsaw and the latter was rejected by Ajdukiewicz. The discussions were continued almost three years. Finally, Ingarden became approved. Here is Twardowski's comment:

We discussed [with Ajdukiewicz] the problem of the second professor of philosophy. Kazik decided to propose Ingarden. I answered that although I do not consider him as a suitable candidate, I will not act against this proposal [...] and promised to vote in favour of Ingarden (Twardowski 1997, p. 156).

Ingarden was nominated in 1933 and became very active in Lvov philosophical life. He chaired the Section of Epistemology in Polish Philosophical Society and delivered several lectures at its meetings. This contributed to more intensive contacts with local philosophers, mostly belonging to LWS. It seems that Ingarden's relations with Twardowski and Ajdukiewicz became warmer than before. The tradition, going back to Brentano and continued by Twardowski, comprised also regular meetings of philosophy professors of a give university. Various documents confirm such encounters in the years 1933-1939. Ingarden had good relations with some other Lvov philosophers, particularly Daniela Gromska and Dąmbska. In 1932, Ingarden proposed to publish a Polish philosophical journal published in foreign languages – this idea was realized by *Studia Philosophica*, edited by Ajdukiewicz, Ingarden and Twardowski³⁰. The first volume appeared in 1935 and contained i. a. German translation of famous Tarski's essay *The Concept of Truth in Formalize Languages*, the second volume – in 1937. All editors, one

²⁹ Cf. (Ingarden 1999), (Jadczak 1999). Ingarden himself formulated nasty remarks on Ajdukiewicz that (both studied in Göttingen in 1913-1914) he (Ajdukiewicz) was more interested in pubs than lectures, and that was forced to leave the University of Warsaw (he was the professor there in 1927-1928) due to Leśniewski's plagiarism objections. Ingarden maintained that Ajdukiewicz became the professor in Lvov, because he was Twardowski's son in law. According to gossips circulated in Polish philosophical community, Ajdukiewicz used to say that a dark water appeared in the crane in his office after Ingarden occupied the next room.

³⁰ The story of this journal is presented in (Ingarden 2018).

phenomenologist and two pillars of LWS were convinced that that a major presence of Polish philosophy on international scene is a very important thing and *Studia Philosophica* was designed to fulfil this task. One of Ingarden's dreams consisted in introducing phenomenology to Polish philosophical life. He tried to organize a phenomenological circle in Lvov. Its members recruited from Twardowski's students, like Walter Auerbach (he moved to Warsaw in 1936), Leopold Blaustein, Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustain, Zofia Lissa and Stefania Łobaczewska, who were less interested in logic, and more in ontology and aesthetics (the Blausteins were involved into studies on Husserl still before contacts with Ingarden. War World II probably prevented the rise a serious phenomenological school in Lvov³¹. Yet the rise of phenomenological circle in Lvov, being a marriage of LWS and phenomenology was a historical surprise.

If pre-war relations of Ingarden and LWS were personal as well as institutional, the post-war became rather limited to the former, because this school ended its existence, at least as a compact and institutionally organized philosophical community. Eventually one might say that in the period after 1945, Ingarden was still active as the editor. He co-edited the journal *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* with Zawirski (he died in 1948). The third volume of *Studia Philosophica* was published in 1948 under editorship of Ajdukiewicz, Ingarden and Twardowski (it was indicated that he died in 1938), and the fourth volume – in 1951 (Ingarden is mentioned as one of collaborators in editing – Ajdukiewicz was the editor-in-chief). *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny*, *Przegląd Filozoficzny* and *Studia Philosophica* were closed in 1949-1951. It was an element of Marxist campaign against bourgeois philosophy. At the same time, several philosophers, including Dąmbska and Ingarden, were moved away from teaching. Ajdukiewicz, Czeżowski and Kotarbiński could only teach logic. Marxists, particularly Adam Schaff, maintained that logicians might be “marxized,” but Ingarden and Dąmbska were regarded as unreformed idealists – they obtained salaries and worked as translators in the Library of Philosophy Classics, remained outside of universities. The task converting of the mentioned logicians to Marxism failed, but it meant that Ingarden and many members of LWS belonged to the same philosophical camp, let say non-Marxist.

Ingarden's situation changed once again in the years 1956-1957, due to political liberalization connected with Polish October 1956. Ingarden

³¹ The Blausteins and Auerbach were victims of the Holocaust.

returned to Jagiellonian University as the professor. He proposed Dąmbska (their relations became very friendly after 1945) and Gromska as other professors of philosophy at this university³². The former represented the logical-analytic wing of LWS (Gromska was a historian of philosophy). Although philosophical differences (cf. below) between Ingarden and LWS remained as fundamental as earlier, the common situation in a new social and political reality, caused new personal links. On a more institutional side, co-operation in Polish Philosophical Society was important. Kotarbiński acted as its president, Ingarden – as the head of Cracow Branch, Czeżowski – as the head of Toruń Branch. The former tensions between Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz weakened, what is documented by the fact that they contributed to *Festschrifts* dedicated to them.

4. Scientific relations between Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School

After many years Ingarden remarked:

I wrote this paper in the winter 1919/1920 – I was motivated by the situation in Polish philosophy I found in Warsaw after coming there in the summer of 1919. Here is no place to describe the disconsolate state of affairs which I experiences. Let it be enough to say that I was hit by almost complete lack of knowledge of what happened in contemporary Western European philosophy. It seem to me that one should try to improve this situation. I arrived, not very far ago, from Göttingen, a great scientific centre at the beginning of the 20th century, in particular, after few-years contacts with Husserl and phenomenologists. I thought that my duty consists in informing Polish philosophical community what I learned there. It was rather a secondary matter, whether one would use that³³ (Ingarden 1919, p. 269).

Doubtless, Ingarden declared similar views in discussions in Warsaw and Lvov, and it cannot be a surprise that his evaluation did not satisfy

³² Ingarden, proposing Dąmbska and Gromska, was also directed by Lvov re-sentiments, very strong in people living in this city before World War II.

³³ It is Ingarden's comment to a reprint of the paper originally published in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* – it was the first extensive presentation of phenomenology in Polish.

philosophical communities in these cities – it was probably one of reasons of a relatively negative attitude of Twardowski and his followers to Ingarden. The last sentence in the last quoted passage (written after more than forty years since the publication of the paper on aims of phenomenology) suggests that Polish philosophers did not follow Ingarden's offer. Independently of whether Ingarden was right in his diagnosis, two things should be observed. Firstly, Ingarden incorrectly identified the knowledge of Western European philosophy with knowledge of phenomenology. Although one can understand that Husserl's pupil had such an opinion, but this measure cannot be considered as universal. Surely, the knowledge of phenomenology was not particularly great in Poland, but qualification that this philosophy was almost completely unknown must be regarded as wrong. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, also associated with LWS published a paper on phenomenology earlier than Ingarden, Leśniewski planned to translate Husserl's *Logical Investigations* into Polish, Ajdukiewicz analysed views of Adolf Reinach or Łukasiewicz repeated (and improved) on Husserl's arguments against psychologism. Ingarden probably intended acceptance of phenomenology, not only its knowledge. Secondly, LWS already had own philosophical identity at that time based on the belief into the effectiveness of logic as a fundamental instrument of philosophical analysis. Accordingly, works of Frege, Russell or Poincaré were quite well known about 1920. Let me remind that Twardowski postulated that Polish philosophers should avoid be influenced by one and only one important philosophical view present in the world.

Of course, the philosophical conflict between Ingarden and LWS cannot be reduced to his disappointment concerning the situation in Polish philosophy around 1918. Taking into account the points (a)-(l) as characteristic for Ingarden's philosophy, the only points (c), (d), (k) and (l) can be considered as shared by LWS³⁴. Particularly, Ingarden and LWS sharply distinguished philosophy and world-views³⁵. As far as the problem concerns other matters, LWS maintained that (i) philosophy can, and even should

³⁴ I only note (k) without a further discussion this point except noticing that Ingarden's axiological objectivism and the related view of LWS had entirely different foundations.

³⁵ This view had an importance for relations between Ingarden and members of LWS after 1945, because it determined the relation to Marxism to some extent. He and Dąbbska stressed that philosophy must be neutral with respect to religion and politics, but not refuse discussions with Marxists on philosophical problems, for instance the question of causality or the validity of dialectics.

use science, for instance, physics; (ii) science, particularly logic, does not require a philosophical justification; (iii) there is no something like eidetic reduction – if we can speak about the essence of phenomena, we should appeal to scientific (that is, normal methods); (iv) experience should be understood according to the old philosophical tradition, even if its scope is controversial (axiological experience, introspection), (v) although one can say that experience presents originally its objects, but it only means that there is direct empirical knowledge; (vi) philosophy is a science in the normal sense, that is, such as in the case of other academic disciplines, but not proposed by phenomenology; (vii) the question of a philosophical system is secondary – answering concrete problems is a primary task of doing philosophy; (viii) the aim of philosophy is minimalistic, although it does not mean that all its traditional problems should be neglected as meaningless (it is an important difference between LWS and logical empiricism) – yet a deeper analysis can suggest that some speculative questions are to be rejected (considering such problems was called metaphysicism by Twardowski). Generally, although it was never explicitly stated (at least, according to my knowledge), LWS considered phenomenology, including Ingarden views, as irrational in Ajdukiewicz's sense (he contrasted irrationalism with anti-irrationalism). According to this qualification, irrationalism of phenomenology consists in using methods which are not intersubjectively communicable and testable. Clearly, Ingarden did not agree with these objections, also formulated against Husserl by the Vienna Circle³⁶. Generally, speaking he considered the account of experience and intersubjectivity proposed by LWS and logical empiricism as too weak. It is easily seen that a compromise in this situation is very difficult because *res ad principiam venit*, relatively to various methodological principles and problems.

The above survey omitted points (c) and (d), that is, intentionality of consciousness and anti-psychologism³⁷. On the side of Twardowski and his followers, the problem was simple – they (cf. above) rejected psychologism

³⁶ For Ingarden's counterarguments, cf. (Ingarden 1963, note 21), and many places in his other collections, like (Ingarden 1971), (Ingarden 1972). He also frequently addressed to these problems in his lectures and seminars in 1960–1963 (I was a participant of them).

³⁷ I also does not discuss axiological problems. Ingarden and LWS shared axiological cognitivism and objectivism. Yet there is a lack of mutual polemics or approvals of these both sides. I guess that Ingarden would qualify the related views of LWS as not theoretically grounded in a sufficient way – the second party would answer that the phenomenological justification is too speculative.

under Husserl influence. Furthermore, intentionality of mental acts, was inherited by LWS from Brentano, eventually supplemented by its semantic dimension. However, Ingarden saw that otherwise. Although he regarded Brentano as a revolutionary philosopher as far as intentionality is concerned, he understood Brentanian account of mental phenomena only as a preparatory step for Husserl's analysis that the constitution of objects in mental acts directed to those items is the essential element of intentionality³⁸. Consequently, Ingarden continues, Brentano remains in the frameworks of descriptive psychology, but Husserl introduced the category of pure consciousness, which allows the proper analysis of intentionality. It is so in Husserl's early philosophy based on eidetic reduction as well as in transcendental phenomenology. As far as the problem concerns Ingarden's relation to views of LWS on anti-psychologism, he more explicitly treated Twardowski's views³⁹. According to Ingarden, the distinction of content and object, introduced by Twardowski, was an important supplement to Brentanism, but it does not cross Brentano's horizon. At most, one might say that descriptive psychology is something transitory between the standard empirical psychology and psychological theory based on phenomenology. Ingarden did not deny the importance of experimental psychological research, but maintained they have no major significance for philosophy, especially, to philosophy of mind or epistemology. In general, Ingarden considered anti-psychologism of LWS as apparent, perhaps as a kind of para-psychologism (or hidden psychologism). Perhaps this evaluation did not concern so much Twardowski himself, but his students, particularly from the logical wing of LWS. Ingarden argued (I rely on my memories related to his lectures and seminars) that formal logic does not overcome psychologism and that semantic approach to intentionality is secondary to its actual phenomenological essence being primary.

Ingarden had a few direct confrontations with members of LWS. His polemics concerned Lesniewski and Kotarbiński on the existence of general objects (universals), Ajdukiewicz on the semantics of questions, Twardowski on clear and unclear philosophical style, Kotarbiński on inner experience (introspection), Kotarbiński on understanding philosophy and Ajdukiewicz on transcendental idealism. clear (against the semantic account of questions (Ajdukiewicz)). Leśniewski formulated an argument, shared by Kotarbiński,

³⁸ Cf. (Ingarden 1936).

³⁹ Cf. (Ingarden 1947).

against the existence of universals⁴⁰. Both assume that general object possesses only such properties which belong to all individual objects related to it. Two objects are identical if and only if they have the same properties (Leibniz's principle). However, it must exist a property which differentiates two individual objects. It cannot be a property of a general object as well as a property which does not belong to a given universal. Consequently, an individual object in question falls and does not fall under a given general object and we have a contradiction. Ingarden criticized this reasoning⁴¹. He questioned considering not possessing a property is a property and resulting statement that universals do not satisfy the principle of the excluded middle. Moreover, Ingarden questioned the definition of universals (and other objects) as being sets (collections, classes) of properties (he called it the class theory of objects – the label frequently used by him in lectures and seminars). He contrasted this theory with his own account based on the conception of ideas (but not in the sense of Plato or Locke). Roughly speaking, an idea has a content and exemplifications – a crucial point is that the content possesses constant and variable elements. Consequently, an individual object satisfies both kinds of content-constituents – two such objects differ their relation to variable elements. In his habilitation, Ingarden analyzed questions and their logical structure. Ajdukiewicz considered a similar problem in delivered talks and papers published at the late 1920s, but later than Ingarden's *Essentiale Fragen*. Ingarden objected that his results Ajdukiewicz were not sufficiently noted by Ajdukiewicz⁴².

Ingarden commented Twardowski's claim, very popular in LSW, philosophers should use a clear style of writing and speaking and avoid unclear one⁴³. According to Ingarden, Twardowski considered clarity too absolutely, although it is a relative property and depends on various circumstances,

⁴⁰ Cf. (Leśniewski 1913), (Kotarbiński 1920). (Kotarbiński's argumentation was slightly different from that of Leśniewski, but I neglect differences.

⁴¹ Cf. (Ingarden 1925). I refer to Polish edition of Ingarden's work *Essentiale Fragen*, published in (Ingarden 1972). Criticism of the argumentation of Leśniewski-Kotarbiński is in an appendix to this version (Ingarden 1972a). Cf. also (Rygalski 1994). Incidentally, views of Leśniewski and Kotarbiński were also criticised in LWS – cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1934). Ingarden told once at his seminar that Leśniewski was the most demanding polemist he met in his life.

⁴² This problem is the subject of Ajdukiewicz's letters to Ingarden published as (Ajdukiewicz 2020). Ajdukiewicz explained that the lack of references to Ingarden in his papers was not intentional.

⁴³ (Twardowski 1919-1920), (Ingarden 1919-1920).

sometimes independent of a given author. As it follows from the later correspondence of both philosophers (I omit bibliographical details), Twardowski agreed with Ingarden that clarity has, so to speak, grades. At the beginning of 1920s, Ingarden and Kotarbiński exchanged polemics concerning introspection and the essence of philosophy⁴⁴. The latter understood the inner experience as a bodily process. This view was inadmissible for Ingarden, because such a materialistic view neglects the subjective aspect of mental acts. As far as the problem concerns the nature of philosophy, Kotarbiński proposed to consider it as a collection of disciplines, but not as a unitary field. He maintained that a philosopher is a logician, a specialist in ethics, a historian of philosophy, but not a philosopher as such. Ingarden protested against this account and argued that philosophy should be understood as a uniform domain, homogenous methodologically. Consequently, one speak about philosophy *simpliciter*, but not only about particular philosophical sub-disciplines. W 1936 took place the Third Polish Philosophical Congress. Ajdukiewicz delivered at this meeting the talk "The Semantical Version of the Problem of Transcendental Idealism." Ingarden participated in the discussion.⁴⁵ Ajdukiewicz argued that if knowledge (as a result) contains arithmetic of natural numbers and the principle of the excluded middle as a valid theorem of logic, then there are true sentences, which are unprovable. Consequently, one cannot reduce the world as a correlate of the cognitive subject represented by the set of provable sentences. Ingarden evaluated Ajdukiewicz's talk as beautiful, but formulated some objections, namely, firstly, that the entire problem is limited to the analysis of meanings (this excludes the problem of the objectivity of knowledge), secondly, that the direct cognition becomes eliminated, and thirdly, that regards meanings as independent of their theoretical contexts. Ajdukiewicz answered that that (*) semantics does not exclude the question of objectivity, because it uses the concept of truth; (**) it is impossible to deal with concepts, if their meanings are unknown; (***) it is always possible to give a definition of a given concept by employing the metalangugae in question. One can say once again that these polemics fall under the principle *res ad principia venit* in every case.

⁴⁴ (Kotarbiński 1922), (Kotarbiński 1921/1922), (Ingarden 1922), (Kotarbiński 1922a).

⁴⁵ For summary of Ajdukiewicz's talk cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1936); for Ingarden's remarks – (Ingarden 1936a). The full text of Ajdukiewicz talk is available in (Ajdukiewicz 1937). For an account of this polemics, cf. the chapter by Olech (in this volume).

Ingarden was conscious of the stormy development of mathematical logic since the beginning of the 20th century. He followed Husserl's understanding of the essence of logic. Various Husserl's ideas, for instance anti-psychologism or the theory of semantic categories played an important role in the history of contemporary logic, but his mathematical-logical interests cannot be regarded as particularly intensive. His lectures and writings (published in the recent thirty years in the series *Husserliana*) deal only marginally with formal logic and concentrate on problems qualified today as belonging to so-called philosophical logic (questions of meaning, logical form, pure grammar, *etc.*). In Göttingen, Husserl belonged to the same academic community to which Hilbert functioned. Their personal relations were rather cold, independently of that, formalism in the foundations of mathematics, the program developed by Hilbert, was entirely at odds with phenomenology. Freiburg, the later place of Husserl's activities, had no more important logicians. Consequently, Husserl, in his transcendental period, was not forced to confrontations with formal logicians. He considered mathematical logic as a part of mathematics and thereby devoid of a major philosophical significance. Ingarden worked in a different situation. He returned to Poland, when LWS strongly interested in logic, existed already, and the Warsaw school of logic started its activities and gained an international reputation very soon in the decade 1920-1930 – this process accelerated in the 1930s. Hilbert's school did not pretend to play a role in general philosophy, but Polish logicians had a different opinion on significance of logic for philosophy. Ingarden worked (for instance, in *Essentiale Fragen*) on many logical problems in Husserl's understanding – his controversy with logicians from LWS was unavoidable, even if completely different opinions on the essence of philosophy. I recall that, according to Ingarden, philosophy is assumption-free and autonomous, also with respect logic⁴⁶. He, guided by the metaphilosophical principles stemming from

⁴⁶ Personal animosities and conflicts also played a role in Ingarden's attitude to logic. It concerns his relations with Leon Chwistek, who did not belong to LWS. He probably wrote the most aggressive criticism of Ingarden's view. According to Chwistek, phenomenology is a characteristic example of verbal metaphysics, and referred to Ingarden as a doctor of the Freiburg University. I remember myself as Ingarden pointed out that this way of speaking was intentionally persuasive in order to suggest that the matter concerned Swiss Fribourge, a very provincial and secondary university at that time. Although Ingarden did not include Chwistek into LWS, he considered his criticism as typical „logistic” malice toward phenomenology.

phenomenology, rejected, what he called, the logistic attempts to rebuilding philosophy.

Ingarden made many critical remarks about logic⁴⁷. Although they were not directly addressed to LWS, but more to the Vienna Circle, the main points of Ingarden's criticism apply to views of Polish logicians as well⁴⁸. Most Ingarden's related objections belong to the philosophy of logic⁴⁹. They include erroneous conventionalism of logic, the lack of explanation of cognitive foundations of logic, "blind" formalism (it causes that even such fundamental metalogical results as Gödel's theorems on incompleteness or Tarski's truth-definition were not properly grounded, even as the problem concerns the scope of their actual validity), the lack clarity in the language/metalanguage, hidden psychologism (I noted this problem above) and metaphysical naivety. Ingarden also stated more concrete objections, e. g. wrong identification of material implication or strict (in the Lewis's sense) and the conditional, admission of formulas, like " p and p " (Ingarden considered them as artificial and counterintuitive) or the modal theorem "if necessary that o , then possible that p " (modalities should be mutually separated). Consequently, logical analysis of ordinary as well as scientific (including philosophical) language *via* formal logic has a very limited scope. However, Ingarden did not agree with the Oxford philosophy of ordinary language. I remember that when Janina Kotarbińska delivered (at the beginning of the 1960s) a talk on the limits of logic and mentioned views of Oxonian

⁴⁷ One can find them in many places in Ingarden's works, for instance, in his collections mentioned in former footnotes, and perhaps in the paper (Ingarden 1972b). In my further remarks, I skip detailed bibliographical references.

⁴⁸ At the beginning, Ingarden considered LWS as a kind of logical empiricism. Later (more precisely after 1945) changed this opinion, perhaps under an influence of Zawirski who argued that no typical representatives of this movement could be found in Poland. When L. Kołakowski's book (Kołakowski 1966) appeared and in which the author described LWS as falling under the Viennese school, Ingarden, after reading this work, told (I know this story from the late Jerzy Perzanowski) that this perspective is not proper, because LWS should be regarded as an original Polish philosophical achievement. This statement did not express any acceptance of views proposed by LWS. The change of Ingarden's evaluation of LWS was perhaps partially caused by his better, than formerly, personal relations with still alive members of this school.

⁴⁹ I summarized Ingarden's anti-logical remarks in (Woleński 1980). The title of this paper points out that I do not consider Ingarden's objections as correct, but I abstain from concrete evaluations in the present essay. I note only that I could repeat my argument stated in the mentioned paper.

philosophers on the logic of the ordinary language, Ingarden qualified them as logical barbarians. At the same time, I had a conversation with Ingarden about logical analysis of the ordinary speech – he said “We, phenomenologists, provide the correct analysis of the colloquial language.”

As I already mentioned, LWS had not a high opinion on phenomenology, in particular, on Ingarden. I quote Łukasiewicz’s words:

The first volume of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* made an enormous impression, especially in my case. I did not like psychologism, practised by Twardowski, for a long time, but I broke with it entirely after reading Husserl. However, I was disappointed by the second volume of *Logical Investigations*. It contained an obscure philosophical gabbing which repelled me from all German philosophers. I was surprised by so great difference between two volumes of the same work. I later realized that someone else spoke to me in the first volume, someone much greater, not Husserl, but the author used by him in the book in question – it was Gottlob Frege (Łukasiewicz 2013, p. 65; this fragment was noted on June 5, 1949)

Łukasiewicz’s view on Husserl’s dependence on Frege is controversial. If nobody had doubts that Husserl’s criticism of psychologism was anticipated (and perhaps somehow motivated) by Frege, many other logical ideas of the originator of phenomenology should be regarded as original), but it is a secondary problem in the present context. Nevertheless, we can assume that if Łukasiewicz would be asked about his opinion on Ingarden, the answer would probably state “it is an obscure philosophical gabbing which repelled me from all German philosophers” (Ingarden had an opinion of someone thinking in German, even when he was writing in Polish). Supposedly, a similar opinion on Ingarden was shared by many other philosophers from LWS – Twardowski’s reservations concerning Ingarden’s appointment as the professor in Lvov could be caused by the mentioned evaluation. If a story on obscure water (cf. note 29) is true at all, it might arise as a result of the qualification à la Łukasiewicz of Ingarden’s view. In other words, Ingarden was considered by LWS as a speculative metaphysician. According to LWS, particularly its logical wing, such an attitude blocked doing scientific philosophy. Although, anti-metaphysicism of Twardowski and his students was more liberal than in the case of that represented by the Vienna Circle, nothing strange that Ingarden connected these both philosophical groups as belonging to the same philosophical camp.

The situation changed after 1945, due to better personal relations between Ingarden and representatives of LWS (cf. above), but also because Ingarden's philosophy gained a better recognition. For instance, Józef M. Bocheński (a member of LWS) wrote that Ingarden's *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, can be considered as the greatest work of European metaphysics since Aristotle. Even if not all evaluate this book in such a way, but no doubt that is a remarkable philosophical achievement. Another path searches of similarities between Ingarden and analytic philosophy, including logic⁵⁰. It is a fragment of a more general trend consisting in building bridges between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. These circumstances motivate some historical remarks, I admit that they are partially speculative. Does Ingarden's presence in the environment dominated by LWS somehow influenced his philosophical views? It seems that the answer is Yes, because he was motivated to a clear formulations of his views – although he had reservations toward formal logic, he felt obliged to respect its recommendation, at least to some extent. Does the reverse influence occurred? Also we should answer positively, because Polish “logicians” cannot ignore Ingarden's idea in ontology, epistemology and the philosophy of language. Perhaps it contributed to a greater respect of metaphysics in LWS than in the Vienna Circle.

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50 The paper Dąmbska 1976 is an early example.

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2. Was Ingarden an Analytic Philosopher?

Roman Ingarden's critical (to put it mildly) attitude to analytic philosophy, the Lvov-Warsaw School included, is universally known⁵¹. On the other hand, however, his works contain examples of original kinds of philosophical analysis, such as analysis of the historical philosophical concepts, ontological analysis, and combinatorial metaphilosophical analysis. Below, I will attempt to discuss these kinds by quoting particular examples (taken from his *Controversy over the Existence of the World*) and to defend the claim that Roman Ingarden was (and, according to his own philosophy, still is) an atypical yet reliable analytic philosopher. I will not include in my discussion Ingarden's strictly phenomenological works or his investigations into language (and logic), which, however inspiring (also for the analytic philosopher)⁵², are less interesting from the methodological point of view than the applications of the methods mentioned above.

1. Analysis of the historical philosophical concepts

In his *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, Ingarden analyzes historical philosophical concepts many times. The analysis consists in distinguishing different meanings of a term taken from the history of philosophy and

⁵¹ Cf. interesting comments on this matter by Szubka (2020). Paraphrasing Skolimowski's remark cited by Szubka, I would say that Ingarden's philosophy is a combination of phenomenology, speculation, and (to no lesser degree) analysis. Perhaps the first two moments may be considered as more "German," while the third as more "Polish," but not necessarily in the sense of precisely indicating their origin. *NB*, I would suggest looking at the connection between speculation and the Latin Scholasticism, present in the Polish Roman Catholicism. Such "psychoanalytical" suppositions, however, would not lead us far.

⁵² Ingarden's analysis of everyday language has been recently discussed by Kołodziejczyk (2020).

in attempting to explicate each of these meanings. Such an analysis shows that a given term is related not to one, but to numerous different concepts (meanings) and that among these concepts (meanings) there are certain relationships. The benefit of the analysis is thus twofold: on the one hand, it helps avoid confusing philosophical concepts and, on the other hand, shows how the concepts in question compare to one another. This kind of analysis makes it possible for philosophers to select concepts which (e.g. because they are characterized by the desired degree of universality) fit better the problems they address.

A model example of the analysis of concepts drawn from the history of philosophy is included in §34 of *Controversy...* entitled “Distinction of the Foundational Concepts of Form and Matter” (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. II, pp. 19-43). The result of the analysis is a list, presented in the subsequent paragraph (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. II, pp. 43-44), of nine oppositions or correlations of form and matter. Slightly simplified, the list may be reconstructed as follows (the source of a given distinction is indicated by names or descriptions in brackets):

I. Form as the determinant – matter as that which is determined (Aristotle).

II. Form as the unqualitative function or structure – matter as the qualitative “filling” of this function or structure (E. Husserl).

III. Form as the ordering of relations among the parts – matter as the ensemble of the parts (K. Twardowski).

IV. Form as THE HOW of something – matter as THE WHAT of something (the distinction between two varieties of Form I: the accidental determinant – the substantial determinant).

V. Form as that which is constant in an object – matter as that which is variable in it (the distinction of moments within Opposition I: constancy is related to Form I and variability to Matter I).

VI. Form as the lawfulness of something or a *Gestalt* of something – matter as that which is subject to a lawfulness or that in which the Gestalt occurs (a modification of Opposition I, I. Kant).

VII. Form as that which is perceived through the senses – matter as that which is merely intended (thought) (the esthetician K.S. Laurila).

VIII. Form as that which is assigned – matter as that which is given (Neo-Kantianism, e.g. P. Natorp).

IX. Form as the model or a finished object – matter as the raw stuff worked-up according to the model (an artistic-technical concept).

Looking at the above list, it is easy to see that Oppositions (Correlations) IV-VI (and perhaps also VIII) are reducible to Opposition I. Ingarden adds that Opposition IX is reducible to Opposition III (the raw stuff is usually an arrangement of the parts, while the model provides a pattern for the relations). Besides, Oppositions VII and VIII are more interesting from the vantage point of epistemology and esthetics than from that of ontology. In the end, there remain only three first Oppositions (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. II, p. 52). In addition, Ingarden changes their order by replacing their historical sequence with the order of their usefulness in ontological investigations. The first place is given to Opposition II (as the pair of the proper formal-ontological concepts), followed by Opposition I (“the Aristotelian concepts”), while Opposition III remains the third (“the relational-technical concepts”)⁵³.

Why has Ingarden so ranked the three oppositions he ultimately singled out? Now, from his analyses one may conclude that

(i) the formal-ontological concepts and the Aristotelian concepts are characterized, as opposed to the relational-technical concepts, by a universal scope of use; simple objects have matter and form (matters and forms) in both the formal-ontological sense and in the Aristotelian one but, having no parts, they also have no matter in the relational-technical sense;

(ii) the formal-ontological distinction of form and matter is, as opposed to the Aristotelian distinction, absolute and more foundational; the Aristotelian substantial form is (upon Ingarden’s interpretation) the Aristotelian matter for accidental form, although in each of these factors it is possible to distinguish non-relativized and more foundational formal-ontological moments, namely the qualitative moment (e.g. humanity in the substantial form of the human being or being bald in a given accidental form) and the functional moment (e.g. constituting in the case of substantial form or attributing in the case of accidental form)⁵⁴.

⁵³ Therefore, further in *Controversy...*, Ingarden changes the numbering, marking the formal-ontological concepts as I and the Aristotelian concepts as II. Actually, in further considerations, he uses only the concepts of form and matter I, although he makes some comments on Correlation III; these comments were reconstructed by (Rosiak 2017), pp. 271-274.

⁵⁴ In addition, Ingarden observes that Aristotle’s idea must lead to the concept of first matter. i.e. “a certain concept that resulted from a theoretical conundrum rather than from an analysis critically thought through” (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. II, p. 28).

As can be seen, Ingarden intended to use the analysis of the historical concepts of form and matter to achieve a greater precision in formulating his problems and to find the most adequate conceptual tool to tackle them. It is also notable that the historical material to which Ingarden refers in this case is not abundant. His analytical mastery consisted exactly in this ability to derive a varied family of concepts from scarce historical resources. In fact, most of the analysis contained in the cited paragraphs refers to the Aristotelian idea of form and matter. To begin with, Ingarden observes that in form conceived as the determinant, one can distinguish the qualitative moment (matter in formal-ontological sense) and the moment of the function of determining (one of the variants of form in formal-ontological sense). Next, he adds that among the variants of form in formal-ontological sense there is the form-function of making-up a whole out of parts. In this way he illustrates the concepts of form and matter in the relational-technical sense. As I have already suggested, Ingarden obtained most of the remaining concepts in a similar fashion. Thus, the Aristotelian idea proves to be a sufficiently capacious basis for analysis.

How would the above example of analysis be regarded by typical analytical philosophers? I believe they would be irritated by its panache, which is unrestrained by the clearly stated logical or linguistic rules. On the other hand, however, they would find it impossible to deny that this kind of analysis could be legitimately used in philosophical studies on the analytic tradition. The difference between Ingarden and the philosophers of this tradition seems to consist primarily in – apart from the panache I have mentioned – their choice of the basis for their respective analyses. The erudition that each of the sides has accumulated and takes as the starting point is different.

At this point, it is worth asking whether there are similarities between Ingarden's analysis presented above and the analysis proposed by the LWS. Experts on the LWS observe that the conceptual analysis done by members of the School consists of the following four main stages: selection of corpus, collecting and examining the corpus data, definitional hypothesis, testing of the consequences of the definitional consequences (Będkowski *et al.* 2020, pp. 63-64, cf. Brożek 2020, pp. 208-211). I believe that one can distinguish these stages in the analysis of form and matter performed by Ingarden. At the first stage, Ingarden chooses a certain corpus of instances of both concepts which includes uses of the respective terms by the philosophers he has selected (verbal corpus) and aspects of objects to which the terms refer, e.g. aspects of a sphere (material corpus). At the second stage, Ingarden makes

various distinctions and comparisons regarding the material in question so as to obtain, at the third stage, three definitions of the pair *FORM* and *MATTER*. The fourth stage may be understood in a twofold manner: (i) as showing that it is above all the so called formal-ontological definition that will be useful in further study; (ii) as drawing consequences from some descriptions made using that definition. As one can see – leaving aside (meta)philosophical declarations and the styles of philosophical languages – there are no essential differences between Ingarden’s conceptual analysis and that proposed by the LWS. Ingarden’s analysis of the concepts of form and matter could well be included in a list of classic analyses performed by the most important LWS members. However, the reader of such a list would easily notice that Ingarden’s analysis stands out by a greater number of factors that has been considered and a lesser tendency to reducing them.

2. Ontological analysis

The best known and most interesting example of Ingarden’s ontological analysis is his analysis of existence. Ingarden included it in §§9-16, 27-30, and 33 of *Controversy...* (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. II, pp. 93-161, 227-278, 289-300). The analysis is entangled in a number of complicated and controversial philosophical assumptions. If we disregard them, the analysis in question can be described by focusing on three operations Ingarden performs.

Firstly, Ingarden discerns (or brings out) certain aspects or factors in any given entity by going through three stages. To begin with, he distinguishes in every entity the formal aspect, the material aspect⁵⁵, and the existential aspect. Then, in the existential aspect, he identifies a mode of being, distinguishing it from the very factuality of being. Finally, in a mode of being, he identifies existential moments, “which can be intuitively discerned and grasped in a mode of being by means of abstraction – by means of a higher order abstraction, so to speak” (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, 108). One might say that Ingarden uses, as it were, an ontological magnifying glass to enlarge ever smaller components of an entity. However, he does not approach these elements mereologically, as parts, much less does he regard them as elements capable of independent functioning. Without entering

⁵⁵ Both aspects are considered in their formal-ontological sense explained above.

into their complicated status, it would be enough to say that they are set apart by means of isolating abstraction of ever higher order.

Secondly, Ingarden attempts a quasi-classification of all possible entities according to their modes (and submodes) of being or similar existential criteria (cf. Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, pp. 290-296). Thus entities (beings) can be divided into absolute (supratemporal), ideal (atemporal)⁵⁶, real (temporal), and purely intentional⁵⁷. Each of the classes distinguished in this way allows for further divisions, among which the division of real entities into present, past, and future, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, objects persisting in time, processes, and events, seems the clearest and best justified. Notably, every part of these divisions can be represented by means of a list of relevant existential moments. In other words, to every (distinguished above) kind of entity, an arrangement of mutually non-exclusive existential moments can be assigned: there are as many possible existential kinds of entities as there are such consistent arrangements. Further divisions, however, require additional formal and material criteria.

Thirdly, Ingarden enumerates and defines (or describes, in a more or less precise fashion) all the relevant existential moments. This operation is the most important in his project because, as I have mentioned above, different kinds of the modes of existence correspond to appropriate combinations of existential moments. But how to obtain these primary existential moments which can be combined further? Regrettably, Ingarden does not establish a clear procedure for identifying existential moments. Based on my overall reading of the discussed fragments of *Controversy...*, I propose the following (albeit infringing upon the chronological order of Ingarden's considerations) reconstruction of this procedure.

(1) We focus cognitively on the entities we know best, particularly on ourselves, and attempt to characterize their existential aspect, by asking two questions:

(a) In what respects is the existence of these entities conditional or dependent (in a broad sense)? (cf. Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, p. 109; Simons 2005, pp. 41-42; Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 662);

⁵⁶ The translator of *Controversy...* into English uses the term "supratemporal" to render both "*ponadczasowy*" and "*pozasczasowy*" (Ingarden 1947. Vol. I, pp. 244, 246; pp. 290, 292). For the sake of precision, I propose to translate the former as "supratemporal" and the latter as "atemporal."

⁵⁷ The latter, if they comprise a temporal aspect at all, it is only in a derivative manner, by having been lent it by certain real entities (cf. below).

(b) What does the specificity of their existence in time consist in?

(2) We write down the results of operation (1) in the form of a list (of the definitions) of type (a) and type (b) existential moments characteristic of the entities which are best known to us.

(3) To each moment included in the list compiled by operation (2), we add possible opposite (or ANTITHETIC/CONTRADICTORY) moments; we illustrate each of the opposite moments with an example of a possible entity characterized by a given moment (examples may be drawn from experience, thought experiments or historical philosophical conceptions).

(4) We proceed to make the list compiled by operation (3) complete and uniform and regard it as relatively final; the list provides the basis for “constructing” and dividing the modes of being.

As a result of operation (1)(a), we obtain the moments of:

– existential derivativeness – e.g. I exist “in virtue of having been produced by some other object” (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, p. 118) or objects, i.e. by my parents;

– existential non-selfsufficiency – e.g. the existence of any single cell of my body “involves a necessary coexistence with some other entity [...] in the unity of a whole,” i.e. in the unity of my organism (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, p. 147);

– existential dependence – e.g. in order to continue, my existence (as selfsufficient existence)⁵⁸ needs or requires the existence of some other (independent) entity, for instance oxygen (cf. Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, pp. 153-154).

Then, as a result of operation (1)(b), we obtain the moments of:

– existential actuality⁵⁹ – e.g. my existence is fully expressed in the present;

⁵⁸ Unfortunately, we must assume some initial understanding of the moment opposed to existential non-selfsufficiency. *NB.* The English term “selfsufficiency” does not convey well, in this context, the meaning of the Polish term “*samodzielność*,” the word “separateness” would be more fitting.

⁵⁹ The translator of *Controversy...* into English uses here the term “activeness” (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, p. 293). In the Polish text, the term used is “*aktualność*” – ‘actuality’ (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, p. 247). The latter seems more appropriate as, according to Ingarden, activeness, or efficaciousness (in German *Wirksamigkeit*), is a submoment of actuality (“actuality harbors this efficaciousness” – Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, p. 240; cf. *ibid.*, p. 241). Ingarden suggests discerning submoments of actuality (although he does this phenomenologically rather than analytically) and is thus moving up, as it were, to the fourth level of isolating abstraction.

– existential fissuration – e.g. the mentioned fulness of my present being is merely “a single [...] narrow fissure” between the past and the future (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, p. 274), continually replaced by an ever new fissure;

– existential fragility – e.g. my existence can be shattered or annihilated (cf. Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, p. 276).

Operation (2) would consist in making a list of the above-mentioned moments and in defining them. I will skip this last step as the above examples and descriptions seem to clarify the meanings of the discussed existential concepts to a sufficient (albeit only initial) degree.

As far as operation (3) is concerned, the list in question, completed with the opposite moments, would look as follows (examples of the supposed “bearers” of the latter moments are given in brackets):

Ad (a):

– existential derivativeness – existential originality (e.g. God as the scholastic *esse a se*)⁶⁰;

– existential non-selfsufficiency – existential selfsufficiency (e.g. a man);

– existential dependence – existential independence (e.g. God or an ideal object);

Ad (b):

– existential actuality – existential non-actuality (e.g. an ideal object) – existential post-actuality (e.g. a real man who is no longer alive)⁶¹;

⁶⁰ It is worth noting that in his text, Ingarden mentions several terms, aspects or variants of this opposition which have not been fully differentiated: factual or temporal opposition (between that which exists in a limited time and that which exists eternally or supratemporally/atemporally), modal opposition (between that which exists, but may not exist and that which exists necessarily), conditional or essential opposition (between that which exists in virtue of an external source and that which exists solely in virtue of the internal source, its essence or nature). Also, some of the other existential oppositions (e.g. existential non-selfsufficiency – existential selfsufficiency) have further variants. I refer here to the absolute understanding of these oppositions, although they can be understood also relatively (e.g. an absolutely original entity is not derived from any other entity, while a relatively original entity, although it is derived from some other entity, is not derived from certain entities).

⁶¹ In this context, Ingarden mentions also more controversial moments: empirical possibility (e.g. a real man who is not yet alive, but may be conceived in the future) and inactuality (e.g. a purely intentional character in a novel). In the former case, one might perhaps speak of pre-actuality (the possible man is allowed or foreshadowed by the present state of affairs), while in the latter case – of quasi-actuality (when we are thinking of a certain moment in the story involving our character as if it were the present moment, similar to our actuality).

– existential fissuration – existential non-fissuration (e.g. God in some theological theories);

– existential fragility – existential durability (e.g. God as an indestructible entity).

In step (4), a new opposition term must be added in part (a):

– existential heteronomy – existential autonomy.

Although the manner in which it was formulated, as well as its appropriateness, led to much controversy, Ingarden regarded the above opposition as a good conceptual tool to discern, in the first place, present real entities (existential autonomy) from merely intentional ones (existential heteronomy). The latter (e.g. works of art) exist, as it were, in virtue of the existence of certain real entities (people) who “create” them (by determining their content) and refer to them or provide them with a physical grounding. Existential heteronomy is conceived as a variant of the greatest conditioning in existence – a conditioning so great that, to many philosophers, heteronomous being (existing “by the grace of conscious act producing it”) seems to be “utter nothing” (Ingarden 1947-1948. Vol. I, pp. 115-116)⁶².

Ingarden’s analysis of existence, as well as the analogous ontological analyses he executed, met with criticism (e.g. Simons 2005, pp. 52-53; Häfliger, Küng 2005, pp. 14, 17, 26, 33; Von Wachter 2005, pp. 78-80) and numerous attempts at complementing or restructuring them were made⁶³. This shows how Ingarden’s proposals were inspiring and, at the same time, open to doubt. It is worth emphasizing that a great proportion of philosophers who have entered into discussion with or continued developing Ingarden’s ontology profess their adherence to the analytic tradition. One might

⁶² According to Ingarden, existential heteronomy is also characteristic of future real objects: they are only empirically possible, and their whole endowment and existence (if one may at all speak of the latter) is fully determined by that which is present. Past entities, in turn, are existentially autonomous, although their actuality is weaker (post-actuality) and they are sustained in being by the present effects or traces of their past actions (retroactive derivativeness).

⁶³ Most of them are discussed in the works published in Polish, so I am not citing them here. The works in question have been authored by direct students of Ingarden (in particular A. Póltawski, J. Perzanowski, A.B. Stępień, W. Stróżewski, J. Woleński) and by their students (M. Rosiak, M. Piwowarczyk, P. Rojek, and F. Kobiela, among others), to mention only those whose manner of thinking about Ingarden is close to mine or who have exerted the greatest influence on me. Also, I do not address the question of what problems and solutions proposed by English-language analytic metaphysics had been anticipated by Ingarden’s investigations.

say that his ontology cannot be considered analytic in the sense of minimalism or ontological reductionism (i.e. as to the content), nor was it analytic in terms of its relationship to logic (i.e. as to the tools used in it) or through endorsing metaphilosophical naturalism or scientism (i.e. as to the primary basis for deliberations). However, the above review shows that Ingarden

- attempted to conduct his discussion in an intersubjectively accessible and rigorous manner;
- used the operations of analysis and the related operations (discernment, classification, juxtaposition, including opposition, *etc.*);
- achieved ever greater precision in expressing the results of his phenomenological insights and descriptions (e.g. by replacing the terms and metaphors he initially used with definitions);
- followed a definite procedure which can be clearly reconstructed;
- was inclined to amend his claims according to new data or criticism;
- although he aspired to create a philosophical system, he set about this, as it were, “at grass-roots level,” by performing a terminological or ontological analysis.

In view of the above-described characteristics of his work, Ingarden can be regarded as an analytic philosopher, albeit – because he had far-reaching ontological ambitions and mixed up analysis (discourse) with phenomenological insight – an atypical one.

It must be emphasized here that the analysis of existence described above is without precedent in the history of philosophy and should be regarded as an exceptional undertaking. While Ingarden’s analysis of historical philosophical concepts may be considered a variety of conceptual analysis performed in the spirit of the LWS, his ontological analysis has no counterpart in the school (without, however, rejecting its spirit, as the above-listed characteristics of the latter analysis indicate). Were I to look for analogies between the methods applied in the LWS and Ingarden’s ontological analysis, I would suggest that the latter may be used as a preparatory or introductory stage of axiomatization. According to (Będkowski *et al.* 2020, p. 70), the first stage of that method includes “choosing primitive terms.” In his ontological analysis, Ingarden actually tried to list and make evident (the most) primitive concepts of the theory of being (existence). The LWS logicians focused on constructing formalized axiomatic theories, while Ingarden focused on what should precede such theories, that is (as Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, one of the LWS members, might have said) on penetrating the meanings of primitive terms. It would be difficult

to reach an agreement on how successful Ingarden was in completing such a difficult task.

3. Combinatorial metaphilosophical analysis

As I have observed, the main element of Ingarden's ontological analysis is the combinatorics of the so-called moments identified by means of abstraction, giving examples (and their phenomenological description), juxtaposing, and defining. Unlike the operation of identifying moments which bears the mark of its author's invention, combinatorics is an operation easy to algorithmize. On the assumption that the initial material is well-ordered and complete⁶⁴, combinatorics can lead to results which are generally acceptable and free from any preconceived bias or prejudice.

Ingarden's achievement consists in that he was one of the first and few philosophers who consistently (as far as possible) used the combinatorial method in philosophy. Although conceptual combinatorics is not analysis in the strict sense (as it consists in putting together and not taking apart), yet it is analysis in a broad sense: it shows possible arrangements of objects or concepts in the aspect of their distinguishing elements.

It is worth noting that Ingarden used combinatorics not only in ontology, but also in metaontology. In the latter – if we assume that the list of (existential) moments is correct – combinatorics has already become relatively independent. Thus, it is justified to speak of Ingarden's combinatorial metaphilosophical analysis. Its most famous and most important result is the list, presented in *Controversy...*, of (fairly) possible solutions to the controversy over the existence of the world, *resp.* the list of (fairly) possible solutions in the realism *vs.* idealism controversy. The procedure of compiling and reducing the list can be described as follows:

(1) On the basis of the list, established *via* ontological analysis, of possible existential moments, we compile their consistent and all-embracing combinations.

⁶⁴ Unfortunately, as Haefliger observes (1995, pp. 32-33), we do not have “the necessary proofs of completeness” of Ingarden's lists of moments and “it is even unclear how these proofs should look [...]. Moreover, it is doubtful that each of Ingarden's concepts of existential moments can be treated as a basic concept.”

(2) We construct ordered pairs: pure consciousness – real world, in which both sides are represented by consistent combinations of existential moments; each pair must differ from the others by at least one combination.

(3) Each pair is named with a term which reflects the existential relations between its elements and can also be used as a name for a philosophical position (in conformity with the generally accepted philosophical terminology).

(4) We reject some of the pairs of combinations according to the criteria

(a) of the discrepancy of moments between the elements of the pairs, and

(b) of the obvious discrepancy between our knowledge of pure consciousness and that of the real world and the moments ascribed to each of them, respectively⁶⁵.

(5) We reject certain pairs of combinations on the basis of more advanced ontological analyses and, possibly, more extensive knowledge of consciousness and the world.

Certainly, some details of the procedure or its execution by Ingarden (who continuously hesitates and pedantically introduces ever new, and sometimes unexpected, possibilities and motifs) may seem doubtful. The fact is, however, that some progress in the realism *vs.* idealism controversy has been achieved thanks to Ingarden's considerations, while his procedure, or a similar one, may be useful in philosophy for the following reasons:

(i) the procedure in question extends the list of positions to be discussed by adding ones which has not been so far formulated in the history of philosophy; thanks to the procedure we can become aware of unknown solutions to the philosophical problem;

(ii) the procedure enables a precise formulation of all possible solutions to the problem using the uniform conceptual apparatus and terminology; as a result, the solutions can be clearly classified (or typologized) and compared with one another, which was more difficult if different philosophical languages were used;

⁶⁵ Basing on some preliminary assumptions, Ingarden rules out some of the pairs of combinations at the outset, and neither formulates them nor gives them a name. Other pairs are rejected after consideration (at different stages of the investigations). The undertaking would become even more complicated if one included some solutions Ingarden actually mentions, such as negative solutions (the real world does not exist at all), double solutions (in which the world of phenomena and the world in itself are distinguished), and ones which refer to the so-called third factors (different from consciousness and the world).

(iii) the procedure makes it possible to gradually reduce the considered positions and thus to approach the (relatively) final solution; what is more, thanks to the procedure, we can discern the solutions that should be rejected “analytically” (in virtue of the discrepancy between the considered existential moments) and the solutions that should be rejected “synthetically” (in virtue of our knowledge and philosophical views).

By referring these merits to Ingarden’s investigation of the realism *vs.* idealism controversy, it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

Ad (i). Before Ingarden, only a few solutions to the controversy has been known. Based on his combinatorics, the philosopher lists 64 solutions (upon modification of the preliminary assumptions, he allows for even more). They include the positions which may be considered as equivalents of the solutions known from the history of philosophy. For instance, in Ingarden’s terminology, the idealism proposed by E. Husserl is called idealist dependence creationism, while G. Berkeley’s idealism is described as idealist unity creationism. However, the preliminary list established by Ingarden contains also positions which had (probably) been unknown so far, such as dualist unity realism, dependence realism or realist unity creationism; they are the positions which posit a weaker variant of the world being conditional on (or derived from/dependent on) consciousness and are thus situated between classical realism and classical idealism.

Ad (ii). Ingarden’s classification (or typology) of positions results from combining two distinctions: between realisms and idealisms (in the former, the world is ascribed existential autonomy, while in the latter world is considered as existentially heteronomous, which entails its existential derivativeness *vis-à-vis* consciousness) and between creationisms and non-creationisms (in the former, the world is ascribed derivativeness; in the latter – originality, which entails the world’s autonomy). Non-creationist realisms are called “realism,” while creationist realisms are named with the term “realist creationism;” because there are no non-creationist idealisms (as heteronomy and originality are mutually exclusive), Ingarden calls all idealist positions “idealist creationism.” To these terms Ingarden adds appropriate adjectives which indicate the existential moments important in individual cases. The adjectives permit to better grasp subtle differences between philosophical positions. For instance, the cited theories of Berkeley and Husserl are described as “idealist creationisms,” as both philosophers maintain heteronomy and derivativeness of the world with respect to consciousness; their standpoints differ in that in the former the connection of the world

with consciousness is closer (non-selfsufficiency – thus idealist unity creationism), while in the latter the connection is slightly weaker (dependence – thus idealist dependence creationism). The other positions listed in ad (i) indicate different variants of the world's being conditional on consciousness (dualist unity realism: non-selfsufficiency, dependence realism: dependence, realist unity creationism: derivativeness and non-selfsufficiency), yet these positions are all realist as they describe the world as autonomous. As one can see, Ingarden's combinatorics provides a uniform plane for quite a rigorous comparison of different solutions to the controversy over the existence of the world.

Ad (iii). Regrettably, due to Ingarden's hesitations, the operation of ruling out certain solutions has not been concluded with unambiguous and definitive results. Suffice it to say that as a result of "analytic" reduction, Ingarden ended up with less than twenty solutions, while had he completed "synthetic" or "philosophical" reduction, less than ten solutions would have remained. In this context, two "analytic" relationships are particularly worth noting:

- if the world is characterized by existential autonomy, all idealist positions are ruled out;
- if the world is characterized by existential fragility, all non-creationist positions are ruled out.

As Ingarden's deliberations on the temporality of real existence (and especially on the moments of actuality and fissuration) confirm the antecedents of both implications, the philosopher is inclined to leave only realist creationisms "in the game:" absolute (realist) creationism (the real world is autonomous, selfsufficient, and independent, but derivative from pure consciousness) and realist dependence-creationism (the real world is autonomous and selfsufficient, but dependent and derivative from pure consciousness) are the two solutions he regards as the most probable. In both these cases pure consciousness is considered as an absolute entity (that is as a consciousness that exists in a radically different way than human consciousness) or as an entity derivative *vis-à-vis* a "third factor." It would be difficult not to realize that his ontological and metaphilosophical analyses have led Ingarden towards a specific form of deism or theism. *NB.* Ingarden's combinatorics provides effective tools to formulate typologies of positions concerning the existence of God and his relationship to the world⁶⁶.

⁶⁶ Comparing *Controversy...* to (Hartshorne 1953. pp. 1-25, 499-514), one might say that Ingarden and Ch. Hartshorne share a combinatorial-topological approach but differ

To sum up the above presentation, it should be stressed that (Ingarden's) combinatorial metaphilosophical analysis may be considered as one of the methods of analytic philosophy. At a guess, I would say that the method in question is actually used in this kind of philosophy, but not on so large a scale. The problem is that results obtained with this method depend on the primary data, and the data proposed by Ingarden (existential moments) were untypical. Thus, it is not combinatorics itself (Ingarden's hesitation in drawing his conclusion seems similar to an attitude frequently adopted by typical analytic philosophers), but its primary basis that is likely to meet with resistance on the part of the analytic philosopher.

I would add that Ingarden's combinatorics discussed above, although susceptible to algorithmization and thus close to axiomatization, also has no counterpart among methods applied by the LWS. It is, however, symptomatic that – as I have observed in (ii) – in his metaphilosophical combinatorics, Ingarden proposed a terminology suitable for expressing, in a uniform way, different solutions (both those already in existence and possible ones) of the realism *vs.* idealism controversy. One can thus say that Ingarden used a method similar to that of paraphrase and translated some theses by Berkeley, Husserl, and other philosophers from their philosophical languages into his own language defined in terms of combination of existential moments (cf. Będkowski *et al.* 2020, p. 67). A separate study would be necessary in order to compare Ajdukiewicz's theory and practice of paraphrase to those proposed by Ingarden. Whatever the results, it would certainly be a serious oversight not to recognize (for all the differences) a methodological affinity between those two great Polish philosophers.

4. Conclusion

By referring to particular examples, I have presented three kinds of analysis proposed by Roman Ingarden. The first analysis – the analysis of historical philosophical concepts (in this case, the analysis of the concepts of form and matter) – can be regarded as an instance of (reductive) conceptual or terminological analysis. The second analysis – the ontological analysis (in this

as to the subject-matter they respectively discuss. I believe, however, that Ingarden's combinatorics and typology, if applied to theological problems, would produce more varied and interesting results.

case, the analysis of existence) – is a twine of several operations of the use of which (or of some of them, such as abstracting, juxtaposing, classifying, defining) no analytic philosopher would be ashamed. Finally, the third analysis – the combinatorial metaphilosophical analysis (in this case, the analysis of solutions to the realism *vs.* idealism controversy) – is based on the combinatorics which introduces an element of algorithmization, so much valued by analytic philosophers, into (meta)philosophy. Even if the described methods are not without flaws (and doubtful presuppositions), nor are they analytic in the standard meaning of the term and have not been employed in a fully satisfactory manner, they respect such “analytic” values as being well-planned, clear, predictable, thorough, cautious, and expressive of reflective criticism. All this leads to the conclusion that Roman Ingarden was an atypical analytic philosopher who developed original methods of analysis outside the classical schools of analytic philosophy.

I would like to complement the above thesis with a hypothesis that the main difference between Ingarden and typical analytic philosophers does not consist in their using, or not-using, certain kinds of analysis, but in two other factors. Firstly, Ingarden believed that the foundational method (along with analysis) of doing philosophy was phenomenological description of what is, in the broadest possible sense, given to us (including the “data of science,” but not as the only or preferable data). Secondly, as P. Simons rightly observes (2005, pp. 52, 53), Ingarden preferred “descriptive and systematic adequacy” which left nothing out to economy and conceptual-terminological elegance. I would say that Ingarden was an analytic philosopher who remained open to a universal system of ontology; as such, he was, perhaps one of a kind, speculative analytic philosopher or analytic systematic philosopher.

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3. Metaphilosophical Disputes. Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw School

1. The term “metaphilosophy”

Roman Ingarden is a philosopher whose main interests were focused on the problems of systematic philosophy, especially ontology, also covering the problems of aesthetics, ethics and theory of knowledge. However, we also find works on methodology and metaphilosophical problems, although it is difficult to indicate the places where he used the term “metaphilosophy.” However, in order to deal with metaphilosophical problems, it is not necessary to use the name. The term “metaphilosophy” was introduced by Morris Lazerowitz in the nineteen forties⁶⁷. Although Lazerowitz was the first to use the term metaphilosophy on purpose in philosophical literature, his concept, referring to L. Wittgenstein and S. Freud, was not widely accepted. He found no successors, and what today is called metaphilosophy is, to a large extent, a different matter. In Polish philosophy, Mieczysław Choynowski was the first to use the term “metaphilosophy.” It was done by Choynowski in his review of the same book by C.J. Ducasse. The review was published in the *Przegląd Filozoficzny* and contains the following passage: “Ducasse’s inquiries belong not to philosophy, but to the philosophy of philosophy, that is, to metaphilosophy”⁶⁸.

Nowadays it is difficult to talk about the existence of one standard understanding of the term “metaphilosophy.” However, on the basis of a few examples, it is possible to show how it is sometimes understood.

⁶⁷ Lazerowitz did it in the pages of *Mind* in (Lazerowitz 1942), in a review of Ducasse (1941). Cf. also (Lazerowitz 1970, p. 91).

⁶⁸ Cf. (Choynowski 1948, p. 198). This review, actually a review article, comprehensively discusses the work by C.J. Ducasse mentioned in footnote 67.

Thus, in *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy* it is briefly referred to as:

...the branch of philosophy that asks what philosophy is, how it should be done and why we should do it (Overgaard *et al.* (2013), p. vii).

Nicholas Rescher in his work *Philosophical Dialectics*, defines it in turn as follows:

Metaphilosophy is the philosophical examination of the practice of philosophizing itself. Its definitive aim is to study the methods of the field in an endeavour to illuminate its promise and prospects (Rescher 2006, p. 1).

As a third example, let us also quote *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, where, in the entry *Metaphilosophy*, its author Paul A. Moser writes as follows:

Metaphilosophy, the theory of the nature of philosophy, especially its goals, methods, and fundamental assumptions. First order philosophical inquiry includes such disciplines as epistemology, ontology, ethics, and value theory. It thus constitutes the main activity of philosophers, past and present. The philosophical study of first order philosophical inquiry raises philosophical inquiry to a higher order. Such higher order inquiry is metaphilosophy (Moser 1998, p. 487).

Thus, the field of interest of this section, referred to as metaphilosophy, is a problem of research concerning the nature, purpose, object, and method of philosophy. In addition, the relation of philosophy to other spheres of culture, such as science, religion, art, everyday knowledge, *etc.*, is considered. In this text, we will try to isolate debates on metaphilosophy that can be found in the works of Roman Ingarden and reasonably attribute them to the author, and then compare them to the metaphilosophical assumptions adopted in the most important Polish philosophical school of the 20th century, i.e. the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS).

2. Ingardenian notion of philosophy

In presenting Ingarden's metaphilosophical views, we will first try to discuss his understanding of philosophy. Early remarks on this subject can be

found in the article “Controversy over the Essence of Philosophy” (Ingarden 1922a), and the later “Is the Task of Philosophy to Synthesize Special Sciences?” (Ingarden 1936). We will also refer to the *Controversy of the Existence of the World*, where in the first volume, especially in chapter II, we find remarks on metaphilosophical topics. In an article from 1922 (Ingarden 1922a), which is partly a discussion with Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s text, we also find some initial theses about the status of philosophy, which are important and can also be found in the philosopher’s later reflections⁶⁹. This article is relatively important for learning the metaphilosophical views of the young philosopher. Roman Ingarden’s position can be expressed initially in two theses:

(1) There is a popular view of the nature of philosophy found in the opinions of some philosophical representatives of the special sciences, as well as some writers and literary critics (Ingarden 1922a, pp. 161 seq.; Ingarden 1935, pp. 195-196. According to this view, philosophy is a general, synthetic view of the world (worldview). On its basis, it is argued that talking about the philosophy of X or the philosophy of Y is legitimate. This understanding of philosophy is, as Ingarden notes, usually very vague. The philosopher strongly rejects it, primarily because a worldview is not purely cognitive in his opinion⁷⁰. This is what Ingarden says about it:

This unfortunate “someone’s philosophy” is on the margins of both natural and exact sciences, and is on the margins of both natural and historical sciences. Serious scholars will undoubtedly dismiss these views as “unscientific.” However, while their author also has strictly scientific merits, criticism will forgive him with a rather light heart for “his philosophy,” as if “philosophy” was a collection of all nonsense committed in the moments of decline, as if philosophy could irresponsibly proclaim various nonsense... (Ingarden 1922a, p. 162).

(2) At this point Ingarden firmly states that philosophy has a *raison d’être*, if and only if sciences do not exhaust all knowledge available to us (humans). This thesis seems to be especially important for how philosophy

⁶⁹ I write more about this metaphilosophical dispute between Ingarden and Kotarbiński in (Kleszcz 2020).

⁷⁰ Husserl also had a critical approach to philosophy, understood as a worldview. He writes about it in his work *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Husserl 1911).

is understood by the author of *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. If they exhausted this knowledge, then:

There is no philosophy and the so-called “philosophical” creations should be branded as phantasmagories, or there is a philosophy, in which case there is one and only one, and not “someone else’s philosophy” and it (philosophy [R.K.]) is an expression of the knowledge of one that they do not obtain and are unable to obtain science (Ingarden 1922a, p. 163).

The first two chapters of *Controversy...* present preliminary considerations of, how Ingarden calls it, preparatory nature. The very problem of the dispute of idealism and realism, crucial for *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, requires prior realization of the nature of philosophical problems which differ from those belonging to the sphere of science (Ingarden 1947, p. 47). This, in turn, raises the question of the types of sciences, their methodological specificity, and differences between science and philosophy, which is discussed in the second chapter (Ingarden 1947, pp. 47-85; also Ingarden 1936, pp. 196-204). Only in this context, it will be possible to indicate the appropriate features of philosophy and philosophical knowledge⁷¹. If we compare sciences with philosophy (in particular its separation from metaphysics), there arises a question whether philosophy itself is a science. According to Ingarden, one must distinguish between narrow and broad understanding of science (scientificity). In its narrow sense, philosophy is not a science, not in the sense sciences are understood. In the broader sense, science is justified and disinterested knowledge, and in this sense, philosophy can be considered a science. As Ingarden points out, adopting this understanding of science, Husserl even called philosophy a “rigorous science” (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, p. 49)⁷². Let us now point to the distinguishing features of the so-called special sciences and philosophy. Ingarden ignores, but does not reject, the division into humanities and natural sciences, traditionally adopted in German thought. He distinguishes, however, two groups (types) within the sciences (Ingarden 1922a, pp. 197-200; Ingarden 1947, pp. 50-53):

⁷¹ More on this problem, cf. also (Gierulanka 1972).

⁷² Husserl, speaking of philosophy as a science, uses the term „strenge Wissenschaft,“ meaning a philosophy that is cultivated in a scientific manner and is justified. This in no way meant that it was a science such as mathematics or physics, for which Husserl used the term “exakte Wissenschaften.”

- (a) factual (experimental) science
- (b) *a priori* science about out-of-time objects.

The main features of factual sciences are as follows :

- their objects are individual and space-time objects of the real world;
- these sciences make certain assumptions about the existence of the real world and the assumptions are contained in their original theorems;
- their cognitive tool is experience which also provides the final justification;
- there is no possibility to distinguish between essential and inessential features of the examined object;
- finally, their primary goal is to obtain research results, not technological applications.

In turn, *a priori* sciences have:

- specific research objects, defined by the system of axioms and definitions;
- they are not elements of the real world, their general theorems are or result from axioms;
- these sciences make assumptions about the existence of a given domain of objects, but do not make assumptions about the existence of the world;
- their cognitive operations are deductive reasoning; the relationships detected in these sciences are necessary, and it is irrelevant within them to distinguish between essential and inessential features;
- and finally, they aim at obtaining purely theoretical solutions.

Natural sciences, as generally seen, and thus covering factual sciences and *a priori* sciences, according to Ingarden, have the following four properties:

- a) seek reasonable answers to theoretical questions;
- b) make assumptions that are undisputed;
- c) their problems concern objects of a given field of research, and the solutions are existential *theorems*;
- d) finally, they do not distinguish between significant and insignificant features (Ingarden 1936, pp. 199-200; Ingarden 1947, pp. 53-54).

In addition to these problems raised by sciences, we have other factual problems that require answers. Hence the need for reflection (“science” in the broad sense of the word) outside the framework of special sciences (Ingarden 1936, p. 202 seq.; Ingarden 1947, pp. 57-58). Here are a few examples of those problems:

– “How is it possible for a certain statement from the realm of physics to be true?”;

– “What cognitive acts must occur in order to discover physical facts?”;

– “What values (aesthetic, ethical) are even possible?”

Attempts to answer these questions would be philosophical (metaphysical) research. Research in the field of metaphysics is specific research because it aims to establish certain facts that can be understood by establishing the essence of a given object. For example, by using suitably developed exact sciences (physiology, psychology), we can find whether mental processes occur within a given organism in which the appropriate physiological process takes place. These sciences can find with high probability that there is such a relationship, and that is their purpose. However, there are always questions that these special (exact) sciences cannot answer. These are questions whether the essence of mental processes is a symptom of a physiological process, or is it only the so-called “bare fact.” Sciences and their cognitive methods, as already noted, are unable to distinguish between essential and non-essential properties. Metaphysical studies examine the facts that go beyond the realm of what is purely factual, outside the realm of “bare” facts. As Ingarden notes:

In the metaphysics understood in this sense therefore, as in the special sciences, the focus is on discovering certain facts, but not just bare rationally unintelligible facts that follow from other equally opaque facts; rather, the focus is on essential facts, which – in the necessity of their factual subsistence – are grounded in the essence of the correlative entities, and which are fully intelligible *vía* rational insight into the ideal interconnections among pure qualities (Ingarden 1947, pp. 59-60)?

Facts studied in metaphysics: “lead us beyond the realm of the real, into the realm of the ideal.” The problem is whether such metaphysical research is only a supplement to the research in special sciences, or is also an adjustment, sometimes essential of these sciences, as for example, Henri Bergson assumed⁷³. When talking about metaphysics, it should be remembered that with Ingarden we are dealing with a distinction between metaphysics and ontology (Ingarden 1947, pp. 79 -85)⁷⁴. As Ingarden notes:

⁷³ Bergson’s philosophical achievements were the subject of Ingarden’s doctoral dissertation. Cf. (Ingarden 1922).

⁷⁴ Sometimes, however, Ingarden uses the name philosophy as a whole encompassing both

The principal difference between ontology and metaphysics is that the former inquiries into the contents of ideas, whereas the latter investigates individual objects, or even ideas – but taken only *qua idea*. In this connection, ontological judgments are, as already mentioned, free of any positing of being (and, indeed, even of ideal being!), whereas metaphysical propositions are either directly existential propositions or categorical ones (Ingarden 1947, 79).

Thus, a metaphysician is not content with the analysis of pure possibility but tries to establish whether a given object actually exists and, therefore, it is a realized possibility. Speaking of metaphysics, we must add an important statement that metaphysical research for Ingarden, although different from ontological research, should be related to ontological research concerning the sphere of pure possibilities. At the same time, ontological research, although important as a preliminary step to metaphysics, cannot replace metaphysical research itself. Metaphysics does not only concern certain facts but also the existence of the world as a whole. When it comes to the relationship between ontology and special sciences, ontology and ontological research would be, in relation to research within the framework of sciences, earlier in terms of theory, more general, not prejudging any positive statements about what is real (Ingarden 1947, p. 61 seq, 74).

Science (special sciences), unlike metaphysics, makes certain assumptions (e.g. the thesis about existence in the world) that it does not submit for discussion. Metaphysics does not accept such assumptions. Nevertheless, it makes existential judgments explaining essential facts. Problems in the domain of metaphysics include questions about the principles of a real world, including questions about the fundamentals of the world. As the philosopher points out, the problem concerning the essentials of the world should not be confused with problems of a cosmological nature. It is worth remembering that Ingarden does not exclude metaphysics, not settled firmly whether metaphysical studies can be completed (cognitive) success (Ingarden 1947, pp. 81-82, 62; Ingarden 1936, p. 208). As a result, although Ingarden considers metaphysical problems to be reasonable, he maintains a

ontological and metaphysical problems. However, it does so for the sake of simplicity, despite the differences between the two types of problems. Cf. (Ingarden 1936, p. 205). On metaphysics and ontology as *viewed* by Ingarden cf. (Stróżewski 1972), (Świdorski 1987).

certain reserve (better to say, caution) in relation to metaphysics, seen as a system of proposed solutions⁷⁵.

3. The ideal of philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School

The Lvov-Warsaw School (hereinafter abbreviated to the LWS) was founded by Kazimierz Twardowski, a professor at the University of Lvov since 1895. The most important students of Twardowski studied at this university. Even before World War I, there was talk of the Twardowski school or the Lvov School (Jan Łukasiewicz, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński and others). Some of the students took over chairs of philosophy in Warsaw, after the establishment of this university as a Polish university which took place in 1915. These professors were: Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski and Władysław Witwicki. Władysław Tarkiewicz, who was metodologically close to the School, was also a professor in Warsaw, after episodes of teaching in Vilna and Poznań. These two circles in Lvov and Warsaw formed the Lvov-Warsaw School, a real phenomenon in the entire history of Polish philosophy. Members of the School philosophers working in cities other than Lvov and Warsaw were as follows: Tadeusz Czeżowski (Vilna) and Zygmunt Zawirski (Poznań). The LWS philosophical school was special, because Twardowski's students were united not so much by common beliefs, but by similar methodological attitudes and a similar understanding of philosophy and its tasks. In Twardowski's opinion:

The main characteristic of this school [...] consists in [...] striving for the greatest possible precision and accuracy in thinking and expressing thoughts, as well as in the most comprehensive justification of what is said and the correctness of the evidence (Twardowski 1992, p. 30).

If people belonging to the LWS shared a common methodological attitude, then the natural question is, what it was. We will now try, first of all, to identify Twardowski's methodological approach, the way he understood philosophy, its methods, goals and specificity. Twardowski's position could be described by the following: (1) Brentanism; (2) psychologism (at least until 1902); (3) moderate scientism; (4) empiricism⁷⁶. On the other

⁷⁵ On this problem, which is worth a more extensive discussion, cf. (Półtawski 1990).

⁷⁶ For more extensive analyses of these indicated theses (Kleszcz 2013, pp. 25-46).

hand, his views on the relationship between philosophy and science allowed him to be classified as a representative of an approach which, proclaiming the slogans of scientific philosophy, does not demand its actual eradication, in line with the postulates of radical positivism. This means, at the same time – what Twardowski clearly noted in his speech (1929) on the 25th anniversary of the Polish Philosophical Association – that he expressly distinguished between scientific philosophy and philosophical worldview (*Weltanschauung*)⁷⁷. If we now apply this to the SLW, metaphilosophical views of Twardowski were generally shared by the representatives of the School, though not by everyone to the same degree.

If we are talking about the general characteristics of the LWS and certain metaphilosophical assumptions adopted in it, it is also necessary to refer to what Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz formulated in his article published in 1934 in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* and shortly afterwards in the German version in *Erkenntnis*⁷⁸. In this article, Ajdukiewicz attributes the following features to the LWS as a school of philosophy:

- (1) anti-irrationalism;
- (2) the postulate of conceptual clarity and linguistic accuracy;
- (3) acquiring the apparatus of contemporary formal logic (then known as logistic)⁷⁹.

Rationalism, called anti-irrationalism by Ajdukiewicz, is a position that values scientific knowledge provided by mathematical and natural sciences. This knowledge, as Ajdukiewicz later pointed out in his work *Problems and Theories of Philosophy* (Ajdukiewicz 1949), should meet two conditions: intersubjective communicability and intersubjective verifiability⁸⁰.

Condition of intersubjective communicability requires that the mental content can be conveyed literally, that is, thoughts should be conveyed without the use of metaphors, comparisons and various half-measures.

Intersubjective verifiability, on the other hand, is the possibility of (intersubjective) control that allows each prepared person to find out whether a given statement is right or wrong.

Ajdukiewicz's opinion is usually presented as representative of rationalism (anti -irrationalism) in the Twardowski School, and is also expounded

⁷⁷ More on this subject: (Kleszcz 2013, pp. 203-220), also (Kleszcz 2016).

⁷⁸ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1934).

⁷⁹ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1934, p. 399).

⁸⁰ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1949, pp. 45 et seq.).

and broadened in the works of other authors, in particular by Izydora Dąmbska⁸¹. The characteristics of Ajdukiewicz's may be, after a slight correction, expressed in the form of the following theses:

- (1) rationalism (anti-irrationalism) opposed to irrationalism;
- (2) the postulate of clarity and accuracy;
- (3) the postulate of using logic tools, broadly understood;
- (4) respect for science (non-radical scientism) and distinguishing philosophy as science and worldview (world view).

This program can be, in principle, found in Twardowski's considerations; it appears (literally its first three points) in Ajdukiewicz's paper "Logistic Anti-Irrationalism in Poland," although in works of individual thinkers it was expressed in more radical or more moderate way, for example with regard to the points concerning logicity and scientism. It can be said that generally, the theses were accepted in the LWS, although at times certain points raised doubts.

Each of these points will now be discussed shortly.

4. Rationalism (anti-irrationalism)

Rationalism, called anti-irrationalism by Ajdukiewicz, is contrasted with irrationalism. In relation to this problem, we already find comments in Twardowski himself. Ajdukiewicz introduced this concept (1934), and it was analyzed most extensively by Izydora Dąmbska (1938)⁸². On its basis we can distinguish the following positions: rationalism and irrationalism. Rationalism (anti-irrationalism) is a position that values scientific knowledge, which should meet two conditions: intersubjective communication and intersubjective verifiability⁸³.

THE CONDITION OF INTERSUBJECTIVE COMMUNICATION requires that a given mental content can be conveyed literally, without using metaphors, comparisons and other so-called half measures of transmitting thoughts.

⁸¹ Cf. (Kleszcz 2016a).

⁸² Her extensive article "Irrationalism and Scientific Cognition" is the most comprehensive analysis of irrationalism in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Cf. (Dąmbska (1938).

⁸³ "It is just [...] intersubjectivity that seems to be characteristic of rational cognition. Rationalism, in valuing only rational cognition, amounts to recognising the worth only of intersubjectively communicable and controllable cognition" (Ajdukiewicz 1949, pp. 46).

INTERSUBJECTIVE VERIFICABILITY, on the other hand, is the possibility of (intersubjective) control that allows any properly prepared person to convince themselves of the rightness/wrongness of a given statement.

This position is sometimes treated as representative of rationalism (anti-irrationalism) in the LWS. Rationalism appreciating the knowledge of intersubjective values (communicability, controllability) is contrasted in this approach with the irrationalist position. Generally speaking, with regard to this pair of positions, rationalism/irrationalism is a question of whether reason, broadly understood here, or some other power is the ultimate factor based on which we evaluate the cognitive qualities of our thought process. The irrationalist admits, at least sometimes and to some extent, the existence of these other factors, such as such as: authority, insight, variously understood intuition, special experience or feeling.

LANGUAGE PRECISION of terminological apparatus is an important methodological determinant of the LWS. In this school, the postulate of strict thinking was combined with the requirement of criticism⁸⁴. K. Twardowski attached great importance to ensure that the language used in philosophy respected such demands as: clarity, precision and accuracy, both when it comes to presenting the problem and proposing its solution. It is evidenced *implicitly* by the entire work of the philosopher himself, and this striving *explicitly* was best expressed in the article "On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style" (Twardowski 1919).

The problems of clarity and precision are easily confused with logical competences in the field of general logic, problems related to the logical requirement, which is discussed in the next section. The very work of the philosopher provides us with good models in this regard. Twardowski emphasizes the fact that the language we have at our disposal is not a perfect tool and requires strenuous work to improve it. Hence the attention that should be paid to the analysis of language and its precision, which requires the use of appropriate methodological tools (definition, explication, removing ambiguity, *etc.*). Twardowski's philosophical program assigns an important, one might say even crucial, role to the method of semiotic analysis. Many philosophical disagreements stem from misunderstandings of a linguistic nature. Twardowski analyses a number of such cases, among them, we find those that are of interest to professional philosophers and those that accompany commonly encountered disputes. These analyses show how he used logic, critically

⁸⁴ Cf. (Kleszcz 2018).

and constructively, to address certain philosophically controversial problems. Many philosophical disputes stem from misunderstandings of a linguistic nature. Twardowski provides a number of such cases in analysis. Some he finds in philosophical texts, others on the basis of colloquial disputes⁸⁵.

In general, semiotic analysis has become an important tool in the LWS and its examples can be found in many authors, both direct and indirect students of Twardowski, most often in works of Ajdukiewicz, who showed true mastery in this field. It can be concluded that this analysis turned out to be highly useful in the sphere of philosophy.

5. Logical tools of philosophy

The realization of the spirit of strictness is particularly essential and necessary within philosophy. In practice, this requires referring to such tools provided by logic. The problem of the role of logic and the application of logical methods is a separate problem. At this point, I shall limit my study to the remarks we find in Twardowski and some of his students. LET US ASSUME INITIALLY THAT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT THE USE OF LOGIC, WE MEAN LOGICAL TOOLS IN THE BROAD SENSE OF THE WORD. This problem can be essentially reduced to logic understood as general logic, thus including semiotics, formal logic and general methodology. The importance of logic thus understood was generally accepted in the LWS. The prevailing belief was that some general logical preparation was necessary for every educated person. One can speak of logical education when one has a certain necessary amount of knowledge and certain skills are developed. Logical competence is therefore both a matter of knowledge and a matter of some logical training⁸⁶. This training should equip an individual with knowledge about inference and with logical sensitivity to protect against lack of clarity and logical inconsistency. The assessment of the situation addressed the importance of logical education, greatly emphasized by Twardowski in his didactic and popularizing activities. Twardowski was the first Polish philosopher who introduced students in Lvov to the new logic in its elementary form (from 1898).

⁸⁵ Cf. (Kleszcz 2013, pp. 75-84).

⁸⁶ Cf. (Twardowski 1919/1920, p. 185).

Among Twardowski's students we can find authors who became professional formal logicians (specialists in logistic according to the terminology of the time), in the modern sense of the word. This is the case of Jan Łukasiewicz or Stanisław Leśniewski. Others, however, especially Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, made philosophically important proposals for the application of logic to the analysis of philosophical problems. At the same time, logic was not associated with any particular philosophical position. This was particularly clearly articulated by Jan Łukasiewicz, who noted:

In logistic, as in arithmetic, no definitive philosophical point of view is either explicitly assumed or clandestinely accepted. Logistic is not philosophy nor does it pretend to replace philosophy (Łukasiewicz 1936, p. 222).

6. Scientism

The already discussed rationalism of the LWS is a position which highly values scientific knowledge, in particular the knowledge provided by mathematics and natural sciences. Hence the supporters of the so understood rationalism present a natural tendency not only to treat science (natural sciences) as a model of rationality, but also to treat philosophy as a science. This is also the approach of the LWS and the original approach of its creator. However, as we know, Twardowski's position underwent a certain evolution in this respect. Initially, he did not contradict the thesis about the differences between philosophy and (natural) sciences. Later, however, Twardowski firmly postulated the cultivation of scientific philosophy. In this program, philosophy can be scientific only when it reaches to the patterns of natural sciences.

Of course, in philosophy which is called scientific, as in science, one should apply methodological rigors which concern, on the one hand, language and, on the other, justification. This program of scientific philosophy was originally outlined by Twardowski in his paper "Psychology in the Face of Physiology and Philosophy" dated 1897. In this work, which deals with scientific philosophy, there is still room for metaphysics as a philosophical science, but then metaphysics is basically placed outside of philosophy, becoming an analysis on worldview problems⁸⁷. Thus, a large part of

⁸⁷ On this problem, cf. (Kleszcz 2016a, pp. 145 below).

the problems of classically understood metaphysics was removed outside the domain of scientific philosophy.

7. Essential differences between Ingarden and the Lvov-Warsaw metaphilosophical positions

After a synthetic review of these two positions, the question arises as to where the essential differences lie between these two metaphilosophical positions. This synthetic presentation of the two concepts allows to identify noticeable differences and some similarities. Ingarden's position will be the starting point for further comments.

(A) Ingarden rejects, like the LWS, the thesis that philosophy is a view of the world, considering such an understanding of philosophy unclear. Above all, however, he assumed that philosophy, as opposed to the domain of worldview, has purely cognitive tasks. It should be noted, however, that in the standard approach of the LWS and Ingarden, the boundaries between philosophy (metaphysics) and the worldview are drawn elsewhere. For Ingarden, the main body of research in classical metaphysics is not transferred to the realm of worldview. Although Ingarden did not prejudge the effects of metaphysical research, he did not remove certain problems, such as the problem of the existence of an absolute being (God), from the sphere of possible philosophical (metaphysical) research. In short, in the views of the LWS, outlined by Twardowski, too much, compared to Ingarden's standards, was transferred to the sphere of the philosophical view of the world. However, this does not apply to all members of the School equally, because some, even if we omit members of the Cracow Circle, were more liberal with regard to classical metaphysics (Czeżowski)⁸⁸.

(B) For Ingarden, philosophy was only valid if the sciences do not exhaust the knowledge available to us. The task of properly understood philosophy should be examining and analyzing subjects that science does not study and, more importantly, cannot study. If, on the other hand, we ask whether philosophy is a science, then, as Ingarden pointed out, the answer can only be positive within the broad understanding of the term of science, as it is justified and disinterested knowledge, but acquired in a way not limited to scientific methods. There is a difference here with the mainstream

⁸⁸ Regarding Czeżowski's views on this problem, cf. (Łukasiewicz 2002, pp. 205-260).

SLW, where it was not clearly indicated. Certain authors (T. Czeżowski) however, noticed the specificity of philosophical problems as compared to scientific problems. However, Władysław Tatarkiewicz (methodologically close to the LWS) sees this relationship very similar to Ingarden's⁸⁹.

(C) Ingarden clearly highlights the differences between philosophy and sciences. There are similarities, because science and philosophy tend to be theoretical and justified knowledge, but there are also fundamental differences. Sciences make assumptions they no longer discuss, unlike philosophy. They deal with objects from a limited field, and philosophy (metaphysics) may ask questions about objects from all over the world. And what is crucial, sciences cannot distinguish between what is essential and non-essential, and for philosophy the question of an essence of an object is an important problem. In this respect Ingarden differed from the mainstream LWS, where these differences were not emphasized to such extent and as strongly. This is even the case of authors who, like Czeżowski, notice differences in the subject, methods and aims of research⁹⁰.

(D) A little more should be said on this last point. Within science (sciences), essential questions are not asked, e.g. questions about the essence of a given natural process, or about the conditions which make the statements about nature true. Meanwhile, as Ingarden points out, these kinds of questions are indispensable questions, which, however, cannot be formulated when we situate ourselves on the ground of science. By providing answers to these questions, we already situate ourselves in the field of philosophy (metaphysics). It can be seen here that Ingarden did not explicitly exclude metaphysical problems from the field of philosophy, including questions that would concern the existence of the world as a whole.

(E) With regard to the four metaphilosophical assumptions adopted within the LWS, Ingarden's attitude to these assumptions was varied.

As for the postulate of rationalism (rejection of irrationalism), he could accept this slogan *de nomine*. However, the difference could emerge when we ask about the cognitive methods considered appropriate. Could the phenomenological tools (insights), intuition and the attempt to grasp the essence of a given object be accepted by a typical representative of the LWS? Ingarden is not satisfied with the rationalism modeled on the methods of natural science. It would be difficult for Ingarden to fully accept

⁸⁹ Cf. (Kleszcz 2020a).

⁹⁰ Cf. (Łukasiewicz 2002, pp. 229-232).

Ajdukiewicz's claim: "Rationalism values cognition whose paradigm is scientific cognition or more precisely whose paradigms are the mathematical and natural sciences" (Ajdukiewicz 1949, pp. 45-46). At the same time, what Ajdukiewicz gives as examples of irrational methods, would also be rejected by Ingarden as a method nonacceptable in rational cognition (special revelation, premonitions, clairvoyance, magic omens). Bocheński pointed out that, unlike phenomenology, analytical philosophy rejects direct insights and the belief that it is possible to study the concepts given in these insights. At the same time, however, some achievements of phenomenologists may, in his opinion, be accepted by analytical philosophers⁹¹.

The postulate of clarity and accuracy is appreciated by Ingarden, who repeatedly articulated the importance of such postulates. However, one may ask if he would agree on the tools to be used to obtain the desired clearness.

More complicated problem is the question of applying logic to philosophy. Ingarden not underestimate logic, however, does not share essentially the logistic reconstruction of philosophy. When he links it with the critique of the metaphilosophy of logical empiricism, many of his reasons seem justified. At the same time, however, his views on logic itself raise considerable doubts, for example in terms of equating contemporary logic with positivism. This whole problem deserves a separate comprehensive analysis. However, despite the high appreciation of Ingarden's philosophical (metaphilosophical) program, it is impossible to accept, to a large extent, his views on contemporary logic⁹².

With regard to the problem of scientism, the SLW had a (moderate) scientist attitude, which is largely rejected by Ingarden. The author of *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, clearly distinguished between the sciences and philosophy. Philosophy, as he conceived it, cannot be limited to the methods of science.

Obviously, these comparative remarks should be significantly extended to form a complete image. In general, it should be noted that both of these concepts, both Ingarden and LWS emphasize and highlight the cognitive tasks of philosophy. They also value the postulates of giving language a precise character and providing adequate justification for the claims. At the same time, however, there are serious differences between these approaches,

⁹¹ Cf. (Bocheński 1993a, pp. 40-41). The whole problem of irrationalism, however, requires a more careful analysis. Cf. (Kleszcz 2007, pp. 49-65).

⁹² His views with regard to contemporary logic (logistic) were formulated by R. Ingarden in (Ingarden 1972). Discussing the views of Ingarden cf. (Woleński 1997, pp. 167-174).

such as the application of logic in philosophy and its (logic) understanding, or the relationship between philosophy and science. It can be assumed that the arguments in this metaphilosophical dispute are divided between Ingarden and SLW in relation to key problems. In a situation where the serious philosophical authors differ, sometimes, in essence, we can see an argument in favour of the thesis that important problems in metaphilosophy are controversial. Thus, the belief that one metaphilosophy is essentially and in all important respects cognitively more valuable than others seems fundamentally questionable.

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PART II.

**INGARDEN AND REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL:**

CONFRONTATION OR CONVERGENCE?

4. On Ingarden's polemic with Ajdukiewicz on the Role of Language in Cognition/Knowledge

At the 3rd Polish Philosophical Congress in Cracow in 1936, Ajdukiewicz gave a lecture "The Problem of Idealism in Semantic Formulation." The subject of the lecture was not a semiotic-logical paraphrase of the transcendental idealism in H. Rickert's version, but rather a more general problem: Ajdukiewicz's meta-philosophical proposal described as semantic epistemology. In turn, this proposal was a consequence of the analytical method of practicing philosophy defended in the said lecture. The main idea of this method is to always consider concepts in association with their corresponding language expressions⁹³.

However, when speaking about the semantic epistemology, as Ajdukiewicz used to describe his meta-epistemological project, two things should be remembered: the first thing is that the term „semantics” meant then as much as the term “semasiology” or the term “general theory of signs” and contained those components that are now included in the term “semiotics.” However, it should also be remembered that until the aforementioned 1936, Ajdukiewicz did not use contemporary semantic concepts due to their antinomial character; the second problem is that the meta-epistemological project of the semantic theory of cognition was a syntactic-pragmatic project, that is, it was not a semantic project in the modern understanding of the term „semantics.” On the other hand, the critical analysis of Rickert's idealist thesis based on this project was based on the already semantically understood concept of truth, i.e. a concept freed by Tarski from its antinomial character – to be more precise: it used the meta-logical principle of the excluded middle as a consequence of Tarski's semantic definition of

⁹³ J.M. Bocheński presented a clear description of the analytical method of practicing philosophy in (Bocheński 1990, p. 35 ff).

truth. However, it was used together with other semiotic concepts, i.e. syntactic and pragmatic concepts. Logical pragmatics – and this should also be remembered – was constantly present in Ajdukiewicz's linguistic approach to epistemological problems.

Noteworthy contributions to the discussion on Ajdukiewicz's lecture concerned mainly those questions which had not been mentioned in the title. Their authors realized that accepting the accuracy of a paraphrase of transcendental idealism, leading to a rejection of Rickert's claim, requires as a necessary but not sufficient condition having accepted the analytical method of practicing philosophy, which should then be followed by accepting semantic epistemology and Ajdukiewicz's directival theory of language. Ultimately, accepting the latter makes the paraphrase of transcendental idealism technically possible.

Ajdukiewicz's main opponent, and the first one to dispute him after his lecture, was Ingarden. This fragment of the discussion, i.e. Ingarden's polemic with Ajdukiewicz on the major problems on which the lecture was based, constitutes the topic of the present chapter.

Ajdukiewicz's meta-philosophical proposal, called semantic epistemology, works as follows. The object of epistemology is cognition, which can be understood in two ways: either as cognition in the psychological sense or as cognition in the logical sense. Cognition in the psychological sense means cognitive acts, including acts of judging, presentation, comprehension, inferring etc.; cognition in the logical sense means the content of these acts, which are perceived, as Ajdukiewicz claimed, as with Bolzano's *Sätze an sich* and *Begriffe an sich*, as "products" of thought processes, or as products of the objective spirit (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 142). However, what constitutes cognition in the logical sense can be, and what is more, should be (if one is an analyst, let us add) defined as linguistic meanings of sentences and terms which are identical, as Ajdukiewicz claimed, when the act of several people communicating with the help of these sentences and terms is taking place. If so, then an equivalent of every sentence predicating something about judgments or about concepts understood logically is a sentence predicating the same on sentences or on terms the meanings of which are those judgments and concepts. The postulates resulting from the above for an epistemologist dealing with objective cognition, that is, cognition in the logical sense, rather than cognition understood as a mental process (which they can also deal with), are the

following: (1) when working on epistemology, one should deal with language as a system of expressions equipped with meanings; (2) statements should be formulated so that they concern expressions, i.e. sentences and terms of a specific language which equips these sentences and terms with specific meanings. The benefit for an epistemologist resulting from following these recommendations is that they will have at their disposal the only possible method, which allows them to speak of “certain cognitions with determinate content” (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 143). For instance, the expression “the concept of a triangle,” as long as it is supposed to serve as a singular name of a concept with specific content, should be, according to Ajdukiewicz, interpreted as an abbreviation of the expression “the concept being the meaning of the name “triangle”” (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 143)⁹⁴. and therefore, as an expression which describes its designate as an object with the relationship of being the meaning for the word “triangle” (I write about the legitimacy of this interpretation in the next section of this chapter). This meta-philosophical proposal has the added advantage of enabling the use of some results obtained in the theory of deductive systems for epistemological investigations, but only after one condition is met, namely, if natural language, which is usually used to conduct such investigations, turns out to be a deductive system (in which it undergoes steps of idealization). Ajdukiewicz already demonstrated that it is such a system in his previously published dissertations: “On the Meaning of Expressions,” “Sprache und Sinn,” and “The Empirical Foundation of Cognition”⁹⁵.

The further course of the argumentation of Ajdukiewicz's paper concerned primarily the semiotic-logical paraphrase of the theorem of transcendental idealism, i.e. the translation⁹⁶ of this claim into a corresponding

⁹⁴ J. Giedymin in his translation of Ajdukiewicz's paper gave here the phrase “the concept which constitutes the meaning of the term ‘triangle’.” In my opinion the verb “to constitute” is not appropriate in this case. The concepts in the logical sense, and just such are considered, are linguistic (logical) meanings of expressions. So, to speak that they constitute the meanings is incorrect: the concept does not constitute the meaning of a given expression, but it is just the meaning of this expression.

⁹⁵ Strictly speaking, colloquial language interpreted in the idealizing way is in Ajdukiewicz's formulation an intentionally interpreted pragmatic deductive system. On the problem of the distinction between pragmatic and apragmatic deductive systems, cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1960).

⁹⁶ The problem of paraphrasing conceived as the semiotic operations is considered by J.J. Jadacki in (Jadacki 1995).

sentence formulated on the basis of deductive⁹⁷ theories and the critique of this sentence in the light of the meta-mathematic results obtained by K. Gödel and A. Tarski – specifically: in the light of Gödel’s theorem on the incompleteness of richer deductive systems and in the light of the meta-logical principle of the excluded middle, as a consequence of Tarski’s semantic definition of truth.

Here are Ingarden’s comments and Ajdukiewicz’s response to the them: Ingarden stated:

The following problems raise doubts in the speaker’s beautiful paper:

(1) Determining one of the tasks of epistemology to be a theory of meanings of expressions entails remaining only in the field of considerations on meanings, thus the problem of the objectivity of cognition, and thus, determining its truth value, is excluded. (2) This determination excludes from epistemology the consideration of the results of direct cognition, not only due to the lack of actual appropriate expressions in the created language but also due to doubts of whether an appropriate expression can be constructed to match every result. (3) Since the meaning of an isolated expression undergoes various changes when the expression is put in a context, there is doubt as to the possibility of explaining the concept “triangle” in the meaning the word has as an isolated construct (Ajdukiewicz 1936a, p. 336).

In response to Ingarden’s comments, Ajdukiewicz noted that:

(1) Indicating the field of meanings as one of the fields included in the name “cognition” does not exclude the problem of the objectivity of cognition from epistemology. After all, indicating the object of a given science is not equivalent to enumerating its problems. The best argument in support of the claim

⁹⁷ Rickert’s claim on transcendental idealism in the interpretation Ajdukiewicz ascribed to it is as follows: “Only judgments dictated by transcendental norms are true” (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 150). Giedymin translated this sentence less precisely as: “A statement is true if and only if it is dictated by transcendental norm.” The semiotic-logical paraphrase of this claim states: “In the language of the natural sciences only sentences dictated by the rules of direct consequence specific for that language are true, thus, only those sentences are true in a given language which are theorems of this language” (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 150). In Giedymin’s translation “In the language of natural science a statement is true if and only if it is dictated by the rules of direct consequence specific to that language, i.e. it is a theorem of that language”).

that the semantic approach to the problem of epistemology does not exclude the problem of truthfulness is contained in Tarski's work mentioned in the lecture. Tarski speaks from a semantic platform and provides the only correct description of the concept of truth in the history of philosophy. (2) If given concepts or judgments (in the logical sense) are not the meaning of any expression, it is impossible to state anything about them in terms of their content. Whatever concerns such concepts and judgments would therefore be inexpressible, and therefore, it could not belong to any science, as long as science is interpreted as something which is socially (inter-individually) accessible. This remark refers especially to the alleged theory of direct cognition. (3). The speaker does not consider to be true the claims that words always change their meanings depending on the context. However, if it were the case, the speaker would not see it as an obstacle to the possibility of "explaining the concept of 'triangle' in the meaning the word has as an isolated construct." Prof. Ingarden claims, as long as his objections have not been misunderstood, that when revealing the meaning of a given word, e.g. through defining it, I have to use the word in the definitional context, where it has a different meaning than in isolation. In order to reveal the meaning of a given word, I do not have to use it (or even, if my standpoint is extensional, I cannot use it), it is sufficient to use the name of this word. Therefore, in a definition, I am allowed to use the name of a word in a given shape taken in isolation (Ajdukiewicz 1936a, p. 338).

Historical considerations require that the analysis of these speeches be preceded by a note that the Cracow Philosophical Congress constituted an important turning point in the evolution of Ajdukiewicz's views, which two facts contributed to. Firstly, during the Congress, Ajdukiewicz announced in public that he was withdrawing from radical conventionalism, although he was still inclined to accept its moderate version. Secondly, the paper presented during the Congress, which is the subject of the present analysis, initiated the semantic, as opposed to the previous syntactic-pragmatic, period in his philosophical views.

Alfred Tarski contributed to both of the above. The reason for Ajdukiewicz's resignation from radical conventionalism were difficulties of a semiotic nature (connected with the concept of consistent and closed languages which was the semiotic basis for radical conventionalism) which were noted by Tarski⁹⁸. On the other hand, the change in the semiotic

⁹⁸ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1964, p. 315).

orientation – from syntactic-pragmatic to syntactic-semantic-pragmatic – was related to Ajdukiewicz's recognition of the importance of the results of Tarski's famous dissertation on the concept of truthfulness⁹⁹. Bearing in mind these facts, it should be noted that when Ingarden raised the question of the objectivity of cognition in connection to Ajdukiewicz's lecture, and consequently, objectively interpreted truthfulness, as well as other previously cited reservations, he did not refer them to radical conventionalism, but rather to general problems, that is, to the analytical philosophical option and to Ajdukiewicz's meta-philosophical proposal stemming from it, that is, to semantic epistemology.

When Ingarden raised the problem of the objectivity of cognition in association with Ajdukiewicz's speech, he meant epistemological objectivity, which is closely connected to his concept of epistemology, and therefore, with his interpretation of direct cognition. Following Ingarden's work from around the same time, it should be added here that he was not satisfied with any other answer to the problem of objectivity besides the one "which will remove the state of doubt and uncertainty, and therefore, will not raise any other doubts and will itself be absolutely certain and final" (Ingarden 1971, p. 41). Direct cognition is guided as the main principle by the postulate to experience every object of cognition so that one reaches direct data and presents this data within such limits which they present themselves in, and at the same time, to neutralize the importance of any opinions and convictions until "direct cognition (experience in the broad meaning of the word) demonstrates their truthfulness" (Ingarden 1971, p. 293). Thus, Ingarden meant objectivity interpreted in such a way that while being connected to direct cognition, it also is tied to Husserl's principle of all principles, which states that the source of validity of all cognition is the source presenting evidence (intuition), called direct experience by Ingarden. He wrote about such an interpretation of objectivity¹⁰⁰ that, as opposed to many possible distinctions of ontically interpreted objectivities, there is only one objectivity interpreted epistemologically. It concerns the objectivity of cognitive acts or their products. This objectivity is not accomplished only through these acts

⁹⁹ It seems Ajdukiewicz hesitated to accept this importance. I present my suppositions concerning this problem in (Olech 1993).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. (Ingarden 1967, p. 488). Although this work by Ingarden is from the 1960s, the author's views on the problem of interest to us included there can be referred to the context of both authors' polemics in Cracow, which Ingarden himself authorizes (Ingarden 1971, p. 41, footnote 2).

or their products referring to some other entity, due to which the entity becomes their object. Only referring to this object makes them objectively referred and no more. We are dealing with actual epistemological objectivity when (1) an act or a cognitive product of an act referring to a given object contains some intentional sense which, directed at an entity different from the act (or product), ascribes to it a certain formed matter and a given mode of existence and (2) if, moreover, this intentional sense is such that what is ascribed by it to the entity matches exactly what exists objectively in this entity or, in other words, when this intentional sense is filled with objective data in this objectively existing entity, where the data reveals a given object of experience and the data is part of direct experience¹⁰¹.

Ajdukiewicz's response does not contain a direct reference to Ingarden's interpretation of epistemological objectivity. Yet, since Ajdukiewicz rejected direct experience in the name of the intersubjectivity of cognition which, he thought, all cognition deserving to be called rational should be able to manage, and only such cognition deserves to be accepted; and also he rejected the notion of epistemological objectivity associated with experience in this interpretation. The motives behind his rejection were, firstly, that Ingarden stressed the doubtfulness of intersubjective communicability of the results of direct cognition whereas Ajdukiewicz did not accept as he was an anti-irrationalist¹⁰²; secondly, that the phenomenologists were convinced that objects given in direct cognition are self-present. This self-presence, or simply the object presenting itself to the subject, can perhaps be reconciled with Ajdukiewicz's view on non-articulable judgments, yet, only that which is in the content of articulable judgments and was derived from wholly non-articulable judgments can rightly be called cognition¹⁰³. In other words, the subject of rational (scientific) cognition, in Ajdukiewicz's concept of epistemology, is always an integral part of language, and therefore, an object is given to a thusly understood subject as something linguistically determined.

Naturally, Ajdukiewicz did not claim that the very intersubjectivity is sufficient for the cognitive results fulfilling it to be real cognition, as the truth value of cognition understood objectively, to use Ingarden's words, is also significant. Ajdukiewicz was able to speak of this truth value without any reservations derived from the antinomian character of the concept of

¹⁰¹ Cf. (Ingarden 1919, p. 308 ff).

¹⁰² Cf. (Ingarden 1919, p. 314) and (Ajdukiewicz 1934a, p. 151 ff).

¹⁰³ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1934, p. 36 ff) . .

truthfulness, having accepted the importance of Tarski's research, which he did for the first time (and actually applied them) in his paper at the congress. Still, neither before 1936, nor later did Ajdukiewicz agree to such an interpretation of epistemological objectivity which completely and arbitrarily suspends the validity of concepts and judgments as the meanings of expressions in a language use (as previously founded) by verbalizing cognitive results. At most, he always stressed the conventional nature of concepts, which raised even more doubts on the part of phenomenologists. One might say that Ajdukiewicz would consider such suspension to be ontologically impossible to the same degree as a Kant proponent would a suspension of *a priori* forms and categories. Yet, Ingarden's interpretation of epistemological objectivity requires such a suspension in order to, as a phenomenologist would put it, "do justice" to the object, listening to what it tells us about itself, in order not to violate the specific nature of the object, to use another of his formulations¹⁰⁴. Only this suspension, which enables a visual relationship with an object, is to constitute a guarantee of actual epistemological objectivity and a point of departure for creating adequate concepts and hence, conceivable but not always possible adequate language verbalizing such cognition.

Here we should at least mention briefly the difference between Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden concerning the problem of language in science. For Ajdukiewicz, every cognitive action which can be called scientific is a language action, and cognition in the sense of product is identical to the logically (linguistically) understood meanings of sentences of a language which cognition was verbalized in¹⁰⁵. Therefore, Ajdukiewicz rejects psychologically understood non-verbalizable judgments and only accepts those which, being verbalizable, have as their components more or less visual (intuitive) presentations of word constructs.

By such restrictive understanding of cognitive acts, i.e. by such understanding of cognitive acts which classifies only verbalizable cognitive acts as acts deserving to be called "cognitive" and by acceptance of the Husserlian philosophy of language, concepts in the psychological sense are identical to

¹⁰⁴ Cf. (Ingarden 1919, p. 299).

¹⁰⁵ This view was presented by Ajdukiewicz in the 1930s. In the 1940s, besides cognition as an activity and cognition as a product, he also adopted the idealistically understood cognition, which would consist of ideally understood terms (concepts) and sentences (judgments); cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1948, p. 119).

acts of meaning intention involved in the visual (intuitive) presentations of nominal expressions, whereas judgements in the psychological sense are identical to acts of meaning intention involved in visual (intuitive) presentations of sentences. And consequently, concepts in the logical sense are identical to understood *in specie* intentional essences of acts involved in visual (intuitive), whereas judgments in the logical sense, i.e. propositions, are identical to understood *in specie* intentional essences of acts involved in visual (intuitive) presentations of sentences¹⁰⁶.

Ingarden assumed a different position on the role of language in cognition. He distinguished cognitive actions from language actions, and he believed language actions to be subordinate to cognitive actions. In his view, the latter should aim to form a language tool, i.e. to create, if possible (*sic!*), clear and distinct meanings of expressions, as the phenomenologists' postulate is to follow "from objects to concepts rather than from concepts to objects"¹⁰⁷. Consequently, there is a view that language only performs the role of technical means to preserve scientific results, which are not reduced to linguistic meanings. In this view, knowledge is an extra-linguistic construct and the role of language is only to externalize it. Therefore, we can speak of non-verbalized knowledge, or even non-verbalizable knowledge, in Ingarden's case. The latter is such precisely due to unsurmountable difficulties encountered by a cognitive subject in creating the meaning layer of a language, with which knowledge is to be preserved and communicated.

It is symptomatic that both in Ajdukiewicz's response to Ingarden's objection and generally in his method of practicing epistemology, emphasis is put on the intersubjectivity of cognition, that is, that which, *mutatis mutandis*, Kant described as universal and necessary validity (*allgemeine Gültigkeit*). This emphasis dominated in the period of Ajdukiewicz's radical conventionalism, to be compensated for later on, starting in 1936, but not weakened in the least, by the notion of objectivistically understood truthfulness, which Ajdukiewicz could discuss "on his own account" (Ajdukiewicz 1953, p. 162), and he did see its source as the same thing which the intersubjective validity of cognition derived from, i.e. in the dictate of language rules, as it had been before 1936¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁶ On this problem, cf. (Olech 2018), and (Olech 2020).

¹⁰⁷ Cf. (Ingarden 1919, p. 300).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1934b, p. 81 ff).

For Kant, and we should not forget about Kantian parallels in Ajdukiewicz's philosophy¹⁰⁹, necessary universal validity and objective validity (*objective Gültigkeit*) were interchangeable concepts¹¹⁰. As is well known, this interchangeability did not concern all judgments made by a subject but rather only those which categories are involved with, that is, forms of intellect (*Verstand*), i.e. experience judgments (*Erfahrungsurteile*). According to Ingarden¹¹¹, Kant confused two concepts which are not at all equivalent. Having stated that, Ingarden was not guided by the results of Tarski's and Gödel's works (the interpretation of which, I believe, can provide an impulse to state such lack of equivalence)¹¹², but rather he kept in mind the validity of the results of direct cognition which do not fulfill the results of intersubjective verifiability.

An analogous entity to the necessary and commonly valid cognition in Kant's understanding is, in the case of Ajdukiewicz, cognition consisting of sentences (judgments) dictated by the meaning-rules of a language (otherwise called as "meaning-directives of a language) which is not necessarily a closed and consistent language, as he believed in the period of radical conventionalism, but also an open language", i.e. which can be enriched and expanded with new expressions, which Ajdukiewicz assumed in the period when he moderated his conventionalist standpoint. On the other hand, objective validity is simply epistemological objectivity, the logical expression of which for sentences or judgments is their classically interpreted truthfulness.

For Ajdukiewicz, the concepts of necessary universal validity and objective validity were not interchangeable, although, as he admitted himself, he had been "tempted" to consider them as such since 1936. Strictly speaking, he was tempted to identify a sentence dictated by the meaning-rules of a language, i.e. a pragmatically interpreted thesis of a language, with a true sentence¹¹³. Yet, he believed until 1953 that the common and necessary validity of cognition forces us to accept at least all thusly interpreted

¹⁰⁹ On the problem of the influence of Kant's thought on Ajdukiewicz's philosophy, cf. e.g. (Albertazzi 1995).

¹¹⁰ Cf. (Ingarden 1936, p. 653). On the interchangeability of necessary universal validity and objective validity in Kant's philosophy, cf. (Kant 2004, p. 50 ff).

¹¹¹ Cf. (Ingarden 1936, p. 653).

¹¹² This is the case because sentences accepted within a given language J, that is, dictated by its rules and as such, having the value of universal validity and being true for language J, that is, objectively adequate and as such objectively important, are not equivalent.

¹¹³ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1936, p. 186) and (Olech 1993, p. 130 ff).

cognition as objectively important, under threat of violating the rules of the language¹¹⁴, although it is not the other way around, that is, objectively valid cognition does not have to be commonly and necessarily important. Since 1936, when besides the expression “to accept as true” he could use “is true” without worrying about antinomy, he spoke not only of the pragmatic-linguistic necessity to consider the cognition true but he claimed that it is true because it has this guarantee in the dictate of the rules of the language. In 1953, he noted publicly for the first time, it seems, that one should doubt that every analytical sentence has a guarantee of truthfulness in the dictate of the relevant discursive rule of a language and that only sentences which are postulates constituting the meaning of one of its expressions have the guarantee of truthfulness without referring to experience¹¹⁵. He elaborated on this problem in his work of 1958 entitled “The Problem of the Foundation of Analytic Sentences.”

One last remark, which cannot be neglected in the case of Ajdukiewicz's philosophy: When speaking of his views on necessary and commonly valued cognition, one should remember that it cannot be interpreted in an absolutist way but only relatively, that is, it is relativized to the language it is verbalized in. The necessity in question is a logical-pragmatic necessity: the speakers of a given language must accept the sentences dictated by the meaning-rules of the language under threat of violation of its semantic layer. Commonness means that this obligation concerns every speaker of the language. Language is not a private construct, as the meaning layer of a language is a construct of a convention of usage (some fragments of this layer can be arbitrarily sharpened).

The question of the validity of the postulate of the intersubjectivity of cognition (interpreted as intersubjective verifiability) in the context of its compatibility with other postulates and claims of neo-positivists were taken up by Ingarden in his polemic with the Vienna Circle, in which he demonstrated that accepting these claims (mainly the claims on the impossibility to cognize other people's mental states) not only makes the postulate impossible but also is devoid of meaning if one assumes the neo-positivist interpretation of meaningfulness¹¹⁶.

¹¹⁴ It is a different thing to claim that one accepts sentence Z as objectively important (thus, true) and to simply claim the objective validity (veracity) of sentence Z.

¹¹⁵ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1953, p. 161).

¹¹⁶ Cf. (Ingarden 1936, p. 653 ff).

It was no accident that Ingarden raised this problem in his polemic with neo-positivists and with Polish proponents of this trend¹¹⁷ (and in this context we should keep in mind the particularly close contact between Ajdukiewicz and Carnap), but rather, it was connected with the problematically intersubjective character of the results of direct cognition as phenomenologically interpreted. Therefore, Ingarden's polemic efforts went towards at least weakening this postulate, if not its elimination, since a phenomenologist stressing the importance of direct cognition is unable to cope with not only interpersonal verifiability, the value of which Ingarden questions, but often also interpersonal communicability.

It is worth noting that the price a phenomenologist pays for the rigorously conceived objective validity of cognition (i.e. epistemological objectivity understood in such a way that it takes into account the postulates of direct experience) is the universal validity of cognition. Still, the universal validity of cognition understood both as intersubjective communicability and intersubjective verifiability is not, according to phenomenologists, something the lack of which would deprive cognition of the quality of validity. Ingarden claimed:

A phenomenologist writer does not "lecture" his science to the reader but only attempts to help the reader gain their own relevant experience. For a non-intelligent reader or one who has no gift for obtaining direct data from experience and feeling the intentions of the author [...] phenomenological books will always seem "incomprehensible" (Ingarden 1919, p. 316).

In another fragment, he questions intersubjective verifiability as a necessary condition for valid cognition and adds that this condition eliminates in an unauthorized manner "any cognitive results concerning objects or facts which can be "cognized" only by one subject of cognition, such as, e.g. one's own conscious experiences" (Ingarden 1936, p. 653).

On the other hand, it is opposite in the case of Ajdukiewicz: the rigor of the universal validity of cognition pays the price of objective validity. After

¹¹⁷ That is, with prominent philosophers from Twardowski's school, who Ingarden did not mention by name but about whom he thought they were "completely immaculate" in terms of "experiencing the intellectual atmosphere created early in the century by neo-Kantianism, bergsonism, Husserl's phenomenology, Dilthey's philosophy, or American pragmatism, as opposed to the members of the Vienna Circle; (Ingarden 1936, p. 646 ff).

all, the rigor of the latter (1) must give way and does give way to harmonious order and pragmatic considerations, which the accepted scientific cognition must fulfill, and (2) is practically unattainable due to the inevitable "besetting" of a subject cognizing through the semantic structure of the language used by the subject.

Admittedly, Ajdukiewicz's works do not contain many fragments in which the problem of epistemological objectivity is researched thoroughly, as they would require more precise analyses of cognitive processes, and Ajdukiewicz dealt with those only superficially and occasionally, focusing instead on productively (logically) interpreted cognition¹¹⁸. Yet, this problem occurs in connection with the analysis of the problem of the truthfulness of images, the problem of sensory illusions and, the most often, the problem of the mutual matching of facts and theory in scientific cognition, conducted by Ajdukiewicz.

In his lectures on epistemology in 1931¹¹⁹ Ajdukiewicz stated that a given image is true when all judgments motivated by this image are true, on the condition that these judgments are not motivated only by this image. Therefore, if it turned out that even one of the judgements motivated by a given image were false, this image should be recognized as being an illusion. Therefore, determining the truthfulness of images, that is, their objective validity or, in other words, their epistemological objectivity, is shifted by the author of the "Lectures" to the area of the logical value of judgments motivated by this image and only by this image. Following that, after analyzing various solutions concerning the question of the truthfulness of judgments founded upon the classic understanding of truthfulness, and after stating that truthfulness interpreted in this way cannot predicate on a certain type of sentences (under threat of and antinomy)¹²⁰, Ajdukiewicz concludes that one can predicate truthfulness about another type of sentences when a certain criterion supports these sentences, that is, a power, as he calls it, which convinces someone to accept these sentences¹²¹. According to Ajdukiewicz, this power is a certain experience of the cognizing subject. He distinguishes between two groups of

¹¹⁸ The only work devoted solely to the problem of epistemological objectivity is (Ajdukiewicz 1931).

¹¹⁹ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1988).

¹²⁰ These are, as Ajdukiewicz calls them in (Ajdukiewicz 1988), not quoted but only described sentences, e.g. "a sentence printed in this and this line of text in a given page of a given book."

¹²¹ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1988, p. 474).

experiences which are criteria: intuitive (he does not describe them further but states that they are obvious criteria) and experiential. Indicating the cooperation of criteria used when recognizing sentences as true (i.e. when issuing judgments), he notes that they can sometimes lead to accepting contradictory sentences. When that happens, we revise the criteria. Both in the life of an individual and in the life of a community (e.g. scientific communities) a constant evolution of criteria takes place which aims at such alignment that cognition achieved on their basis is non-contradictory and biologically useful.

The moment of harmonious order highlighted by Ajdukiewicz and the motive of biological pragmatism reappears in the works "The World-Picture and the Conceptual Apparatus" (Ajdukiewicz 1934) and "The Scientific World-Perspective" (Ajdukiewicz 1935). He claimed there that we accept such a world-picture, or such a world-perspective (and the latter is a category which also retains its value in the moderately conventionalist views held by Ajdukiewicz) which meets the condition of non-contradiction and systematic order, besides which also other conditions may be taken into consideration, including the biological wellbeing of humans, and here Ajdukiewicz refers to Georg Simmel.

How then is the world-picture (the category of a radical conventionalist) and the world-perspective (the category of a moderate conventionalist) related to the world? The world-picture, as Ajdukiewicz wrote, is not absolutely matched to reality. The world-picture of the world is established in idealized language and "is only approximately compatible with the cognized reality" (Ajdukiewicz 1934b, p. 88).

The world-picture [...] is not a coloured picture, if experimental data be colours. Our world-picture consists rather in just the meaning of expressions; and in these experiential data are not contained. The world-picture is constructed entirely of abstract elements. The role of perceptual data consists only in this: the conceptual apparatus having already been selected, in terms of it, perceptual data determine which of the elements in the conceptual apparatus are to enter the world-picture (Ajdukiewicz 1934b, p. 87).

Abstracting from the difference in meaning of the notions of the world-picture and the world-perspective, which is insignificant in this case, one could say that the relationship described between "the world-picture" and "the world" is analogous to the relationship between "the world-perspective" and "the world."

In the dissertation entitled “Conventional Elements in Science” (Ajdukiewicz 1947), Ajdukiewicz’s tone in the problem concerning us is similar; he wrote

The task of science is not to copy faithfully the world in all its glory, in the richness of colors, sounds, and smells the world displays before us, but to create a conceptual framework which would recreate faithfully the very structure of the world, its framework stripped of all sensory content [...]. The aim science strives to achieve is a clear map of the world which would allow us to pave the way for our practical actions, rather than a realistic portrait of the world (Ajdukiewicz 1947, p. 35).

The world-picture (or the world-perspective) is stripped of all sensory content. The role of sensory data only consists in determining which of the elements included in the conceptual apparatus should be included in the world-picture (or the world-perspective). What is the relationship between sensory data and the world? Ajdukiewicz’s view on this problem is critical towards critical realism. Critical realism denies that:

[Critical realism denies that] we are right by ascribing the objects of the outside world, i.e. things, secondary properties. According to them [critical realists], no thing is white, or red, or any other color, and the sentences in which these properties are ascribed to things are false, unless we do not accept them literally, e.g. when we understand “red” to mean “emitting such and such waves” *etc.* (Ajdukiewicz 1931, p. 212).

According to Ajdukiewicz (and he consistently accepted this view since the 1930s)¹²² sentences such as “snow is white” or “blood is red” must be accepted as true specifically with the regular, colloquial understanding of the terms used in them. As Ajdukiewicz claimed in “O obiektywności poznania zmysłowego” [On the Objectivity of Experiential Cognition], in English a given rule (in his later terminology it is called the empirical meaning directive) which states that only one who is prepared to accept the sentence “it is white,” having experienced the impression which normally occurs in us, e.g. when seeing snow, gives meaning appropriate to this sentence in English. Someone who would not accept this sentence in this situation would

¹²² Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1965a, p. 241 ff).

ipso facto prove that the question “is this white?” and the answer “this is white” is associated with a different meaning from the one ascribed to these expressions in English. On the other hand, a person who accepts sentence Z of language J when speaking language J must also, as Ajdukiewicz claimed in “O obiektywności poznania zmysłowego” and in other works from the syntactic-pragmatic period in his views, accept the sentence “Z is true in language J.”

This analysis, which ascribes sensory properties to things provided in experience is continued in the paper “Language and Meaning.” In it, the author distinguishes between simple and complex meaning rules. Simple ones require the readiness to accept specific sentences in the presence of appropriate impressions, whereas complex ones – in the presence of appropriate impressions and “inarticulate judgments by which a situation is interpreted as ‘normal’” (Ajdukiewicz 1934, p. 46). Ajdukiewicz believes that sentences concerning the external world are probably accepted based on complex empirical rules and thus, words signifying objects from this world and their properties seem to have complex meanings. On the other hand, expressions making up sentences dictated by simple empirical rules, and referring to the objects from the mental world and the properties of these objects have a simple empirical meaning. Accepting these expressions as having simple empirical meanings, that is, accepting that non-articulated judgments describing the situation as normal in reference to mental phenomena are unnecessary, brings to mind Brentano’s approach to the object of inner experience: to the phenomena about which Brentano thought that “they are true in themselves” and that “as they are in a phenomenon [...] so they also are in reality” (Brentano 1874, p. 28). Therefore, Brentano thought that in the case of inner experience, as opposed to external experience, false (deceptive) information about the object of this experience does not occur. Thus, the conclusion would be that the inner world can be cognized objectively, and what is more, it can be known that one learnt it objectively and without doubt.

The condition of accepting a perceptive sentence referring to the outside world is for the subject accepting this sentence to find themselves in a situation which would motivate this acceptance. This situation is ascribed to this sentence through an empirical meaning-rule dictating this sentence. Does it then result from the above that one cannot accept or does not accept perceptive sentences which are not dictated by empirical directives? The answer to this question is not contained in the work “Language and

Meaning” but can be found in Ajdukiewicz’s later work *Pragmatic Logic*. He states there¹²³ that one can accept and in fact often accepts perceptive sentences not dictated by empirical rules, but such sentences do not have their truthfulness guaranteed then; perceptive sentences accepted based on empirical rules are always true. Therefore, if it turns out that a perceptive sentence which we accepted without taking into consideration the empirical rule (nor did we act against a given rule) is false, it is a sign that we were subject to sensory illusion. Not all perceptive sentences are and can be accepted according to empirical rules, which results from the fact that the condition of such acceptance is that the sensory organs of the subject accepting it are in normal condition when accepting it. Therefore, in order to decide anything about, e.g. the colors of objects and follow empirical meaning-rules in this process, one must look at these objects in daylight. In the work “Language and Meaning” as well as in *Pragmatic Logic*, Ajdukiewicz states that for natural languages one cannot formulate unquestionable examples of complex empirical rules, i.e. rules dictating sentences about the external world, as ascribing meanings specific to these languages is not fixed precisely. This means that for no perceptive sentence are there ever established conditions which should be deemed normal, and also that the scope of impressions is ever established, in the face of which one could rule on a given external object its ownership expressed with that sentence so that one can be certain of not violating the empirical meaning-rule dictating this sentence. This entails both semiotic and epistemological consequences: semiotic – as no expression of colloquial language referring to an object from the external world has a strictly established meaning; epistemological – since the inability to establish the meaning results from the lack of unambiguous determination of the abovementioned normality of conditions. Then perceptive sentences, which Ajdukiewicz wanted to be “statements regarding the so-called ‘external world’” (Ajdukiewicz 1934, p. 47), are also certainly utterances about the world of impressions of the subject accepting this sentence. Yet, there is no certainty that they are also adequate (objective) utterances about the external world. When the difference between complex and simple empirical rules (which do not pose conditions of normalcy) is blurred, in the sense that the line between the normality and abnormality of conditions for the senses is unclear, the basis for distinguishing between utterances about “the redness of a rose” and utterances about the “redness”

¹²³ Cf.: (Ajdukiewicz 1965a, p. 240 ff, 220) and (Ajdukiewicz 1953, p. 163 ff).

of the content of certain impressions disappears. This complicates the defense of Ajdukiewicz's epistemological standpoint, direct realism, which is polemical towards critical realism.

Ajdukiewicz noted¹²⁴ that the lack of grounds for the skeptical standpoint consists in erroneous identification of justified knowledge with the knowledge that this knowledge has been justified. Considering that a situation which motivates one to accept a perceptive sentence (belonging to the realm of relationships which the empirical meaning-rule is based on) is an argument which justifies the sentence directly, Ajdukiewicz's remark directed at sceptics retains its value also in the problem of the objectivity of knowledge. Its modified version could be as follows: objective knowledge about the external world is one thing and the knowledge that the knowledge about the external world is objective is another thing. Therefore, we should gather that the conclusion of the above argument concerning the problem of the objectivity of cognition would be unsatisfactory for a sceptic, who identifies objective knowledge about the external world with the knowledge about the fact that knowledge about the external world is objective. This would be the case because the role of impression data in Ajdukiewicz's epistemological views consists in determining which of the elements included in the conceptual apparatus should join the world-picture (or the world-perspective). And since it is impossible to determine the relationship between sensory data and the external world in a specific situation, due to the impossibility of determining the conditions for normality, it is also impossible to create a conceptual scheme which would be certain to recreate the structure of the world faithfully. This lack of certainty as to the faithfulness (adequacy, or in other words, objectivity or objective validity) of recreating the structure of the world would definitely be raised by a sceptic and would constitute a premise to raise the objection that Ajdukiewicz's epistemological project does not meet the conditions of epistemological objectivity. In fact, Ingarden made this objection in response to Ajdukiewicz, starting with the same premise as any hypothetical sceptic:

No other answer [to the problem of objectivity] will satisfy us but that which will remove the state of doubt and questioning, and therefore will not suggest any other doubts and will in itself be absolutely certain and final (Ingarden 1971, p. 42).

¹²⁴ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1983, p. 18 ff).

The condition for obtaining certainty as to the objective character of cognition is, according to Ingarden, the critical consideration (with regard to cognitive objectivity) of the concepts which make up the world-picture or the world-perspective in Ajdukiewicz's epistemology, and simultaneously, taking the language in which cognition is verbalized into brackets during the critical consideration, and then construction of new concepts (meanings of expressions) in making sense-creating operations; the matter is about such concepts which can, but do not have to, be identical in content with the existing concepts (meanings) of the language and which genetically derive from direct cognition.

Thus, we are faced with a choice: either certainty as to the objective character of cognition (*objective Gültigkeit*), certainty derived from the phenomenologically interpreted direct cognition, but at the cost of the intersubjectivity of cognition, or the intersubjectivity of knowledge (*allgemeine Gültigkeit*), at the cost of certainty as to its objective value, and if so, then perhaps objective validity itself, if not always, then at least sometimes?

There is one more problem to consider in Ajdukiewicz's response to Ingarden's objections to his lecture during the congress¹²⁵. It is tied to the problem of the objectivity of cognition discussed before, and moreover, which is interesting, it touches at the core of the analytical method of philosophizing, that is, treating concepts and judgments in the logical sense as linguistic meanings of expressions. "If a concept or a judgment (in the logical sense) is not the meaning of any expression, then nothing can be said of it which would concern its content," Ajdukiewicz stated in response to Ingarden's objection that defining the domain of meanings as one of the domains included in the name "cognition" is at least problematic, as it is not possible to construct appropriate expressions to match all cognitive results, e.g. the results of direct cognition. Ajdukiewicz added:

Everything which concerns such concepts and judgments would therefore be inexpressible, and thus, would not be able to belong to any science, as long as science is understood as something which is socially (interindividually) accessible. In particular, this remark refers to the alleged theory of direct cognition (Ajdukiewicz 1936, p. 338).

¹²⁵ I leave out yet another set of problems occurring in both philosophers' polemics; they would require more in-depth analysis, which would go beyond the scope of a regularly sized article.

Ajdukiewicz justified this opinion extensively in an article, which was an extended version of his paper at the congress¹²⁶. This justification is valuable at least for the reason that in Ajdukiewicz's works it is the only justification (and the only one in analytical philosophy at all), which is this convincing and clear, of the necessity to approach dealing with concepts and logical judgments from the point of view of language, the necessity of which is stressed in his other works. This justification legitimizes one of the leading mottos of analytical philosophy; following J.M. Bocheński's characterization:

[Language requires] rejecting the belief in concepts which "fly in the air." For analysts, concepts are the meanings of words, there are no concepts themselves. One can only reach concepts through words (Bocheński 1990, p. 36).

Ajdukiewicz claimed the same, stating that "it is impossible to name a given concept or judgment except by characterizing them as the meanings of certain terms or sentences" (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 142). Therefore, if we have to be able "to make assertions about certain cognitions with determinate content" (Ajdukiewicz 1937, p. 143) we must approach analyzing concepts and judgments from the point of view of language, and thus, consider them to be the meanings of specific expressions. The justification for this claim is as follows: Seemingly, a phrase such as "the concept of a triangle" is not at all about something which would necessarily be the meaning of the expression. However, when the expression "the concept of a triangle" is to be an individual name for a specific concept with certain content, then the word "triangle" must occur in this expression as the name of itself. Therefore, this expression should take on the form: "the concept which is the meaning of the name 'triangle'." The expression "the concept of a triangle," assumed in a simple objective supposition, signifies the only object in the relationship of being the concept for the triangle. Analogously, we should state that "the concept of a threeside" denotes the only object in the relationship of being the concept for a threeside. And since a threeside is the same as a triangle, whatever is the only object in the abovementioned relationship towards a threeside is the same object in the abovementioned relationship towards a triangle. That is, in other words, the concept of a triangle would have to be the same as the concept of a threeside, and it is not

¹²⁶ Cf. (Ajdukiewicz 1937).

(although a triangle is the same as a threeside); it is not when the expressions “the concept of a triangle” and “the concept of a threeside” are to be individual names of certain concepts specific as to their content. Admittedly, these expressions are the same when they occur as general names because, as such, they are of equal range.

The expression “the concept of a triangle,” with the word “triangle” used in the normal supposition (*suppositio naturalis* in Peter of Spain's terminology), is a general name, the range of which includes all concepts which are meanings of names of equal range with the word “triangle, such as “triangle,” “a flat figure with the sum of its angles equal to 180°” etc. The problem is analogous with the expression “the concept of a threeside” and the word “threeside” used in an normal supposition.

The essence of the above considerations is included in the stressed condition: “if we are to speak of specific cognition, determined as to its content.” Indeed, if we are to speak of specific cognitions, determined as to their content, then such expressions as “the concept of a triangle” must be considered to be individual rather than general names, and if so, the word “triangle” must occur in a material supposition, and the concept in question must be the meaning of the word “triangle.” The concept of “triangle” may not be understood as the meaning of the word “triangle,” but then it will not be cognition determined as to its content, and then the expression “the concept of a triangle” will not be an individual name but a general name, which includes meanings of names of equal range with the word “triangle.”

Ajdukiewicz's polemic with Ingarden concerning concepts and meanings is interesting for many reasons. Both philosophers accepted the intentional theory of expressions, whose framework was established by Husserl in *Logische Untersuchungen*. They also both developed Husserl's theory: Ajdukiewicz performed its semiotic-logical explication in “On the Meaning of Expressions.” Ingarden developed Husserl's theory, modifying it significantly, in *Das Literarische Kunstwerk*. What distinguishes the two philosophers greatly in the problem at hand is that Ingarden accepted, following J.M Bocheński's formulation, “concepts flying in the air” and ascribed to these concepts the status of ideal objects, simultaneously distinguishing concepts from meanings. In his view, the latter are not ideal objects but rather intentional objects, in the specific, non-Brentanian, but rather Ingarden's meaning of the word: they have a beginning in time as they were created *ex nihilo* in a sense-creating operation of the subject, they change with the passing of time and when entering various syntactic relationships, and

are existentially heteronymic. The relationship of the meanings of expressions to ideal concepts is as follows: the former are partial actualizations of the sense included in the latter. Although ideal concepts are transcendental in relation to expressions and to sense-creating operation of the subject, they still constitute the being basis for expressions in the sense that the subject selects from them appropriate moments of sense and actualizes them, constituting the meaning layer of language. For instance, the meaning of the expression “a square” is a partial actualization of the sense included in the ideal concept of a square; another actualization of another moment of this sense is included in the meaning of the expression “rectangular parallelogram.”

In Ajdukiewicz’s semiotics, ideal objects are logically interpreted concepts and judgments; in Ingarden’s semiotics they are also concepts, but they are not meanings of expressions, contrary to concepts in Ajdukiewicz’s interpretation. Meanings of expressions are only a subjective, partial actualizations of the sense of ideal concepts. In Ajdukiewicz’s semiotics, ideal concepts and judgments, as logical meanings of expressions, are explained at the level of the syntax and pragmatics of language in the terms of rules of use of expressions as intra-lingual properties of expressions, that is, as their linguistic meanings, and at the same time they are considered to be a guarantee of the inter-subjective identity of expressions; their specific assignment to signs of expressions determines their use¹²⁷. In Ingarden’s semiotics, ideal concepts perform an analogous role. Although Ingarden claimed in his foreword to the Polish edition of *Das Literarische Kunstwerk* in 1958 that such a concept of concepts raises his objections, so he would not “be inclined to accept the existence of ‘ideal concepts,’” he also added that he cannot see “another concept of objective grounds for the identity of the meaning of a sentence which would replace that one without raising significant doubts” (Ingarden 1931, p. 14).

Thus, if in the case of Ingarden we can speak of linguistically actualized and linguistically not actualized cognition (and linguistically not actualized cognition is both ideal cognition consisting in ideal concepts, which just did not “happen to” be actualized, as well as cognition interpreted as a product of cognitive actions of direct cognition, which is linguistically not actualized due to the lack of proper expressions), then in the case of Ajdukiewicz’s views from the 1930s, that which is linguistically not actualized is not cognition. His *dictum* in this problem could take on the form:

¹²⁷ Cf. (Olech 1993, ch. I and III).

the boundaries of language determine the boundaries of cognition, or more precisely, rational cognition. Linguistic articulation is a necessary condition for cognition and nothing which is not verbalized linguistically deserves the name of cognition. Only rational cognition is meant by cognition.

By defending his conception of concepts and judgments interpreted logically (and in general: logically interpreted cognition) as linguistic meanings of expressions, Ajdukiewicz defended the legitimacy of his original meta-epistemological project – the semantic theory of cognition (knowledge), which is clearly impossible without the linguistic relativization of cognition. Also accepting Ingarden's interpretation of epistemological objectivity (which is associated with accepting his understanding of the role of language in cognition¹²⁸) and direct cognition, makes the project impossible. Therefore, if we are to speak of COGNITION DETERMINED IN TERMS OF CONTENT, we should, in conclusion, resign from Ingarden's interpretation of objectivity and accept Ajdukiewicz's solution, which identifies logical concepts and judgments with linguistic meanings of expressions.

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¹²⁸ I write about the differences between a phenomenologist's (Ingarden's) and an analytical philosopher's (Ajdukiewicz's) approaches to language in cognition in (Olech 1996).

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5. Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz on Meaning. Similar Inspiration, Different Solutions

Edmund Husserl's seminal work *Logical Investigations*, published for the first time in 1900/1901¹²⁹, influenced significantly both Roman Ingarden and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. The former, numbered among outstanding phenomenologists, was a disciple of Edmund Husserl who was also the director of his doctoral dissertation. The latter was one of the most prominent analytic philosophers of Lvov-Warsaw school founded by his teacher Kazimierz Twardowski who was Husserl's co-disciple of Franz Brentano. Moreover, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz spent the academic year 1913/1914 in Göttingen where he attended Husserl's lectures.

In the paper I focus on some aspects of Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning presented in *Logical Investigations*¹³⁰ as an inspiration of Ingarden's theory of meaning formulated in *The Literary Work of Art* published for the first time in German in 1931, and Ajdukiewicz's directival theory of meaning formulated in "On the Meaning of Expressions" published for the first time in Polish also in 1931. In this paper, contrary to his subsequent papers on directival theory, Ajdukiewicz referred directly to *Logical Investigations* and proposed a very original reinterpretation of Husserl's theory of meaning. In his 1934 paper "Language and Meaning," Ajdukiewicz presented a formal formulation of his theory and in "The World-Picture and Conceptual Apparatus," published for the first time also in 1934, he used directival theory as a background of his radical version of conventionalism in philosophy of science. As Ingarden's theory of meaning was formulated as a part of his vast ontological project of analysis of literary works of art, it is easy

¹²⁹ The second modified version of *Logical Investigations* was published in 1913.

¹³⁰ In the paper I restrict myself to the theory from *Logical Investigations* and I only mention Husserl's later theory of meaning from *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) as it did not influence significantly neither Ingarden nor Ajdukiewicz.

to see that both theories of meaning, as well as the theory of Husserl, were not formulated for their own sake but to support philosophical conceptions of their authors.

1. Some remarks on theories of meaning

Chronologically, the initial problem of the philosophical reflection on language was the status of LINGUISTIC MEANING. Though names could refer to something real or could refer to nothing, in both cases they are obviously meaningful. From the antiquity philosophers who were conscious of the role of language formulated various theories of meaning for two interconnected reasons – to give account of meaningfulness and to deal with non-referring expressions.

Nowadays, the fully-fledged philosophy of language is the independent branch of philosophy. As such, it was initiated by late Wittgenstein, Austin, Grice, and others who dealt with the phenomenon of natural language for its own sake and focused on various aspects of its use and, therefore, the stress was transferred from theory of meaning and theory of reference to pragmatics. The initial stress on meaning can be interpreted as a mark of an instrumental approach to philosophy of language. From this point of view Husserl, Ingarden, and Ajdukiewicz, as well as their philosophical predecessors, could hardly be called philosophers of language in the modern sense of this term. Of course, they formulated many interesting and illuminating remarks about language use as by-products of extending theories of meaning beyond their initial applications to specific areas of use of natural language. Theory of meaning in *Logical Investigations* was intended mainly to back Husserl's anti-psychologist conception of pure logic¹³¹ which was conceived by him as a universal meta-science. Ingarden formulated his theory of meaning as a background of the ontology of the literary fiction, and Ajdukiewicz constructed his directival theory of meaning as an important part of his philosophy of science. All of them used the notion of meaning as a tool

¹³¹ It was not Husserl's aim to build formal system of logic but rather to support systems of pure logic developed by other authors. He "envisioned a system of what philosophers and logicians today call SEMANTICS: the systematic correlation among forms of expression, meaning and objects in the world" (Smith 2007, p. 90).

applied to solve some important philosophical problems, but, in the same time, they extended obtained solutions to natural language use.

This instrumental approach to the philosophical reflection on language was typical for philosophers from the antiquity. In *Cratylus* Plato tried to deal with the problem whether the relation of reference was natural or conventional, but without the notion of meaning he did not manage to solve the problem. Aristotle's remarks on meaning in *On Interpretation* and other works permitted him to solve Plato's problem, as the relation between names conceived as sounds and their meanings was conventional, and the relation between meanings and referents was natural. Aristotle's solution was obviously motivated by his metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology. John Locke and David Hume, the conceptualist followers of Aristotle, formulated their IDEATIONAL or ASSOCIATIONIST theory of meaning to support their empiricist epistemology, John S. Mill presented his CONNOTATIONAL theory of meaning to back his empirical and psychological conception of logic and mathematics, and Frege's THEORY OF SENSE constituted an indispensable part of his Platonist philosophy of mathematics.

It is not the aim of this paper to diminish the role of Husserl, Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz in the development of philosophy of language as an independent branch of philosophy. What interests me, is to give an account of the reception of Husserl's ideas about meaning and reference in *Logical Investigations* by Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz, and show that the receptions of Husserl's theory of meaning strongly depended on philosophical positions of both authors.

2. A short overview of Husserl's theory of meaning from *Logical Investigations*

Husserl's theory of meaning was motivated by his idea of pure logic. "Like Bolzano and Frege, Husserl held that the proper medium of logic is not language but meaning" (Smith 2007, p. 109)¹³². I present some aspects of this theory in two subsequent paragraphs. In the former I focus on mental acts involved in understanding utterances of natural language and in the latter I present ontological problems concerning meaning and reference. The

¹³² The inspirations of Husserl has been elaborated in details by David W. Smith (cf. Smith 2007, pp. 86-109).

division is justified by the topic of this paper as Ajdukiewicz presented a very original reinterpretation of Husserl's investigations on understanding language and, in the same time, he rejected entirely Husserl's ontology and the theory of reference. On the other hand, Ingarden continued and developed Husserl's ontological ideas.

2.1. Acts of meaning intentions

Though Husserl's theory of meaning was formulated mainly in *Investigation I*, it should be judged from the perspective of the whole work¹³³.

Let us start with the Husserlian notion of MOTIVATION which was used explicitly in Ajdukiewicz's directival theory of meaning, though originally was used in Husserl to make a distinction between two senses of the term "sign." In the first of its senses, the notion of sign is understood as an INDICATIVE SIGN, i.e. a state of affairs that, when experienced by someone, indicates to her another state of affairs, i.e. motivates her to believe that another state of affairs takes place:

In these [the concept of indication, J.M.] we discover as a common circumstance that certain objects or states of affairs OF WHOSE REALITY ONE HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE INDICATE TO HIM THE REALITY OF CERTAIN OTHER OBJECTS OF STATES OF AFFAIRS, IN THE SENSE THAT HIS BELIEF IN THE REALITY OF THE ONE IS EXPERIENCED [...] AS MOTIVATING A BELIEF OR SURMISE IN THE REALITY OF THE OTHER (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 184).

Husserl introduced the concept of motivation to make a sharp distinction between indicative signs and MEANINGFUL EXPRESSIONS. This distinction can be easily seen while analysing the double meaning of the term "demonstration" (Husserl, 1900/1901, pp. 184-186). Conceived as a mere indication, demonstration lacks what Husserl calls AN INSIGHT and what consists, loosely speaking, in exercising meaning (sense, content). In order to illustrate it, let us consider the following example. If a prosecutor demonstrates so-called proof in a court, e.g. the suspect's fingerprints on a handle of a knife, this fact or state of affairs can MOTIVATE a judge to believe that

¹³³ A profound and elaborated presentation of *Logical Investigations* can be found in (Bell 1990).

the suspect is guilty. In the second sense, a demonstration is conceived as a PROOF or logical inference based on the objective relation of logical consequence. This relation is “the ideal connection among the contents [meanings J.M.] of the judgements” (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 185). We recognize this ideal connection when we conduct mathematical proofs with INSIGHT or, as Husserl puts it, “through ideative reflection on the contents of the judgements” (*ibid.*). In case of mere indication when an experience of an object or a state of affairs motivates us (as in the case of example above) to experience another judgement “knowledge regarding the ideal connections among the contents of the judgements concerned, is quite excluded” (*ibid.*)¹³⁴. When the prosecutor expresses the judgements that there are the suspect’s fingerprints on the handle in the form of the sentence “There are the suspect’s fingerprints on the handle,” the judge can somehow infer, probably taking into account also other premisses, the sentence “The suspect is guilty of stabbing the victim.” In this case the ideative insight into these two sentences does not suffice to explain the transition between the relevant judgements. On the other hand, the ideative insight suffices to explain the transition from the judgement that *X* is the murderer of *Y* to the judgement that *Y* is the victim of *X*.¹³⁵ Ajdukiewicz’s reinterpretation consisted in introducing the notion of motivation even to logical inference.

A necessary condition to have an ideative reflection on the content of the judgements in Husserl is to treat linguistic signs not only as indicative signs but as EXPRESSION of a language. Moreover, any act of sense-experience of a linguistic expression (an inscription or an utterance), contrary to acts of experiencing indicative signs, is “phenomenally one with the experiences made manifest in them in the consciousness of the man who manifests them” (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 188).

Let us summarize the remarks above. For the sake of later applications, and following partially Ajdukiewicz, let us distinguish between the JUDGEMENT that *a* from the THOUGHT that *a*. If I utter “*a*”, I have to THINK that *a*, but it is not necessary that I must have the JUDGEMENT that *a*, because I could simply lie. The expression “to think” stands here as a label for mental

¹³⁴ For the sake of simplicity I will identify a judgement with an actualization of a belief which is a disposition.

¹³⁵ Of course, Husserl recognized that one’s judgement that the proof is valid and one’s belief in its premisses can motivate a belief in the conclusion without the insight into the content of the premisses and the conclusion.

phenomena that constitute “*a*” to be an expression of a language. So, while uttering “It is raining,” I must somehow think that it is raining, though I may judge or believe that the weather is sunny. Without the thought that it is raining, the utterance “It is raining” would not be an utterance of the linguistic expression, but only a mere sound. Thoughts experienced while uttering or hearing expressions Husserl describes generally as “certain sense-giving acts” (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 189).

The EXPRESSIVE function of a linguistic expression should not be mistaken with its INTIMATING function, which consists in indicating the speaker's thoughts in the sense above, i.e. the sense-giving inner experiences of the speaker that could differ from his judgements. Of course, the assertions usually are sincere, i.e. thoughts and judgements just coincide. So, if I hear someone's utterance “It is raining,” it intimates to me the speaker's thoughts, i.e. sense-giving acts, and usually motivates me to ascribe this persona judgement that it is raining. The intimating function of expressions does not exist in a SOLITARY LIFE (speaking to oneself), though the expressive function remains, because the SENSE-GIVING ACTS are not separable from utterances¹³⁶. So, the intimating function is not essential to the fact of being an expression, i.e. to the fact that the expressions has a content, i.e. it means something. Both functions coincide only when “we actually speak and hear. Here the thought must not be merely expressed as meaning, but must be communicated and intimated” (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 191).

If we focus on the expressive function of expressions, we have to distinguish between the mental acts of perceiving a physical phenomenon and two other mental acts:

The acts which give it MEANING and possibly also INTUITIVE FULNESS, in which its relation to an expressed object is constituted. In virtue of such acts, the expression is more than a merely sounded word. It means something, and in so far as it means something, it relates to what is objective (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 192).

¹³⁶ Let us imagine that for some reasons the speaker is lying and says by phone “It is raining here,” though the weather is sunny. In his solitary life he would utter to himself “The weather is sunny.” If the hearer discovers the lie, the speaker's utterance would intimate to her the thought that it is raining, but would not motivate her to ascribe to the speaker the judgement that it is raining. I introduced the distinction between thoughts and judgements mainly to indicate that in case of a solitary life thought coincide with judgements, as it is exactly in Ajdukiewicz's case.

“This objective somewhat” (*ibid.*) is just the referent of the expression. We will come back to the problem of reference in 2.2.

We can sum up this paragraph stating that Husserl distinguishes between the MEANING-CONFERRING ACTS OF MEANING INTENTIONS, and acts “not essential to the expression as such, which stand to it in the logically basic relation of fulfilling (confirming, illustration) it more or less adequately, and so actualizing its relation to its objects” (*ibid.*), which are called MEANING-FULFILLING acts. These two acts, as well as the sense-experience of the expression, form the PHENOMENAL UNITY. The idea of phenomenal unity was adopted both by Ingarden and by Ajdukiewicz. They criticized strongly, as Husserl did, the ASSOCIATIONIST theory of meaning which separated these acts. The criticized theory, introduced for the first time by Aristotle in *On Interpretation* and developed later by John Locke and David Hume, stated that the mental acts of experiencing the sense-content of an utterance and the relevant thought were only ASSOCIATED. But it is important to stress that the phenomenal unity of acts refers to UTTERANCES i.e. TOKENS of expressions. If we take into account an expression conceived as a TYPE we can distinguish: “the expression itself [i.e. type J.M.], its sense and its objective correlate” (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 195).

2.2. Ontological status of senses and referents in *Logical Investigations*

Let us start with the problem of ontological status of reference that can either exist or not exist in the external world. Husserl’s comments in *Logical Investigations* are sometimes misleading:

In virtue of such acts [i.e. meaning intentions and meaning-fulfilling acts, J.M.], the expression is more than a merely sounded word. It MEANS something, and in so far as it means something, it relates to what is objective. The objective somewhat can either be actually present through accompanying intuitions, or may at least appear in representation, e.g. in a mental image, and where this happens the relation to an objects is realized (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 192).

Sometimes, Husserl’s distinction between the meaning of an expression and its object is identified with Frege’s distinction between sense and

reference (cf. e.g. Mohanty 1977). Contrary to Husserl, Frege was a metaphysical dualist who maintained that a linguistic expression either refers to something that exists or has no referent at all (cf. Frege 1892, p. 62). David Bell argues that referents of linguistic expressions in Husserl are always INTENTIONAL OBJECTS (Bell 1960, p. 129), so the problem of their existence in the external world disappears. The intentional objects were not defined precisely in *Logical Investigations*:

Husserl sometimes distinguishes between objects that enjoy “actual existence” and those that have “merely intentional existence” [...]. Under Brentano’s influence, not that of common sense, Husserl ascribes ‘actual existence’ to whatever elements are present in an experience as its component parts; the intentional object of an experience, on the other hand, is not a part of that experience, and is said to exist merely intentionally (Bell 1960, pp. 103-104).

In phenomenological tradition, an intentional object is something the mental act is DIRECTED to or IS ABOUT. For Brentano intentional object of a mental act was CONTAINED IN the mental act as its part. For Husserl intentional objects were not contained in mental acts, but in *Logical Investigations* he did not give any ontological characterization of intentional objects. As Bell puts it “Husserl’s distinction [between actual versus intentional objects, J.M.] is thus one made within descriptive psychology” (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 104). The precise ontological characteristics of intentional objects was given later by Ingarden.

The very term “object” was used by Husserl to cover intentional referents of expressions of different categories: names, predicates and sentences which were traditionally conceived as COMPLETE or CATEGOREMATIC expressions. So intentional objects could be entities, properties and states of affairs. On the other hand, he did not ascribe intentional referents to functional, i.e. INCOMPLETE or SYNCATEGOREMATIC expressions. Roman Ingarden partially followed Husserl stating that linguistic expressions always refer to intentional objects. In order to distinguish them from referents from the external world, from now on, I will call them SEMATIC CORRELATES. What differs Ingarden’s solution from Husserl’s one, is that in Ingarden all expressions, even incomplete ones, have semantic correlates.

It is a well-known fact that meanings of type-expressions in Husserl are ideal Platonic entities. The first question that arises is whether we can identify Husserl’s meanings with Frege’s senses. Apart from the problem of

a disputable ontological status of senses in Frege¹³⁷, the clue for the difference was given by both philosophers. Frege stated that senses were GRASPED by mental acts of language users, while meanings in Husserl are EXEMPLIFIED in meaning-intention acts. As Husserl's analysis of meaning intentions partially presented in the previous paragraph is obviously much more elaborated than mental acts in Frege, it demands some additional clarification. As Peter Simons puts it, meanings in Husserl are "ideal or Platonic entities of particular sort, namely the kinds, or, as Husserl says, IDEAL SPECIES of certain ASPECTS of mental acts" (Simons 1970, p. 107). But what is the special aspect of a meaning intention act that exemplifies the meaning as a Platonic entity? When a speaker utters an assertion (token) that the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point, the relevant mental acts arise and pass away "but what the assertion asserts, the content THAT THE THREE PERPENDICULARS OF A TRIANGLE INTERSECT IN A POINT, neither arises nor passes away. It is an IDENTITY in a strict sense" (Husserl, 1900/1901, p. 195).

The same happens even in case of false assertions I have mentioned in the paragraph 2.1:

We distinguish their ideal content from the transient acts or affirming and asserting it: it is the meaning of the assertion, a unity in plurality. We continue to recognize its [the meaning's J.M.] identity of intention in evident acts of reflection: we do not arbitrarily attribute it to our assertions, but discover it in them (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 196).

What an uttered token-expression of a given type-expression SAYS is something different from what it INTIMATES. It SAYS its content (sense, meaning) and intimates a relevant meaning-intention act of a speaker:

What it [an uttered assertion] says is not my mental act of hypothetical presumption, though I must of course have performed this in order to speak sincerely as I do. But it is rather the case that, when this subjective act is intimated, something objective and ideal is brought to expression (*ibid.*).

¹³⁷ Tylor Burge in (1990) maintains that senses are Platonic entities, but they cannot be identified with linguistic meanings. On the other hand, Michael Dummett in (1973) states that the sense of an expression is one of the components of its meaning and it cannot be conceived as ideal, but only as intersubjective. The intersubjectivity of senses is the result of common use of utterances by the members of linguistic community. David Bell in (1990) identifies Fregean senses with abstract entities.

The “objective and ideal” aspect of a meaning-intention mental act exemplifies the meaning of an expression and is called the ACT’S MATTER.¹³⁸ So linguistic meanings in *Logical Investigations* are conceived as the IDEAL SPECIES of acts’ matters. As Bell states:

What, as it were, breathes life into this situation [i.e. understanding an expression, J.M.] are the mental acts, and in particular the moments of those acts called their act-matters, which are the source of all intentionality, which are intimated by certain speech acts, and whose species constitute the meaning or sense of linguistic expression-types (Bell 1990, p. 141).

The notion of act’s matter indicates the difference between Fregean senses and Husserl’s meanings. Senses are, as Frege puts it, grasped by relevant mental acts what permits to interpret them as ABSTRACT OBJECTS, rather than universals, while meanings in Husserlian sense are typical universals or Platonic ideal entities that are instantiated or exemplified by the acts’ matters of meaning intentions. Peter Simons who is rather apt to interpret Frege’s senses as ideal entities writes:

Husserl thus effects a remarkably economy in the ontology of abstract meaning by employing the relation of instantiation of exemplification, which the realist about universals needs anyway, and at the same time tying meaning internally to the mental, a feat which had eluded his Platonist forebears, Bolzano and Frege (Simons 1995, p. 113).

Though the act’s matters obviously differentiate meanings of linguistic expressions because they are just instances of these meanings, very little has said about their very nature by Husserl. One of the possible interpretations was given by Simons who identified the act’s matter with the aspect of the mental act that INTENDS an object. Let us consider the utterance “It is green.” The intended object of the relevant meaning intention would be an abstract MOMENT, i.e. an instance of a property of greenness (cf. also the diagram in (Bell 1990), p. 104). As Simons puts it:

When I see a green leaf and later think to myself that it is green [or utter “It is green,” J.M.], then there is an aspect of my mental act of presenting

¹³⁸ The notion of the act’s matter was introduced by Husserl in *Investigation V* where he investigated the notion of intentionality.

the leaf symbolically, which Husserl calls the ACT'S MATTER, which serves to direct it to the particular individual greenness of the leaf, what Husserl calls a colour-moment [...]. The greenness of the leaf is the object of this act, while the act's matter is what has called its content. Husserl prefers to use the word "content" not for this psychological moment but for the abstract species of such moments, and this, finally, is the MEANING of the word "green" (Simons 1995, p. 113, cf. also a diagram on the next page).

As the PROPERTY of being green is instantiated by moments of greenness in different entities called by different token-expressions "green," the meaning of the type-expression "green" refers to, or, as Bell puts it, is intentionally directed to the property of greenness (cf. (Bell 1990), p. 141, Fig.4). Of course this property as a semantic correlate of the type-expression "green," should be conceived, as an intentional object. A different situation takes place in case of names of entities and sentences. In this case the meaning of a type-expression and the act's matter of a token-expression are directed towards the same intentional object, i.e. an entity or a state of affairs (Bell 1990, p. 142, Fig. 5).

In *Logical Investigations* Husserl introduced very complex system of notions. But the ontological status of the crucial notions of Husserl's semantics, i.e. the act's matter and the object (the semantic correlate), are apt to different interpretations. Ingarden's main achievement was to develop and specify Husserl's semantics as a basis for his own semantics and sophisticated ontology.

3. Roman Ingarden's reinterpretation of Husserl's theory of meaning

The general problem of Husserl's theory of meaning, when applied to natural language, is how to give an account of the evident fact that meanings of natural-language expressions can appear, disappear, and evolve like their referents, i.e. the objects from the external world, usually do. The problem not only affects Husserl but is also typical for all logic-oriented or mathematical-oriented theories of meaning, including Frege's theory of sense. Our natural view-point concerning mathematics is that we somehow DISCOVER senses of "mathematical" expressions as something eternal, invariable, and independent of human mental acts. The problem of Husserl's theory, when

applied to natural language, is that it is difficult to believe that the “Platonic heaven” of meanings is a place where ideal objects wait to be exemplified by acts’ matters in meaning-intention acts, when, people decide to use the relevant expressions. This is, more or less, the core of the critique of Husserl’s position from *Logical Investigations* given by Roman Ingarden in *The Literary Work of Art*. Ingarden recognizes that Husserl abandoned Platonism in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (Husserl 1929) but he adds that Husserl made little use of it (cf. Ingarden 1968, p. 29)¹³⁹.

In spite of the objection given above, an unquestionable advantage of Platonism in theory of meaning is that it ensures the INTERSUBJECTIVITY of meanings. As Ingarden has adopted Husserl’s claim that the semantic correlates of linguistic expressions are intentional objects but, contrary to Husserl, he identified meanings with intentional objects, he had to solve the problem of the intersubjectivity of meanings in a different way.

Husserl did not give any precise ontological characteristics of intentional objects, as his general attitude in *Logical Investigations* was generally not ontological but psychological, i.e. phenomenological. As Ingarden stated that intentional objects were always PRODUCED by mental acts, he not only faced the problem of the intersubjectivity of meanings but also the problem of intersubjectivity of semantic correlates as well, because when two people are talking about something, they are presumably talking about “the same.” The problem of intersubjectivity of semantic correlates in Husserl was not so urgent, as they were determined by meanings conceived as ideal entities. If Ingarden ensured the intersubjectivity of meanings, he would, in the same time, ensure the intersubjectivity of semantic correlates.

Before answering the question how Ingarden managed to ensure the intersubjectivity of meaning, let us make a digression about semantic correlates and their relation to referents, if they exist. If we read a novel and think or discuss about its fictitious characters, we think or discuss about SOMETHING. It does not suffice to say, as Frege did in *On the Sense and Reference*, that a reader just follows intersubjective senses and experiences private ideas, colourings and shadings (cf. Frege 1892, p. 61)¹⁴⁰. According to

¹³⁹ It is so-called NEOMATIC theory of meaning which was welcomed by Ingarden in the introduction to (1931). Cf. also (Simons 1995, pp. 125-129).

¹⁴⁰ Frege’s philosophy of language was directed towards mathematics. As a Platonist Frege maintained that mathematical objects existed as ideal objects, therefore, he could believe that there was COLOURINGS, that two mathematicians talked about.

Frege, sentences in literary fiction have no referents, i.e. logical values. On the other hand, the semantic correlates of declarative sentences in Husserl are not logical values but intentional states of affairs, and this view was adopted by Ingarden whose phenomenological approach permitted him to give an account of the very intuitive fact that if we discuss about fictitious characters, very often (but not always) we ascribe logical values to the sentences. Ingarden stated that if a fictitious character x has a property ascribed explicitly or implicitly to him by the author, let us call it A , the sentence " x is A " is true (case 1). If the author wrote explicitly or implicitly that the character does not have the property A , the sentence is false (case 2). If there is no clue whether the character was or was not endowed with the property A , the sentence, as well as its negation, is neither true nor false (case 3)¹⁴¹. Readers discussing about A know perfectly that A does not exist as an object of the external world. In fact they are not discussing about the referent but about the semantic correlate of A . Moreover, the phenomenological approach works well in case of discussions about objects of doubtful existence in the external world (like in case of yeti) or in case of posits of empirical theories. From the point of view of possible existence or non-existence of referents of linguistic expressions, Ingarden's semantics works as METAPHYSICALLY NEUTRAL i.e. it makes no assumptions about the extralinguistic world. Of course, a semantic correlate can sometimes HIT the referent, if it exists.

A detailed ontological characterization of intentional objects, as well as differences between meanings and semantic correlates as intentional objects, were formulated in the first volume of *Controversy over the Existence of the World* (1947), Ingarden's ontological *opus magnum*. In order to understand why Ingarden intended to build metaphysically-neutral semantics in terms of ontology, we have to distinguish two frequently confused notions. According to Ingarden, ontology deals with characteristics of POSSIBLE ways of existence, while metaphysics tries to answer the question if there are entities of the given ontological characteristics. From this point of view, the semantics presented in *The Literary Work of Art* is in fact not metaphysically-neutral, because Ingarden assumes that THERE ARE meanings and that

¹⁴¹ Apparently, it is possible to achieve a similar, but not identical, solution in Frege following his analysis of subordinate sentences (Frege 1892, pp. 65-67). Let us treat a sentence " x is A " about a fictitious character as an elliptical form of the sentence " y WROTE THAT X IS A ", which is obviously either true or false. Nevertheless, this solution has evident drawbacks. First of all, the extended or full form of a sentence is always either true or false and, in consequence, the difference between (2) and (3) is lost.

THERE ARE semantic correlates of linguistic expressions. Therefore, Ingarden's semantics only WORKS AS metaphysically neutral, i.e. it can be applied to a language without any metaphysical assumptions about the "reality" the language is about¹⁴².

The distinction between the semantic correlate and the referent of a linguistic expression have some other advantages. Besides the metaphysical-neutrality with respect to the existence or non-existence of referents, it eliminates the problem of empty names and their role in sentences of natural language, e.g. the problem that bothered so much Bertrand Russell in *On Denoting* (1905)¹⁴³. If one utters a sentence "The present king of France is bald" the surprised hearer would probably at first protest and not ascribe to the utterance any true value, but if the interlocutors start to talk about the fictitious king of France and characterize it, they can little by little agree or disagree about him, as they start to talk about the semantic correlate of the description "The present king of France" conceived as a product of their mental acts.

The ontological or ontological-existential characterisation of an intentional given by Ingarden in *Controversy* is based on EXISTENTIAL MOMENTS presented in four pairs of oppositions¹⁴⁴:

1. autonomy – heteronomy;
2. originality – derivativeness;
3. selfsufficiency – non-selfsufficiency;
4. independence – dependence.

Let us define intentional objects in terms of moments starting from the opposition autonomy/heteronomy.

¹⁴² We can, of course, treat meanings and semantic correlates as mere posits of Ingarden's theory. This slightly relativistic view on metaphysics was popular among Ingarden's analytically-oriented contemporaries, e.g. Carnap and Quine. Treating intentional entities in *The Literary Work of Art* not as *actually* existing objects, but as posits of his theory, can neutralize the possible objection against Ingarden that his ontological attitude towards intentional objects from *Controversy on the Existence of the World* is inconsistent with *The Literary Work of Art*.

¹⁴³ Russell's strategy consisted in fact in eliminating definite descriptions from language by convenient paraphrases.

¹⁴⁴ The notion of MOMENT was introduced by Husserl in his *Investigation III*. It can be conceived as a part of an entity that can be separated from the whole only mentally.

An entity [...] exists autonomously (is existentially autonomous) if it has its existential foundation within itself (Ingarden 1947, p. 109).

A heteronomous entity has its existential foundation in some other entity, i.e. it cannot exist without this entity. As intentional objects cannot exist without mental act, they are HETERONOMOUS. Heteronomy excludes ORIGINALITY as:

An entity is existentially original if according to its essence, it cannot be produced [...] by any other entity (Ingarden 1947, p.118).

In consequence, an intentional object must be DERIVATIVE as it is produced by a mental act.

The next opposition enables to make a distinction between semantic correlates and meanings:

An entity is existentially selfsufficient if according to its essence it requires for its being the being of no other entity which would have to coexist with it within the unity of some whole, or, in other words, if its being involves no necessary coexistence with some other entity within the unity of a whole (Ingarden 1947, p. 147).

Though semantic correlates are existentially SELFSUFFICIENT, meanings are NON-SELFSUFFICIENT, as they form PARTS OF linguistic expressions conceived as phenomenal unities of sense-contents (sounds or inscriptions) and meanings.

The last opposition refers only to selfsufficient entities, i.e. only to semantic correlates:

It is possible for an entity to be selfsufficient and still require, in virtue of its essence, the existence of some other SELFSUFFICIENT entity for its own [...]. We then refer to the first entity as EXISTENTIALLY DEPENDENT” (Ingarden 1947, p. 153).

The semantic correlates can be either DEPENDENT OR INDEPENDENT. The semantic correlate of the definite description “Alexander’s stallion” is an entity that requires in accordance with its essence the existence of Alexander (i.e. the semantic correlate of the name “Alexander”), contrary to the

semantic correlate of the proper name Bucefalus that does not require the existence of any other entity.

The general ontological and existential frames formulated explicitly in *Controversy* are later than Ingarden's theory of meaning formulated in *The Literary Work of Art*, where Ingarden proposed a sophisticated characterization of meanings of linguistic expressions. Following Husserl, Ingarden distinguished three groups of expressions: names, finite verbs (*verba finita*) and functors but, contrary to Husserl who treated functors as syncategorematic expressions, i.e. expressions that do not have independent meanings but modify meanings of compound expressions, Ingarden ascribed meanings to all expressions of the language. The most elaborated characterization of meanings was given for meanings of names which were treated as very complex objects mirroring the intended features of their semantic correlates, and for finite verbs (cf. (Ingarden 1931), part II, §15). The characterization of meanings of functors is much more laconic.

In *Logical Investigations* Husserl intended to formulate grounds for logic conceived as the theory of ideal relations between ideal senses of sentences. The aim of Ingarden was different. His elaborated characterisation of meanings was designed as a tool to construct higher-order meaning units, i.e. a sentence and a literary work of art as a whole. This explains why Ingarden not only developed but also significantly complicated Husserl's ontology of meanings and semantic correlates. A literary work of art was conceived by Ingarden as created by its author, i.e. her mental acts, and treated as a higher-order meaning unit. Higher-order meaning units not only were compound by meanings of words but they MODIFIED these meanings in the process of interpretation of the text. The complex construction of meanings permitted such modifications. Therefore, Ingarden could not maintain that meanings were ideal entities.

Let us now come back to the problem of intersubjectivity of meanings which will shed light on some metaphysical commitments of Ingarden's theory. Though meanings are products of human mental acts, they are subject to some restrictions that are encoded in their complex characterization which constitute a sufficient condition of their intersubjectivity. As an example of this kind of restriction can serve the FORMAL CONTENT which is the third of five elements of the NOMINAL MEANING, i.e. the meaning of a name. The formal content describes the FORMAL STRUCTURE of the semantic correlate of a name that can be filled in with features constituting a MATERIAL CONTENT, i.e. the second element of the nominal meaning. This

intersubjective restriction on meanings was possible because the language communication in Ingarden, like earlier in Aristotle, was ANCHORED in the external reality common to all language users¹⁴⁵.

As I have already suggested, Ingarden's semantics WORKS AS metaphysically neutral. The characterization of meanings comprises the INTENDED ontological status of semantic correlates but it does not presuppose their existence, e.g. the semantic correlate of a mathematical term, though is an intentional entity, is INTENDED AS an ideal entity, i.e. its meaning comprises a MOMENT OF EXISTENTIAL CHARACTERIZATION of the semantic correlate as an ideal entity. If ideal entities like numbers exist, semantic correlates of numerals can just HIT them. In consequence, two mathematicians, e.g. a Platonist and a formalist, can discuss about numbers, mathematical theorems, and proofs without any obstacles. Even if we consider intentional objects only as posits of Ingarden's theory, there is an argument in favour of the contention that his semantics is not metaphysically neutral. His semantics tacitly assumes some form of Aristotelian ESSENTIALISM. Contrary to Aristotle, the ESSENCE IN Ingarden is not identified with meaning¹⁴⁶ but is interwoven in a very subtle way in the characterization of meanings. This point was questioned by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz who reinterpreted Husserl's semantics in evidently anti-metaphysical way.

4. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's reinterpretation of Husserl's theory of meaning

Ajdukiewicz's DIRECTIVAL THEORY OF MEANING is evidently oriented towards languages of mathematical and physical theories. This aspect of his theory decided that Ajdukiewicz, contrary to Ingarden, adopted Husserl's view about the SOLITARY LIFE (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 190-191) that the communicative aspect of language is not essential to its use. Though science is obviously a social phenomenon, a scientific theory can be formulated by a single scientist. Therefore, Ajdukiewicz neglected the communicative aspect

¹⁴⁵ In fact Ingarden often declared himself as a follower of Aristotle.

¹⁴⁶ The meaning of a common name in Aristotle can be identified with the essence of its referent (a substantial form) which can be grasped by a mental act as a mental image. In case of fictitious names like "centaur" the meanings are reduced to mental images (cf. Modrak 2006).

of language. At the end of the last paragraph I indicated the essentialism as a hidden aspect of Ingardenian theory of meaning. The consequence of this view is that there is only one “true” description of the world. This position was also questioned by Ajdukiewicz whose inspirations came from French conventionalism represented by Henri Poincaré and Eduard LeRoy¹⁴⁷.

One of the main features of Poincaré’s philosophy of science was the thesis that empirical theories formulated in formalized languages INTERPRET empirical data relative to CONVENTIONS¹⁴⁸. Therefore, from the point of view of scientific theories, there are no RAW FACTS. Different theories can interpret the same empirical data in different ways though, as Poincaré maintained, the rival theories were mutually TRANSLATABLE. Moreover, Poincaré stated that natural language is the language of raw facts, i.e. natural language description of empirical data does not apply conventions. Much more radical form of conventionalism was presented by Pierre Duhem who maintained that the languages of rival theories were not mutually translatable. The similar position was held by LeRoy, though Poincaré argued that LeRoy’s views about translatability were in fact not so radical (cf. Poincaré 1905, pp. 112-128, and Giedymin 1978, pp. XXVIII-XXXV).

Ajdukiewicz declared that his position was much more radical than Poincaré’s and similar to the views of LeRoy (cf. Ajdukiewicz 1934a, p. 68). The radicality of Ajdukiewicz’s views consisted in his contention that the languages of rival theories were not translatable in his views on natural language. According to Ajdukiewicz, natural languages interpreted empirical data in the same way as the languages of formalized theories. This view can be conceived as the application of the main ideas of conventionalism to philosophy of natural language. Contrary to Poincaré and other conventionalists, Ajdukiewicz stated that, in spite of obvious drawbacks of natural language like vagueness and ambiguity, our everyday interpretation of empirical sense data depends on conventions, and the idea that natural language gives us a description of raw facts is only a myth. According to Ajdukiewicz, the distinction between raw facts and interpreted facts only mirrors the ordinary distinction between report-sentences and interpretation-sentences and is based on the false belief that report-sentences describe

¹⁴⁷ Two other representatives of French conventionalism, i.e. Pierre Duhem and Gaston Milhaud were not mentioned by Ajdukiewicz in his papers of conventionalist period.

¹⁴⁸ According to Poincaré, the conventions imposed by a theory are identified with its theorems.

raw facts without any conventions (Ajdukiewicz 1934a, p. 77). Contrary to Poincaré who identified conventions with theorems, Ajdukiewicz identified them with RULES OF MEANING, i.e. MEANING DIRECTIVES.

Thus the only differences between report-sentences and interpretation-sentences is that the former are decided in languages which are part of our upbringing, whereas the latter are decided in languages in whose construction we have consciously participated. From this point of view, the meaning-rules which enable us to decide about report-sentences appear at first glance to be unexceptionable, whereas the conventions necessary to a decision about interpretation-sentences seem to be alterable arbitrarily by us since we introduced them by willing them so (Ajdukiewicz 1934a, p. 79).

Ajdukiewicz maintained that natural language can be considered as a mosaic of separate pre-theoretical sub-languages. We can identify these sub-languages with languages of popular arithmetic, popular physics, popular biology, *etc.* Though their boundaries are fuzzy and meanings vague, we intuitively recognize situations when somebody violates the conventions, i.e. meaning rules. If one sincerely asserts that two plus two equals three or states that dogs are not animals we do not treat him as badly educated in maths and zoology but as a person, who does not understand English numerals and names of natural-species.

Ajdukiewicz's directival theory of meaning was formulated for the first time in his 1931 paper "On the Meaning of Expressions." The influence of *Logical Investigations* on Ajdukiewicz's paper is evident. On the first pages of his paper Ajdukiewicz analysed, like Husserl did in *Investigation I*, the difference between mere signs and linguistic expressions. The crucial notion in Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning is MOTIVATION originally applied by Husserl to distinguish mere signs from expressions. Ajdukiewicz recognized that this term was usually related with decision and action (e.g. like in case of a signal which motivates us to take a decision or undertake an action) and, following Husserl, he extended this notion to beliefs. So the experience of a sign can motivate someone to come to an experience of a certain belief.

It seems to me quite proper also to use the terms "motivation" and "motivate" in those cases when the apprehension of a signal results in a belief and

not necessarily a decision. This extension of the application of these terms follows Marty and Husserl (Ajdukiewicz 1931, p. 2).

As we remember, Husserl did not apply the notion of motivation to logical inference. Ajdukiewicz extended the application of this notion to proofs and reasonings, departing in the same time from Husserl's view that the acceptance of the conclusion depends on the insight into meanings of premisses and conclusions, which were conceived as ideal entities. As, according to Ajdukiewicz, the belief in premisses motivates a person who speaks a language to believe in conclusions of a certain form, the very notion motivation constitutes the basis of Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning.

Let us consider the following example. The transition from "X is the murderer of Y" to "Y is the victim of X" in Husserl is immediate because it is based on the insight into the meanings or contents of the sentences and if we take into account relevant judgements, the motivation relation between them is based on the ideal relation of inference between meanings of the premisses and the conclusion. Ajdukiewicz changed the direction of this dependence and based meanings on the motivation relation between relevant judgements or acts of believing in sentences. For the English speakers, the act of believing in the premiss motivates them to believe in the conclusion. This manoeuvre was possible as he identified judgements (act of believing in sentences) and thoughts (i.e. the counterparts of meaning intention acts).

The main part of "On the Meaning of Expressions" constitutes a very complex argument which finally leads to Ajdukiewicz's original solution of the problem of meaning, being in the same time a subtle polemic with Husserl and a reinterpretation of many aspects of *Logical Investigations*. Ajdukiewicz started his argumentation with the analysis of quotations in order to indicate that if we give the meaning of an expression inside the quotation marks, we explicitly or implicitly refer to a certain language. If we say, for example, that "rana" means "a wound," we implicitly refer to Polish and not to Spanish or Latin where "rana" means "a frog." The conclusion was that the meaning of an expression was RELATIVE to the language of utterance. This relation was much stronger in Ajdukiewicz than in Husserl who maintained that meanings instantiated acts' matters of meaning intentions (or thoughts in Ajdukiewicz's terminology). In consequence, meanings in Husserl were in fact language-independent contrary to Ajdukiewicz who conceived meanings as strongly connected with

a language and, consequently, he looked for them INSIDE the language. To carry out the task of formulating the theory of meaning with meanings determined by a language instead of being residents of the Platonic heaven, Ajdukiewicz analysed three different senses of the expression “to speak Polish.”

In the first of its meanings, to speak Polish means just to utter sounds belonging to Polish phonology, e.g. a Spaniard who does not know a single word in Polish speaks Polish in this sense when he utters “rana.” This solution is obviously unsatisfactory even from the Husserlian point of view because Spaniard ascribes to the sound “rana” a different meaning than a Polish speaker would ascribe to the same sound. In the second sense, the expression “to speak Polish,” beyond uttering sounds belonging to Polish phonology, consists in experiencing certain mental acts:

[The expression “to speak Polish” means also] experiencing, simultaneously and in connection with those speech-sounds, mental acts in a manner assigned, whether uniquely or ambiguously, by the rules of Polish to those speech-sounds” (Ajdukiewicz 1931, p. 6).

This is, generally speaking, Husserl’s and Ingarden’s position, where meanings are only incidentally connected with the expressions of a language.

Sometimes, as Ajdukiewicz notices, two different languages contain expressions of identical physical shapes and the same meanings in Husserl’s sense. When a speaker of a language *A* utters “*X*” he speaks in *A*, while a speaker of a language *B* uttering the same “*X*” speaks *B*, though they utter and experience the same sounds and experience the same mental acts assigned to this expression by the rules of relevant languages. What is the difference between both utterances, the difference that permits to qualify them as belonging to different languages? To answer this question Ajdukiewicz adds to his characterization of speaking Polish another condition: “also to do so [experience the same mental acts] while having a set of dispositions to respond to Polish speech sounds which all and only those people have who can speak Polish” (Ajdukiewicz 1931, p. 7).

Before coming back to Ajdukiewicz’s analysis, let us notice that the last sense of “to speak Polish” takes into account the HOLISTIC aspect of language and meaning neglected both by Husserl in *Logical Investigations* and by Ingarden in *The Literary Work of Art*. Though Ingarden declared that he

treated language as a WHOLE and even mentioned Ajdukiewicz's theory, he had in mind rather DEPENDENCES between meanings that should not be confused with meaning holism¹⁴⁹. The holistic aspect of Ajdukiewicz's theory is obviously motivated by conventionalism, but Ajdukiewicz's argument does not depend on it.

The next step in Ajdukiewicz's argumentation was, like in Husserl, the analysis of mental acts experienced while speaking a language (in the third sense of this notion). Ajdukiewicz starts with the critique of the associationist definition of meaning arguing that experiencing a thought ASSOCIATED with an uttered expression is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for using the expression as the expression of a given language (Ajdukiewicz 1931, pp. 11-12).

Here we have to make some reservation. The basic unit of meaning for Ajdukiewicz was a sentence, while for associationists it was a name. When a speaker utters an expression of a given language (in the third sense), he obviously thinks something, i.e. he experiences a meaning intention act in Husserl's sense. Ajdukiewicz usually applied the term "a thought that ..." or "to believe in a sentence" as a counterpart of Husserlian act of meaning intention. Every thought of this kind obviously has some ASPECT that distinguishes it from other thoughts experienced when uttering expressions of the same language. This aspect is obviously the counterpart of the Husserlian notion of the act's matter. Moreover, as Ajdukiewicz argued, thoughts formed, like in Husserl, PHENOMENAL UNITIES with the experiences of the sense-contents or physical shapes of relevant expressions (Ajdukiewicz

¹⁴⁹ Dependencies between meanings are evident and are reflected in various theories of meaning. In Mill's connotational theory the meanings (connotations) of "a man" and "a horse" depend because they comprise the same attribute "being living organism." Ingarden based these dependences on common elements of meanings conceived as an intentional objects. Similarly, in the associationist theory the meaning of "a centaur" depends on the meanings of "a man" and "a horse" as the mental image (idea) of a centaur is constructed from mental images (ideas) of a man and a horse. By holistic theories of meaning I understand theories that are not atomic, i.e. do not have meaning atoms. The theories of meaning mentioned above are atomic because they make use of MEANING ATOMS: MOMENTS as parts of meanings in Ingarden, SIMPLE ATTRIBUTES in Mill or SIMPLE IDEAS in associationism. In these theories meanings are reified as compound meanings are constructed of atomic meanings conceived as ENTITIES of special kind. Ajdukiewicz's theory does not reify meanings which are given by rules. Two expressions are in a meaning relation if they appear (in an essential way) in the same meaning rule. As the meaning relation is transitive, the meanings of all expressions of a given language are related.

1931, p. 14). The classical associationism obviously excludes the phenomenal unity of mental acts of the mentioned kind.

For the sake of argument, Ajdukiewicz tried to conform the demand of phenomenal unity with associationism, extending the very notion of association and testing the hypothesis that the experience of the sense-content was just the thought associated with sense-content in the EXTENDED sense. The thesis of extended association should be understood as follows: a thought of type *A* is associated in an extended sense with a thought of type *B* when:

(...) in the past, our thoughts of type *A* happened to be thoughts of type *B* and henceforth habitually thoughts of type *A* are thoughts of type *B*" (Ajdukiewicz 1931, p. 16).

As Ajdukiewicz notices, the thesis of the extended association is not satisfactory because it does not permit to find any criteria for SYNONYMY. If *A* is an experienced sense-content of an expression and *B* is a thought associated with *A* in an extended sense (so *B* happens to be the *A*), *A* does not specify the TYPE of thought *B* which happens to be purely incidental. If, for instance, someone's experience of the utterance "a teacher" MAY HAPPEN TO BE the thought of an old man with a white beard while for another person the experience of the same sense-content may happen to be the thought of a blackboard and a piece of chalk. Let us notice that the notion of synonymy was crucial for Ajdukiewicz's aims, as the physical shape of expressions is only incidental to meanings and two speakers can differ in physical shapes of some or all utterances though they may speak "the same" language¹⁵⁰. The only possibility to show the sameness of two systems of linguistic expressions depends, according to Ajdukiewicz, on a good notion of synonymy.

As the analysis of associationism did not permit Ajdukiewicz to give an account of the notion of synonymy applied to the third sense of the notion of speaking Polish, his last step was the analysis Mill's theory of connotation which seemed to give a good basis for the criteria of synonymy. Mill's theory was originally formulated for names, but Ajdukiewicz explicated it for sentences in terms of motivation to actualizations of beliefs:

¹⁵⁰ Like in case of two logicians who apply different symbols, though the logic remains the same.

Between the belief in Socrates having a body, being rational, *etc.* and the belief in the sentence *Socrates is a man* there is a relation of the same type as between the belief in the premisses and in the conclusion of an inference. We will refer to such a relation as motivation (Ajdukiewicz 1931, p. 20).

This analysis of Mill's definition led Ajdukiewicz to express his own views on speaking a language:

If this interpretation is accepted then one would assume that to speak a language it is necessary to have dispositions towards particular motivational relations, viz. dispositions to accept certain sentences [...] on the basis of other experiences, e.g. on the basis of certain other beliefs (*ibid.*).

Though the Millian approach seemed to be promising, Ajdukiewicz did not accept Mill's externalist solution that the meaning of a name is its CONNOTATION conceived as the set of essential attributes or properties of the referent. As Ajdukiewicz argues, the same properties can be conceptualized or described in different ways. In consequence, beliefs do not depend on the properties as they are in themselves but on the way they are conceptualized or described. As conceptualizations depend on language, Ajdukiewicz abandoned Mill's externalism and looked for meanings in language. In spite of this, the analysis of connotational theory was a very important step towards Ajdukiewicz's BELIEF-HOLISM. As Ajdukiewicz noticed in the analysis of the connotational theory, one cannot have an isolated belief, e.g. that Socrates is a man, without believing in the same time that Socrates is a living creature, is rational *etc.*, because ACTUALIZATIONS of beliefs MOTIVATE each other.

Though Ajdukiewicz rejected his own version of Mill's theory, he maintained that speaking a language (in the third sense) consists in actualizing beliefs, i.e. having relevant thoughts (meaning intentions) when uttering or at least thinking the relevant assertions. The mental acts constituting a phenomenal unity with the acts of experiencing the sense-contents of utterances are always somehow motivated. Ajdukiewicz distinguished three basic types of MOTIVATION RELATIONS conceived as semantic rules or MEANING DIRECTIVES: empirical directives, axiomatic directives, and inferential directives. In the first case, all users of a language actualize a belief, i.e. they believe in the relevant sentence when they are motivated by experiencing certain empirical data, e.g. I accept "I hear a thunder" as an English sentence if I have a sense-experience of a certain type called by the users of this

language “a thunder.” Of course, experiencing the same empirical data motivates to believe in other sentences of English, i.e. “I hear a loud sound.” In consequence, this meaning directive does not suffice to give the meaning of the expression “a thunder” in English, as there are other sentences motivated by experiencing a thuner,, and there are other directives that motivate to believe in different sentences comprising the expression “a thunder.” The totality of meaning directives of a language permits us to distinguish the meaning of “a thunder” from meanings of other expressions, e.g. “a sound” or “an explosion,” *etc.* The act’s matter of a token-expression, as well as the meaning of the relevant type-expression, can be identified with the POSITION of the type-expression within the totality of meaning directives. Obviously, all English language speakers would believe in a sentence “Every thunder is a sound” (motivated by the relevant axiomatic directive), on the other hand the act of believing in a sentence “I see a flash of lighting” motivates them to believe in a sentence “I will hear a thunder soon” (inferential directive). Of course, the meaning of the expression “a flash of lightning” is distinguished from the meanings of other expressions (like “a light”) by other meaning directives. The conclusion from the example is as follows: the meaning of an expression of a language is GIVEN BY the set of ALL MEANING DIRECTIVES of this language. If we speak a language (in the third sense) we have to know all, or at least many, meaning directives of our language. Therefore, the meanings are intrinsically contained in a language as a whole and, in consequence, one cannot just know some single words of a foreign language. In this case we would rather say that the speaker incorporated some foreign words into his own language¹⁵¹.

Meaning holism in Ajdukiewicz is inseparable from belief holism, as meaning directives are just the rules of acts of believing in sentences. Therefore, a language impose its structure of meanings on beliefs conceived as DISPOSITIONS to experience the thoughts or acts of believing in relevant sentences. Moreover, any change of the set of meaning directives changes the meanings of all expressions of the language and, in fact, the change results in a new language. As meanings in Ajdukiewicz were not entities, the only intuitive access to these changes is *via* the changes of meaning directives¹⁵².

¹⁵¹ This idea was also articulated by Donald Davidson in 1966 who stated that we cannot know a part of a language, but we can only know a language PARTIALLY.

¹⁵² Ajdukiewicz’s theory was formulated for idealized closed languages and the remarks above concern them. If we change in a closed language any meaning directive, we will

In the second paragraph I described Husserl's distinction between indicative signs and meaningful linguistic expressions. In Ajdukiewicz, this difference consists in the holistic aspect of the latter, while the former, i.e. indicative signs, though they motivate us to have certain beliefs that can be articulated in a language, are in fact isolated. In consequence, an indicative sign is not a part of a language conceived as a net of interrelated meanings constituted by meaning directives.

The immediate consequence of the fact that the meanings are contained in a language conceived as a whole, is that the same part of reality can be described or categorized in different ways by different languages. The rival languages, as Ajdukiewicz conceived them, were not translatable. Moreover, and this is the immediate consequence of Ajdukiewicz's approach, every language, even a natural language, is in the same time a theory, as it comprises axioms, rules of inference, and interpretations of sense-data¹⁵³.

Presenting Ingarden's theory of meaning I stated that it worked as metaphysically-neutral, though it applied metaphysical assumptions about meanings and semantic correlates. Ajdukiewicz's theory does not only work as metaphysically neutral but was conceived by him as metaphysically neutral. Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning neither reifies meanings nor comprises any theory of reference or semantic correlates. In consequence, Ajdukiewicz evades the problem of the ontological status of meanings as well as the ontological status of "the reality the language is about." The reality is as it is, and determines causally our beliefs about it within a definite language. Though the directival theory was originally designed as the theory of meaning of languages of scientific theories it can be applied, after some modifications, even to literary fiction¹⁵⁴. The meanings of fictitious characters, fictitious species,

change in fact the whole language. As real languages, either natural or languages of scientific theories, are in fact open, changes in the set meaning directives are not so dramatic. Let us imagine that one discovers that bulldogs are not living creatures, but alien robots that spy as. In this case we have to decide if we want to abandon the axiomatic meaning directive "Every dog is an animal" and maintain "Every bulldog is a dog" or *vice-versa*. In this case we have to decide between two open languages with meaning directives which partially coincide.

¹⁵³ This seems to coincide with the hypothesis of Sapir-Whorf concerning the impossibility of translation form some exotic languages. The hypothesis was questioned by Donald Davidson in 1974. Nevertheless, one cannot apply Davidson's arguments against Ajdukiewicz's untranslatability thesis as Ajdukiewicz's notion of translation is very strict.

¹⁵⁴ Significant modifications are necessary as Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning was formulated for closed languages. Natural languages are in fact a mosaic of open languages which

and fictitious objects are introduced by specific meaning directives added to the meaning directives of the “realistic” part of the language of the novel¹⁵⁵.

Though Ajdukiewicz did not use reified meanings, he decided to define the meaning of an expressions by ABSTRACTION. Ajdukiewicz made two attempts to define this notion. The former, formulated in terms of synonymy, was presented in “On the Meaning of Expressions,” and the latter, more elaborated and based on the notion of a position in a MATRIX OF LANGUAGE, was presented in “Language and Meaning.” Therefore, sometimes it is said that Ajdukiewicz, following Husserl, treated meanings as ideal objects. In face of what has already been said, it seems to be a serious misunderstanding. Ajdukiewicz was an empiricist, and as such, he applied the method of abstraction in constructing concepts. The application of this strategy does not mean that he identified abstract concepts with ideal entities. If we apply Husserlian terminology, the act-matters of meaning intentions in Ajdukiewicz neither EXEMPLIFY meanings as ideal objects (like in Husserl) nor the meaning intentions PRODUCE meanings as intentional objects (like in Ingarden). We can only say that the meaning-intention acts (or acts of believing in sentences) together with their act-matters ARE CONSTITUTED by meaning directives of this language. In the last paragraph of “On the Meaning of Expressions” Ajdukiewicz states that:

In our view those who say that the word “table” is used as an expression of English if one has a thought of certain objects as being such and such merely state the following: one is then thinking in such a way that one is prepared to respond to certain intuitive presentations by accepting the sentence “this is a table,” furthermore one is prepared to accept other sentences containing “table” given those and not other motives. In our view “the intentional (object-directed) nature of acts” and “the matter of acts” reduces to just such dispositions (Ajdukiewicz 1931, pp. 33-34).

5. Final remarks

Roman Ingarden developed and made more precise the ontological side of Husserl’s semantics. Ajdukiewicz interpreted the phenomenological aspect

can be extended in literary fiction.

¹⁵⁵ The ordinary meaning directives of the language could also be modified by the author.

of Husserl's theory from conventionalist perspective. Of course, he made significant idealizations and simplifications which are acceptable if one takes into account the intended applications of Ajdukiewicz's theory. This perspective permitted Ajdukiewicz to abandon the correspondence theory of truth and, in consequence, to abandon ontological assumptions about the external reality. Ingarden built a very complex ontology as a basis for his semantics but, as I have argued, he had to accept some metaphysical essentialist assumptions. Contrary to Ingarden, Ajdukiewicz maintained that the reality can be categorized in different ways by different languages. Ontological categories in Ingarden are prior to meaning as he explicated meanings in terms of ontological categories. Ontological categories in Ajdukiewicz can be conceived only as posits of a theory, i.e. a language, and, therefore, meanings are prior to ontological categories. From this point of view both reinterpretations of Husserl seem to be complementary.

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6. Czeżowski and Ingarden on Values and Metaphysics

In the present paper, I would like to discuss some similarities in the philosophy of Tadeusz Czeżowski and Roman Ingarden concerning their views on values and metaphysics. Also, I will try to explain why Czeżowski's and Ingarden's philosophy may be regarded as compatible with theism, understood as the thesis that there is a personal God, though their views are not compatible with the so-called classical theism.

The order of the discussion is as follows. First, I will provide a brief account of close personal relations between the two philosophers, Czeżowski and Ingarden. Second, I will discuss some major similarities to be found in Czeżowski's and Ingarden's views. Sections three and four will outline the theories of values offered by Czeżowski and by Ingarden, respectively; and sections five and six will discuss their concepts of metaphysical cognition. Finally, in section seven, I will try to support the thesis that Czeżowski's and Ingarden's philosophy is compatible with theism, although it does not imply any theistic metaphysics.

1. Personal relations between Czeżowski and Ingarden

Tadeusz Czeżowski remained in long-lasting, regular and close contact with Roman Ingarden, especially after World War II¹⁵⁶. The relations between the

¹⁵⁶ Tadeusz Czeżowski was born in Vienna in 1889 and died in Toruń in 1981. In 1907, he enrolled at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Lvov to study philosophy, mathematics and physics. Under Twardowski's supervision, he wrote his dissertation (in Polish) on *The Theory of Classes*, for which he obtained his doctoral degree in 1914. During the Polish-Soviet war in 1920, he was a soldier and he was awarded for courage. In 1923, Czeżowski was offered the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Vilnius, which was vacant at the time, and he accepted that proposal. It is worth mentioning that during

two philosophers were, one could say, very friendly, and lasted until Ingarden's death (in 1970), which is evidenced by the letters they wrote to each other. In the Archives of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, there are about one hundred letters from Ingarden to Czeżowski. That these were very cordial relations can be inferred from the way they addressed each other. For example, Czeżowski begins his letters to Ingarden as follows: "Beloved/Dearest Roman" (Czeżowski, AUMK, 185/V), which may seem overly emotional today, but was a common form in those days – however, only when the relation was truly close and cordial.

Not only did they like each other, but it must be stressed that they also respected each other's philosophical achievements. Ingarden recommended Czeżowski's textbook *The Main Principles of Philosophical Sciences* to his students; he wrote to Czeżowski in one of his letters:

I have reviewed *The Main Principles*... and I find it a useful textbook, although I would try to present some matters differently, but this is natural. I have recommended your textbook to young people on many occasions (Ingarden AUMK, 185/V, letter dated October 24, 1946).

Czeżowski, in turn, discussed Ingarden's *Controversy over the Existence of the World* during his seminars with students. Referring to that, Ingarden wrote: "I am very glad that you are reading my *Controversy* at the seminar" (Ingarden AUMK, 185/V, letter dated December 4, 1949). Both the first and the second volume of *Controversy*... were reviewed by Czeżowski; in one of the reviews, Ingarden's work is described by Czeżowski as follows: "Insightful, exhaustive, inventive analyses ... but they also require patience from the reader" (Czeżowski 1949, p. 9).

the German occupation, Czeżowski saved the lives of many Jewish people, for which, in 1963, he was awarded the title of Righteous among the Nations by Yad Vashem Institute, together with his wife Antonina and their daughter Teresa; and in 2012, he posthumously obtained the honorary citizenship of Israel. After the war, Czeżowski had to leave the University of Vilna and, like other professors of that university, he was moved to a newly established University of Toruń (Nicolaus Copernicus University), becoming one of its main organizers. In total, he is the author of over 190 scientific publications, including his philosophical books: *Philosophical Lectures*, *Philosophy at Crossroads*, *The Main Principles of Philosophical Sciences* and an advanced handbook on logic: *Logika*. It is worth noting that during the years of the communist regime, which started in Poland immediately after the war, Czeżowski – till his death – refused any awards offered by the communist state.

The fact that the relations between the two philosophers were very friendly is worth noting, especially when we remember that Ingarden disagreed on many fundamental problems with the logicians from the Lvov-Warsaw School, to whom Czeżowski belonged. Likewise, Czeżowski did not accept the essential premises and claims of phenomenology. This, however, did not prevent him from pointing out – in his review of the book by Martha Kneale and William Kneale, *The Development of Logic* – that the authors completely ignored the achievements of Edmund Husserl and Franz Brentano. Czeżowski regarded Husserl's formal ontology as a modern continuation of the classical metaphysics understood as the first philosophy (Czeżowski 1948, p. 58).

Czeżowski compared Husserl's insight into the essence of things to intuitive generalization, which was an integral part of the method of analytical description that he himself used. He regarded Husserl, next to Henri Bergson and William James, as one of the main representatives of intuitionist metaphysics, and he considered the phenomenological intuition to be an important way of how we come to know the reality. Czeżowski was, if not the first, then certainly one of the first who saw the need to use modern logic in phenomenological research. He believed that Ingarden's method of resolving the dispute between realism and idealism by purely conceptual consideration was fundamentally wrong. According to Czeżowski, the only way to confirm the existence of the world is by probabilistic reasoning based on perceptual experience (Czeżowski 1979, p. 72).

2. Similarities in Czeżowski's and Ingarden's philosophy

Despite the above-mentioned methodological differences, Czeżowski and Ingarden shared the view that the existence of the spatio-temporal world and the axiological world (of moral and aesthetic values) is independent of the human mind.

Czeżowski justified the thesis about the existence of the world by induction – unlike Ingarden, who used conceptual analysis. When justifying the thesis of the world's existence, Czeżowski refers to the methods of natural sciences. Scientists treat the thesis about the existence of the external world as a conclusion of reasoning, the premises of which are propositions based on the perception of physical phenomena.

Ingarden, however, accuses scientists of committing a logical error, consisting in the fact that the premises of reasoning already contain the conclusion.

In Czeżowski's opinion, that objection is not valid, because a more detailed analysis of the reasoning does not show this assumption in the premises. The premises can be generally represented by the proposition: "there is such-and-such a phenomenon." Propositions of this type are singular propositions, and they are not justified by a general proposition asserting the existence of a whole consisting of all individual phenomena about which singular propositions speak (Czeżowski 1958). It is the opposite; namely, the singular propositions justify the general proposition 'the world exists,' where the world is an aggregate or collection of objects or physical phenomena or systems.

Regarding axiological realism, both Ingarden and Czeżowski refer to the existence of a special kind of experience by which we can know different kinds of values. That recognition of the existence of axiological experiences can be treated as a result of the influence of phenomenology on Czeżowski's thought.

Neither Czeżowski nor Ingarden treat values as properties of objects. I believe that the non-predicative ontology of values propounded by Czeżowski and by Ingarden are original proposals in the ontology of values not only within Polish philosophy, but within philosophy in general. Therefore, the following two sections will be concerned with Czeżowski's and Ingarden's theories of values.

3. Czeżowski's ontology of values

Czeżowski defends a version of axiological realism which is an original combination of the medieval metaphysics, Brentanism and non-naturalism. Axiological realism is a view that can be defined as a negation of axiological antirealism. Axiological antirealism claims that axiological propositions – evaluations and norms – do not have any logical value or that they are always false (as error-theory claims), and that values are not in the things themselves, but they are rather mere projections; they are just feelings that we project onto the world. Axiological realism, on the other hand, has two forms: naturalism and non-naturalism.

Axiological non-naturalism was for Czeżowski the only possible option since he was convinced that axiological propositions are true or false. The evidence that axiological propositions have one of two logical values is provided by the analysis of language and the usage of expressions representing logical values; "It is true that..." and "It is false that...." Czeżowski made

a very simple observation that the propositions ‘Truthfulness is good’ and ‘It is true that truthfulness is good’ are meaningful (Czeżowski 1989, 144).

It is also worth noting that the best known explanation of the existence of inferences in the domain of axiological discourse consists in the assumption that axiological sentences have logical values whose bearers are propositions. The following reasoning may serve as an example of inference in the domain of axiological discourse (Czeżowski 1989, 107):

(1) If truthfulness is good, then one should tell the truth.

(2) Truthfulness is good.

Then:

(3) One should tell the truth.

Since Czeżowski, like the whole tradition to which he belonged, rejected the deflationist conception of truth and approved of the classical definition of truth, he could not overlook the linguistic facts previously mentioned, and he had to find an adequate truth-maker for axiological sentences. Thus, it is clear that Czeżowski was perfectly aware of “Frege’s point” or “Searle’s problem.”¹⁵⁷

Czeżowski, like many other thinkers, was persuaded by Moore that correct deduction of axiological propositions from natural ones is impossible. The crucial thing here was Moore’s warning against ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ based on his famous “open question argument.”¹⁵⁸ Czeżowski

¹⁵⁷ Peter Geach made it clear that we believe that the status of an argument as valid depends, at least in part, on the words not shifting in meaning as we move from premise to premise. However, if there is no common thing predicated by relevant sentences, it is hard to see what their meanings have in common in the context of a given argument. This is what Geach called ‘Frege’s Point’, but it has also been called ‘Frege/Geach/Searle’s Problem’ in honor of its earliest discussants (Lenman 2004). Geach also observed: ‘A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition’ (Geach 1965, p. 449). He provided the following example of reasoning: (1) If tormenting the cat is bad, getting your brother to do it is bad. (2) Tormenting the cat is bad. And, hence, (3) Getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad.

¹⁵⁸ Moore reasons: if axiological properties were identical with natural properties, then it would be odd to ask: ‘I know this activity is pleasurable, but is it morally good?’ After all, if being pleasurable is just the property of being morally good, then to ask this would be like asking: ‘I know this activity is pleasurable, but is it pleasurable?’. Since the original question is ‘open’ rather than silly or self-answering, the identity must not obtain. Since exactly the same point can be made regarding any putative identity between a moral property and a natural property, Moore concludes that no such identity is possible (Lenman 2004).

never analyzed that argument but accepted it without reservation. However, Czeżowski could not accept the metaphysics of axiological realism defended by Moore, because for Moore expressions relevant to axiological discourse, for example, “good,” “bad,” “beautiful,” “valuable” and their synonyms, are predicates denoting simple, indefinable, and, in Brentanian terms, “unpresentable” object’s properties, that is properties which, as Hume and Kant would say, “make no addition” to the object (Łukasiewicz 2008).

The arguments against the predicative conception of values are similar to the reasons of non-predicative notion of existence, therefore I will present them together. Below, I will discuss two of them.

First, since axiological sentences are true or false (as Czeżowski claimed), then they are, according to the Brentanian psycho-ontology, expressions of axiological judgments. The nature of judgment is explained by Czeżowski in terms of the “idiogenetic theory of judgment,” which embraces two essential claims (Łukasiewicz 2006, p. 188):

(1) Each judgment is reducible to an existential judgment; that is to a judgment asserting the existence of an object.

(2) No judgment is a combination of a subject and a predicate.

An axiological judgment does not assert the existence of an object, because it asserts only its value. An axiological judgment, as a judgment, is not a combination of a subject and a predicate. It follows from this that the judgment ‘*a* is good’ does not contain any predicate. The word “good,” according to the idiogenetic theory of judgment, is only an apparent predicate (the same may be said about the word ‘beautiful’ and its synonyms).

The second reason was provided by the analysis of the syntactic structure of expressions composed of such words as “true,” “good,” “necessary” and “beautiful.” According to that analysis, existence and values are not any properties because they are not symbolized in language by predicates. Such words as “true,” “good,” “necessary” and “beautiful” are only morphologically similar to predicates, but in fact they are not predicates. They are propositional operators, because they occur in such constructions as, for example, “It is necessary that...,” “It is good that...,” “It is beautiful that...,” or “It is true that...”

Thus, Czeżowski’s view is that such expressions as “exists,” “valuable,” “good,” “beautiful,” but also “necessary” and “possible,” are not predicates, and therefore, they do not denote any properties of things or individuals. However, sentences containing them are not necessarily false, because they assert what was called, in the Middle Ages, “modes of beings” (in Latin:

modi essendi), and Czeżowski regards *modi essendi* as *transcendentalia* or transcendental concepts. *Transcendentalia* do not belong to the description of an object, that is, they do not determine universals and cannot be defined (in Brentanian terms: they cannot be presented), and hence, they are no properties in Czeżowski's psycho-ontology. Czeżowski writes:

In all these examples, there occurs a sentence composed of *modus* and *dictum* (if we use the classical terminology); *modus* is the expression: "It is necessary that...", "It is true that..." etc., *dictum* is the sentence following *modus*. Today we call *modus* a sentential conjunction. The fact that modal conjunctions (necessary, possible), the conjunction of assertion (it is true that...) and the conjunction of evaluation (good, beautiful) do require as their complement a sentence (and not a name, as other adjectives do when they play the role of an attribute) shows that these *modi* cannot be given in presentations but that they are asserted by judgments. Anyway, it has been well known for a long time – Hume and Kant were conscious of it – that they (*modi*) cannot be given in any presentation, and even that these expressions are "contentless;" they express only someone's reaction to a certain state of affairs (Czeżowski 1965, pp. 38-39).

What is important Czeżowski followed here not Thomas Aquinas but Duns Scotus by claiming that *transcendental concepts* are disjunctive. But Czeżowski, we can say, also denied Duns Scotus' theory when saying that *existence* and *values* are disjunctive because they can be negated; the negation of goodness is evil, and the negation of beauty is ugliness. In consequence, Czeżowski suspended also the thesis that transcendental concepts, for example, existence and goodness are convertible. The question about convertibility of transcendental concepts may be answered empirically by means of experience, and not *a priori* by means of deduction (Woleński 2004).

In sum, the essential role in the controversy between non-naturalistic realism and antirealism is played by the claim that values (goodness, beauty) are not object's properties. Therefore, goodness and beauty cannot be identical with any natural property or with any natural fact. However, truthfulness, kindness, sacrifice, justice, faithfulness, harmony etc. are not *values* (like goodness and beauty), but they are properties, and, as Czeżowski calls them, they are "criteria of goodness," "criteria of evil," "criteria of beauty," or more generally, "criteria of values" (Czeżowski 1989, p. 107).

4. Ingarden on values¹⁵⁹

Ingarden uses a number of terms related to values. He says about the ideas of value, the ideal qualities of values, values *in concreto* and *in individuo*, the matter of values, and the valuableness of values (Ingarden 1989, p. 331).

A value *in concreto* is any value predicated of an individual object. Concrete values are neither objects, because they are dependent on the value-bearers, nor properties because if a value were a property, it could not be possessed by physical objects having only physical properties. Values cannot be reduced to any relation between a certain individual or social subject and the object evaluated, because this would imply relativism, but only some values are relative. Values cannot be characterized by existential categories, that is by Ingarden's modes of existence, because the way aesthetic values exist is different from moral values. According to Ingarden, values have modes of existence other than real, ideal or intentional, and the ways of how values exist have to be discovered because they are not known yet, in fact. Ingarden's value ontology is therefore more negative than positive, but it is not entirely negative. We know of values that 'value arises from the very essence of an object' and that it is determined by its properties along with its valuableness. We also know that values are positive and negative, and that an object with positive values obtains a certain *dignitas* by possessing them (Ingarden 1971, p. 103). The realization (*Realisierung*) of moral values presupposes the REAL EXISTENCE of free and responsible human actions, and this may lead to the recognition of the real world in which there are CAUSAL RELATIONS and interactions between persons and their environment. Thus, in Ingarden's theory, axiological considerations seem to play an important role in resolving the dispute over the existence of the world (Porębski 1996, p. 30).

5. Czeżowski on metaphysics

Czeżowski's metaphilosophy is clearly scientific; in that respect Czeżowski was a faithful student of Kazimierz Twardowski (Brożek 2014). According to both philosophers, philosophy is to be a science and should cooperate

¹⁵⁹ Władysław Stróżewski provides a very brief and clear overview of Ingarden's theory of values in (Stróżewski 1976).

with natural sciences. However, Czeżowski's metaphilosophical scientism is connected with the classical, pre-positivist and even pre-Kantian understanding of philosophy as a science about all reality, about 'the totality of being'. The following statement by Czeżowski can illustrate this thought:

It is in the nature of the human mind that it goes beyond the limits of individual life, reaching with its thoughts to the farthest ends of existence. Some people experience this relation with the whole of being more strongly and clearly, others less strongly and without being aware of it; in some people, intellectual elements are more emphasized, in others emotional ones. But in the history of human thought, this relation is an extremely powerful factor. This totality of being – whether we call it “God” or “Nature” – with which we feel connected, on which we feel dependent, and from which we draw life and strength ... becomes all closer to us when we get a precise and accurate grasp of its manifestations in the world available to our knowledge, but we come even closer to that totality of being when capturing its perfection in value judgments and its beauty in aesthetic contemplation (Czeżowski 1989, 45-46).

In thus construed philosophy, Czeżowski recognizes the vitally important role of axiology, and within the latter, the importance of knowledge about values. As Czeżowski says, our relationship with being – understood as God or nature – becomes closer not only through descriptive judgments but also through axiological knowledge, through our knowing of the value of reality. Our knowing of the value of reality is part of our knowing of reality, and this leads to some metaphysical beliefs. Metaphysical beliefs are intersubjectively verifiable and communicable. Thus, metaphysics as a science about the totality of being is possible¹⁶⁰.

6. Ingarden on metaphysics

In Ingarden's philosophy, there are two concepts of metaphysics. The first is related to his conception of ontology as a science of pure possibilities; metaphysics in this ontological context should provide answers to the questions of which of these possibilities are realized, whether the real world exists

¹⁶⁰ The idea of metaphysical experience understood as an axiological interpretation of the world was later developed in Polish philosophy by Marian Przełęcki (1989).

independently of pure consciousness, and the like. The second, less “official,” concept of metaphysics is related to Ingarden’s axiology and the existence of metaphysical experiences, in which we learn what Ingarden calls “metaphysical qualities.” Metaphysical qualities reveal the primal sources of existence and represent, as he called it, “the world of higher powers” (Ingarden 1931, pp. 292-293).

Examples of metaphysical qualities include: the loftiness of someone’s sacrifice, the meanness of betrayal, the tragedy of someone’s defeat, the horror of someone’s evil deeds, the sanctity (or sinfulness) of someone’s life or the ecstatic nature of someone’s delight.

Ingarden says that we do not experience metaphysical qualities too often in the circumstances of everyday life, but – much more often – such experiences happen to us thanks to great works of art. On that occasion, we find that the metaphysical qualities reveal to us the “deeper meaning” of life and of reality in general. Metaphysical qualities constitute this hidden meaning and reveal the primal source of being; thereby, they represent “the world of higher powers.” The existence of metaphysical qualities and of the world of higher powers has the effect that we humans do not feel at home in the world of nature, since we are radically different from animals – we are able to create culture and experience metaphysical qualities. However, we do not feel quite at home in the world of human-created culture either, because the world of culture and art reveals metaphysical qualities leading to “the world of higher powers,” to use Ingarden’s expression, over which we have no control. All this may sound slightly mysterious, and perhaps this view merely expresses Ingarden’s fascination with Rilke’s poetry, but one cannot exclude the possibility that there may be something deeper at play here (Porębski 1996, p. 29).

7. Czeżowski’s and Ingarden’s views on the existence of God

As to Czeżowski’s views concerning God’s existence, one can find only sparse and brief references to this subject in his writings, which is not surprising. Czeżowski, like his teacher, Kazimierz Twardowski, considered the problems related to one’s worldview to be in principle outside the field of philosophy (Brożek 2014).

In Czeżowski's opinion, it is impossible to prove the existence of God inductively by generalizing individual observations, because we do not have any observations of personal divinity. There are no valid deductive proofs either, although, what is significant, Czeżowski does not exclude the possibility of formulating such proofs in the future (Czeżowski 1948, p. 91). He considers the ontological argument to be fundamentally mistaken since it is wrong to conclude that the real world exists by way of conceptual analyses as Ingarden did it. In his sparse and brief remarks concerning the existence of God, Czeżowski does not refer to the inference to the best explanation either.

By contrast, in *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, Ingarden speaks of God as a being which is absolute and which is A RADICAL ESSENCE, to use his technical term (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 392). In the conclusion of this work, he represents a creationist position assuming the existence of an absolute being on which human consciousness and the real world are dependent – because human consciousness and the world, according to Ingarden, are contingent beings. This conclusion of Ingarden's work does not appear original; it resembles the argument from a necessary being and is based on a logical fallacy: the fallacy of composition. According to Ingarden's ontological analyses, every individual object existing in time is contingent (this also applies to the human mind, pure consciousness); and hence, the whole composed of such objects is contingent too.

Some philosophers try to support the theistic position suggested by Ingarden by appealing to the experience of metaphysical qualities, which has been mentioned above and which should reveal the source and the sense of reality (Wojtysiak 2001, p. 8). On my view, however, the experience of metaphysical qualities is not sufficient to conclude that there is an absolute personal being, which is traditionally called God. The Nature itself and human products can be the bearers of metaphysical qualities of which Ingarden speaks.

Summing up Ingarden's and Czeżowski's contributions to the reflection on the nature and existence of God, it should be noted that Ingarden considered the idea of absolute being to be coherent. Czeżowski, like Ingarden, regarded the idea of God as coherent since he allowed for the possibility of formulating a formally correct deductive proof of God's existence. However, Czeżowski himself did not provide any such proof, nor did he refer to any existing proofs or arguments for God's existence.

Someone might say that these are not great contributions to the metaphysics of God; however, firstly, these contributions must be assessed in the historical context, secondly, none of them aimed at defending and developing theistic metaphysics (perhaps because philosophy should be ideologically neutral, as both claimed). As to the historical context, it is worth remembering that both Ingarden and Czeżowski were active in the times of politically dominating Marxist atheism, still influential neo-positivism, not to mention the metaphilosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School and the key premises of phenomenology, which, taken together, did not create an encouraging background to develop an interesting and systematic metaphysics of God.

However, Ingarden does make several interesting remarks about divinity. First, in *Controversy over the Existence of the World, Volume One* Ingarden seems to reject the doctrine of continuous creation because, if God existed, the necessity to sustain the created world in existence would testify to GOD'S POWERLESSNESS and therefore to His imperfection (Tarnowski 1995, p. 68). I think that Ingarden is right here; but the rejection of *creatio continua* is a rejection of a very important component of traditional classical theism. Almost all contemporary theists defend the view that God sustains the world in existence.

Ingarden's second remark concerns his rejection of theistic Platonism, which was defended, for example, by St. Augustine, and, in the Lvov-Warsaw School, by Jan Łukasiewicz (Woleński 1989). Ingarden says that it is possible to treat ideas and ideal abstract objects, mathematical objects included, not as God's thoughts but rather as something independent and uncreated by God. He firmly states that it would be fundamentally wrong to think of abstract objects as divine thoughts or something created by God (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, 207). The above claim may be regarded as corresponding to the view held by, for example, contemporary Molinists, who believe in the counterfactuals of freedom, counterfactuals of quantum physics and ideal essences, which have not been created by God and over which God has no control¹⁶¹.

It should also be added that Ingarden rejects both the doctrine of God's simplicity (because every individual object consists of the substrate of properties and its properties) and the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas about God as the pure act of existence (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 382). And if I am

¹⁶¹ The most eminent representative of contemporary Molinism is Alvin Plantinga (1974).

right about Ingarden's view on metaphysical qualities, he rejects the claim of classical theistic metaphysics that EVERY BEING IS GOOD.

If we take all this into account, Ingarden's views on God, although not systematically elaborated, seem to be quite original. Surely, his theism is not classical theism, but it is not a version of open theism, Molinism, or process theism either¹⁶². Whether Ingarden's views represent a coherent theistic position is another problem. In order to evaluate the coherence of Ingarden's metaphysics of God, an analysis based on more data would be required, which data are difficult to find in Ingarden's works. However, even if we limit ourselves to analysing his occasional and brief remarks, his position does not seem coherent – but it can easily be made coherent by rejecting the thesis that there are uncreated abstract objects. And then, I hope, it could work.

Besides the above-mentioned directly theological matters, there are certain elements of Czeżowski's and Ingarden's philosophy which are vitally important for theistic metaphysics. Despite some differences, both philosophers assume the reliability of our cognitive powers, such as perception, intellectual intuition, inference, our grasp of values and metaphysical experience understood as cognition of the value of reality, including the value of works of arts. They also assume the difference between the physical and the mental; perhaps this is a difference to be considered in terms of dualism (whether it is substance dualism or property dualism is another question). Both Czeżowski and Ingarden presuppose human abilities and needs to create works of art, literature, music or poetry. And last but not least, they both assume the mind's intentionality consisting in the direct grasping of the object itself. All these are important premises of theism.

8. Conclusion

To conclude, in my opinion Ingarden's and even Czeżowski's views can be considered perfectly compatible with theistic metaphysics, although not with the classical theism. However, as mentioned at the beginning, even though Czeżowski's and Ingarden's views on metaphysics are compatible with theism, this does not constitute a firm and explicit claim on their part that God exists, nor does it provide any argument for the existence of God.

¹⁶² For a detailed description of these views, cf. for example (Beilby, Eddy 2001).

On the other hand, it remains an open question whether Czeżowski's and Ingarden's views concerning human higher cognitive abilities and real achievements in creating culture and science are truly compatible with metaphysical naturalism understood as the view that there is no personal absolute being and that humans are products of blind and random evolutionary processes driven by natural selection focused solely on fitness and survival rate. Let me quote here the great British philosopher John Locke, who in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* writes:

For it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative Matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing should of itself produce Matter (Locke 1689/1690, p. 623).

But if Czeżowski's and Ingarden's views are not quite compatible and fitting with metaphysical naturalism, then one could argue that perhaps theism and theistic worldview combine better with their views on the ontology of values and human nature.

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7. Ingarden's Position in the Polemic around Twardowski's Article "On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style"

As it is known, the postulate of clarity was one of the Lvov-Warsaw School program's main points (Woleński 1985, p. 304). One of the polemics regarding the postulate of clarity was sparked by Kazimierz Twardowski's article "On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style." This article was published in 1919 in the journal *Ruch Filozoficzny*. In the pages of this journal, there was also a polemic about the article in which Joachim Metallmann, Roman Ingarden, and Dawid Einhorn took part. In my text, I will try to discuss Ingarden's objections to Twardowski's theses.

Twardowski's main theses expressed in the article are as follows (Twardowski 1919):

(1) The view that certain philosophical problems cannot be clearly written about is unfounded (because no one has shown that all philosophical writings on a certain subject have a obscure¹⁶³ style; moreover, some philosophers can express themselves clearly on matters deemed difficult).

(2) Thus, obscure style comes from obscure thinking: whoever thinks clearly, writes clearly; whoever writes unclearly, cannot think clearly (in support of this view, Twardowski refers to a close relationship between thought and speech – speech is a tool of thought, especially abstract thought, so thought immediately appears in a verbal form; it is not that we think first and then choose words).

(3) If so, we are under no obligation to guess what an author who wrote obscurely thought because we can assume that this author cannot think clearly, so these thoughts do not deserve guessing (the exception is when we know that the author thinks clearly, so we can assume that the vagueness of the text is due to other reasons).

¹⁶³ I use the words "unclear" and "obscure" interchangeably.

In the beginning, Ingarden outlines his position; this outline can be summarized in four points (Ingarden 1919):

(4) The postulate that philosophical works should be written clearly is correct.

(5) The obscurity of thinking entails the obscurity of the work. Ingarden adds: not necessarily obscurity of the work style, which may remain clear in this situation.

(6) It is not true that the obscurity of the style depends only on the obscurity of the author's thinking.

(7) Twardowski's postulate that one can give up on guessing the thoughts expressed in an unclear text is not correct.

The first two points grant a somewhat general acceptance of the postulate of clarity, but Ingarden does not pay much attention to them. First of all, he tries to show that the unclearness of style may be caused by factors other than the unclearness of an author's thinking, i.e. he tries to justify what is included in (6). According to Ingarden,

(8) clarity of style is a feature that allows the reader to think about the same objects or objects of the same kind that the author is thinking about, and think the same about these objects (this statement can be added to the summary of Ingarden's position).

There must be objective features of a style that give it clarity, Ingarden says. However, clarity is a relative feature. Ascribing unclearness to a philosophical work depends not only on the author's thinking but also on the reader's qualifications. For example, an untrained reader may find a work unclear when it is clear to others. A reader's inadequate qualifications may relate to the following four matters (Ingarden 1919).

(9) The reader is a novice in philosophy and is not used to thinking about specific objects; this reader is also unable to follow the author's thoughts.

(10) The reader only pays attention to the verbal-conceptual layer of philosophical works, and not to the reality to which the words refer (this kind of reader, Ingarden says, "has missed his profession"). This type of reader has read many philosophical works but has never understood them because when uttering sentences with philosophical content, he does not realize what objects or states of affairs correspond to those sentences' content; he does not present himself the objects to which the words contained in these sentences refer. The described reader will find any work unclear that does not deal with the derivation of relationships between concepts, but

with the description of the subject's features. To understand a work about particular objects, the reader must awaken the intuition of the objects being described, thereby gaining an exact meaning of the author's statements. A word derives its meaning from the visually given features of an object, and it becomes clear when its use enables the reader to visualize those features. The danger of a purely verbal reading of work occurs especially when the author writes about objects that cannot be broken down into known elements. The reader should try to see such items in their specificity, following the verbal descriptions or comparisons of the author. As Ingarden emphasizes, the paintings of the Impressionists who discovered the incredible richness of colors and images were "incomprehensible" until one learned to see what the Impressionists had seen. The type of verbal readers discussed here may include formal-mathematical minds or historians of philosophy who study the concepts used by philosophers and the relationships between them, rather than trying to see the world through individual philosophers' eyes.

(11) If the reader's language ability is at a lower level than that of the author of the work, the reader may consider the work to be unclear. This situation will occur especially when the reader is incapable of following the author's arguments and this reader will consider his own way of expression to be the only correct one. Such a reader will give his own meanings to the author's terms and perceive the author's ideas through his own mental categories. However, this will result in a belief that the work is unclear.

(12) The evaluation of a work in terms of clarity also depends on the difference between the evaluator's views and those of the author of the work. A reader who believes in a particular philosophical school's principles may find the work of an author belonging to another philosophical school obscure. Every philosophical system, especially one created by an outstanding individual, contains a number of propositions close to the truth, but also subjective and deceptive propositions. Sometimes such systems fossilize, and their followers cannot see reality directly. Such people then move in the world of the school's phantoms, taking them as reality, and they consider books about other subjects to be unclear.

Ingarden concludes: it can be seen that the attribution of unclearness to a work can be caused by many factors that do not come from the unclear thinking of the author. The obscurity of the author's thinking can only be considered the cause of the work's obscurity if the reader of the work is qualified to understand it. Ingarden makes some final remarks in connection with Twardowski's postulate that one can give up on guessing the thoughts

contained in an unclear text (3). Clarity, Ingarden says, is not the only value of a work, and a certain lack of clarity is not enough to deny a work value. The value of a work is primarily determined by the object and content of its author's thinking. A philosopher who knows how to delve into the most difficult problems can be forgiven for a certain obscurity. It is more difficult to forgive superficiality and lack of thought even for a very clear philosopher.

It seems that in private letters to Kazimierz Twardowski, Ingarden presented his criticism of Twardowski's position as not very radical; that he wanted to weaken its tone. Ingarden stated that he wrote his article because he did not understand why Twardowski considered clarity an absolute feature, while to Ingarden it seems to be a relative feature, and he had arguments to support his position. In response, Twardowski stated that he also considered clarity to be a relative feature, but perhaps he expressed this unclearly in his text (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 178-179). In the next letter, Ingarden wrote that Twardowski did not directly express the view that clarity is an absolute feature, but it could be assumed that Twardowski adopted such a view. Ingarden argues this way. According to Twardowski, it can be concluded from the work's unclearness that the author's thinking was unclear. So – according to Ingarden – Twardowski treated the work's obscurity as an absolute feature. Ingarden, on the other hand, wanted to show that the work is obscure when a) there is a relation of reading between the work and its reader, and b) the reader does not have the qualifications necessary to assess the clarity of the work accurately. If so, it is not always possible to conclude that if the work is unclear, then its author thought unclearly. Ingarden adds that in his text "On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style," he wanted to emphasize that some particular philosophical works require the reader's special skills, as he had often encountered the fact that certain works were considered incomprehensible while they were only misunderstood (Ingarden, Twardowski 2016, p. 182-183).

Some of Ingarden's theses are worth commenting on. Thesis (5) assumes a close relationship between thought and speech, but this assumption is not universally accepted. There seems to be no reason to think that the obscurity of thinking coexists with the obscurity of the verbal expression of thoughts in every case. However, such co-occurrence can happen in many cases. While, following Jacek Jadacki, we will understand the unclearness of thinking as the incompleteness of images, the instability, and haziness of beliefs, and the opacity of reasoning (Jadacki 2018, p. 30), it seems that in many cases, such features of thinking may be reflected in the

unclearness of statements. It is worth adding that both Twardowski and Ingarden accept the thesis that a person's unclear thinking directly results in unclear work.

Ingarden further states that a philosophical work may be unclear, but its style may remain clear. Ingarden does not discuss this statement, but this problem demands a few remarks. The style of expression in linguistics is understood as, e.g. a colloquial, official, or journalistic style. In philosophy, one can distinguish a formal style referring to logical symbolism and a completely different essayistic and literary style. However, a style in philosophy or a philosophical style can also be understood in another, broader way. According to Leon Koj, a philosophical style consists of: a specific subject, a starting point and scope of considerations, a method of arguing, an attitude to the past, a system of values, types of assertions, the personal involvement of the philosopher or lack of such involvement, and the literary form (e.g. dialogue, maxims). In this sense, Anna Brożek writes about three contemporary philosophical styles: analytical, phenomenological and hermeneutic (Brożek 2009). Style in the first sense (in the linguistic sense) is not directly related to a philosophical work's clarity or obscurity. Perhaps some styles are clearer than others, but, e.g. philosophical works written in formal language can be both clear and unclear. The same applies to philosophical works written in literary language (e.g. postmodern works are written in this language, and for some people are unclear). So the clarity or unclearness of a work does not depend on style (in the linguistic sense); style is indifferent to clarity.

When Twardowski and Ingarden spoke of a clear and unclear philosophical style, I suppose they meant neither style in the literary sense nor style in the broader, second sense (in which the philosophical style is understood as a comprehensive way of practicing philosophy). However, they could mean some unspecified features that make a philosophical text clear or unclear, or simply the clarity or unclearness of a text. When I read the statement (8), I am not sure if Ingarden establishes a real difference between "clarity of the style of the work" and "clarity of the work." I suppose there is no difference here, especially since Ingarden states elsewhere that obscurity of thinking causes "obscurity of the work," not "obscurity of the style of the work." It is worth noting that in his correspondence with Twardowski, Ingarden wrote about clarity, not clarity of style. When Ingarden said that an obscure work might have a clear style, by clear style he could mean apparent clarity (e.g. lack of specialist terminology).

I think Ingarden is right that clarity is a relative feature and he aptly describes the various gaps in reader's qualifications that may cause a work to be misjudged in terms of clarity. Ingarden's considerations on this subject can be summarized in this way. The reader may find a clear philosophical work unclear for the following reasons: (a) he is a novice in philosophy, (b) the level of his language is too low in relation to the level of the author's language, (c) when reading the work, he focuses only (or too much) on the verbal level, (d) he reads the work using his own mental categories or from the point of view of his own philosophical views, while he should follow the author's words without prejudice. However, preventing the latter reason is associated with significant difficulty. In fact, Ingarden himself points to this difficulty when he writes about the obstacle to mutual understanding between the author and the reader caused by the difference between their philosophical views. But on the other hand, Ingarden strongly recommends that the reader follow the author's words, and the goal is that the reader will see the objects the author sees. However, suppose the author is, e.g. a phenomenologist and the reader is a supporter of analytical philosophy. In that case, the reader will neither accept the existence of certain objects, nor accept the methods of learning about these objects¹⁶⁴. Thus, what will be clear to one will be unclear to the other. So clarity and obscurity depend on the philosophical styles (in the sense of Leon Koj) that both the author and the reader are based in. However, clarity and obscurity depend on a philosophical style in a sense stronger than that of Ingarden. The philosophical style is not a subjective obstacle that can be removed in the pursuit of the supposed objectivity in philosophy. It is an indelible element of philosophy.

Ingarden's position in the discussion was not overly related to his phenomenology, apart from the thread mentioned above. Ingarden's remarks modified Twardowski's statements and refined them in the right direction, as they had omitted the problem of the reader's competence, were too general and therefore unclear, and were too radical even for some members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. For example, Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa doubted that Twardowski really believed that unclear works have no cognitive value and that it is not worth considering them. After all, as Łuszczewska-Romahnowa argued, he spread knowledge of the history

¹⁶⁴ For example, the Lvov-Warsaw school representatives rejected any direct cognition (e.g. eidetic cognition) that was not a sensory experience or an internal psychological experience. Ingarden criticized such a position (cf. Woleński 1997, pp. 198-199).

of philosophy in his lectures, including very unclear philosophical views (Łuszczewska-Romahnowa 1977, p. 121).

It is worth quoting the position of the other two participants in the polemic. Joachim Metallmann claimed that only in general do those who think clearly write clearly. The clarity of the style depends not only on the clarity of thought but also on the writer's talent and stylistic sophistication, the difficulties and degree of maturity of problems, and the reader's clarity of thinking. Metallmann also noted that the phrases "clarity of thought" and "clarity of style" are not clear enough (Metallmann 1919). Dawid Einhorn, on the other hand, criticized the statements of both Metallmann and Ingarden. He notes that the problem raised by Twardowski requires the inclusion of a competent reader, so talking about an incompetent reader is superfluous. We do not know the writer's thoughts directly, so we can judge the clarity of thought only based on his statements. Thus, attempts to capture the author's allegedly clear thought without considering its external expression are subjective. Therefore, the postulate to exclude unclear judgments from the scientific history of philosophy is correct (Einhorn 1920). As Jan Woleński points out, the arguments of Ingarden and Metallmann indicate that the relationship of thought and speech is not close enough for every property of speech to translate into a property of thought automatically, and *vice versa*. Einhorn's argument that clarity of thought can only be recognized through its outward expression also seems justified (Woleński 1997, p. 89).

On the other hand, the relationship between the author's thinking and his writing is probably not as essential as it seems. As J. Jadacki emphasizes, from the reader's point of view, the relationship between the text and the world is more important (Jadacki 2018, p. 37). As indicated, the author's thinking is directly unavailable to us (Einhorn 1920; Jadacki 1989). Therefore, for the reader, the clarity of the statement is more important than the clarity of its author's thinking. According to Jadacki, the obscurity of the statement is its incomprehensibility. A statement is incomprehensible to person *X* when: (1) *X* does not know what the individual parts of the statement refer to because *X* does not know the meaning of these parts or when (2) individual parts of the statement are ambiguous, and although *X* knows their different meanings, he does not know which of these meanings to consider. Situation (1) may occur because (a) the individual parts of the statement do not fulfill any semantic function (they do not mean or refer to anything) or because (b) the parts mean something, but *X* doesn't know what.

The author of the statement is responsible for the situation (1a), and the allegation of incomprehensibility is justified. The same is the case for (2). On the other hand, the responsibility for (1b) lies with *X*, that is, the reader/listener, who should acquire specific knowledge if he wants to understand the statement. Thus, it is clear that the incomprehensibility (i.e. obscurity) of a given statement is not always the failing of the author of the statement (Jadacki 2018, p. 29). However, there is still the problem of the relationship between the clarity of speech and the philosophical style. As mentioned, adherents of different philosophical styles may have different judgments about a particular statement's clarity. Thus, adherents of a certain philosophical style may find that the parts of a given statement fulfill semantic functions, while adherents of a different philosophical style may find that these parts do not fulfill these functions.

Taking into account the above-presented arguments in the discussion on the clarity of philosophical statements, one could try to transform Twardowski's recommendation (3) as follows:

(13) A competent reader who represents a particular philosophical style (in the sense of how philosophy is practiced) has no obligation to try to understand an obscure text representing the same philosophical style.

This reformulated recommendation takes into account Ingarden's arguments pointing to the dependence of the work's clarity on the reader's competence. It also takes into account the fact that the reader does not have direct access to the author's thoughts, and the relationship between the statement and the world is more important to him. Recommendation (13) may still seem too radical to some but seems acceptable to those who value clarity highly. Most of them will probably be inclined to think similarly to Władysław Tatarkiewicz, who wrote that by giving up reading obscure books, he might sometimes lose something, but more often, he gains (Tatarkiewicz 1979, p. 176; cf. Jadacki 2018, p. 37).

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8. Ingarden's and Blaustein's Theories of the Image

The aim of this chapter is (1) to reconstruct the theories of the image proposed by Leopold Blaustein and created by Roman Ingarden, (2) to present the dispute between Blaustein and Ingarden about the priority of created concepts, and (3) to identify possible influences: Blaustein on Ingarden and Ingarden on Blaustein.

1. Leopold Blaustein's and Roman Ingarden's theories of the image – reconstruction

1.1. Objects considered in both theories and relations between these objects

1.1.1. The theory of Leopold Blaustein

The starting point of Blaustein's theory is the statement that, apart from reproductive and productive presentations, there are also imaginative presentations. Imaginative presentations are the key to explaining the psychology of those dealing with fine (visual) art works (e.g. paintings and sculptures), and theatrical and cinematic works. Blaustein introduces the term „imaginative presentation” with the analysis limited to objects from the visual sphere.

The basic objects we deal with in Blaustein's theory are:

(1) a reproducing object, i.e. a work of art, e.g. a painting, a sculpture, a theatrical performance, a film, or photography, but also, e.g. a mirror.

(2) the viewer – the perceptor of the reproducing object.

The perceptor, looking at the reproducing object, imaginatively presents certain objects to himself. Various attitudes are possible. The difference

between these attitudes is that the recipient can interpret the objects as different subjects, namely:

(3) an imaginative object, i.e. an object located “in” the image, in some peculiar world,

(4) a reproduced object – an object that once really existed.

This is possible due to the fact that the content presenting the item to us fulfills the functions of its appearance (Blaustein 1930a, p. 9).

And so, for example, in the case of a reproducing object: Wyspiański’s pastel titled “Helenka:”



we can intend – depending on our attitude – as an imaginative object, that is, the depicted girl “in” the painting, or as a reproduced object – that is, a real woman – Wyspiański’s daughter, Helena, who lived from 1895-1971.

1.1.2 *The theory of Roman Ingarden*

The basic objects we deal with in Ingarden’s theory are:

- (1) a picture₁ or painting,
- (2) a viewer – the perceptor of the painting.

Color spots spread on the surface of the painting are the basis for visual perceptive reconstructed appearances. The painting determines the reconstructed appearances (Ingarden 1946a, p. 70). Through these reconstructed appearances, the objects depicted in the painting are intentionally designated (Ingarden 1946a, p. 26) and presented. The perceptor in the right attitude reconstructs the picture₂ on the basis of the sense data (Ingarden 1946a, p. 26) and this constitutes its concretization, i.e. an aesthetic object.

The painting (picture₁) is the condition for the existence of picture₂, the existential foundation (Ingarden 1946a, p. 70) of the picture₂. While a painting (picture₁) is a real thing, a picture₂ is composed of strata (*Schichten*):

- (a) appropriately shaped color spots,
- (b) a reconstructed appearance showing the item presented,
- (c) presented objects:
 - (c₁) an object visually depicted in the painting,
 - (c₂) a literary topic, which is the life situation presented “in the picture” (optional stratum),
 - (c₃) a historical theme, i.e. a historical situation presented “in the picture” (optional stratum).

Ingarden also considered (d) reproduced objects, i.e. objects that exist or once existed in reality, transcendent to the picture₂ and no longer strata of the picture₂. These objects are of three kinds and are respectively represented by (c₁), (c₂), and (c₃). They are:

- (d₁) a reconstructed object (person, thing), i.e. once actually existing,
- (d₂) a recreated life situation, i.e. once actually existing,
- (d₃) a reconstructed historical situation, i.e. once actually existing.

Note that: Ingarden's painting corresponds to Blaustein's reproducing object, Ingarden's objects (c₁), (c₂), and (c₃) – Blaustein's imaginative object, objects (d₁), (d₂), and (d₃) – Blaustein's reproduced object.

Ingarden distinguishes (c₁) from (c₂) and (c₃) due to their ontological categories – (c₁) is the presented person or thing, and (c₂), (c₃) are presented situations. The ontological category is similarly distinguished between (d₁) (person, thing) and (d₂), (d₃) (situations). Ingarden uses the word “object” in two different senses. We will use “object” to designate an object of any ontological category (e.g. a thing, a person, a situation) and “objects” to designate only things or persons. The table below lists the corresponding items in Blaustein's and Ingarden's theories (in parentheses, I give Polish equivalents of English terms).

Blaustein	Ingarden		
reproducing object (<i>przedmiot odtwarzający</i>)	painting (picture ₁) (<i>malowidło</i>)		
color spots, i.e. the presenting content that fulfills the role of the appearance of an imaginative object (<i>plamy barwne czyli treść prezentująca pełniącą rolę wyglądu przedmiotu imaginatywnego</i>)	color spots or the basis of appearances (<i>plamy barwne czyli podłoże wygląków</i>)		
	reconstructed appearance (<i>zrekonstruowany wygląd</i>)		
the depicted object, i.e. imaginative object (<i>przedmiot przedstawiony, czyli przedmiot imaginatywny</i>)	presented objects, that is: (<i>obiekty przedstawione, czyli:</i>)		
	presented object _s (person, thing) (<i>przedmiot przedstawiony (osoba, rzecz)</i>)	presented life situation (i.e. literary topic) (<i>sytuacja życiowa przedstawiona (czyli temat literacki)</i>)	presented historical situation (i.e. historical topic) (<i>sytuacja historyczna przedstawiona (czyli temat historyczny)</i>)
a reproduced object, i.e. an object that once actually existed (<i>przedmiot odtworzony, czyli realnie kiedyś istniejący</i>)	reproduced objects, that is: (<i>obiekty odtworzone, czyli:</i>)		
	a reproduced object _s , that is, once actually existing (person, thing) (<i>przedmiot odtworzony, czyli kiedyś realnie istniejący (osoba, rzecz)</i>)	life situation reproduced, that is once actually existing (<i>sytuacja życiowa odtworzona czyli kiedyś realnie istniejąca ewentualnie</i>)	historical situation reproduced, i.e. once actually existing (<i>sytuacja historyczna odtworzona, czyli kiedyś realnie istniejąca</i>)
–	concretization of an image, i.e. an aesthetic object (<i>konkretyzacja obrazu czyli przedmiot estetyczny</i>)		
–	title of painting/picture ₂ (<i>tytuł malowidła/obrazu₂</i>)		

1.2. The problem of places of indeterminacy and their filling in

Blaustein states that „the appearance needs to be completed from the invisible side” (Blaustein 1930a, p. 37). Usually it presents only one side of the item; the other can be filled in freely (*ibid.*). He considers a situation in which he sees a house from the front and envisions for example, the color of the roof from the back. In „Imaginative Presentations” we read: “I can freely envision these properties and a whole range of others, and in this way a whole range of different objects will arise which I can contemplate” (Blaustein 1930a, p. 37).

And similarly in Ingarden's works: the “back side” of the thing depicted in the painting is not precisely and in every respect defined by appearance (Ingarden 1946a, p. 11). Ingarden uses the term “place of indeterminacy.” Both the appearance and the object depicted (whether in a literary work or in a painting) have various places of indeterminacy (*ibid.*; cf. also Ingarden 1960, p. 321) that we fill in¹⁶⁵ and are therefore schematic objects. Picture₂, composed of these strata, is also a schematic object.

The difference between Blaustein and Ingarden is that Blaustein believes that “the intentional object of imaginative representation is unambiguously determined to me by appearance and is one and only one” (Blaustein 1930a, p. 37). He states that the view according to which one can intend to different imaginative or reproduced objects through one static appearance is wrong. There are as many worlds of imaginative objects as there are paintings, photographs, reflections in mirrors, *etc.* (Blaustein 1930a, p. 19). In Blaustein, therefore, we are dealing with one reproducing and one imaginative object. The “same” Venus of Milo is the intentional object of the imaginative acts of all the people looking at her (Blaustein 1930a, p. 47-48). Ingarden, on the other hand, believes that the painting is one and the picture₂ is one (so here we have – as one might suppose – an unambiguous determination), but as a result of various additions of different viewers, various concretizations of the picture₂ (i.e. aesthetic objects) arise. So we have: one painting, one picture₂ and many of its concretizations.

It is worth mentioning – regarding additions – that, according to Blaustein, the perceptor of the work complements the properties and leaves [...] the area of imaginative representations, resorting to the help of reproductive and productive images or concepts (in Polish: “wyobrażen i pojęć”)

¹⁶⁵ Cf. (Ingarden 1946a, p. 192).

(Blaustein 1930a, p. 37). Ingarden will say analogously about a literary work of art – that the reader, filling in the places of indeterminacy, “goes beyond what exists in the text (or is determined by the text)” (Ingarden 1922, p. 323).

1.3. Properties of reproducing object – paintings and imaginative objects – presented objects

Blaustein states that the reproducing object is a real, temporal and spatial thing given in perception. On the other hand, imaginative objects are intentional objects that are not perceived, but grasped in a certain act. These objects are not elements of the real world, they are only quasi-real, quasi-temporal and quasi-spatial, i.e. they are not temporal or spatial, but behave like temporal and spatial objects. Imaginative objects in a given picture do not have any spatial and temporal relations to real objects (Blaustein 1930a, p. 19) (we feel a «precipe» between them (Blaustein 1930a, p. 20), but they are in quasi-spatial relations with each other (Blaustein 1930a, p. 23). Blaustein was the first to investigate the relationship between imaginative objects and time and space.

The Ingarden's analyses presented in *The Literary Work of Art* (1931) and “On the Structure of the Painting” (1946) [On the Structure of a Picture] are analogous. A painting is a real, produced thing, created out of a certain material, and given in simple perception. Objects depicted in the picture (things, people, events, processes) are not real, physical objects (Ingarden 1946a, p. 60), but they seem real (Ingarden 1946a, p. 60)¹⁶⁶; they are intentional objects. They are not perceived, but are grasped in a complex act. The picture₂ is a purely intentional object (Ingarden 1946a, p. 72). The real space and the space presented in a literary work of art are completely separate spaces and “there is no spatial transition between them.” (Ingarden 1922, p. 289). It is the same in the case of a visual work of art (a painting) – we are dealing with different spaces (Ingarden 1946, p. 10).

¹⁶⁶ Cf. “The objects presented in a literary work of art have the external *habitus* of reality. [...] They undergo modification of being – «pretense», «allegedly», «quasi»” (Ingarden 1922, p. 285–286),

1.4. The problem of spatial orientation

Blaustein notes that “my body is crucial, central to my understanding of spatial relations” (Blaustein 1930a, p. 17) – something is behind me, in front of me, next to me. In the case of the grasp of imaginative objects, the body is “projected” into the imaginative world, in some way one is in this world and in a specific place of this world (and one can precisely define the place into which it projects itself; it is the place where, e.g. a painter or photographer stood (Blaustein 1930a, p. 18). “I am there, though invisible” (*ibid.*).

This conviction can also be found in Ingarden's work *The Literary Work of Art* – the perceiving subject is the center of the space orientation, is the beginning of the frame of reference, and the objects presented are shown from the certain point of view of an invisible person. The reader of a literary work or the perceptor of a picture₂ can “directly gain insight into the space represented, and thus to some extent bridge the gap between the two separate spaces” (Ingarden 1922, p. 290). In the case of a picture₂, however, sometimes we „imaginarily travel *via* the image to a given point in space” (Ingarden 1946a, p. 60).

1.5. The problem of representation

Blaustein asks whether the intention goes directly to the reconstructed objects or through imaginative objects. In the latter case – the reproduced object would be represented by the imaginative – however, Blaustein does not resolve this problem¹⁶⁷. According to Blaustein, the relation of representation takes place – as we may suppose – between the reproducing and the reproduced objects. On the other hand, in Ingarden's theory, the representation relation, which is based on the reproduction function, occurs between the presented and the reproduced objects.

When we look at Blaustein's theory of imaginative object and Ingarden's theory of literary work and a work of painting, we see many similarities between these theories. As a result, questions arise as to (1) which of the theory came first, and (2) who referred to whom – Blaustein to Ingarden or Ingarden to Blaustein.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. (Blaustein 1930a, p. 29).

2. Blaustein – Ingarden: a dispute over priority

In numerous statements, both Blaustein and Ingarden wish to demonstrate the priority of their own conception over that of their opponent. Let us begin with Ingarden's statements: In a footnote to the first German edition of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (1931) by Roman Ingarden, we read:

L. Blaustein, ein Schüler von K. Twardowski und mir, hat sich mit diesel Erfassungserlebnissen beschäftigt und rechnet sie den von ihm so genannten „imaginativen Vorstellungen“ zu. (Vgl. *Imaginative Presentations*, Lvov 1930). Die Arbeit erscheint eben, wo ich die letzten Korrekturen des Textes vor der Ablieferung des Manuskripts durchführe (Ingarden 1931, p. 329)¹⁶⁸.

These words can also be found in the subsequent German editions of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (in the second – 1960, the third – 1965, the fourth – 1972)¹⁶⁹. On the other hand, in the first Polish edition of this book, *O dziele literackim* (1960), the above mentioned footnote is longer and also includes the words:

I must emphasize that L. Blaustein was well aware of my concept of a literary work, as I presented it for the first time in my university lectures in Lvov in the spring of 1927 (Ingarden 1960, p. 397).

Ingarden writes about lectures he attended in University in Lvov in the third trimester of academic year 1926/1927 titled: “On the Literary Work of Art. Philosophical Foundations of Theory of literature.”

In the preface of the Polish edition of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, we can also read:

¹⁶⁸ English translation: “L. Blaustein, a student of K. Twardowski and mine, dealt with these experiences of appreciation and included them among what he termed „imaginative presentations (Cf. *Imaginative Presentations*, Lvov 1930). This work appeared at the time of the last revisions of this book.”

¹⁶⁹ It is interesting, that in the English edition of *The Literary Work of Art*, the above mentioned footnote is shorter: “L. Blaustein, a student of K. Twardowski and myself, concerned himself with these apprehending experiences and included them among what he called «imaginal representations.» Cf. his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* (Lvov, 1930)” (Ingarden 1973, pp. 319-320).

The primary Polish scholar who in significant, but various ways, referred to *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, was Leopold Blaustein, murdered by the Germans, who in a number of dissertations tried to either supplement some of my research, or applied this method of research to other related fields. [underlining – A.H.] At the same time strongly influenced by Kazimierz Twardowski, he psychologized much of his research and considered himself its continuator (Ingarden 1960, p. 15).

What is also significant is what Ingarden wrote in his *Diary* on April 13th, 1933. After Radosław Kuliniak's and Mariusz Pandura's book, Ingarden wrote:

I have repeatedly had bad experiences in which people to whom I introduced my philosophical views in a friendly conversation later announced them to be theirs, and in addition, those who were confronted regarding this matter „could not «remember» the conversation” referred to. Such was the case with Blaustein in more than one case (cf. Kuliniak, Pandura 2019, p. 500, footnote 103)¹⁷⁰.

It is also worth noting that in “Memoirs of Philosophers Who Died in Years 1939-1945, Ingarden writes about Blaustein:

Leopold Blaustein, together with his wife Eugenia *de domo* Ginsberg, belonged to the last generation of Twardowski's students; they were also educated under the theoretical influences of Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden (Ingarden 1946).

As we can see, Ingarden himself points out that Blaustein was under his influence. What's more – even in the first footnote to *On the Structure of the Painting*, Ingarden intended to inform the reader that his considerations on the structure of the painting had already been contained in § 71 – the last chapter of the typescript of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, written in January 1928 in Paris (that is – let us note, before the 1930 edition of Blaustein's work *Imaginative Presentations*). Ingarden wrote, that § 71 was not published in 1931 for technical reasons. Anyway – let us add – §§ 69-72 were

¹⁷⁰ It is a citation from Ingarden's *Memoirs*, that is “Black Notebook” with poems, 13th April 1933.

never published as a part of *The Literary Work of Art*, which invariably has 68 sections. § 71 was published in 1946 and was titled “On the Structure of the Painting: A Sketch in the Theory of Art” (Ingarden 1946a). In the edition from 1966 the content of “On the Structure of the Painting” was significantly expanded (Ingarden 1966, p. 7, footnote 1).

What Ingarden claims is that:

(a) Blaustein’s works on presentations (starting with the work *Imaginative Presentations*) are a continuation of Ingarden’s idea outlined in *Das literarische Kunstwerk*.

(b) Blaustein preaches the statements he heard from Ingarden as his own, claiming that they are a continuation of Twardowski’s thought.

(c) Blaustein is theoretically influenced by Ingarden and applies Ingarden’s solutions to other related fields of art.

Now let’s go to Blaustein. Blaustein points out the priority of his concept over Ingarden’s in three different reviews of Ingarden’s *Das literarische Kunstwerk*: (Blaustein 1931), (Blaustein 1932), and (Blaustein 1935-1937).

In the first and second reviews, Blaustein indicates the foundations and contributions to the multi-strata nature of a literary work that existed before Ingarden’s theory. Among these bases and contributions, Blaustein lists:

(1) The distinction (by Twardowski, Husserl, and Meinong) of the act, content, and object of the presentation and judgment, and the related distinction between the expression and the object designated by it. As we can read:

[These ideas] allowed one [...] to distinguish primarily the stratum of linguistic symbols, i.e. the text, from the stratum of meanings, which was usually understood as the corresponding psychological experiences of the author and the reader, and both of these strata from the stratum of intentional objects of these experiences, i.e. from the real world of people and events, which is referred to in the literary work of art (Blaustein 1931, p. 453).

(2) Works by Juliusz Kleiner, Eugeniusz Kucharski and Waldemar Conrad. It is especially important to recall the works of Juliusz Kleiner. In our opinion – only Kleiner can be considered the proper creator of the strata theory of a literary work of art. In the first paragraph of his work, “Content and Form in Poetry” published in 1922, we read:

The essential feature of each poem is a clear (at least apparently clear) two-strata structure [emphasis – A.H.]; the whole consists of a set of words

and a set of meanings; as a reaction to the work, two groups of presentations arise (Kleiner 1922, p. 323)¹⁷¹.

(3) His own views:

The author [...] of this review tried to render probable the thesis that among the three strata of a literary work of art, the most important is the startum of intentional objects, determined and defined in a fragmentary and schematic way by a psychologically understood stratum of meanings, also incompletely and ambiguously determined by the stratum of signs (Blaustein 1931, p. 453).

In all of his reviews, Blaustein points out that Ingarden's concept of objects presented in a literary work is analogous to his concept of an imaginative object:

The author discovers in this field [the strata of objects and schematized appearances – add. A.H.], analogous to the imaginative objects existing in the world [emphasis – A.H.], which indicates a deeper relationship between literature and the plastic arts (Blaustein 1931, p. 454).

The results obtained by the author on the quasi-reality of these objects and on the time and space in which these objects are located, time perspectives and the role of the so-called orientation center, indicate, due to the significant similarities between these objects and imaginative objects [emphasis – A.H.], a deeper relationship between fiction and fine arts, theater, cinema, *etc.*, in contrast to, for example, architecture and music (Blaustein 1935-37, p. 101b).

Analogies with imaginative objects are also visible in the analysis of the functions of representation and reproduction.

Blaustein is convinced that:

(1) his concept of imaginative objects is primary to that of Ingarden's literary work

(2) his theory of the imaginative object was "transplanted" by Ingarden into belles-lettres and other arts.

¹⁷¹ The fact that Ingarden knew this work by Kleiner is evidenced very well by the footnote on p. 9 of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*. Cf. (Ingarden 1931, p. 8, footnote 1).

Blaustein's reviews of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* prove that Blaustein's and Ingarden's points of view toward structure and the mode of existence of a literary work of art are completely different. In Blaustein's third review of Ingarden's book (a review published in *Ruch Filozoficzny* 1935-1937, Blaustein writes, that according to Ingarden:

[Sound entities] are nothing real. They are also not ideal, self-existing, autonomous objects [...]. The meanings of words, sentences, and the relations between sentences that make up the second stratum of a literary work of art are the products of subjective operations. They exist neither really as specifically experienced psychic «contents,» nor ideally as ideal meanings (Blaustein 1935-37, p. 99a).

And next:

On the basis of the above characteristics of particular strata, it becomes understandable that the author considers the entire literary work of art to be purely intentional, having a non-self-existent being" (Blaustein 1935-37, p. 99b).

It seems that the epistemology of literary studies would have encountered considerable difficulties if it had relied on the author's concept (Blaustein 1935-37, p.100b).

Until the author completes his ontology of the literary work with a convincing epistemology, his assumptions may give the reader the impression of multiplying beings against which he does not yet know how to state whether they exist or not (*ibid.*, p. 101a).

Many readers will use Occam's razor as a criterion for resolving these doubts [...] (*ibid.*).

Finally, Blaustein presents his own concept of a literary work – as an autonomous object:

Such a way to save the subjective identity of a literary work of art, which does not require these metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, is perhaps claiming that a literary work of art is a system of sentences of a certain language created thanks to the subjective operations of the creator and preserved in writing or otherwise, and accepting the thesis that a reader who is orientated in (nastawiony na) this language and who understands the

sentences of this language, grasps the fictional world intentionally determined by these sentences. The identity of this world, as grasped by various readers, is guaranteed by the isomorphism of sentences that are given to them and the fact that, while focusing on a given language, they understand these sentences in accordance with the same directives. Where these directives take place, various interpretations of given sentences or relations between sentences arise, but all readers grasp the same fictive world [...] Also, from this standpoint, one should distinguish the stratum of signs (phonetic entities or their visual artifacts) and stratum of meanings, which the reader does not grasp in the normal attitude when grasping intentionally and directly the stratum of objects, some of which are sometimes given in appearances (Blaustein 1935-37, p. 101a-101b).

As we can see, Blaustein does not accept Ingarden's metaphysical and epistemological assumptions – including that the literary work of art is to be a purely intentional entity. He maintains that the basic strata of an autonomous literary work of art is a stratum of written sentences of a certain language.

3. Attempts at settling the dispute – further arguments

The decisive factor in the matter of determining the priority of one theory over the other is the time of its creation. What do we know about this?

(1) Firstly, in the introduction to his work, *Imaginative Presentation. A Study on the Borderline of Psychology and Aesthetics* (1930) Blaustein writes:

The content of the following arguments was included in essential outline in my two speeches, delivered on May 15, 1925, and May 21, 1926, at the Philosophical Conservatory of Academic Youth in Lvov, and in the speech delivered at the first Congress of Philosophical Circles of Students of Polish Universities in Warsaw in September 1927. This dissertation was established in the Philosophical Seminar of Prof. Twardowski in 1926 (Blaustein 1930a, p. 6, footnote 1).

Unfortunately, Twardowski's *Diaries* do not cover the period from June 26, 1918, to November 10, 1925. Therefore, we will not find in them confirmation that Blaustein delivered the first speech on imaginative

presentations on May 15, 1925. The confirmation that Blaustein's dissertation was written in Twardowski's seminar conducted by Kazimierz Twardowski on Fridays in the third trimester of the 1925/1926 academic year can be found in Twardowski's *Diaries*. We read there:

Friday, May 21st, 1926. [...] In the evening – seminar. Blaustein's speech on imaginative presentations.

Friday, May 28th, 1926. [...] In the evening – seminar with a discussion on Blaustein's speech on imaginative presentations.

Friday, June 4th, 1926. [...] In the evening – seminar with the continuation and conclusion of the discussion on Blaustein's speech (Twardowski, pp. 245-247).

As to the First Congress of Philosophical Circles of Students of Polish Universities in Warsaw, mentioned by Blaustein, it began – as we read in Twardowski's *Diaries* – on Monday, September 19th, 1927, at 10 am. On the same day, Blaustein had a lecture on the problems contained in Kazimierz Twardowski's dissertation *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* (1894). Let us mention that immediately after that Congress of Philosophical Circles, which ended on September 22, on September 23, the Second Polish Philosophical Congress began in Warsaw, in which Blaustein was a participant (in the discussion), and Ingarden did not attend.

(2) Secondly, Blaustein had been dealing with presentations – and primarily with imaginative presentations – since 1924. This is evidenced in a letter written by Blaustein to Twardowski on September 1st, 1930, from Lvov, in which we read:

With the end of this dissertation [it is about the work *Schematic and Symbolic Presentations* – add. A.H.] my work seems to end in the field of presentations, begun in September 1924, i.e. six years ago, which resulted in four dissertations and seven readings in this field of psychology (Twardowski 1930, p. 1).

If Blaustein's work *Imaginative Presentations* was ready in 1926, and – as Ingarden writes – Blaustein learned about literary works from Ingarden in the spring of 1927, then Blaustein's concept of imaginative objects was prior to Ingarden's concept of a literary work. However, the following facts should be noted:

(1) Although Blaustein's work *Imaginative Presentations* was ready in 1926, it was not published until 1930, i.e. four years later. Before publication of that work, Blaustein's PhD thesis had been published. Before January 26th, 1928 – two years after completing the work *Imaginative Presentations* – Blaustein learned from Twardowski that he would have to wait another two years for the publication of *Imaginative Presentations*. In a letter to Twardowski of January 26, 1928, Blaustein writes:

The news that "Imaginative Presentations" will be published in the fourth volume of „*P[rzeгляд] F[ilozoficzny]*” so in two years, depresses me enormously (Blaustein 1928, p. 6).

It is worth mentioning that Blaustein's article *Imaginative Presentations* had been edited by Twardowski. Twardowski writes in his *Diaries*:

Tuesday, February 25th, 1930, [...] Not until from half past 5 to 8 o'clock was I «working,» but again this work consists in preparing Blaustein's paper for edition! (Twardowski 1997, p. 287).

(2) In the second footnote to his work *Imaginative Presentations*, Blaustein writes:

The following arguments owe more than one improvement to valuable comments from Prof. Twardowski as well as Prof. Ajdukiewicz, Doc. Ingarden, and my university colleagues for which I would like to express my deepest thanks here (Blaustein 1930b, p. 6 footnote 2).

It follows from this statement that Roman Ingarden knew Blaustein's dissertation even before its publication, and – as we may believe – before writing *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, however it is impossible to determine which fragments of Blaustein's work owe their improvement to Ingarden.

Roman Ingarden started courses at the Jan Kazimierz University in the 1925/1926 academic year. In the same academic year, he became the chairman of the Section for the Theory of Cognition of the Polish Philosophical Society, whose meetings were attended by Blaustein.

(3) In the Archives of PAU in Cracow, there are five documents relevant to our problem. They are, chronologically:

(3.1) “Conversation about a Literary Work of Art” – this is a manuscript in the form of notebook dated on – as Ingarden declares – 1918. This is a dialogue of several people about how a literary work exists – whether it is real or ideal. This proves Ingarden’s interest in the literary work of art as early as 1918 (Ingarden 1918).

(3.2) The typescript (in Polish) *O dziele literackim* [On a Literary Work of Art] – as Ingarden writes on the first page – from 1922 (*sic!*) (Ingarden 1922).

In this work, Ingarden wishes to „convince readers that there are a number of questions regarding a literary work,” (Ingarden 1922, p. 1) such questions as: Is there one work, for example, *The Peasants* of Władysław Reymont, or is there a greater number of them? What are not the elements of a literary work? What are the elements of it? It must be emphasized that this typescript contains an outline of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*. Ingarden touches on:

(a) the problem of the strata of a literary work of art. Ingarden writes, i.a. that a literary work of art is composed of various strata, including the verbal medium and meanings;

(b) the problem of distinguishing real objects (independent from the subject of cognition and from the literary work of art) from quasi-real objects which are only an intentional equivalent of presumptions in the work;

(c) the problem of undetermined places. According to Ingarden, features of intentional objects are not fully determined and there is a certain sphere of freedom in reproducing and reading the work.

Although on the first page of this typescript we can read: “Toruń 1922” we are not convinced that this typescript came into being in 1922. There is no proof of that in Ingarden’s correspondence.

(3.3) The Parisian typescript (in German) of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* from 1928, containing the appendix “Ausblick auf Kunstwerke anderer Typen,” in §§ 69–72. § 70 – is devoted to a musical work of art. § 71 consists of 37 pages (520–556) and is devoted to a painting, §72 – to an architectural work of art.

(3.4) Two of Ingarden’s responses to Blaustein’s reviews of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (1932), responses that were never published, and which Ingarden wanted to publish in the *Polskie Archiwum Psychologii*, edited by Stefan Baley. Baley refused to publish them. Ingarden is outraged by Blaustein’s reviews. He writes that Blaustein’s review gives the impression that:

- (a) the concept and the entire problem of a literary work of art as a multi-strata entity were well known before publication of Ingarden's work,
 (b) Ingarden only systematically developed these problems.

According to Ingarden – this is false. It was he – Ingarden – who was the first to ask the questions and come up with a comprehensive original solution. His – Ingarden's – concept is independent of Blaustein's. In response, Ingarden describes the whole situation as follows:

1. Since autumn 1925 Mr. Blaustein was my student at university.

2. In October 1925 [emphasis – A.H.] I presented to Mr. B. my concept of the strata structure of a literary work of art in its main outlines. [...]

I have never hidden from Mr. B. my unpublished scientific concept. [...]

3. Mr. B.'s readings took place on November 5th and December 3rd, 1926, so over a year later after our just-mentioned conversation and a half a year after I had proposed a lecture on the structure of a literary work of art at Lvov University. I actually delivered these lectures afterwards in the summer trimester of 1927. [...]

I am not saying that Mr. B.'s readings were based on my concept of a literary work of art. I am only saying that Mr. B. neglected to point out that at the time of delivering these readings he was familiar with my concept of a literary work of art. [...]

In February or March 1926 during my philosophical exercises at the Jan Kazimierz University, I initiated a discussion on the construction of an image. It took two meetings and led to results very similar to those reported by B. regarding imaginative objects. Mr. B. participated in the discussion and showed a considerable degree of knowledge of the relevant problems. Therefore, I am not saying that Mr. B. created the concepts of imaginative objects on the basis of my exercises. I am only against such a presentation of things by Mr. B. which gives the impression that my views on this matter depend on his arguments on this subject (Ingarden 1932, second reply).

As I mentioned above, Stefan Baley – the editor of the journal *Polskie Archiwum Psychologii* – refused to publish Ingarden's reply to Blaustein's review. Ingarden called the whole thing – Blaustein's review and Baley's refusal to publish a reply – “disgusting” (Ingarden 1933).

4. Conclusions

The conclusion is that Blaustein's concept of an imaginary object came into being before Ingarden's concepts of a literary work of art and painting. However, it is rather difficult to talk about the influences of Ingarden's thought upon Blaustein's thought and *vice versa*. These two theories came into being independently of each other. The scope of inspirations of these two philosophers is wide and includes, amongst other things, the works of: Kazimierz Twardowski, Edmund Husserl, Julius Kleiner, Eugeniusz Kucharski, Waldemar Conrad and Władysław Witwicki.

Numerous facts show that Blaustein was not a phenomenologist. He did not follow the results of Roman Ingarden's research, although he sometimes cited them. Blaustein was not Ingarden's continuator. What's more – he criticized Husserl's and Ingarden's theories dozens of times. Ingarden himself contributed to the recognition of Blaustein as his – Roman Ingarden's – continuator, as was the case with Zygmunt Łempicki.

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- Abbreviations: APAU – Archive of PAN and PAU in Cracow; CKT – Kazimierz Twardowski Scientific Correspondence; AKT – Digital Archive of Kazimierz Twardowski of Connected Libraries of WFiS, IFiS PAN and PTF in Warsaw.
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9. A Revision of the Psychological Trend of the Lvov-Warsaw School? On the Reception of Ingarden's Phenomenology in Blaustein

1. Introduction

The chapter examines some topics present in Leopold Blaustein's (1905-1942 [or 1944]) writings by juxtaposing them with Roman Ingarden's (1893-1970) philosophy. Blaustein was student, as well as critic and interpreter of Ingarden. At the same time, Blaustein – who was educated by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) – is regarded as a member of the Lvov-Warsaw School¹⁷². Given this, by exploring the Blaustein-Ingarden discussions, I address the problem of Ingarden's presence in the Lvov-Warsaw School. I do not claim that Blaustein's philosophy or the Lvov-Warsaw School was determined, or influenced by Ingarden. I suggest that some topics are present in both theories. Accordingly, my ultimate aim is to define these elements of Blaustein's theory which seem to be connected to critiques of and discussions with Ingarden's philosophy. The reason for juxtaposing both philosophies has first of all a historical nature and refers to biographies of both thinkers. Let me first shed more light on these biographies.

Ingarden began his studies in Lvov in 1911, yet after one semester he decided to move to Göttingen¹⁷³. There he planned to study under Georg Elias Müller (1850-1934), an experimental psychologist, but he felt dissatisfied with the style of lecturing by Müller and he joined lectures held by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Later, already in Freiburg i. Br., in 1918 Ingarden defended his doctoral dissertation on Bergson. After his return

¹⁷² Cf. e.g. (Woleński 1985, pp. 13, 352).

¹⁷³ Ingarden's biography before 1938 is presented in (Kuliniak, Pandura 2019).

to Poland he taught in schools in Lublin, Warsaw and Toruń. This period ended in 1925 when Ingarden published his habilitation on the essential questions and began his job at the John Casimir University in Lvov. Ingarden, however, did not get a chair until 1933¹⁷⁴. Before that happened, namely since 1927 he gave classes on the literary work of art and in 1931 he published a summary of these classes and his studies on this topic in *The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature*. In 1934-1939 Ingarden held a seminar on aesthetics which concerned the phenomenology of the aesthetic experience. His studies on this topic were published in § 24 of Polish edition of *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* (Ingarden 1937, pp. 175-218). After his move to Cracow in 1944, Ingarden developed his aesthetic theory by introducing new topics, such as the concept of the encounter with the artwork, or the idea of a situation for describing the aesthetic experience¹⁷⁵. This, however, is not my concern here. Instead let me go back to the Lvov period. While being in Lvov already in 1925, Ingarden met a 12-years younger talented student – Blaustein. The latter started his studies in Lvov probably in 1923. Importantly, just as Ingarden before him, Blaustein had an occasion to study directly under Husserl since he spent few weeks during the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg i. Br. At that time, Husserl lectured on the phenomenological psychology. With the supervision of Twardowski, Blaustein had written a doctoral dissertation on Husserl's theory of the act and content. The work was published later in 1928¹⁷⁶. On the basis on his early account of Husserl's theory, Blaustein developed later original research on the aesthetic experience as a whole composed of so-called imaginative presentations. In the 1930s, he was no longer interested in theoretical basis of aesthetics, but rather he examined concrete types of aesthetic experiences, including the phenomenon of listening to the radio, watching a movie in a cinema, or a theater play (Blaustein 2005, Rosińska 2013, Płotka 2020b). Since 1925 until Blaustein's death, he met Ingarden very often and they held a permanent philosophical discussion. Ingarden wrote about this period in the following way:

¹⁷⁴ On Ingarden's attempt to get a chair in Lvov, cf. (Ingarden 1999a), (Jadczak 1994), (Jadczak 1999).

¹⁷⁵ On these developments cf. e.g. (Ingarden 1975).

¹⁷⁶ On Blaustein's position in the context of early phenomenology in Poland, cf. (Płotka 2017).

I met Blaustein personally in the fall of 1925 when I began lecturing at the Jan Kazimierz University. Blaustein was a young man at the time; he began his third year of university studies, but he was indeed mature and advanced in his studies; you could discuss with him as with a friend. Therefore, from his first visits to me, in September 1925, until the outbreak of the war, we saw each other almost every day, when he was still listening to my lectures and attending my classes, and later a seminar, or at the meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society, or finally, in the last years before the war, at the aesthetic seminar that I held from 1934 until the outbreak of the war. But we also saw each other privately at many of the philosophical exchanges in my house (Ingarden 1963, p. 87).

Given the fact that both philosophers considered similar topics, it should come as no surprise that in the scholarly literature one finds a thesis that Blaustein was influenced by Ingarden. The fact was noted by Jan Woleński (1985, p. 310, fn. 11), or Robert T. Ptaszek (2011, p. 120). Bohdan Dziemidok (1980, p. 178) wrote more on these influences in the field of aesthetics. It is beyond any doubt that Blaustein formulated his original philosophy in a permanent dialogue, as well as in polemic with Ingarden (Płotka 2020b, p. 180). Yet, the question to what extent this dialogue and polemic shaped Blaustein's theory remains open. In this chapter, I will defend a thesis that Blaustein discussed with Ingarden not only in the field of aesthetics. To show this, in Sect. 2 I address the question whether it is justified to call Blaustein an "analytic phenomenologist" and if so, to what extent one has to understand this label. Next, in Sect. 3, I present the critique of eidetic phenomenology that was formulated by Blaustein in the same time as he began his studies on aesthetics. This presentation will show, as it seems, different approaches to phenomenology as an eidetic discipline (Ingarden) and as descriptive psychology (Blaustein). In Sect. 4, I discuss the basics of Blaustein's analysis of Husserl's theory of content. In doing so, I suggest that the main argument against the theory Blaustein borrowed from Ingarden's philosophy and his analysis of sensations in lived experiences. In the last main part of the paper, Sect. 5, I attempt to juxtapose the aesthetic theories developed by both philosophers. At that point, I will indicate both similarities and clear, or more vague breaks.

2. Blaustein as an “analytic phenomenologist”

As stated above, Blaustein was educated by philosophers who represent different philosophical traditions. This fact may suggest that he was influenced by those traditions, and for this reason he did link divergent approaches and used various methods. This suggestion leads some scholars to call Blaustein an “analytic phenomenologist.” But, one may ask, what does it mean that someone is an “analytic phenomenologist”? This classification is based mainly on historical-philosophical arguments. Jan Woleński (1985, p. 310, fn. 11; 2010, p. 23), for instance, calls Blaustein a “precursor of analytic phenomenology” which ought to consist in “connecting ideas of Twardowski and Husserl.” Yet, this description is enigmatic since one does not get any knowledge of which particular ideas of both philosophers are to be connected or what this “connection” supposed to mean. If one refers in this context, say, to the problem of content in Husserl – i.e. the topic of Blaustein’s doctoral dissertation and Twardowski’s habilitation thesis – this would suggest that ANY attempt to interpret Husserl’s theory of content has Twardowskian roots, what is false.

Woleński’s proposal was developed recently by Marek Pokropski who classifies Blaustein as an “analytic phenomenologist.” As he states,

The originality of Blaustein’s thinking is due to the fact that he synthesized to some extent two philosophical traditions: Twardowski’s analytical philosophy (logical and conceptual analysis) and Husserlian phenomenology (description and analysis of acts of consciousness) (Pokropski 2015, p. 94).

Pokropski adds to Woleński’s description that Blaustein connects METHODS used in both traditions, i.e. he seems to link logical analysis with the phenomenological one. The former consists in analyzing concepts, whereas the latter is focused on consciousness. Though Pokropski’s proposal is richer than Woleński’s idea, it still seems to be partial. Pokropski clarifies that “analytic phenomenology” refers to the fact that Blaustein used TWO methods, but this classification is inadequate since it does not address the originality of Blaustein’s philosophy. It has to be noted that in Blaustein’s writings logical analysis is rather marginal¹⁷⁷; it serves often as a preliminary and metaphysical tool to summarize some philosophical findings. Blaustein

¹⁷⁷ Cf. for instance, (Blaustein 1928, pp. 2, 52); (Blaustein 2005, p. 47, fn. 12).

was interested rather in object-directed descriptions of concrete psychic phenomena. Moreover, the phrase “analytic phenomenology,” which was supposed to describe phenomenology that uses conceptual analysis is misleading. Pokropski refers to a strict meaning of the term “analysis,” which comprehends analysis as logical and conceptual studies. If this is the case, the phrase “analytic phenomenology” falls into the *contradictio in adjecto* fallacy since it suggests that a philosopher should use a method inadequate to analyze phenomena; one can analyze CONCEPTS only. Importantly, Blaustein was critical of the scope of the analytic approach of the Lvov-Warsaw School – as defined by Pokropski. This is evident if one refers in this regard to a critical review of Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s (1886-1981) *The Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology of Sciences* published by Blaustein in 1930 in the journal *Przegląd Humanistyczny* (Blaustein 1930a). All in all, Pokropski’s reading, which is based on a narrow meaning of “analyticity,” is controversial.

Pokropski (2015, p. 94) notices that the attempt to comprehend Blaustein as “analytic phenomenologist” comes from Wioletta Miśkiewicz. Contrary to Pokropski, however, Miśkiewicz does not connect Blaustein with Twardowski’s analytic method, understood as logical and conceptual analysis. Miśkiewicz places Blaustein’s philosophy rather in the tradition of early descriptive phenomenology – called by her “analytic phenomenology” interchangeably – which is focused on the question of the source and value of knowledge. The key insight of this tradition, according to Miśkiewicz, consists in putting an emphasis on intentionality. Phenomenology thus understood ANALYZES intentionality and for this reason, it is justified to call phenomenology, “analytic phenomenology.” Following Miśkiewicz:

There are at least two kinds of phenomenology: hermeneutic and descriptive. The latter rests on the idea that what is given in conscious experience is direct, akin to perception – what most phenomenologist would have called “intuition” – and is therefore a genuine source of knowledge. The theories of early ANALYTICAL phenomenologists were aimed at providing an understanding of the latter. For instance, the well known distinction between the quality, the content, and the object of mental acts elaborated by Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong in the wake of Brentano was meant as a conceptual tool for the purpose of analyzing and describing cognitive processes such as “representation” and “judgment” (Miśkiewicz 2009, p. 181).

I think that Miśkiewicz's description is more adequate since it places Blaustein in the right context of the Brentanian tradition. Thus, if the phrase "analytic phenomenology" is useful at all in the context of Blaustein, it should refer to the tradition of descriptive psychology. Yet, his view of descriptive psychology was shaped in the context of phenomenology, which, as it is well known, was formulated in the discussion with Brentano's heritage. Given this, Blaustein was a member of the psychological trend of the Lvov-Warsaw School¹⁷⁸. Teresa Rzepa (1992; 1993) divides the history of psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw School into three main periods. The FIRST period goes back to 1895 when Twardowski's got a chair at the University of Lvov. In this period, Twardowski lectured on descriptive psychology and on some particular psychological topics. Moreover, he published few important works, which bear the mark of Brentano. The first period, according to Rzepa, has ended in 1901 when Władysław Witwicki (1878-1948) defended his doctoral thesis in psychology, written under Twardowski's supervision. Rzepa (1992, p. 37; 1993, p. 48) describes the SECOND period (1902-1919) as the development of psychology which "clearly organized around Twardowski's psychological views. The specific feature of that period was the work undertaken by the Master and his students to establish Polish psychological vocabulary." Importantly, during this period, Twardowski redefined his early account of descriptive psychology – e.g. he pointed out an important difference between actions and products which led him finally to overcome the ontological psychologism of his early writings (e.g. Bobryk 2009) – but he also established new original studies on descriptive psychology held by his students (e.g. Salomon Igel [1889-1942]). The THIRD period covers the years 1920-1939. During this period, Twardowski's students developed their original projects. At that time, some students of Twardowski started teaching at universities outside Lvov. This was the case of Stefan Błachowski (1889–1962) and Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski (1881-1948) who became professors in psychology in Poznań as early as 1919 (Woleński 1989, p. 10). Rzepa (1992, p. 38; 1993, p. 48) locates Blaustein's philosophy in the third period. It is justified to hold that Miśkiewicz's proposal to include Blaustein into the tradition of analytic phenomenology, i.e. the tradition which is rooted in Brentano's psychology, is adequate to read his original theory and, more importantly, to understand his polemic against Ingarden's method (Płotka 2020a). Let me look closer at this aspect of the Blaustein-Ingarden discussion.

¹⁷⁸ More on the psychological motives in Blaustein, cf. (Płotka 2020).

3. Two phenomenologies? A controversy over the method

There is no doubt that the period of Blaustein's studies in Lvov was a time of unflagging popularity of Twardowski's concept of descriptive psychology and, more generally, his view of philosophy. Blaustein valued above all a critical attitude promoted by Twardowski (e.g. Blaustein 1939). The fact that Blaustein adopted this attitude is evident if one reads his doctoral dissertation. The book consists not only in a reconstruction of Husserl's theory of content, but it presents an interesting critical assessment of it¹⁷⁹. The book is important for another reason too. It shows that Blaustein indeed developed the psychological trend of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The project of descriptive psychology, rooted in Brentano and developed by Twardowski, was indeed an important point of reference for Blaustein. Descriptive psychology is the source for Blaustein's understanding of the object of philosophy as psychic phenomena or for his emphasis put on the introspective procedure as the basis of his method. Elsewhere I have shown that the controversy over the method – descriptive psychology OR phenomenology – is an adequate framework for defining Blaustein's position within the tradition of early phenomenology in Poland, as well as within the psychological trend of the Lvov-Warsaw School (cf. Płotka 2017, p. 86; Płotka 2020a). One can find the most developed critique of eidetic phenomenology in two talks given by Blaustein in 1928 on April 28 and May 5 on the occasion of the meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society. The full text of both talks was lost, but one can follow main arguments while reading two reports published later in *Ruch Filozoficzny*.

By “phenomenology” Blaustein (1928/29, p. 164b) understood a descriptive method used to analyze ideal essences of lived experiences. All descriptions concern pure consciousness which is grasped due to the phenomenological reduction (*epoché*). Next, pure consciousness is understood here – following Husserl – as *residuum* of reduction. As such, it is the field of eidetic investigations. Yet, Blaustein asked, how does one understand the “ideal essence” here? For him, if one comprehends an essence as a general object, one falls into a series of errors and problems. In his talk given on April 28, Blaustein discussed FIVE charges in a more detail. Firstly, he referred to logical arguments. For Blaustein, if one wishes to define the phrase

¹⁷⁹ For a closer study of the evolution of Husserl's theory of content, cf. (Byrne 2020a and 2020).

“ideal essence,” one has to assume the existence of its *definiens*. This means, however, that also a whole set of properties of ideal essences are taken for granted. Yet, by doing so, one solves the problem which does not concern logic. Secondly, Blaustein formulated an epistemological argument. He held that eidetic cognition requires a specific methodological attitude, namely eidetic intuition, or seeing the essences (*Wesensschau*). This attitude, however, does not aim at its object directly, but it is based on so-called SCHEMATIC PRESENTATIONS. For Blaustein, in this form of presentations the presenting content is NOT an image of the presented object. After all, essences are not images. If so, the presenting content of eidetic intuition cannot refer to all properties of the presented object and thus, as Blaustein (1928/1929, p. 165a) puts it, “one is never be sure that the set of presented properties is adequate, nor it is impossible to differentiate adequate presentations from the inadequate ones.” Thirdly, Blaustein formulated an ontological argument. He stated that the way of “existence” of general objects is unclear. If one has to understand the way in analogy to the phenomenological “self-givenness” (*Selbstgegebenheit*), then this analogy is fallible. It is so, since eidetic intuition – according to Blaustein – has no form of perception. Fourthly, he discussed a psychological problem. Of course, he agreed that general objects are given in lived experiences, but he stated that the way of their manifestation requires further analysis. Fifthly, Blaustein referred to methodological problems. He argued that the question of existence of general objects is presupposed at the very beginning of investigations, though the question whether they REALLY exist is the problem which should be addressed before one starts investigations. All in all, Blaustein’s arguments can be summarized as follows: phenomenology – at least in its eidetic formulation – falls into the *petitio principii* fallacy.

If one would confront Husserl with these arguments, either with his *Logische Untersuchungen* or with *Ideen I*, they seem to be unjustified (cf. Płotka 2020b, pp. 172-175). Blaustein was wrong to claim that an essence is comprehended by Husserl as a hypostasis of the general object. Moreover, his description of the way of givenness of an object in intuition is inadequate. One can go even a step further and claim that Blaustein in fact misreads Husserl. The basic disagreement between both philosophers lies in the fact that Blaustein did not accept the phenomenological reduction. After all, the reduction makes the question of existence neutral. Husserl simply suspended the question. Blaustein, in turn, asked again and again about the EXISTENCE of essences. So, if Blaustein did not criticize Husserl here, one can

still argue that he engaged with a certain interpretation of the phenomenological method, namely with an interpretation that comprehends essences as EXISTING general objects. In the scholarly literature this reading was formulated by Kuliniak and others. Radosław Kuliniak, Dorota Leszczyna and Mariusz Pandura (2016, pp. 97, 114), and more recently Kuliniak and Pandura (2019, pp. 548-549), claim that Blaustein's lectures were in fact directed against Ingarden. Its aim was to weaken the position of phenomenology after Ingarden's return to Lvov; Kuliniak and others even hold that Blaustein's attack on phenomenology was to prevent Ingarden's professorship. In any case, let me go back to the core of the polemic.

It can be argued that Blaustein's critique of both eidetic intuition and the thesis about the EXISTENCE of ideal essences aimed in fact at Ingarden and his concept of phenomenology. For Ingarden, phenomenology is understood as the analysis of the content of ideas due to the act of the direct seeing of essences (*immanente Wesenerschauung*). This concept is elaborated in an article that was divided into two parts, "The Aims of Phenomenologists," originally published in 1919¹⁸⁰. Of course, Ingarden's concept of ideas is not fully clear and for this reason it can be interpreted in a few ways. This was shown, for instance, by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (1999, pp. 25-29). In spite of this ambiguity, one finds in Ingarden's text a Platonic account of ideas as "ideal objects." As he insisted, these objects do not exist either in time, nor in a real space; as such, they are unchangeable (Ingarden 1919a, p. 322). Yet, real and ideal objects refer to each other; Ingarden called this relation "embodiment." Thus, real objects "embody" the ideal ones. According to Ingarden (1919, p. 338), the cognition of ideal essences is NOT ontologically neutral; rather in the act of seeing an essence one "states the ideal existence" of relevant general objects. He also wrote about "the world of ideal objects," which is the objects of Blaustein's critique who refers to "the world of ideas." As it seems, Blaustein never did accept the view of ideas as EXISTENT and on many occasions he attacked Ingarden's concept of essences. In this regard, he claimed that one has to use "Ockham's razor" and in consequence – to exclude the existence of general objects (Blaustein 1930, p. 454; Blaustein 1935/1937, p. 101a).

To sum up this part of the chapter, it can be noted that the above presented critique of eidetic procedures enables one to understand both approaches – Blaustein and Ingarden – as two readings of phenomenology.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. (Ingarden 1919) and (Ingarden 1919a); for German edition, cf. (Ingarden 1999).

The former argued that “phenomenology is possible only as an empirical, descriptive science of types (the lowest genera) of experiences in pure consciousness, not as an *a priori*, descriptive science of higher essences as ideal objects” (Blaustein 1928/1929, p. 165b); for Blaustein, then, phenomenology is a form of descriptive psychology. By contrast, the latter understood phenomenology as the study of the content of ideas. Even if the difference between both approaches is evident – the empirical *vs.* the ideal – there is an element which seems to bridge the gap. Even if in the 1919 article Ingarden provided a Platonic concept of ideas, it is true that later he accepted an ontologically neutral approach, especially at the beginning of his analysis held as the study of the ways of givenness of the objects in experience. In a word, Ingarden, just as Husserl, investigated the “how” of the manifestation of objects¹⁸¹. If so, Ingarden’s approach is very close to Blaustein’s project. After all, especially in his later aesthetics, Blaustein (1937) pointed out the importance of studies of the ways of givenness (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of the objects in experience. For this reason, even if one can be justified in claiming that both philosophers were proponents of two different concepts of phenomenology – EMPIRICAL (Blaustein) and EIDETIC (Ingarden) – it is also true that these concepts have a common ground, i.e., they aim at describing the ways of how objects are given in experience.

4. Sensations in experience: Ingarden and Blaustein on the content of consciousness

As shown, Blaustein did not accept Ingarden’s eidetic method. Nonetheless, he referred to Ingarden’s theory of consciousness, more precisely, to his view of sensations as alien to the ego. Yet, this reference – present in Blaustein’s *Husserl’s Theory of the Act, Content and the Object of Presentation* – is not clear. Blaustein discusses in his book a certain position, but he did not include a reference. The theory, however, is the cornerstone of Blaustein’s own account of lived experiences. In the end, as we will see in the present section, the theory provides a decisive argument against Husserl’s theory of content; additionally, the theory determines the direction of Blaustein’s further investigations into the aesthetic experience as focused on sensations.

¹⁸¹ Concerning the early Ingarden’s analysis and critique of Husserl’s transcendental turn, cf. (Byrne 2020b).

In this section of the chapter, I will analyze this Ingardenian background of Blaustein's critique of Husserl's theory of content.

Blaustein's dissertation is divided into three main parts. At the beginning, Blaustein summarized the development of the content theory from Bolzano to Twardowski. In this regard, he defined problems inherent to these early theories. Next, in the second part of the book, he attempted to show in which sense these early problems determined Husserl's theory of content. Finally, in the third part of the book, he defined limitations of Husserl's solution. Let me sketch Blaustein's train of thought.

To begin with, he held that Bolzano in his theory formulated in *Theory of Science* – especially in § 48 and § 49¹⁸² – used a three-elements structure of presentations since he wrote about subjective and objective ideas, and about the object of an idea. Even if Bolzano indeed operated with the three-elements structure of presentations, his definition of the relationship between the object and content is vague. This relation, according to Blaustein, was described by Brentano (1837, p. 74-75) in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* as intentional. In this regard, for Blaustein, Brentano's idea was a step forward in the development of the theory of content. He argued that even if Bolzano wrote that a presentation presents something, it was Brentano who called this relation “intentional.” Blaustein (1928, p. 5) stated that this relation – as described in *Psychologie* – occurs between the act and its object, rather than between the content and its object. It is so, since for Brentano, as shown by Twardowski¹⁸³, the object is identical with content. Brentano insisted to describe the object as “immanent,” and he states that the object does not have to really exist. So, even if Brentano's idea overcame some limitations of Bolzano, he introduced new theoretical problems. Bolzano did not clearly define the relation between the object and content, but Brentano blurred the lines between both elements since he seemed to reduce the object to content. Given this, Twardowski's theory of the object seemed to overcome the limitations of both Bolzano and Brentano. According to Blaustein, namely, in his *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und*

¹⁸² Bolzano's theory of objective and subjective ideas is the response to the problem of objectless presentations. Cf. (Bolzano 1837, pp. 77-81).

¹⁸³ “For, although Brentano calls the object of a presentation its primary object, just as we have, he understands by the secondary object of a presentation the act and content taken together, as far as they are both grasped through ‘inner consciousness’ when the presentation of an object occurs and this presentation, therefore, becomes conscious” (Twardowski 1894, p. 16, fn. 8).

Gegenstand der Vorstellungen Twardowski accepted, following Bolzano, that every presentation has its object and moreover he tried to secure, following Brentano, a metaphysical neutrality of investigations. Twardowski's key insight in this context, was a clear differentiation between the object and content. Blaustein (1928, p. 13) noticed and analyzed Twardowski's arguments to justify the differentiation, but in the end, he assessed them as inadequate to explain the relation between the act and content. This problem arose in *Zur Lehre*, since after accepting Brentano's divide between intentional acts and non-intentional physical phenomena, Twardowski cannot assign content to the intentional; after all, content is NOT an act.

Against this background, Husserl's theory of content addressed difficulties inherent to the tradition of Brentano and Twardowski. In Husserl's theory, namely, immanent parts are subordinated to the act and consciousness. In turn, the object is transcendent in relation to the act. Blaustein argued that Husserl did agree with Bolzano, that the act, as defined in a narrow way, is a subjective idea (or presentation); he also disagreed with Twardowski's claim that the act is a psychic act. At the same time, Husserl accepted the basic idea that an act contains parts which are immanent or real (*reell*) parts of lived experiences. According to Blaustein's interpretation, then, Husserl comprehended an act wider than Bolzano and Twardowski. In Husserl's phenomenology, an act is divided into two inseparable parts: quality and matter. Quality is here an equivalent to Bolzano's subjective idea (of presentation) and to Twardowski's act; quality determines a relevant act as a presentation, a judgement, *etc.* Matter, in turn, refers to Bolzano's objective idea (or presentation) and to Twardowski's view of content (Blaustein 1928, p. 13). Thus, Husserl's theory of content attempts to comprehend an act as a compound of two inseparable parts: subjective with objective ideas (or presentation) (in Bolzano) and act with content (in Twardowski).

In spite of these advantages, Husserl's theory of content leads to other difficulties. Blaustein's criticism was directed mainly towards the thesis that sensations seem to be real parts of lived experiences. It is so, since for Husserl sensations are lived through, whereas the objects are at least perceived (Blaustein 1928, pp. 26-27). According to this view, the object, or its parts are correlated with immanent parts of the act, more precisely, they are correlated with a color sensation. Next, the immanent part is grasped, or apprehended in perception. By doing so, according to Blaustein, Husserl differentiated between a color, which is a trait of the object, and a color, which

is the content of consciousness¹⁸⁴. Nonetheless, as Blaustein held, Husserl's description is inadequate since sensations are NOT an immanent part of the act. Sensations are rather EXPERIENCED, than LIVED THROUGH (Blaustein 1928, p. 26). The argument to justify his thesis, Blaustein borrowed from Ingarden's explorations. In his 1921 text on "Über die Gefahr einer *Petitio Principii* in der Erkenntnistheorie," Ingarden held that "sense data ... are contents which are different than conscious acts and they (in themselves) are not conscious. This means that the way of its existence is being experienced, but not being lived through. Conversely, the way of existence of sense data is 'living through'" (Ingarden 1921, p. 562). Of course, the question of how Ingarden did understand sense data is challenging, especially in regard to the problem of the cognition of its existential status (cf. Chruzdowski 1999, pp. 156-177). Yet, from a phenomenological point of view, sensations are experienced in a different way, as, e.g., intentional thoughts. Sensations are passive. The subject does not produce sensations, but rather they are "imposed" on the subject. Ingarden and Blaustein described this aspect of experiencing sensations as "being alien to the ego" (*ichfremd*). Precisely for this reason, sensations are NOT immanent, or real parts of lived experiences; they are placed rather at the peripheries of consciousness. This means that sensations are non-immanent parts that are correlated with immanent contents which, in turn, are lived through. According to Blaustein, the content arises due to apprehension of sensations.

To summarize this part of the chapter, let me emphasize that in his analysis of Husserl's theory of content, Blaustein first and foremost seemed to follow Twardowski. This thesis is justified by the fact that Blaustein referred – just as Twardowski before him – to Bolzano in his reconstruction of the theory of intentionality. His criticism of Brentano's psychologism is rooted in Twardowski too. Yet, Twardowski lacked the description of how one experiences sensations. For this reason, Blaustein could not refer in this regard to Twardowski, but instead to Ingarden. This Ingardenian argument was decisive against Husserl's theory of content. It can be argued that Blaustein's criticism of Husserl can be reduced to the basic idea that

¹⁸⁴ "The sensational moment of colour, e.g. which in outer perception forms a real constituent of my concrete seeing (in the phenomenological sense of a visual perceiving or appearing) is as much 'experienced' or 'conscious' content, as is the character of perceiving, or as the full perceptual appearing of the coloured object. As opposed to this, however, this object, though perceived, is not itself experienced nor conscious, and the same applies to the colouring perceived in it" (Husserl 1901, p. 83).

sensations are non-immanent parts of lived experiences, though they have their correlates in lived experiences. Let me add, that the argument bowered from Ingarden is the basis of Blaustein's more general view that sensations are a part of the "phenomenal world." The latter thesis is an original thesis of Blaustein and to interpret it adequately one has to refer to Stumpf's understanding of sensations. Let me add that Blaustein studied under Stumpf as he held a fellowship in Berlin. This topic, however, goes beyond narrow limits of the present study.

5. The presence of Ingarden in Blaustein's aesthetics

There is no doubt that, following Dziemidok (1980, p. 178), "Blaustein's views on many basic topics of aesthetics were inspired by Ingarden." First of all, they both attempted to describe the structure of the aesthetic object. Next, they accepted a phasic concept of the aesthetic experience. In this section of the chapter, I will attempt to show that these mutual references did not lead to an uncritical acceptance of Ingarden's aesthetic theory by Blaustein. It can be argued that Blaustein formulated his theory also in the context of Twardowski, what makes the thesis about Ingarden's influences weaker. Certainly, Blaustein was not an epigon of Ingarden. Let me emphasize these critical references first.

According to a general thesis of Ingarden's ontology, a real individual object exists autonomically. If this does not hold, i.e., the object exists as heteronomous, it is a purely intentional object, yet from the perspective of formal ontology, it is still an individual object. A purely intentional object, contrary to the real one, has its existential foundation outside itself. In his early ontology, Ingarden wrote about so-called "also intentional" objects – besides purely intentional objects – which are a real foundation of the purely intentional object. Ingarden used these conceptual distinctions in *The Literary Work of Art* to describe a theater work of art as a "borderline" case of the literary work of art. And so, people who are at the stage during the play are real individual objects which "represent" purely intentional objects – i.e. characters of the literary work of art, which was the basis of the theater play. Ingarden (1931, p. 319) called the former objects, i.e. people on the stage, "representing" objects which "reproduce" "represented" objects, i.e., fictional, or purely intentional objects which, in turn, are "reproduced." Actors and their concrete movements on the stage, or words are not

comprehended by a theater-goer as actions of actors themselves, but rather as actions of “reproduced” characters. For this reason, people on the stage are real objects which – from an ontological point of view – are “also intentional” objects. One finds a comparable description of a theater play in Blaustein’s writings, yet few important differences are introduced.

In *The Imaginative Presentations*, Blaustein elaborated Shaw’s drama *Caesar and Cleopatra* as an example of a theater play. According to his description, one experiences directly, or perceptually what is now happening on the stage. While watching a play, however, one does not comprehend events on the stage as meaningless. Actors “perform” certain plays, for instance, the play of Caesar who speaks with Cleopatra. For Blaustein (2005, p. 54), actor’s plays are manifested as *quasi*-real objects. The process of apprehending these objects is complex and is described by him as follows: the imaginative object (Caesar) is presented imaginatively as direct – i.e., as concrete movements of the actor – and indirect – i.e., as a fictional chat of Caesar with Cleopatra – at once. The difference between both objects is evident if one notices that the direct object has properties “really” ascribed in the perceptive act (e.g. being a man with a concrete color of hairs). Contrary to the direct object, the indirect object has properties ascribed in the mode *quasi*.

The description provided by Blaustein, despite the different vocabulary, seems to be comparable to Ingarden’s view. For both philosophers, a theater-goer refers to different objects while experiencing a theater play. For Blaustein, one refers to an imaginative object that is a compound of direct and indirect objects. In turn, for Ingarden, actors on the stage are ALSO intentional objects, but the roles they perform are fictional objects, thus purely intentional objects. Nonetheless, it is unjustified to identify both theories. The point is that for Blaustein the object of the aesthetic experience is divided into a few corelated objects¹⁸⁵. Blaustein claimed, then, that the existential status of the aesthetic object depends on the attitude of the subject. The fact that in ONE aesthetic experience one refers to MANY objects that

¹⁸⁵ “Contrary to the popular view that we do not conceive of the object of aesthetic experience as real, I believe that this only happens with imaginative perception in the attitude towards the imaginative world and with signitive perception in the attitude towards the fictional world. In perception, I grasp the object of aesthetic experience as real, not otherwise in the imaginative and signitive attitude towards the reproduced objects, with the proviso, however, that in the latter two situations I do not recognize it as existing *hic et nunc*” (Blaustein 2005, p. 140).

have different existential statuses makes Blaustein's theory different from Ingarden's approach. In a word, in Blaustein's aesthetics, the aesthetic object does not have a clear existential status. Is it real, or rather purely imaginative? Moreover, Blaustein significantly redefines Ingarden's view of constitution of the aesthetic object. For him, the aesthetic object is not "created" as the purely intentional one (as for Ingarden), but "composed" of different presentations. One can argue that Blaustein was influenced in this regard by Twardowski. After all, the aesthetic object is understood by him as a product of relevant psycho-physiological actions, i.e., aesthetic acts. All in all, Blaustein did not accept Ingarden's theory.

Despite the differences described above, it is still possible to remark few similarities between both approaches. And so, Blaustein seemed to agree with Ingarden in claiming that there is no universal schema, which holds for all forms of aesthetic experiences. Rather, the schema depends on different forms of works of art. Next, both philosophers agreed that the subject of the aesthetic experience is ACTIVE (Blaustein 2005, pp. 5–6, 165) and they referred to aesthetic experiences as phasic, or temporal (Blaustein 2005, pp. 6, 144, 177) (yet, they presented different order of phases). In addition, Blaustein was of the same opinion as Ingarden that a work of art is a multi-strata object which contains spots of indeterminacy (Blaustein 2005, pp. 13, 16, 138) and they both claimed that the aesthetic experience constitutes a "polyphony" of aesthetic values. They both held that the aesthetic experience "frees" a man from his everyday life and situates one outside ordinary practical life. In contrast to Ingarden, however, Blaustein (2005, p. 184) stated that feelings are preceded by the act of perception. These differences are even more complex. The element, which differentiates both approaches in the most clear way, is the basis of their analysis: inasmuch as for Ingarden ontology determines aesthetics, for his student – descriptions of different experiences, thus phenomenology, determined aesthetics. This is the reason for Blaustein's obscure difference between real, imaginative and fictional objects. Here the manner of experience determines in the end the undefined existential status of the aesthetic object.

6. Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was the presentation of these elements of Blaustein's philosophy that seemed to be connected with his polemic with Ingarden

and of a critique of his approach. Besides discussing those elements that show that Blaustein broke with Ingarden's philosophy, I indicate few references to some motifs discussed in *The Literary Work of Art*. I do not claim that Blaustein was explicitly influenced by Ingarden. Instead, I hold that there are some topics which connect both theories. Already in Sect. 1, I have emphasized that the need to juxtapose both approaches arises from the fact that Blaustein studied in Lvov where Ingarden provided classes and later Blaustein established closer philosophical cooperation with his teacher. Even if this fact was noticed in the scholarly literature, there is still a lack of closer studies on both approaches. So, by juxtaposing both philosophies I attempted to address this lack in the scholarly literature. More importantly, while exploring Ingarden's (apparent) influences on Blaustein, I wanted to examine the question of Ingarden's position in the context of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In Sect. 1, I formulated a hypothesis that the presence of Ingarden's thought in Blaustein's philosophy was not limited to aesthetics – as claimed, e.g., by Dziemidok (1980, p. 178) or Ptaszek (2011, p. 120) – but it also reached methodology and theory of consciousness.

In the light of presented analysis so far, the hypothesis should be reformulated. First, as shown in Sect. 2, it is pointless to understand Blaustein as an “analytic phenomenologist” who combined the method of analyzing concepts with phenomenology; rather, he represented a (descriptive) psychological trend of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In Sect. 3, I have argued that Blaustein's critique of eidetics was in fact directed against Ingarden, yet both philosophers accepted a basic phenomenological intuition that a philosopher analyzes the ways of givenness of an object in experience. In Sect. 4, I noticed an important shift in Blaustein's attitude towards Ingarden. In was argued that *Husserl's Theory...* seemed to be based on Ingarden's view of sensations and its place in the structure of consciousness. In Sect. 5 I focus on aesthetics. In this regard, I noticed some breaks (e.g. Blaustein blurred a border between the imaginative object and the fictional one), as well as few references (e.g. the thesis about a multi-stratified structure of the work of art) to the Ingardenian tradition. In conclusion, then, it can be argued that the reception of Ingarden's philosophy in Blaustein was critical. Yet, at least in regard to some topics, Blaustein misinterpreted the theory of his teacher (e.g. he did not notice the key of “also” intentional objects). At the same time, it is unjustified to call him a mere epigon of Ingarden. The critique formulated by Blaustein built his original research on the complex structures of lived experiences. For instance, he incorporated the view of

sensations as distant from immanent contents. So, even if Blaustein did not reject some elements of Ingarden's philosophy, it seems that all these elements shaped his philosophical project.

As shown in Sect. 2, Blaustein represented a psychological trend of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Given all presented intertwined connections between Ingarden's philosophy and Blaustein's original project, one can ask whether these references resulted in the revision of the trend? After all, Husserl's phenomenology was developed as a critique of descriptive psychology, and Brentano's psychologism. In this context, it is worth mentioning that in his "Preface to the Polish Edition" in the Polish translation of *The Literary Work of Art*, Ingarden (1960, p. 15) appreciated importance of Blaustein's attempts to develop his aesthetic theory; nonetheless, according to Ingarden, Blaustein stayed under "strong influences" of Twardowski and for this reason he fell in the end into psychologism. Ingarden's charge is partly correct since Blaustein, as shown in Sect. 3, indeed offered to understand phenomenology as a form of descriptive psychology. Furthermore, given the controversial view of the imaginative object which is the "direct" and "indirect" object of the intentional relation at once, one can agree with Ingarden. Yet, it has to be noted that Blaustein did not use a naïve concept of psychology which put emphasis on the analysis of TOKENS of lived experiences. It seems that even if he did not use eidetic reduction, nor transcendental reduction, he had accepted the need of the psychological reduction. With these ideas in mind, I think that this was possible due to Ingarden's influences on Blaustein and on the Lvov-Warsaw School. All in all, the PHENOMENOLOGICAL revision of the psychological trend of the Lvov-Warsaw School lay in the redefinition of the object of descriptive psychology as the ways of givenness (*Gegebenheitsweisen*) of an object in experience, instead of tokens of psychic life.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. The project is financed by the National Science Centre, Poland (no. 2017/27/B/HS1/02455). I would like to thank Thomas Byrne for his help with the language of the manuscript.

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Part III.

INGARDENIAN ANALYSES

**IN THE SPIRIT OF THE LVOV-WARSAW
SCHOOL:
WORLD AND ART**

10. Ingarden's Hidden Nominalism. Platonism, Universals, and Relational Beings

In 1970, Roman Ingarden gave three lectures at the Polish Philosophical Society in Krakow in which he discussed *a priori* knowledge and the theory of essence. After one of these lectures, the young Władysław Stróżewski asked Ingarden a question about the relation between the individual and the universal essence, crucial for the problem of universals. Ingarden replied:

This is a very difficult, old Platonic problem, whether the essence is as individual as its object, and whether it is contained within it. That which is *reines Wesen* [pure essence – P.R.] is not in an object; it does not make sense. This is one for many. It cannot be said, although there have been such attempts, once someone spoke about it in Lvov in the 1920s, that if I have a black blackboard here [in Krakow], and there is a second black blackboard in Oxford, it [...] means that there is one blackness, and therefore these [blackboards] are somehow fused through their blackness. Well, this cannot be said. Individuals are closed, separate wholes. And now, we have to find that which is above them in a sense, what is [...] the same (Ingarden 1970b, p. 42).

This reply perfectly summarizes Ingarden's theory of universals. First, things have properties, or, more precisely, properties and essences. Second, properties and essences are as individual as things. Third, however, there

¹⁸⁶ This is a slightly shortened English version of my paper "Piekący problemat Ingardena. Platonizm, uniwersalia i byty relacyjne," *Filozofia Nauki*, vol. XXIX (2021), No. 1, pp. 109-138. I thank Katarzyna Barska, Agnieszka Barszcz, Marek Piwowarczyk and Edward M. Świdorski, as well as Maciej Piwowarski and Michał Wiczorkowski for their remarks, which helped to improve this text. The paper is a side result of a research project generously funded by the National Science Center (NCN) through grant no. 2018/31/B/HS1/01861.

are universal ideal qualities and ideas, which exist not in things but outside of them. The first claim distinguishes Ingarden from extreme nominalism, which admits only things; the second links him to trope theory, which admits only individual properties; finally, the third connects him with Platonism, which also admits transcendent forms. David Armstrong, in his *Nominalism and Realism*, noticed that it is possible to combine trope theory with Platonism, but he was unable to give any example of such a position (Armstrong 1978, p. 85); apparently, it was Ingarden who endorsed it.

In my book *Tropes and Universals*, I argued that Ingarden's theory, like any Platonic theory of universals, though it postulates ideal beings, is in fact a hidden nominalism (Rojek 2019, pp. 163-167). Realism in the debate on universals admits entities that really can be one in many distinct things. But ideal beings are not in things at all. They are universal only in the sense that many individuals fall under them. The true realist was the man in Lvov mentioned by Ingarden, who claimed that all black things really have something common, namely the same blackness. Hidden nominalism, for sure, is not unique to Ingarden. I have merely repeated some arguments that had been formulated against Plato, Frege, and Husserl.

My thesis raised a wave of criticism (Petryszak 2019; Luc 2020; Barska 2021). Particularly, it was discussed in details by Marek Piwowarczyk in his paper "Platonism and the Debate on Universals" (Piwowarczyk 2020), where he pointed out a fundamental gap in my argument:

But why should we choose Rojek's understanding of universals as appropriate? We will not find the answer to this question in *Tropes and Universals*. [...] Rojek should first examine whether the universals, understood in a Platonic way, might be a ground of similarity, and not reject this possibility out of hand only because Platonic universals are not universal in the sense of moderate realism (Piwowarczyk 2020, pp. 117-118, 119).

Furthermore, Piwowarczyk proposed a more precise formulation of the Platonic position, which apparently avoids my charges (Piwowarczyk 2020, pp. 128-132). This does not mean, however, that Piwowarczyk himself adopts Platonism. His sole purpose was to show that – contrary to my suggestions – Platonism is "one of the sensible realistic solutions in the dispute on universals" (*ibid.*), and, for sure, "more coherent than moderate realism" (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 133).

In this chapter, I would like to take a closer look at the Platonic view on universals and answer at least some of these objections. I confess that in my book I took Platonism quite flippantly. The theory of transcendent forms, as it is usually presented in analytic philosophy, does not look very promising. However, I will try to show that the more historically adequate Platonism discussed by Marek Piwowarczyk, while actually avoiding the difficulties I have raised, not only does not correspond to Ingarden's position, which is ultimately not so important, but, above all, has some troublesome consequences. For if Platonists refuse to accept universals in things, they must not only accept transcendent forms, but also concede that all individuals exist and have their properties in virtue of relations to them. Platonism leads therefore to the conclusion that there are no independent substances in the world, but there are only relational entities. Plato may have really thought so, but Ingarden would have probably been shocked by such a supposition. Plato's transcendent forms undermine the autonomy of the world no less than Husserl's transcendental ego. Personally, I am inclined to relational ontology, but I do not think that it should be accepted simply as an explanation of the problem of common properties.

In the first part of this chapter, I outline Ingarden's theory of universals and argue that it is a kind of hidden nominalism. Then, in the second part, I try to show that my criticism of Platonism does not stem merely from arbitrary terminological decisions. Without a satisfactory theory of universals, one cannot formulate an adequate theory of essence, which was a key task for Ingarden. In the third part, I deal with the proposal to radicalize Ingarden's Platonism by admitting the existential dependency of individuals on ideas. I attempt to show that, although such a theory does, in fact, solve the problem I have indicated, it is fundamentally inconsistent with Ingarden's views. In the fifth part, I look in more detail at the consequences to which such radical Platonism leads.

I would like to take this opportunity to supplement my analysis of Ingarden's views given in my *Tropes and Universals* with some new materials from the joint archive of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) and the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (PAU) in Krakow, recently made available on the Roman Ingarden Digital Archives. Especially important seems to be the notation of Ingarden's lectures from 1970, which I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, recorded probably by the late Prof. Andrzej Póltawski (Ingarden 1970, 1970a, 1970b). Although these lectures partly coincide with the last chapter of *The Fundamentals of the Theory of*

Knowledge (Ingarden 1971, pp. 244-355), they contain many of Ingarden's original thoughts and formulations, and above all, his discussions with the audience, including the aforementioned Władysław Stróżewski, Fr. Józef Tischner, and Michał Hempoliński. Unfortunately, we have only a crude transcript of the lectures and discussions, and I will refer to it in a slightly edited version. Before his death, Ingarden authorized only a few pages of the typescript (Ingarden 1970a, pp. 1-5). Unexpectedly, these lectures turned out to be his philosophical testament.

1. Universals

The problem of universals consists of explaining the fact that many distinct things seem to have common properties. Ingarden, which may seem quite surprising, very rarely dealt directly with this problem. He was much more interested in the reverse problem, namely the necessary coexistence of certain properties in the same things. In my book, I have identified only one place, in the appendix to *Essential Questions*, where Ingarden actually analyzed the fact that two things have the same property (Rojek 2019, p. 124; Ingarden 1972, p. 503). Now it turns out that he also dealt with this problem in his last lectures. In one of them he said:

We have two white sheets of paper; [...] they are of the same whiteness. If they are of the same whiteness, then, Husserl says, there is [something] one and the same in respect to which [...] they are the same. This is the quality of whiteness. And this is the beginning of the whole problem (Ingarden 1970b, p. 16).

In the following one, he continued:

In the previous lecture, I showed you two white sheets of paper, and I said that if they are really [...] the same, then they are the same in whiteness. *Species* is the respect to which these two sheets of papers are the same in color. But what is the same, as opposed to their individual colors, was [however] not explicated by Husserl (Ingarden 1970, p. 4).

Although Ingarden was discussing Husserl's position, he had no objections to his views on the nature of *species* (cf. Ingarden 1971, p. 288; Makota

2007). Things have individual properties, but these properties have certain aspects, by which they resemble each other. So the *species* are not determinate properties like this white, but rather determinable aspects like whiteness or color. Distinct individual whites resemble each other in respect to their universal whiteness.

As Ingarden continued, developing Husserl's views in his own way, the generality of *species* lies only in the fact that they might correspond to many distinct individual properties. As he said,

A *species* [...] is universal in that sense that [...] it may have two correlates, being the same in two distinct objects. It is one towards this plurality (Ingarden 1970, p. 6).

And further:

The universal idea [...] corresponds to thousands of the same individuals [...]. Merely corresponds. It is not something contained in an individual object (Ingarden 1970, p. 25).

As he replied to Stróżewski, general essences are not “in” individuals, but “above” them (Ingarden 1970b, p. 42). Ingarden repeatedly emphasized that the relation between individuals and qualities or ideas, which he often called concretization, does not consist in the actual participation of ideal qualities in real individuals, but is merely a correspondence (Rojek 2019, pp. 154-163, cf., however, Widomski 2003; Barska 2013). In other words, Ingarden assumed the transcendent status of qualities and ideas. That is why it seems to me that at this point he departed from Husserl, who seemed to adopt immanent universals (Moreland 1989, cf. also Widomski 1980, 1985, 1985a, 1989; cf. Djian 2020; Koch 2020).

So, it seems that Ingarden explained the problem of common properties somehow in this way:

(*) *a* is F and *b* is F iff object *a* has a particular property F_1 , object *b* has a particular property F_2 , and both these properties F_1 and F_2 correspond to ideal quality F.

In order to explain the problem of unity in multiplicity, Ingarden assumed therefore three categories of beings: things, properties, and qualities,

and two fundamental ontological relations: having properties by things and the correspondence between properties and qualities. For the sake of simplicity, I ignore here the distinction between properties and essences, which plays an important role in Ingarden's theory of individual objects, but does not affect his theory of universals (cf. Chrudzimski 2004; Johansson 2009; Piwowarczyk 2015, pp. 109-180; Rojek 2019, pp. 123-178; Kaczmarek 2020).

Obviously, such a position is close to Platonism (cf. Tymieniecka 1961; Rygalski 1993; Widomski 2003; Nowaczyk 2009). Plato, notoriously, "separated" universals (*Metaphysics*, 1078b30; Aristotle 2016, p. 221). Usually, the "separation" of ideas is understood in two ways: either as their ontological independence from individuals or as their transcendence towards them (Fine 2003, pp. 255-264; Devereux 1999, p. 192). It is usually said that, according to Plato, ideas could exist even if there were no corresponding individuals, and that they were not their properties or constituents, but separate entities. Participation, contrary to the etymology of the word, was not supposed to be a relation which involves the being of ideas in things or things in ideas (Devereux 1999, p. 194). Commentators disagree on the relation between independence and transcendence. Gail Fine argued that Plato, while recognizing independence, nevertheless – at least in some dialogues – accepted the immanence of general forms (Fine 2003, pp. 252-325). I would stick here, however, to a more standard view that Plato assumed both the independence and the transcendence of universal forms (Devereux 1999).

There is no doubt that Ingarden accepted the separation of his ideas and ideal qualities in both Platonic senses. This is clearly seen in Chapter X on ideas from his *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. On the one hand, he wrote that "it could well be that the entire domain of ideas would exist, yet, despite this, no real objects of any kind would" (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 261), and on the other hand, he pointed out that "the notion that the entire sphere of ideas somehow occurs within the real world [...] is to be rejected" (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 261). Moreover, Ingarden's answer to Stróżewski's question, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, strikingly resembles the famous reasoning of Plato in *Parmenides*. Ingarden, like Plato, first considers the possibility of literally common properties in things and then rejects it firmly. One and the same blackness, which is supposed to exist simultaneously in Krakow and Oxford, would be – as Plato put it – "separated from itself" (*Parmenides*, 131b; Plato 1997, p. 8). Ingarden, following Plato, ultimately asserts that general ideas must exist above things

(*Parmenides*, 132d-133e; Plato 1997, p. 11). Ingarden's theory, it should be noted, embracing both individual properties and universal ideal qualities, is particularly close to the Plato's theory from *Phaedo* (102a-105b), where he apparently accepted both individual characters and transcendent forms (Plato 2002, pp. 54-59; Wolterstorff 1970, pp. 264-279; Vlastos 1978; Mertz 1996, pp. 83-95; Devereux 1999, pp. 194-201).

Surprisingly enough, Ingarden had a rather ambivalent attitude towards Plato. This can be particularly seen in his last lectures. On the one hand, when he introduced the concept of pure essence, he simply stated that "this is also a Platonic idea" (Ingarden 1970, p. 27). On the other hand, when one of his students suggested that he was a Platonist, Ingarden replied with irritation: "It is not true, it is not true that I stand on the ground of Plato's theory of ideas" (Ingarden 1970, p. 38). I think that Ingarden's complicated relationship to Plato may be explained by his reminiscence on Husserl.

Husserl used to say: "I have nothing to do with Plato." These are almost literally his words, I just repeat. And I am not surprised at all. Because, although in my opinion undoubtedly this thought that comes from Plato that one should speak about ideas is very fascinating and genial, in what Plato said on this subject, there are [also] many propositions that are difficult for us to digest today. So Husserl did not get involved in this (Ingarden 1970, p. 8).

Apparently, Ingarden also did not want to get involved in these hard-to-digest views of Plato's. Thus, although he admitted independent and transcendent ideal beings, he also rejected – as he used to say – Platonic "mythology," that is, on the one hand, the presence of ideas in things (Ingarden 1972, p. 364), and, on the other hand, the possibility of the influence of ideas on things (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 646).

In my book, I argued that Platonic ideas are, nevertheless, not universals. The truth of this claim, as my critics have pointed out, obviously depends on how the concept of universal is understood. However, I do not think I accept any eccentric concept of universals. Gustav Bergmann, one of the patriarchs of contemporary analytical metaphysics, in his classic paper "Frege's Hidden Nominalism," which was one of the inspirations for my criticism, wrote:

In ontological discourse the terms *realism* and *nominalism* are used in two ways; once strictly, once broadly. The ontologist's first business is to list

all kinds of entities (not, all existents). If he discerns many kinds, perhaps too many, one calls him a realist. If he lists but a few, perhaps too few, one calls him a nominalist. This is the broad use. In the strict sense, an ontologist is a realist if he counts [universal – P.R.] characters, or at least some characters (for example, simple ones), as a kind of existent. A nominalist in the strict sense holds, conversely, that no characters are existents (Bergmann 1960, p. 206).

The definition of universals as one in many is surely a terminological decision, but there are important methodological reasons behind it. When we adopt such a definition, the concepts of particulars and universals stand for beings belonging to two significantly different categories. The former are unique, while the latter are repeatable. Now, those who accept the wide use of realism often identify as universal entities any kind that merely play a role in explaining the problem of universals. Such entities are, for instance, Platonic ideas which – as Marek Piwowarczyk says (2020, p. 116) – are common only as “points of reference” for many particulars, but are at the same time as unique and particular as their individuals. In my opinion, being a common “point of reference” without any additional conditions is not enough to introduce a new ontological category. For this reason, a narrow understanding of universals seems to me more justified.

I think, then, that Bergmann is essentially right and we should keep separate two senses of realism and nominalism. Nevertheless, the broad understanding of realism in Bergmann seems to me a little bit too broad, while its narrow concept – is a little bit too narrow. First, I think terms “realism” and “nominalism” should be reserved for the very problem of universals. Their use, I think, introduces much confusion, on the one hand, in discussion on the existence of certain particular entities, such as sets (Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel 1958, pp. 332-347) or social groups (Warriner 1956), and, on the other hand, in debates on essentialism, e.g. in gender studies (Stoljar 2011). Second, true universals need not be, as Bergmann suggested, common properties (*NB.* He always understood characters to be universal). Not only determinate properties may be universal, but also determinable aspects of properties (Rojek 2019, pp. 76-95). By the way, I am personally inclined to extend the concept of universal even further, as long as it retains any connection with the relation of inherence; in this way, I wanted to ensure that Hegel’s concrete universals would be recognized as a true type of universals, but I will not elaborate on this topic here (Rojek 2019, pp. 103-104, cf. Luc 2020, pp. 103-104).

Regardless of these reservations, it seems clear to me that some authors who dealt with the problem of universals were realists merely in a broader sense. If they were unconscious of this, they can reasonably be labeled as hidden nominalists. On this basis, Bergmann argued that Frege and Husserl, although they admitted ideal beings, did not recognize common characters; so they were, in fact, hidden nominalists (Bergmann 1960, 1964). In turn, Donald Brownstein, one of Herbert Hochberg's students, who was himself a student of Bergmann, indicated that Plato himself was a hidden nominalist. As he wrote:

Even though Plato recognizes an entity over and above *a* and *b* there is no particular reason to treat F-ness as a universal, since the dichotomy universal/particular depends upon exactly that which Plato gives up to Parmenides – the difference between entities which may remain undivided while shared in by separate entities and those which must be divided to be shared in by separate entities (Brownstein 1973, p. 59).

As now can be seen, claiming that Ingarden was a hidden nominalist, I have only extrapolated the thesis of Bergmann and Brownstein.

In the case of Ingarden, however, there are additional reasons to believe that the problem of hidden nominalism is not just a matter of terminology; for it seems that the lack of a satisfactory theory of universals makes it impossible to formulate an appropriate theory of essence, for which Ingarden introduced his complicated theory of ideas. Hidden nominalism is therefore a ticking bomb placed under Ingarden's whole system.

2. Essences

Ingarden was not so interested in the problem of universals, that is, the multiple occurrence of the same properties, but rather, he was interested in the problem of essence, that is, the coexistence of different properties. As he stated in one of his last lectures, "the question of the coexistence of different qualities in one whole was a problem that concerned me and still concerns me a lot" (Ingarden 1970b, p. 40). Ingarden was apparently fascinated by the regular connections between properties. For example, some properties require each other, some are mutually exclusive, and others are indifferent to each other. If something is colorful, for instance, it must also be extended,

or the sound cannot have color¹⁸⁷. These connections between properties occur not only synchronically, determining the selection of properties, but also diachronically, limiting the possible changes of the object (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, pp. 474-475).

Ingarden's famous theory of ideas was designed exactly to explain the problem of essences, i.e. coexistence, and not the problem of universals, i.e. the multiple occurrence of properties. As Ingarden explained, without independent ideas it would be impossible to explain the necessary connections between the coexisting properties of things. If there were no ideas,

the whole topic of the necessary connections would fall. There would be nothing to ask about. There would be only permanent nonsense (Ingarden 1970b, p. 49).

Moreover, Ingarden believed that Plato's theory of ideas was aimed at the same purpose (Ingarden 1971, p. 263; Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, pp. 51, 68-69; Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, pp. 356, 410).

I am not going to analyze Ingarden's theory of ideas here. It is rather complex. Ingarden distinguished simple pure ideal qualities on the one hand, and complex ideas on the other. The latter were to explain necessary connections between their concretization. Next, in the structure of ideas he distinguished the properties of ideas as ideas and the content of ideas (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. pp. 225-264). The explanation of the coexistence of properties has therefore approximately the following:

(**) a is F and a is G if object a has individual property F_1 which correspond to ideal quality F and individual property G_1 which correspond to G and qualities F and G belong to the content of an idea, which is exemplified by the object a .

Surely, this formula should be developed further. The content of the idea, for instance, should be divided into constants and variables, and among variables, in turn, variable factors and relatively constant factors should be distinguished. Moreover, it is not the case that qualities make up

¹⁸⁷ Although, at one of his last lectures, Ingarden confessed that he had surprisingly started experiencing synesthesia for some time: "What can I do about it? – he said – I hear [...] violet sounds!" (Ingarden 1970b: 40).

the content of ideas, but rather their ideal concretizations (cf. Waszczenko 1995; Poczobut 1995; Rygalski 1995; Rojek 2019, pp. 142-154). However, all these details do not seem to be of great importance for my further argumentation.

In *Tropes and Universals*, I have argued that Ingarden's theory of essence does not after all explain the necessary coexistence of properties. This is because an explanation of the problem of essence presupposes an explanation of the problem of universals, and since Ingarden's theory of universals is in fact nominalistic, it fails in both. The explanation of the coexistence of properties requires the same relation of correspondence that was supposed to explain the multiplication of properties. This correspondence, however, is understood too weakly to explain the problem of universals, and therefore does not explain the problem of essence either. This is the ultimate reason why, in Ingarden's case, his hidden nominalism is not just a matter of terminology.

The difficulty of Ingarden's theory is a special case of the fundamental problem of Platonism, which was pointed out, not surprisingly, by Plato himself (*Parmenides*, 135bc), and afterwards was formulated by, among others, Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, 991a) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theologiae* I, 84, 1). The difficulty is that if ideas are separate from things, then knowledge of ideas cannot apply the things themselves. In *Tropes and Universals*, I referred to the version of this charge formulated by Gustav Bergmann, and then repeated by Edward M. Świderski (Rojek 2019, p. 166). I will now take a closer look at this great argument.

Bergmann, in his famous paper "The Ontology of Edmund Husserl," argued that in Husserl's theory the connections among ideal essences cannot explain the connections between real moments, because the relation between essence and moments is contingent. As he wrote:

Red and green exclude each other. Call this essential truth *S*. [...] All its constituents are essences. Let now red_i and green_j be two items [i.e. individual properties – P.R.] and consider *S*: red_i and green_j exclude each other. Unless *S* is also necessary, the "necessity" of *S* does not do its job. So far, exclusiveness having been introduced as an essence, it is not even clear what the sentence expressing *S* means. [Husserl's] system, as it must, takes it to mean (red_i < red) and (green_j < green) and *S*. The last of the three conjunction terms is necessary; the other two, since they contain items, are not. Hence, *S* is not necessary. This is the mistake (Bergmann 1964, pp. 204-205).

Red_i and green_j are “items” or moments, that is, in Ingarden’s terminology adopted here, properties, while red and green are essences, i.e. pure ideal qualities. The sign “<” denotes here the relation between them, called by Bergmann “exemplification,” and by Ingarden “correspondence” or “concretization.”

Świdorski first applied Bergmann’s argument against Husserl’s theory of essences to Ingarden’s theory of ideas. In a short entry on pure ideal qualities, published in *Dictionary of Roman Ingarden’s Philosophical Concepts*, he wrote:

S, which is necessarily true, concerns “pure ideal qualities.” Beside this, no necessity applies to the “moments” or, indeed, to the copula in *S*. Using Ingarden’s terminology, it can be said that pure ideal qualities – despite their function in the content of ideas, and despite the role which they are supposed to play in explaining the phenomenon of “concretization” among possible exemplification of ideas – do not work in the world (Świdorski 2001, p. 125).

“Working in the world” should be understood here not so much as causal relations, excluded by the very nature of ideal quality, but rather as explanatory relations, that is, the grounding of necessary connections between individual properties.

In *Tropes and Universals*, I tried to reconstruct Bergmann-Świdorski’s master argument. The starting point for the explanation of the necessary connections in things is the sentence *S* on the essences of red and green, while the final point should be the sentence *S* on the individual properties of red_i and green_j:

- (1) red and green exclude each other;
- (2) red_i corresponds to red;
- (3) green_j corresponds to green;
- (4) red_i and green_j exclude each other.

Now, the problem is that in order to move from the sentence (1) on ideal qualities to the sentence (4) on individual properties, one must accept the sentences (2)-(3) on properties corresponding to qualities. Ingarden was fully aware of these connections. As he wrote:

The relations between the contents of ideas and the corresponding individual objects [...] make possible an easy transformation of propositions that pertain to the contents of ideas into propositions that establish the possible and necessary states of affairs within the realm of individual objects (Ingarden 1947, vol. I, p. 72, cf. also Ingarden 1971, p. 296).

However, Ingarden did not seem to notice any difficulty here. The problem is that while the sentence (1) is obviously necessary, the sentence (4) would also be necessary, as expected, only if the sentences (2) and (3) were necessary. Unfortunately, Ingarden's ontology does not ground their necessity. This is so because individual properties do not have any common constituents which could ground the necessity of their connections with pure ideal qualities¹⁸⁸.

It seems, then, that the necessary connections between the properties of real things can be explained only if the relation between the ideal and the real is held as necessary. But the mere acceptance of its necessity, without any attempt to ground it, would seem an *ad hoc* solution. How, then, can they be grounded? According to Bergmann, the basis of necessity might only be a partial identity. Without any identical component in properties "there is nothing in the item itself to make it either this or that, or the first or the second" (Bergmann 1964, p. 215). In other words, only immanent realism can explain the necessary connections in the structure of things. Unfortunately, in Ingarden's ontology, there is no identity of properties or their aspects; there is only a primitive, ungrounded correspondence instead. So there are no reasons to accept it as a necessary relation. For this reason, Ingarden's correspondence seems to be too weak to ground the shift from ideas to things. Due to the radical separation of ideas from things, the necessary coexistence of properties, which so fascinated Ingarden, remained unexplained.

¹⁸⁸ Marek Piwowarczyk (2020, p. 132) points out that the sentence (1) should be reformulated in Ingarden's theory. Strictly speaking, pure ideal qualities do not have direct necessary connections to other qualities, but only determine such connections between their possible concretizations. However, this does not fundamentally change my argument. For, as Piwowarczyk himself notices, "even if pure qualities determine the necessary connections between their concretization [...], then these connections are still not necessary because particulars are only externally correlated to ideal qualities" (*ibid.*).

3. Participation

How can we get out of this problem? In *Tropes and Universals*, I suggested that we could try to reinterpret Ingarden's system in order to limit his Platonism and find immanent universals in it (Rojek 2019, pp. 167-172). Surely, universals cannot be properties that are certainly individual. But the indeterminate moments of properties, such as the colorness of this red or the colorness of that green, look quite promising. Ingarden openly admitted such moments. If it turned out that they could be strictly identical in many distinct individual properties, Ingarden's realism would be saved. Perhaps pure ideal qualities could then be understood as these common determinable aspects of individual properties. In such case, the correspondence between properties and qualities would be grounded in partial identity of their determinable moments, and, as a result, one could move from the knowledge of essences to the knowledge of individuals. Roughly, this is how James Moreland (1989) defended Husserl against Bergmann's charge of hidden nominalism. Unfortunately, it seems that in Ingarden's case, that would be a modification rather than a reinterpretation of his system. Ingarden repeatedly pointed out that even such determinable moments are numerically distinct in distinct properties (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, pp. 147, 102; Ingarden 1972, p. 503).

Now, Marek Piwowarczyk suggests exactly the opposite strategy. Instead of limiting Ingarden's platonism, he proposes its radicalization. The crucial point is the understanding of the relation between properties and qualities. According to Piwowarczyk, I wrongly interpreted Platonism as taking correspondence as a contingent relation. As Piwowarczyk writes,

If this was external correlation, and not essential connection between particulars and universals (as Rojek understands it), then he would be right to say that the Platonic understanding of the universal is not sufficient to solve the problem of universals (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 120).

But the true Platonic participation is more than merely contingent correspondence. As Piwowarczyk reminds us, for Plato participation was a kind of ontological dependence.

A Platonist must claim that individual properties and essences have a characteristic content (that is, they are, for example, individual humanity or

redness) *in virtue of their connections with pure ideal qualities*. The redness of a tomato is redness precisely *because* it is a concretization of pure redness (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 130, italics mine – P.R.).

Such a nature of participation is suggested by Plato's well-known metaphors of imitation or reflection. In the case of imitation, it is clear that the prototype "contributes to the existence of a copy, but not the other way around" (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 131). Similarly, in the case of a reflection, "my reflection reflects myself and I am one of the reasons for its existence and persistence" (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 132). Participation, understood in a proper Platonic way, is therefore not merely correspondence, but it implies an asymmetric ontological dependence, since it grounds both the character and the very existence of individuals (cf. Allen 1978; Kielbasa 1995; Stróżewski 1992).

Marek Piwowarczyk suggests that Ingarden understood the correspondence between individual properties and general qualities exactly in this way. "Ingarden – he says – assumes [...] that pure qualities condition their concretizations" (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 129). What is this conditioning? According to Piwowarczyk, Ingarden accepted strong structural and radical transcendence between properties and qualities, so this conditioning could not be an "existential connection involving non-self-sufficiency," but only a connection involving "at most dependency" (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 129). Of course, Piwowarczyk refers here to Ingarden's own distinctions between existential moments of non-self-sufficiency and dependence. Non-self-sufficient entities must coexist with something else within one whole (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, p. 147), whereas dependent entities require only the existence of something else with which they do not form one whole (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, pp. 153-155). Ultimately, Piwowarczyk claims that according to Ingarden "property [...] existentially depends on pure quality" (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 132) and that is why "the relation of ideal qualities and their concretizations is one-sidedly necessary" (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 130), that is necessary for properties, but contingent for a quality.

Platonism, insofar as it recognizes the dependence of individual properties on pure ideal qualities, avoids the problem of grounding individual essences, which I raised against it. As Marek Piwowarczyk notes,

This problem would arise if it were not necessary that a particular property corresponds to an ideal quality, i.e. if, for example, this property could

no longer correspond to one quality and began to correspond to another. However, this is impossible due to the indicated one-sided dependence of a particular property on pure quality (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 132).

To recall, Ingarden's problem was precisely the contingent nature of the correspondence between individual properties and universal essences:

- (2) red_i corresponds to red,
- (3) green_j corresponds to green.

But now, since participation is taken as one-sided existential dependence, sentences (2) and (3) turn out to be necessary. It is essential for red_i that it participates in redness, just as for green_j it is essential that it participates in greenness. The very relation to ideal qualities gives properties their content and their existence. Properties could not, contrary to Bergmann's suggestion, change their places. Therefore, if one accepts the one-sided necessity of participation, "Rojek's objection to Platonism" turns out to be – as Piwowarczyk triumphantly concludes – "groundless" (*ibid.*).

I think that Marek Piwowarczyk's interpretation of Platonism is historically and philosophically sound. Plato did really believe that individuals depend on ideas, and such a relation allows him to avoid the charge I indicated. The theory of participation does indeed ground the necessity of relation between individual properties and general qualities. Moreover, the recognition of participation as a one-sided existential dependence also allows one to avoid a number of other difficulties traditionally attributed to Platonism. In particular, since ontological dependence connects their terms directly, participation does not lead to the relational regress indicated by Gilbert Ryle (Armstrong 1978, pp. 70-71). Even more, the relation between individuals and ideas now resembles a reversed inherence, and this, as I argued in *Tropes and Universals*, should be enough to recognize ideas as true universals (Rojek 2019, pp. 103-104, cf. Luc 2020, p. 106). Full-blooded Platonism, therefore, rather surprisingly, at least for me, turns out to be quite a serious position.

Unfortunately, it seems that Piwowarczyk's proposal cannot be considered an adequate interpretation of Ingarden's position. We have strong evidences that Ingarden consciously rejected participation as an ontological dependence. In Chapter X of his *Controversy over the Existence of the World* he clearly saw the "urgent problem" of "the general existential relation between

the two worlds – that of ideas and that of individual objects” (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, 226), which is “disturbing to all those researchers who since the times of Plato and Aristotle have run into ideas in their investigations” (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 225) and “brings with it difficulties that appear to be insurmountable” (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 226). The problem for Ingarden was not so much the dependence of the world of ideas on the real world, which he obviously rejected, but rather the possible reverse dependence of the real world on the world of ideas. “Is the real world existentially independent of the world of ideas, or does a certain dependence of one of these worlds prevail here, and if so, of what kind is it?” (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 226). Ingarden discussed Plato’s view that the real world is existentially conditioned by the world of ideas. As he wrote, in Platonism “ideas comprise a being which is more original and perfect than what is real” and they are “a condition for the existence of real, individual objects” (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 223). More precisely, according to Plato, individual entities “were supposed to be derived” from the ideas (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, p. 142). But Ingarden clearly rejected that view. In § 51 of Chapter X on ideas, devoted specifically to the relationship of ideas to individual objects, Ingarden states emphatically:

If the real world exists, then [...] the source of its being – provided it is not existentially original – must be something other than ideas. Ideas also do not sustain real objects in being [...], i.e. they do not comprise any sort of existential foundation for the latter, which is just a way of articulating that [...] real objects are [...] autonomous (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, pp. 261-262).

It seems, therefore, that it is exactly the opposite of what Marek Piwowarczyk holds. Ingarden evidently rejected both the derivativeness and the heteronomy of the real world to the world of ideas. “Derivativeness” and “heteronomy” are, of course, the next two technical terms of Ingarden’s existential ontology. Derivativeness consists in the necessity to be produced by something else (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, p. 118), and heteronomy in deriving its qualitative content from the outside (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, pp. 109-110). Thus, ideas do not condition the world either in its existence or its character (see also Mordka 2002, p. 219).

But what about the dependence suggested by Piwowarczyk? After all, the lack of derivativeness and heteronomy between things and ideas does not exclude such a weaker existential connection. First of all, it should be

noted that, according to Ingarden, dependence, in its proper sense, can only obtain between existentially self-sufficient beings (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, p. 153), so it could not, strictly speaking, obtain between non-self-sufficient individual properties and their corresponding self-sufficient pure ideal qualities. However, this is not a serious problem because one can easily extend the concept of dependency to include such cases. The crucial point is, however, that Ingarden explicitly rejected even weak existential dependency between real and ideal beings. He wrote:

It is not the mere *modus existentiae* of being-real that demands the existence of ideas as an indispensable condition for the existence of the world. It therefore does not seem absurd that there could in fact be a real world whose existence would not require the existence of ideas (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 264).

No more evidence is needed, I believe, to definitely reject the suggestion that Ingarden adopted the Platonic understanding of participation as an ontological dependence.

So, what really is the “conditioning” of things by ideas, to which Marek Piwowarczyk refers? According to Ingarden, ideas do not condition either the existence or the content of the world, but they only determine the necessary connections between properties in the world (Rojek 2019, pp. 159-160). As Ingarden wrote, this “certain conditioning” consists exclusively in that,

The necessity of the interconnection that obtains among particular moments that go into the complete make-up of the essence of an individual object can only be understood if we can appeal to the necessary interconnections among elements of the idea’s content and to a certain conditioning of what is individual by something idea-like (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 226).

As Artur Mordka notes, the relationship that takes place here is not existential, but only “material” (Mordka 2002, p. 219); I myself proposed that it be called “essential” (Rojek 2019, p. 174). In fact, it is merely an isomorphism between the elements of the content of ideas and corresponding elements of the essences of things. So there is only a structural resemblance between the real and the ideal contents. In other words, ideas are neither the principle of existence nor character, but only “the coexistence in the real world of the material moments that are necessarily bound together”

(Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, p. 264). This, by the way, leads to the conclusion that only ideas with complex content can condition things in this way. Simple ideal qualities have nothing to “determine” in their corresponding properties.

Therefore, I think that the form of Platonism proposed by Marek Piwowarczyk cannot be considered an adequate interpretation of Ingarden's views. This, however, is not crucial for Piwowarczyk's argument, since it rather concerns systematic than exegetical questions. By the way, it was Władysław Stróżewski who proposed a theory of participation as dependency between things and ideas, without, however, suggesting that he had interpreted Ingarden in this way (Stróżewski 1992, pp. 71-73). Piwowarczyk's proposal is therefore rather a creative development of Ingarden's theory, no less problematic, in my opinion, than the opposite suggestion to search for true universals in his ontology. Apparently, Ingarden stopped halfway. He departed too far from Aristotle to accept common constituents of things or properties, but he did not come quite close enough to Plato to accept the dependence of properties on ideal qualities. As a result, to my mind, he cannot be defended against the charge of hidden nominalism, which not only compromises his theory of universals, but also – and perhaps above all – ruins his own theory of essence. For his entire sophisticated isomorphism between ideas and essences breaks down if it is based merely on contingent correspondence and not on identity or dependence.

4. Relational beings

Now I would like to take a closer look at the Platonic solution of the problem of universals suggested by Marek Piwowarczyk. Even if, as I argued, it cannot be regarded as a satisfactory interpretation of Ingarden's position, it is still a compelling proposition of great historical importance. After all, ontological research primarily concerns not the interpretations of one author or another, but rather the possible solutions of the problem of universals. Now, however, I shall try to show that such a position leads to rather drastic consequences, which usually seems to be neglected by advocates of Platonism.

According to Platonists, things are what they are and have their existence as a result of their relation to transcendent ideas. As Marek Piwowarczyk clearly wrote, “a property is essentially what is in virtue of reflecting [of pure quality]. However, since it cannot exist without being itself, it is

also existentially dependent on pure quality (contrary to what Rojek says)” (Piwowarczyk 2020, pp. 131-132). This claim perfectly agrees with the nowadays standard interpretations of Plato. For example, R.E. Allen, the eminent Plato’s translator and commentator, pointed out that “reflections depend upon their original both for their character and their existence; it depends on them for neither” (Allen 1978, p. 179). As it turned out, such a theory, based on participation as a one-sided necessary relation, can avoid many difficulties. However, it leads to another disturbing question about the status of individuals. For what are individuals in themselves if they owe everything to their relation to ideas? Gareth Matthews and Marc Cohen, in their famous 1968 paper “The One and the Many,” formulated the following dilemma for the Platonic theory of universals:

Either Felix is what he is independent of participating in cathood (and is therefore a bare individual, whatever that might be thought to be) or else he is a mere relational entity (like a shadow or a reflection [...]) that owes its identity and continued existence to the relation it bears to something else (Matthews, Cohen 1968, pp. 643-644).

The problem arises from the fact that Platonic ideas are understood as transcendent to individuals, that is, they are neither their properties nor moments of their properties. Therefore, if there are no essential properties, i.e. all relations to ideas are contingent, then individuals turn out to be bare particulars; and if there are essential properties, i.e. some relations to ideas are necessary, individuals turn out to be relational beings. In both cases, Platonism leads to a radical revision of the ontological status of individuals, regardless of whether they are understood – e.g. by Matthews and Cohen – as concrete particulars or – as in the Platonic tropes theory, analyzed here – as abstract particulars. So, either we accept bare particulars, that is, individuals with no properties, or we admit relational beings, that is, individuals essentially related to other beings. For Matthews and Cohen, as for many others, both of these options seem unacceptable, so they propose abandoning the assumption that universals are transcendent, and, consequently, rejecting Platonism.

In *Tropes and Universals*, as Marek Piwowarczyk rightly noted, I suggested that Platonism leads to the adoption of bare particulars (Rojek 2019, p.166; Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 130). This was obviously due to my interpretation of Ingarden’s participation as a contingent relation between properties and qualities. If it is merely correspondence, then there is no reason

why a given property should relate rather to this or that ideal quality. This means, in turn, that properties have no intrinsic natures. Therefore, they are bare particulars. This is perhaps the most popular way of arguing against Platonism in analytical discussions. For example, David Armstrong wrote:

Suppose that *a* and *b* have quite different properties. According to the theory of transcendent Forms they are *in themselves* exactly the same. Their only differences lie in their relational properties: their relations to a different set of Forms. But may there not be a difference of nature in *a* and *b*, beyond mere numerical difference? Yet this difference the theory of Forms could not account for (Armstrong 1978, p. 69).

Armstrong pointed out that in Platonism, individuals, apart from their relations to ideas, are exactly the same, since they have no intrinsic qualities. So they are bare particulars. This charge seems particularly embarrassing when applied not so much to things, as Armstrong suggested, but to the properties themselves. Bare properties seem to violate the most elementary philosophical intuitions.

However, Platonism does not have to – and should not – lead to bare particulars. If one accepts, like Marek Piwowarczyk and many others, one-sided necessary participation, then the properties are essentially related to ideal qualities, and so they can never be bare. They always have a certain nature, though – and this is the price for avoiding bare particulars – this is a relational nature. Properties are what they are in virtue of their relations to qualities. So they are relational entities. Interestingly, this way of understanding Platonism is perhaps most often adopted by historians of philosophy. For example, Gail Fine says:

I do not find both horns of the dilemma [formulated by Matthews and Cohen – P.R.] unattractive. Although I reject bare particulars, I accept relational entities. If it is a consequence of Plato's [...] theory that particulars are relational entities, that is a desirable consequence (Fine 2003, pp. 327-328).

Relational entities are welcomed by historians of philosophy because they help in explaining the ontological difference between individuals and ideas, so highlighted by Plato. As Allen, who introduced the term “relational being,” pointed out,

The very being of a reflection is relational, wholly dependent upon what is other than itself [...]. The reflection does not *resemble* the original; rather, it is a *resemblance of* the original. This is its nature, and the whole of its nature. "Resemblances of" are quasi-substantial; relational entities, not relations. They stand to their originals as the dependent to independent, as less real to more real (Allen 1978, pp. 174-175).

In Platonism therefore, individuals, as opposed to forms, are relational. This is the core of the ontological difference between them postulated by Plato. Moreover, such an approach helps to solve many problems of the theory of ideas, particularly, the problem of the third man (Allen 1978, p. 183).

The theory of relational being explains the foundations of Plato's ontology, but requires a quite significant revision of the dominating image of the world. Things are usually treated as entities that exist independently of others and have their own intrinsic characteristics. In Platonism, on the contrary, as Allen wrote:

Particulars have no independent ontological status; they are purely relational entities, entities which derive their whole character and existence from Forms (Allen 1978, p. 181).

Therefore, it can be said that in Platonism things are no longer substances in the classical sense. For, as Aristotle wrote with emphasis, "no substance is spoken of as a relative," (*Categories*, 8a16; Aristotle 2002, p. 22), that is, the being of substance is not the same as "being somehow related to something" (*Categories*, 8a 31-32; Aristotle 2002, p. 22). Whereas, as Allen continued, according to Plato, exemplifications are not "substances in which qualities inhere" but "relational entities, entities in which resemblance and dependence so combine as to destroy the possibility of substantiality" (Allen 1978, p. 183). Certainly, a historian of philosophy may not be concerned about this, but a systematic ontologist must take it as a rather high price for Platonism. Gail Fine tried to somehow soften the Platonic position, pointing out that we in fact implicitly adopt looser criteria of substantiality. We accept, for instance, following Saul Kripke, that people have essential relations to their parents (Kripke 1980; Fine 2003, p. 341). I would add that even Ingarden himself allowed for ontological dependency between self-sufficient individual objects (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, pp. 153-155). So even if Platonic particulars are relational beings, they

still remain well-known, independently identifiable and persisting objects. Therefore, as Fine wrote, “we need not to conclude that Socrates is just a shadow and not a substance” (Fine 2003, p. 348). This return to normalcy, however, is at the cost of a revision of the classical concept of substance.

Marek Piwowarczyk does not explicitly formulate the Platonic dilemma, but seems to recognize the problems pointed out by Matthews and Cohen. He openly rejects the suggestion that Platonism leads to bare particulars. “One cannot,” he says, “understand the dependence of individual properties on ideal qualities in the (absurd) way that the properties themselves are unqualified” (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 130). Moreover, he seems to be inclined towards a relational solution. As he states, in Platonism, individual properties “are essentially what they are [...] in virtue of imitating” (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 131).

Marek Piwowarczyk clearly ascribes this version of the Platonic theory of ideas to Ingarden (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 130). As I have already argued, however, it cannot be accepted as an interpretation of Ingarden's position. However, the attempt to develop a robust Platonism in the frame of Ingarden's ontology leads to interesting results. Piwowarczyk apparently tries to moderate the idea of relational existence, presumably in order to be as close to Ingarden as possible. Thus, he emphasizes that although individual properties are conditioned by their relations to ideal qualities, they are nevertheless in themselves what they are. As he says,

The concretization of pure quality must consist, among other things, in arising out of a new individual content, which, in a way, reflects the pure quality. [...] However, this individual quality is conditioned by the ideal quality (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 130).

It is precisely this content, conditioned by participation in quality, that constitutes the qualitative nature of a property. In other words, the relation of participation leaves a permanent mark on the properties themselves. In this way, the thesis on the relational nature of being can be somewhat moderated.

It is easy to figure out why Marek Piwowarczyk insists so much that properties actually have their own content in themselves. If it were otherwise, properties, and hence also things, could not be considered autonomous beings, which for Ingarden would be a total disaster. In such a case, the real world would resemble purely intentional objects, and Platonism would be dangerously close to idealism. That is probably why Piwowarczyk emphasizes:

It is important, however, that the individual property of being red is autonomous in Ingarden's sense, and thus that the individual property of red (i.e. the individual quality) is actually contained in the individual property of being red or actually constitutes it (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 130).

Properties, although they possess their content solely in virtue of their relations to ideal qualities, remain within themselves what they are. In this – among other things – they differ from purely intentional entities. I think that this thought may be expressed, in reference to one of Ingarden's distinctions, by saying that the nature of individual properties, though relationally grounded, nevertheless resembles externally conditioned properties rather than relative characteristics (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. II, pp. 333-353). So, there is really something in the properties that is conditioned by their relations to ideas, not only the very relation itself. That is why, as Piwowarczyk claims, "being a red thing cannot be reduced to the relation between this thing and the pure ideal quality" (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 130).

I am not sure, however, whether Platonism can so easily avoid the world's heteronomy. For if the contents of properties really result from their relations to qualities, then, regardless of whether they are immanently contained in them or not, their ontic foundations lie beyond them, and this is a characteristic feature of heteronomy. Ultimately, the individuals in this version of Platonism are nothing in themselves; they are not even bare particulars, since both their existence and character is determined by participation in ideas. In this respect, the status of things in Platonism is strikingly similar to the status of things in idealism.

Moreover, it seems that if we adopt some rather uncontroversial methodological principles, it is quite easy, contrary to Piwowarczyk's claim, to reduce the content of properties simply to the relation of participation. In Platonism, the nature of an individual property apparently *supervenies* on the relation to general quality. Thus, the case of Platonism is in some sense the opposite of trope nominalism, in which it is usually believed that the resemblance relation supervenes on the natures of properties. Now, the point is that, according to many authors, what supervenes is not necessary for explanation of the world, and therefore does not have to be counted as real being. The supervenient entities are, as famously Armstrong put it, merely "ontological free lunches," which we "do not have to take too seriously metaphysically" (Armstrong 1989, pp. 100, 56). This is so because of the basic

principles of the theory of truthmaking, which seeks sufficient (or necessary and sufficient) conditions for the truthfulness of propositions (Rodríguez-Pereyra 2006). In the case of propositions on resembling tropes, for instance, the sufficient condition for their truth is simply the existence of the relevant tropes and their natures, and there is no need for the supervenient relation of resemblance (Rojek 2018, pp. 24–26). The situation is analogous in the case of individual properties participating in ideal qualities. It seems that the very relations of properties to ideal qualities are sufficient to make true propositions on the properties. There is simply no need for their supervenient contents. From the point of view of the theory of truthmaking, in the case of Platonism, the immanent contents of properties, which ultimately ground the autonomy of the world, are therefore unnecessary “ontological additions.” I do not want to discuss here in detail the methodological assumptions adopted in this argument. I think that even in this form it shows that Piwowarczyk’s moderate proposal is rather problematic.

Ultimately, it turns out that, in the consequent Platonism, things and properties in the real world exist and have their content only in virtue of their relations to ideas. In this respect, they seem to be similar to purely intentional beings. The horror of Platonism can be felt when we compare it with a fragment of Ingarden’s famous criticism of Husserl’s *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.

And what is the final result of all these considerations? [...] There is *nothing* existing in itself (*an sich Seiendes*), except pure consciousness [...]. It is absurd to ascribe to real objects “being in itself.” The idea of reality settles [...] that a real object is something devoid of a solid essence, that it does not contain any solid concretization of ideal qualities, that it is nothing in itself. Real objects are essentially existentially dependent on conscious acts (Ingarden 1933, p. 506).

It is enough to replace “pure consciousness” with “pure ideal qualities” in the above quotation to obtain a quite accurate description of the Platonic world. Platonism thus turns out to be idealism *par excellence*, though not in the modern sense of ideas in the mind, but rather in the ancient sense of ideas in the Third Kingdom. In both of these cases, the existence of the individuals is taken over by relations. And this, finally, is the ultimate price which has to be paid in order that “universals, understood in a Platonic way” could be, as Piwowarczyk urged, an appropriate “ground of similarity” (Piwowarczyk 2020, p. 119).

Now, I believe that the problem with Platonism is not so much that it simply accepts the relational nature of being, but rather that it situates it in the wrong place. The category of relational being seems to be indispensable in many areas, starting from the philosophy of physics (Ladyman 2016), through the philosophy of mathematics (Shapiro 2000), to social ontology (Rojek 2020), and also, and perhaps above all, to the metaphysics of the Holy Trinity (Rojek 2021). I even think that the thesis on the relational nature of being was Plato's most far-reaching discovery (Pabst 2012, pp. 5-52). The problem, however, is whether it is really necessary to invoke relational beings to explain the very problem of universals. Even in this matter, as it seems to me that Hegelian concrete universals are better than Platonic forms (Rojek 2019, pp. 95-107, 212-261, cf. however, Rojek 2008 and Florensky 2020). Therefore, unlike Marek Piwowarczyk, I am ready to accept the difficulties of relational being in explaining the existence of finite beings or *creatio ex nihilo*, but not merely the multiple occurrence of properties.

5. Conclusions

The theory of ideas was one of the greatest philosophical achievements of Roman Ingarden. Over the course of his whole life, he developed a detailed analysis of the structure of ideal beings. As he proudly stated, his approach "makes it possible to sustain a theory of the idea free from the objections that have been leveled at ideas ever since Aristotle's times, or rather – since the times of Plato's *Parmenides*" (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, p. 70).

All this impressive machinery, as I pointed out, was designed solely for the analysis of the problem of co-occurrence, not of the multiple occurrence of properties. Ingarden was fascinated by the problem of essences, not universals. Treated as a theory of universals, Ingarden's theory of ideas turns out to be a hidden nominalism. This is so because Ingarden defined concretization as merely correspondence between individuals and ideas, rejecting both the essential participation of the ideas in individuals and any existential connections between them. Ingarden merely accepted a structural resemblance, which was supposed to correlate the elements of things and the elements of their corresponding ideas. As I suggested, his system might be developed in different directions. One can supplement it by adding either true universals, or existential dependency between properties and qualities. I have advised the former, whereas Marek Piwowarczyk has attempted to follow the latter. In both cases, however, one has to ignore some of Ingarden's

rather unambiguous claims. So these two options are definitely not interpretations but rather modifications of his system.

The discussion of Ingarden's theory of ideas reveals specific links between the theory of universals, the theory of the object, and the theory of relations. Either one accepts immanent universals, or bare particulars, or relational entities. Each of these categories of beings is quite problematic. Immanent universals exist in many different things at once, bare particulars have no qualitative determinations, and relational beings draw their content and existence from other beings. However, one has to decide on something. It seems to me that Ingarden quite carelessly rejected immanent universals, not realizing the serious consequences of this move for his whole system of ontology. If one rejects universals in things, one has to accept either bare particulars or relational entities. This is the Platonic dilemma identified by Matthews and Cohen. If universals are not in things, either things have no content at all, or they have their content solely in virtue of their relations to universals. It seems that in discussions on universals, analytic philosophers usually attribute to Plato the adoption of bare particulars, whereas historians of philosophy tend to ascribe him the acceptance of relational entities. Each case is obviously troublesome, though.

As I have tried to show, the fundamental weakness of Ingarden's ontology is the nature of the relation between individual properties and pure ideal qualities. Ingarden was fully aware of its importance, but never provided any deeper analysis of it. In 1925, at the beginning of his philosophical career, in a footnote to his *Essential Questions*, Ingarden confessed:

The question of the relation of ideal qualities to their concretization in individual objects is still dark to me (Ingarden 1925, p. 364).

In 1970, at the end of his life, in answer to Stróżewski's question, he stated:

Nobody has said what the relation is here. But it is sure that it must be dealt with somehow differently (Ingarden 1970b, pp. 42-43).

Unfortunately, as I have argued, without explaining this "urgent problem" of the relation of properties to ideal qualities, not only the problem of universals, but also the problem of essence remains unsolved. For this reason, it seems to me that Ingarden's theory of ideas remains an unfinished project. As Prof. Władysław Stróżewski (2020, p. 285) recently recalled, "Ingarden himself claimed that the theory of ideas was not yet completed."

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11. Ingarden on Ontic Relations

I have been dealing with the works of Roman Ingarden for a long time. The first phase of my “Ingardenological” interest occurred in the decade 1973-1984, when, after studying the philosophy of Leon Chwistek, I began to study phenomenology, shocked by the sharp criticism of it contained in Chwistek’s (harmful) article, “Tragedy of the Verbal Metaphysics” (Chwistek 1932). In this phase I published seven works – (Jadacki 1973), (Jadacki 1974), (Jadacki 1975), (Jadacki 1980), (Jadacki 1980a), (Jadacki 1981) and (Jadacki 1984) – in which I analyzed and presented a proposal for a reinterpretation of various aspects of Ingardenism. I was discouraged from taking further steps in this direction by the almost complete lack of a matter-of-fact response from the numerous Ingardenist circles at that time, who, moreover, to this day usually repeat (I am afraid, without proper understanding) the original formulations of the author of *Controversy over the Existence of the World*.

Later I returned to the “Ingardenological” problems less systematically; one of the most important impulses for such returns was reading the inspiring works of Jerzy Perzanowski (Perzanowski 1989) and Jan Woleński (Woleński 1990), the publication of *Dictionary of Roman Ingarden’s Philosophical Concepts* (Nowak, Sosnowski (ed.) 2001), which I critically assessed in the review “Ingardenian Encyclopedia” (Jadacki 2001), and recently an article by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski about Ingarden’s concept of ways of existence (Chrudzimski 2015).

Now I have returned to Ingarden again – armed with many years of experience in undertaking analytical and historical research. The following text deals with the four key concepts of Ingarden’s ontology: heteronomy (Polish “*niesamoistność*”), derivativeness (Polish “*pochodność*”), non-self-reliance (Polish “*niesamodzielnosc*”), and dependence (Polish “*zależność*”),

which I generally call (not without support in Ingarden's own statements) "ontic subordination" or, for short, "subordination" (Polish "zawistość")¹⁸⁹.

1. Analysis

1.1. Heteronomy

Here is what Ingarden writes in *Controversy over the Existence of the World* about the pair of concepts, autonomy – heteronomy:

[A] Something exists autonomously if it has IN ITSELF its foundation of being. In turn, it has such foundation if IT IS IN ITSELF IMMANENTLY DETERMINED. On the other hand, something exists heteronomically if its foundation of being is in something other than itself (Ingarden 1947-1948, 93-94).

Let us assume that the " p if q " functor used in [A] can be interpreted as definitional equivalence, i.e. as the phrase " p when q ." I will reconstruct Ingarden's definition of "heteronomy" in such a way that it is understandable to a non-Ingardenist and satisfactory from the point of view of the requirements of logical methodology.

The first step in this reconstruction will be to give it a form¹⁹⁰:

(1) $(x \text{ } Zy) \text{ } \circ$ (x is heteronomous in relation to y | x has a basis of being in y).

In turn:

(2) x has a basis of being in y | x is determined by y .

¹⁸⁹ In this paper, I refer to the Polish version of *Controversy* in my own translation, because I have smaller or bigger reservations about the existing translation (Ingarden 2013-2016). For example, in this issue the sentence "Przedmiot jest bytowo pierwotny, jeżeli z istoty swej nie może być wytworzony przez żaden inny przedmiot" is translated as: "An entity is existentially original if, in accordance with its essence, it cannot be produced by any other entity." Namely, instead of my "object" we have "entity", instead of my "primary" we have "original," instead of my "essentially" we have "in accordance with its essence" etc. (cf. below, [B]). So the translation conventions are quite different than mine. However, there is no place to discuss the details here.

¹⁹⁰ Here and below, for the sake of simplicity, I will omit quantifiers in formulas where all quantifiers are generalizers.

Note that formula (2) does not prejudge whether $(x = y)$ or $(x \text{ Z}y)$. In the first case, Ingarden says that x is “in itself immanently defined.” I have the impression that the word “immanently” is a pleonasm in this context, so the sentences “ x is defined in itself” and “ x is immanently defined” are definitionally equivalent.

After substituting (2) for (1) we get:

(3) $(x \text{ Z}y) \text{ O } (x \text{ is heteronomous in relation to } y \mid x \text{ is determined by } y)$.

As in the case of autonomy, we can speak in Ingarden’s spirit of x which is heteronomical in relation to y , different from x , that x is transcendently determined.

The question arises now of what it means that x is determined by x or by y different from x . Having collected Ingarden’s statements scattered throughout the various works, I would say that:

(4) x is determined in aspect of v by $x \mid w$ (w is a specification of v w is ascribed to x).

(5) $(x \text{ Z}y) \text{ O } \{x \text{ is determined in aspect of } v \text{ by } y \mid [\sim w$ (w is a specification of v w is ascribed to x) w (w is a specification of v w is ascribed to x by y)].

Two cases can now occur: (a) x is defined only in some aspects, or (b) x is determined in all possible aspects. I will limit myself to case (a) below, because case (b) does not actually take place. Let us agree that V is the class (set of all) aspects in which x is defined; following Ingarden, let us call such a class of considerations “ x ’s endowment.”

Formula (3) can then be expanded into one of two forms:

(6) $(x \text{ Z}y) \text{ O } (x \text{ is fully autonomous in relation to } y \mid [v \underset{V}{\sim} w$ (w is a specification of v w is ascribed to x) $v \underset{V}{\sim} w$ (w is a specification of v w is ascribed to x by y)].

Speaking freely: a given object is completely heteronomous in relation to another object when each property that is a specification of any aspect belonging to the endowment of the first object is only assigned to it by the second object (or at most by a certain person).

(7) $(x \text{ Z}y \text{ Z}z) \text{ O } \text{ \textcircled{Z} } \text{ is partly heteronomous in relation to } y \mid \parallel v \underset{V}{\sim} w$ (w is a specification of v w is not ascribed to x w is to x ascribed by y) $v \underset{V}{\sim} w$ {[w is a specification of v [w is ascribed to x (w is not ascribed to x w is ascribed to x by z)]]} \text{ \textcircled{Z} } \text{ †

Speaking freely: a given object is partly heteronomous in relation to another object when there are properties which are specifications of any aspect belonging to the endowment of the first object which are only ascribed to

it by the second object, and moreover, they are such that they are ascribed to the first object, or are only ascribed to it by an object different from the first or second one.

As we can see, in order for formulas (6) and (7) to be understandable to us, we must understand the predicates “[property] w is a specification of [aspect] v ,” “[property] w is ascribed to x ,” and “[property] w is ascribed to x by y .”

(8) [Property] w is a specification of [aspect] v | w is v .

For example, redness is a specification of colorness, because redness is a colorness. In turn:

(9) [Property] w is ascribed to [object] x | x is w -like.

For example: redness belongs to this-here-poppy-petal, because this-here-poppy-petal is red.

Ingarden believes objects which are heteronomous in relation to something to be, firstly, purely intentional objects whose certain properties (which specify their endowment) are heteronomous in relation to corresponding acts of consciousness of a given person, and certain other properties are ascribed to them¹⁹¹. Examples of such purely intentional objects include objects of our imagination and “individual literary works, musical works, objects of the social and state system, positive law, *etc.*” (Ingarden 1947-1948, p. 99).

Secondly, “empirically possible future objects and states of affairs, determined each time by current sets of states of affairs within the real world [...], [also] belong to heteronomous objects until they are realized” (Ingarden 1947: 102). Note that in the case of such objects in definitions (6) and (7), the phrase “ w is assigned to x by y ” should probably be replaced by the phrase “ w , as the property of x , is determined by y ,” and y is a certain “current sets of states of affairs within the real world.”

1.2. Derivativeness

In *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, we read about the pair of concepts, primariness-derivativeness:

¹⁹¹ For example, when I imagine Sienkiewicz's Zagłoba as a witty nobleman, being-witty is a property of this imaginary Zagłoba ascribed by me, and he is entitled to being-heteronomous.

[B] An object is *EXISTENTIALLY PRIMARY* if it essentially cannot be produced by any other object. If it exists at all, it is only because *IT CANNOT NOT EXIST FROM ITS ESSENCE*, as long as “essence” of this kind exists at all, and speaking more precisely, such a selection of ideal properties which would determine it in such a way. [...] Hence it follows that, while it exists, it cannot be annihilated by any other object, that is, it is *EXISTENTIALLY PERMANENT*. On the other hand, an object is *EXISTENTIALLY DERIVATIVE* if in its essence it is such that it can only exist by being produced by another object (Ingarden 1947-1948, pp. 102-103).

Let us assume – similarly to [A] – that the functor “*p* if *q*” used in [B], and also in similar circumstances below, may be interpreted as definitional equivalence. I will now reconstruct Ingarden’s definition of “derivative.” In [B], two things are said about derivativeness (and, accordingly, about primariness):

(10) [*x* exists (*x* *Zy*)] \circ [*x* is derivative in relation to *y* | (*x* is produced by *y*) \wedge *x* is annihilated by *y*].

(11) *x* is derivative | it is possible that *x* does not exist.

Formulas (11) and (12) should be supplemented with some intelligible interpretation of the phrase „from its essence.” Let this be interpreted as follows:

(12) [*x* exists (*x* *Zy*)] \circ [*x* is derivative in relation to *y* | from *x*’s essence (*x* is produced by *y* \wedge *x* can be annihilated by *y*)].

(13) *x* is derivative | from *x*’s essence, it is possible that *x* does not exist.

But what does the phrase “from *x*’s essence, it is the case that *x* is *P*” mean? On the basis of Ingarden’s various statements about essence, I am inclined to conclude that:

(14) From *x*’s essence, it is the case that *x* is *P* | it is impossible that it is not the case that *x* is not *P*.

If my interpretation of Ingarden’s expression “from *x*’s essence, it is the case that *x* is *P*” is accurate, then formulas (12) and (13) can assume the following form:

(15) [*x* exists (*x* *Zy*)] \circ [*x* is derivative in relation to *y* | it is impossible that it is not the case that (*x* is produced by *y* \wedge *x* can be annihilated by *y*)].

(16) *x* is derivative | it is impossible that it is not the case that *x* does not exist.

I cannot distinguish the meaning of formulas (16) and (11). As for formula (15), it can be simplified to the form:

(17) [x exists $(x \text{ Z } y)$] \circ [x can be derivative in relation to y | it is necessary that (x is produced by y x is annihilated by y)].

According to Ingarden, a primary object is neither produced by something nor can be annihilated, so if it exists, it is eternal¹⁹²; in contrast, a derived object is not eternal, so if it exists, it has been produced by something or can be annihilated by something.

Ingarden considers individual things in Plato's and Aristotle's works to be derivative in relation to something (derivative in relation to ideas or forms, respectively), as well as the world of the neo-Platonists and scholastics (derivative in relation to God). It is significant that none of these examples of objects derived from something is provided by Ingarden on his own responsibility, as indicated by the expressions "with Plato," "with Aristotle," *etc.*

1.3. Non-self-reliance

Let us quote an excerpt from *Controversy over the Existence of the World* again, this time one which contains a description of the pair: self-reliance – non-self-reliance:

[C] An object exists self-reliantly if IT DOES NOT REQUIRE, FROM ITS ESSENCE, THE EXISTENCE OF ANY OTHER OBJECT WITH WHICH IT WOULD HAVE TO COEXIST WITHIN ONE AND THE SAME WHOLE. In other words: IF ITS EXISTENCE IS NOT, DUE TO ITS ESSENCE, A NECESSARY COEXISTENCE WITHIN ONE WHOLE WITH ANOTHER OBJECT. [...] On the other hand, something is existentially non-self-reliant if its EXISTENCE IS ESSENTIALLY A NECESSARY COEXISTENCE WITHIN ONE WHOLE WITH SOMETHING ELSE (OR IT IS SOMETHING SPECIFICALLY DEFINED AS TO ITS MATERIAL ESSENCE) (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, p. 132).

Unlike in the case of derivativeness, Ingarden immediately gives his own examples of non-self-reliance, providing them with an appropriate commentary. Thus:

¹⁹² Cf. (Ingarden 1947, p. 128).

The moment “redness” in the whole “red color” is non-self-reliant because it must coexist with the moment of “colorness” contained in this whole [...]. There can be no “red” object in which there would be “redness” but no „colorness” (Ingarden 1947-1948, pp. 132-133)].

Another case of non-self-reliance occurs in the existence of the “red color” as the PROPERTY of a certain “red” individual object (thing). Also here the “red color” cannot exist for itself, separate from a given thing [e.g. red cloth], which it is a property of, but only in coexistence with it (Ingarden 1947-1948, pp. 133).

Both the definitional context (C) and the examples of non-self-reliance given by Ingarden (let us add, for example, color and extension to them, for example) allow us to reconstruct the concept of non-self-reliance as follows (I omit the phrase „from its essence” for the above mentioned reason):

(18) $(x \text{ } Z y) \text{ } \circ [x \text{ is non-self-reliant in relation to } y \mid z (z \text{ is a whole it is necessary that } x \text{ coexists with } y \text{ within } z)]$.

Elsewhere, Ingarden distinguishes between two kinds of whole: summative whole and organic whole. The main difference between them is that the parts of the summative whole are separable *in concreto* from each other, as he says, and the parts of the organic whole are not (they are, at most, intellectually separable). There is no doubt that formula (18) concerns to an organic whole, but if so, formula (18) can be simplified assuming that:

(19) It is necessary that x coexists with $y \mid x$ is not separable from y .

Therefore we obtain:

(20) $(x \text{ } Z y) \text{ } \circ (x \text{ is non-self-reliant in relation to } y \mid x \text{ is not separable from } y)$.

1.4. Dependence

Also in this case, the last within the present review, let us begin with a quotation:

[D] One more important distinction must be made WITHIN existentially SELF-RELIANT objects. Namely, it is possible that a certain object is existentially self-reliant, and DESPITE THAT, it requires from its essence for its [continued] existence a certain OTHER EXISTENTIALLY SELF-RELIANT object. We then say of it that it is existentially dependent on it. [...] It is possible that two or

more objects are [...] MUTUALLY existentially dependent. In all these [...] cases, existentially dependent objects are two mutually SEPARATED wholes. [...] If, on the other hand, a certain existentially independent object does not essentially require ANY existentially independent object for its existence, and thus no other object at all, then it is existentially INDEPENDENT in the ABSOLUTE sense (Ingarden 1947-1948, vol. I, 138-139).

I will risk the following interpretation of context [D]:

(21) $[(x \text{ Z}y) \quad (x \text{ is independent } y \text{ is independent})] \text{ O } [(x \text{ is dependent in relation to } y \mid (x \text{ exists } \text{O} \ y \text{ exists})]$.

Let us note, following Ingarden, that conditioning the existence of y by x , mentioned in *definiens* of formula (21) – that is, that y exists provided that x exists – does not consist in production (as is the case with derivativeness).

Ingarden's examples of dependent objects are: father – son, husband – wife, human organism – oxygen and appropriate outside temperature, purely intentional object – (appropriate) act of consciousness¹⁹³.

1.5. Relationships between subordinations

According to Ingarden, the following relationships occur between kinds of subordinations:

(22) $x [\ y (x \text{ is heteronomous in relation to } y \text{ O } \sim \ y (x \text{ is primary in relation to } y)]$.

Moreover, (22) does not imply that heteronomous objects (that is, purely intentional ones) are derivative of something. The relation of assigning something to something is not reducible to the relation of production. Therefore, we obtain¹⁹⁴:

(23) $x \text{ is heteronomous in relation to } y \text{ O } x \text{ is not primary in relation to } y$ ¹⁹⁵.

(24) $x \text{ is heteronomous in relation to } y \text{ O } x \text{ is not independent in relation to } y$.

(25) $x \text{ is non-self-reliant in relation to } y \text{ O } x \text{ is not independent in relation to } y$.

¹⁹³ Cf. (Ingarden 1947-1948, pp. 139-140).

¹⁹⁴ Cf. (Ingarden 1947-1948, p. 141).

¹⁹⁵ A heteronomous object is also not a derivative object. Cf. (Ingarden 1972, p. 450).

Yet, the fact that x is not primary in relation to y does not mean that x is derivative in relation to y etc.

2. Criticism

2.1. Ad heteronomy

Formulas (7) and (8), concerning heteronomy, give the impression that their *definiens* refers to the same properties (w) belonging to the endowment of items defined as heteronomous. However, this is an illusory impression. After all, what does it mean that w is only ascribed to x by y (or z)? It means the following:

(26) w is only ascribed to x by y | (x states about w that w inheres in x | w does not inhere in x).

Naturally, the fact that someone says something about a certain property does not imply that that property is a real property. Let us consider the state of affairs that this-here-poppy-petal is red; the redness of this petal is therefore also real. However, when I say about redness, for example, that it inheres in a poppy-petal, which I just imagine as red, it is by no means real redness, but it is also imaginary. And no such imaginary redness belongs to the endowment of an actual poppy petal.

A similar reservation should be made regarding the transformations of formulas (7) and (8) with the phrase “ w , as x ’s property, is determined by y ” in their *definiens*, since the problem is about future properties, and therefore, not yet “implemented” properties, as Ingarden states.

Finally, of an object that is heteronomous, or at least purely intentional, Ingarden says that it has an existential basis (or the foundation of existence) in another object¹⁹⁶, where:

(27) y is the existential basis for x | x would not exist without y maintaining x ’s existence¹⁹⁷.

I think, contrary to Ingarden, that these – in fact – metaphors can be understood literally in such a way that the condition of having an existential-basis in another object is fulfilled not only by a purely intentional object, but by all kinds of objects subordinated in relation to something.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. e.g. (Ingarden 1963, p. 482).

¹⁹⁷ Cf. e.g. (Ingarden 1958, p. 68).

2.2. *Ad derivativeness*

As we remember, Ingarden's definition of derivativeness can be interpreted in two ways: (17) and (11). This situation raises two questions.

The first question is: How do formulas (17) and (11) relate to each other, and in particular, whether the definition of "derivativeness" is their conjunction, or is only one of these formulas, or the second results from the definition, or, finally, is a "separate" thesis on derivativeness? I have the impression that formula (11) is a consequence of formula (17), assuming that:

(28) [It is necessary that y (x is produced by y x can be annihilated by y)] \circ it is possible that x does not exist.

It can therefore be assumed that formula (17) is the correct reconstruction of Ingarden's concept of derivativeness.

NB. Ingarden also assumes the following thesis on derivativeness:

(28) x [x exists \circ (x is derivative in relation to y \circ y is primary in relation to z)].

Admittedly, Ingarden declares that he means here "absolute derivativeness," but his explanation of "absoluteness"¹⁹⁸ does not let me understand the difference between absolute derivativeness (perhaps: derivativeness from any object?) from relative derivativeness (perhaps: derivativeness from a specific object?).

Another question related to formula (17) concerns the concept of production, entangled in *definiens* of this formula. (It can be assumed that the problem with the second concept of *definiens* of this formula – i.e. with the concept of annihilation – disappears after a satisfactory answer to the

¹⁹⁸ I quote the appropriate passage *in extenso*: "Both concepts of existential primariness and existential derivativeness refer to something absolute in the mode of existence of given objects. However, the concept of existential derivativeness also contains a certain relative reference, namely a certain indication of the object which a given existentially derived object comes from. This reference can be either completely unequivocally defined, so that then we know exactly which object a given existentially derived object comes from, or it remains undefined" (Ingarden 1947-1948, p. 131). So far, the problem is clear to me: it is about distinguishing the phrases (a) " x is derivative," (b) " x is derivative in relation to another object," and (c) " x is derivative in relation to this specific object." Moreover, I do not understand why Ingarden perceives some ontic "gap" between (a) and (c), since (c) is a substitute for (b), and (b) is a deelipsization of (a). Further on, Ingarden writes: „If such indeterminacy is connected with the unlimited variability of the reference to the parent object, then we speak of the absolute relativity of the ontic derivative of a given object" [*ibid.*]. This is just the puzzling part for me.

question on the concept of production.) To put it simply, two interpretations of production are permissible:

(30) x is produced by y | (y acts on z the fact that y acts on z is the cause of the fact that z changes into x).

(31) x is produced by y | y brings integrally x into existence.

Let us retain the term “producing” for case (30), and in case (31) speak of “creating.”

Initially, Ingarden writes:

There MAY be causal relationships between the existentially primary object and the existentially derivative object, although this is doubtful (Ingarden 1947-1948, p. 105).

Later, however, he maintains that producing is a variant of a causal relationship. Interpretation (31) seems to come into play as well. However, it is difficult to say what the “material” content of the creation defined in the formula (30) would consist of – as Ingarden would probably put it. Would it consist on some *Fiat!* from nothing – just as annihilation would consist in the total disappearance of the object being annihilated?

2.3. *Ad non-self-reliance*

Among the examples of non-self-reliance provided by Ingarden, the least controversial is the relationship between any property of a certain object and the object itself, e.g. between the redness and a red object. Let us note that this is mutual non-self-reliance because the red object is non-self-reliant in relation to (its) redness, assuming, of course, that if x is a red object and at some point the color of x changes from redness to brown color, for example, then the object x will become an object, say, y , different from x .

It is similar, perhaps, with, for example, two different properties that belong to one object at the same time – e.g. the redness and the extension of a certain red extended object.

The situation is different with the relation between, e.g. redness and color, which Ingarden also considers non-self-reliance. Indeed, redness is not separate from the color of an object because if the object is red, it is also colored. But is it allowed to say here that (this-here) red and (this-here) color form a summative whole (in Ingarden’s understanding)?

Let us use the letter ‘*A*’ to symbolize the set of all and only red objects, the letter ‘*B*’ to symbolize the set of all and only objects that are colored, and the letters ‘*P*’ and ‘*Q*’ respectively to symbolize redness and colorness. Thus we obtain:

(32) *P* is dependent from $Q \mid A \quad B$.

This kind of Ingarden’s examples of dependence, then, are essentially purely semantic relationships.

2.4. *Ad* dependence

Formula (21) itself, which is the definition of “dependence,” does not present any interpretative difficulties. Difficulties arise in at least some of Ingarden’s examples of dependence, namely the father-son and husband-wife pairs. Let us consider the first pair (in the case of the second – the reasoning can be repeated with appropriate modifications). In *definiens* of formula (21), let us substitute for *x* and *y*, in turn, the expressions “father” and “son.” We then obtain:

(33) Father exists \circ son exists.

There is no doubt for me that formula (33) is elliptical and after expanding it takes the form (in the male class):

(34) (*x* is *y*’s father \mid *x* exists) \circ (*y* is *x*’s son \mid *y* exists).

Formula (34) is a consequence of two formulas (also in this case, let us limit ourselves to the male class, for the sake of simplicity):

(35) (*x* is *y*’s father) \mid (*y* is *x*’s son).

(36) ($xRy \mid x$ exists) \circ *y* exists.

Formula (35) expresses, like formula (32), a certain semantic relationship: the being-a-father relationship between *x* and *y* may otherwise be called (in the male class) the “being-a-son relationship between *y* and *x*.” On the other hand, formula (36) expresses a statement which has no universal value if we understand the same by “existence” in the precedent and the consequent (e.g. “being-in-space-and-time”) because there are certain relations that exist between real and purely intentional objects (cf. e.g. the relation of imagining that occurs between me and the centaur I am imagining).

3. Conclusion

The conclusion of the analysis and criticism carried out above is the following:

(a) Ingardenian definition of “heteronomy,” at least in the version that I reconstruct, is logically incorrect.

(b) The concept of production found in *tdefiniens* of Ingarden’s definition of “derivativeness” is either reducible to the concept of cause (the reduction of which Ingarden opposes *expressis verbis*, at least in some places), or remains unexplained; then this definition assumes the features of an *ignotum per ignotum* definition.

(c) At least some of Ingarden’s examples of non-self-reliance and dependence are semantic, rather than ontic, in character.

Ingarden wrote of Benedetto Croce:

The reality with which he communicates and which he tries to master with his theory is, as if obscured by fog, produced by his imprecise language and unfinished conceptual apparatus (Ingarden 1958, pp. 339-340).

Unfortunately, I applied this diagnosis to most of Ingarden’s works in the first phase of my “Ingardenological” research, and I am inclined to maintain it also today.

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12. Musical Work. Ingarden's Elitist-Liberal Approach

1. Initial remarks

There is an epigram by Tadeusz Kotarbiński²⁰⁰ about herring unsuccessfully looking for deep but clear water. In philosophy, as in the sea, it is difficult to find a clear depth. Roman Ingarden is undoubtedly a profound philosopher, who did not avoid the most important and difficult philosophical problems. Reading Ingarden's writings, however, one feels a certain nebulosity of the style. He was often reminded of this nebulosity by his colleagues from Lvov who stood, let's say, on the "bright" side (but, as Ingarden might say – "shallow"). They were the "logicizing" students of Kazimierz Twardowski.

Ingarden himself was also a student of Twardowski for a short time, but he took more from Edmund Husserl, to whom he was sent by Twardowski himself. It was Husserl's style of philosophizing that Ingarden took over and instilled in Polish soil. Both Twardowski and Husserl were students of Franz Brentano, but they developed their teacher's ideas in different directions. Ultimately, the Twardowski's School is considered to be the Polish mainstream of analytical philosophy, and Ingarden is considered to be the leading Polish phenomenologist. Both these currents, however, have a common source just in the philosophy of Brentano, who inspired both Twardowski and Husserl. This applied especially to certain methodological features common in both traditions, despite obvious differences.

¹⁹⁹ This is an improved, English version of my paper "Rozjaśnianie ciemnej głębi," presented in October, 2020, at the conference "Roman Ingarden. Pytania fundamentalne" (Warsaw, September, 2020) and published in *Przegląd Filozoficzny*.

²⁰⁰ In English translation, the epigram sounds more or less as follows: "A certain picky herring went / In pursuit of bright depths. / Wherever it went, it was always in vain. / Shallow but clear here; deep but dark there."

Returning to the question of the clarity: when Twardowski wrote the text “On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style” in 1919, Ingarden replied according to the principle: hit the table and the scissors will sound. In his reply to Twardowski’s text, Ingarden pointed out that understanding of a text depends as much on the author as on the reader. It is difficult to disagree with this, and it should even be added that when reading other people’s texts, we should be guided by the principle of goodwill towards their authors (accompanied by cold criticism of our own texts).

In the following comments about Ingarden’s conception of musical work²⁰¹, I will be guided by the principle recognized in the Twardowski’s School, according to which the thought of the analyzed author should be understood and expressed more clearly than the author himself did. Perhaps in this case, clearer is also more shallow, but this tradeoff is sometimes worth it. When reconstructing Ingarden’s position, I will not try to imitate his style as attempts to imitate the style of great philosophers are generally unsuccessful. I will try to express Ingarden’s thoughts in my own conceptual scheme. I support this with the belief that if a thought is expressible at all, it can be expressed in more than one language – sometimes including a language that is clearer than the original language.

Ingarden’s conception of musical work was commented on by many philosophers of music, most recently by (Simons 2021) and (Świdorski 2021). In the latter paper, one may find a broad and competent presentation of various approaches to Ingarden’s views on musical work. What is striking in these various approaches is that the paper of the Polish phenomenologist has so many significantly different interpretations. Some of these interpretations are for sure erroneous. Unfortunately, it is Ingarden and his unclear style that should be blamed for these misinterpretations.

The analysis of Ingarden’s position presented here is of a methodological nature; so I will refer to other papers on Ingarden’s conception only as long

²⁰¹ From among many possible terms, I use here “musical work” in reference to what Ingarden wrote about. Firstly, it is closer linguistic equivalent of “utwór muzyczny” (not: “utwór muzyki”) used by Ingarden in the Polish original. Secondly, it is a closer analogue of the term “literary work” which is commonly used by “Ingardenists.” Thirdly, the adjective+noun construction helps to avoid the multiplication of genitives. However, in the official English translation of Ingarden’s paper “Utwór muzyczny i sprawa jego tożsamości” the term “work of music” is used (*The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*). Some fragments of Ingarden’s paper were drafted in 1928, and the final version of which was published (in Polish) in 1957.

as they touch this methodological perspective. I look at Ingarden's conception primarily from the point of view of the assumptions he made and the procedures he used in his investigations. At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between what he himself declared that he was doing and what he really did, i.e. the methods which he explicitly declared he would use, and what he actually used implicitly. Of course, the reconstruction and systematization of the latter is tedious and risky, and yet even Ingarden's marginal remarks allow some hypotheses to be made in this matter.

2. Internal and external criticism

When a methodological critique of philosophers' conceptions is made, the following elements must be noted:

- (a) the problem they posed;
- (b) the assumptions they made;
- (c) the methods they applied.

We should distinguish also between the internal and external analysis (or criticism) of a given conception. In the internal analysis or criticism of the work of a given philosopher, we adopt the same assumptions as that philosopher, and we apply the procedures that philosopher chose to solve the posed problem. Through this prism, we look at the results that the philosopher came to. If possible, we repeat the appropriate research (of course, this can only be done as long as the author uses a repeatable method). Let us remember that the above-mentioned elements (a)-(c), i.e. these problems, assumptions and methods, are not always clearly indicated by the author of the philosophical work. Sometimes we can only guess at these elements.

In the external analysis or criticism, we can, in turn, revise some or even all of the above-mentioned points, checking whether the method has been selected correctly and whether certain assumptions have been correctly adopted; we can also undermine the accuracy of the question posed or the legitimacy of asking it at all.

Below I will consider Ingarden's conception from an internal and external point of view, respectively.

3. Problem

What questions did Ingarden raise in his monograph on musical work, what assumptions did he adopt, and what procedures did he use to answer these questions? The fundamental problem of his book may be simply expressed by the question:

What is musical work?

In particular, Ingarden is concerned with the ontic category of musical works, and then with the essence of musical works. Thus, these are the questions of essence (“*essentiale Fragen*”) in Ingarden’s sense²⁰². It is the ontological problems that come to the fore in Ingarden’s dissertation (although there are also epistemological and aesthetic problems), so I will also focus mainly on them.

Let us explain what Ingarden means when he writes about musical works. He does not take into consideration anything that we call “music” in ordinary speech, he does not deal with the totality of musical phenomena. He limits his scope to a certain corpus with selected Western music compositions (say, the classical philharmonic repertoire)²⁰³. The easiest way to find out which works Ingarden is writing about is based on the examples he cites in the text. Incidentally, Ingarden often mentions exemplary musical works in it. Every few sentences he states that he is considering works such as Beethoven’s 5th Symphony or Chopin’s Sonata in *B* minor, as if to constantly remind the reader that in his deliberations he does not go beyond the class he chooses (as one could say: below a certain level). Music from other cultural areas or, for example, entertaining pieces, do not interest him in this case. The choice of such and no other corpus or canon as the “empirical” basis of Ingarden’s conception plays an important role in his investigations.

In the collection of compositions of Western musical culture written between the 17th and the beginning of the 20th century, Ingarden makes further serious cuts. He does not take into account, e.g. musical works with

²⁰² Cf. (Ingarden 1925). Prof. Edward Świdorski attracted my attention to the fact that Ingarden’s aim was not to indicate of the essence of musical work but only the conditions of its identity. Perhaps it is right, however, I still read at least some parts of Ingarden’s book as “essentially” oriented. I believe that in this reading, I somehow follow a certain tradition initiated by Lissa (1966).

²⁰³ Although Ingarden does not write directly that he is limited to outstanding works, this additional limitation is evidenced by his examples, as well as some detailed considerations, e.g. concerning the unity of a musical work.

text, such as masses, oratorios, operas and songs. This is another very serious limitation. Mieczysław Tomaszewski, an eminent Polish music theorist, maintained that music with text constitutes ca. 80% of music in general. I do not know if Tomaszewski's estimates are justified (I do not know the exact statistical data), but even if the proportions are slightly smaller, ignoring vocal music is a theoretically significant decision²⁰⁴.

In connection with the above-mentioned limitations, let us call the type of corpus that Ingarden chose as his empirical base an "elitist corpus."

4. "Pre-scientific" assumptions

Ingarden openly lists certain "pre-scientific" assumptions, which he makes the starting point for his deliberations. These are statements that, according to him, are recognized by people who have contact with compositions belonging to the above-mentioned elitist corpus. Moreover, according to Ingarden, any scientific theory must start from some pre-scientific assumptions. The problem is about the beliefs we hold in "everyday life" before we succumb to one or another theory. While Ingarden does not prejudge the truth of these claims, they set his "direction to the search." Ingarden writes about this openly:

Every theory of musical works that is not mere speculation but seeks a base in concrete facts must refer to the presystematic convictions that initially gave direction to the search (Ingarden 1938, p. 1).

²⁰⁴ *NB.* Although Ingarden did not deal with music with text in his dissertation, he considered the matter of vocal-instrumental works and the question of the relationship between music and the word as important, but difficult to theoretically elaborate. It just so happens that the connections between music and words became the main focus for the aforementioned Tomaszewski. Tomaszewski wrote an extensive MA thesis on this subject, and Ingarden was its reviewer. Ingarden was so pleased with the work that he only recommended that the ending for the first chapter be written and presented as an MA thesis, and the rest be retained for a PhD. Tomaszewski wrote the ending to the first chapter, but Ingarden found it so interesting that he suggested leaving it for his habilitation. At the same time, however, as Tomaszewski recalled, Ingarden made so many overbearing philosophical remarks on the fringes of his work that Tomaszewski was for a long time discouraged from climbing the next steps in his scientific career (cf. Milewska 2019).

Here is this set of Ingarden's "pre-scientific" ("presystematic") assumptions in my paraphrase. In square brackets, I give example sentences of which Ingarden's assumptions are generalizations. Sentences of this type are relatively commonly accepted by people who have contact with music (or at least with elements of the elitist corpus).

(Z₁) Musical works are created by composers. [„Sonata in B minor, Op. 58, was created by Fryderyk Chopin.”]

(Z₂) Musical works are created in a certain time. [“Sonata in B minor, Op. 58, was created in 1844.”]

(Z₃) Musical works last regardless of the duration of their authors. [“Sonata in B minor exists in 2020, i.e. 171 years after the death of Fryderyk Chopin.”]

(Z₄) Musical works are usually written in notes. [“The manuscript of Sonata in B minor, Op. 58, is in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris.”]

(Z₅) Some musical works were never written in notes. [“In December 1835, Chopin improvised during a concert for Polish refugees.”]

(Z₆) Musical works are usually performed on musical instruments. [“Sonata in B minor, Op. 58, is intended for solo piano performance.”]

(Z₇) Some musical works were never performed. [“Sinfonia concertante for oboe, horn and bassoon with orchestra by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart has never been performed.”]

(Z₈) One musical works can have multiple performances. [“During the second stage of the 15th Chopin Piano Competition in 2015, Sonata in B minor, Op. 58, was performed ten times.”]

(Z₉) Performances of musical works and reproductions of these performances are the object of perception of listeners and the object of their aesthetic experiences. [“Over 50,000 listeners listened to the performances of Sonata in B minor in the second stage of the 15th Chopin Piano Competition.”]²⁰⁵

Ingarden lists the assumptions Z₁-Z₈ in the introduction to his book and, let us emphasize once again, that he expresses his conviction that any theory of musical work should take them into account (although he admits that possibly at least some of these assumptions will have to be rejected). Let

²⁰⁵ Note that assumptions Z₄ and Z₆ contain weakening quantifiers (“usually”), and assumptions Z₅ and Z₇ describe the relevant exceptions to the rules. The remaining assumptions can be treated as generally quantified.

us note here that not every philosopher of music follows Ingarden's advice and take these assumptions into consideration. This happens especially with those who cannot withdraw their strong ontological prejudices.

5. Method and methodological assumptions

There is a second type of assumption made by Ingarden. These are the assumptions and, let us add, the postulates related to his style of philosophizing: the phenomenological style. Although the postulate of no assumptions is associated with the phenomenological style of philosophizing, and is sometimes misunderstood, some general attitudes accompany this research.

These are both negative (anti-reductionism – including anti-psychologism, and anti-scientism) and positive attitudes. An important role here is played by the postulate of basing research on a theoretically uninvolved description of objects, which derives from a particular way of cognizing them. This postulate is briefly summarized by Husserl's slogan "*Zurück zu den Sachen selbst*," and Ingarden considers it proof that "objects have claimed their rights" (Ingarden 1919, p. 289). It is about the kind of experience in which we "put into brackets" all theoretical and scientific knowledge, and "open up" only to what objects are: their formal diversity and richness of content. Taking the aura of mystery out of these expressions, we would simply say that we do not make assumptions about the metaphysical status of objects we examine.

This particular method of cognition, which makes it possible to attain "things themselves," is supposed to be different from external perception and different from reasoning. Figuratively speaking, due to this cognition, the phenomenologist puts "the object itself" "in front of the eyes of their soul" and try to get rid of all "prejudices," including linguistic habits, to "see" it "as it is *in se*." Moreover, the phenomenologist believes that such an unbiased view of an object is eidetic cognition, which could lead him to know the essence of this object. He puts the matter in such a way that through careful "insight" in the object, including "varying" different elements of the examined object and looking for invariants – he finally sees what is general in the object (and thus common to other objects of the same type). Sometimes the application of this procedure is connected with the conviction that there is some special visibility, thanks to which we "see" entities in the eidetic cognitive act.

A trace of these attitudes in Ingarden's writing on a musical work is, i.a. a reference to the above-mentioned "natural" assumptions related to pre-theoretical contact with a musical work.

In Ingarden's text, there are also echoes of the "perception" of a musical work as an object. It seems that Ingarden, in seeking to discover what musical work is as such, takes into account a certain representative, or rather a few representatives, of this genre. They must be typical representations in which it will be easier to "capture" the essential features. We can already see why, for example, Ingarden did not take into account all "manifestations of music" in his deliberations: why, among others, in particular, he did not take into account works with lyrics. The combination of musical works with other arts "obscures" the image of the object, which is a "purely" musical work.

When presenting the phenomenological methods, Ingarden stressed that in his writings he does not simply "presents" his views but tries to show the reader the way to the results he reached. In fact, some echoes of this strategy are visible in many Ingarden's works, including the essay on musical work. However, this style of writing, somehow methodologically motivated, has some serious disadvantages. When reading Ingarden's works, it is sometimes difficult to strictly distinguish what he writes about the cognition of the objects analyzed and, let us call it so, ontological structure of these objects.

For the sake of the completeness of the presentation, one should also mention some of Ingarden's peculiar "attitudes," which stem from his earlier results. They are not surprising for a philosopher who had systemic aspirations. When Ingarden wrote his dissertation on musical work, he had also made some decisions concerning the catalog of objects distinguished by their way of existing and the "ready-made" concept of a literary work as a purely intentional object with a four-stratum structure. In Ingarden's catalog of basic ontological categories there are: absolute objects, real objects, ideal objects and purely intentional objects. If this list were to remain unreviewed, a musical work would have to fall into one of these categories. It is an extensive list: not every philosopher is inclined to adopt such rich ontic possibilities²⁰⁶.

²⁰⁶ The ontological admission of a rich spectrum of ontic possibilities is, of course, not the same as a metaphysical determination of the actual ontic status of a given object – the musical work, in this case.

To sum up, it can be said that Ingarden's approach is **ELITIST** due to the empirical corpus adopted, and **LIBERAL** due to the admission of a categorically rich ontology. We should now look at his solution from this perspective.

6. Musical work and other musical objects

Before we look at musical works through Ingarden's eyes, let's deal with other items from the "ontological area" of music that are relatively less problematic.

Composing a musical work involves certain psychophysical activities of the composer taking place in time and space. One of the products of the composer's work is the notation of the work (score), and therefore a certain thing. The second product is a trace of memory in his mind. Performing a musical work is, in turn, the psychophysical activity of performers. The products of this activity, i.e. individual performances of a given musical work, are certain acoustic processes (air vibrations), taking place again in a certain place and time. The perception of a musical work is a psychophysical process that leaves a memory trace in the brain that can probably be captured using appropriate electroencephalographic techniques.

Therefore, we have here things, physical processes, mental processes and physiological states. Is not a work such as, for example, Sonata in B minor, simply²⁰⁷ one of the aforementioned objects?

Well, according to Ingarden, such an identification cannot be made. It is easy to see that if we did, we would quickly come into conflict with some of the "pre-scientific" assumptions listed earlier. Any such identification ultimately leads to paradoxes. Musical works – or, in any case, the elements of Ingarden's corpus – are identical neither with the compositional idea, nor with the score (i.e. notation), nor with the performance (i.e. with the "realization" of the composer's idea), nor, of course, with perception of a given performance.

²⁰⁷ This "simplicity" should not be treated as recognition of such a solution that does not pose any theoretical difficulties. Such difficulties include, for example, the problem of whether the elements of a score are taken as tokens or as types. The former are certainly things, but the ontological status of the latter is not so indisputable.

Thought, and therefore all mental processes, are short-lived, and the works exist even when their authors are long gone. Sonata in B minor is not Chopin's thought, as it exists also today, in 2021, although neither Chopin's thoughts nor Chopin himself (assumption Z_3) exist.

The individual scores are things located in time and space (assumption Z_4), while we do not place musical works as such in space. Musical works are at most a *sui generis* sense of the signs contained in the score, just as novels or poems are the sense of the appropriate words. Moreover, the identification of a given musical work with "its" score leads to the fact that we are forced to deny the existence of unwritten works (which contradicts assumption Z_5). There is still a solution that would involve a score-type, which, however, introduces new theoretical difficulties.

Yet, can we not identify Sonata in B minor with acoustic processes, with processes of realizing given composers' ideas? Those who are willing to identify these objects must deal, i.a. with the following difficulties. If, for example, we identify Chopin's Sonata in B minor with a certain particular performance, we must agree that there are as many Chopin's Sonatas in B minor as there are corresponding acoustic performances. Moreover, almost all of these performances (with the exception of perhaps a few composers' ones) were created after 1844 (assumption of Z_3). Recognizing musical works as acoustic processes also leads to the claim that there are no unplayed works (which contradicts with assumption Z_7). The claim that the works are the sum (mereological set) of the individual performances seems even more counterintuitive, as we would have to agree a fortiori that this work "grows in size" with each new performance.

Musical works are also not ideal objects, as even some contemporary philosophers of music, including, among others, Peter Kivy, state. Ideal objects do not have "creators" (among the people), are not created over time, and do not perish. Meanwhile, Sonata in B minor was undoubtedly created sometime, and may also cease to exist one day (assumptions Z_2 and Z_3).

To sum up, musical works (being temporal) do not belong to the class of ideal objects, let alone absolute objects, but also (being non-spatial) they are not real objects. Ingarden can only consider musical works to be purely intentional objects. Intentional – because they are the subject of intentional acts, purely intentional, because these acts do not „hit“ anything real, or ideal (or, of course, absolute).

Many authors emphasize that purely intentional objects are "weak," "anemic" and "dubious" kind of objects. Still, as Ingarden notices, they play

an important role in our society and culture. In fact, musical works in Ingarden's sense are dependent from intentional acts on one hand and their ontic bases (see below, point 7) on the other hand, seems to be quite suspicious entities. However, can we imagine our culture without Chopin's Sonata in B minor or Beethoven's the 5th? This paradox of purely intentional objects was suggestively expressed by Świdorski as follows:

How, despite being “nothing,” can they be “separable” from their origins in intentional acts and enjoy a public life (as in the case of musical works and other kinds of artworks, generally) (Świdorski 2021)?

7. Ontic relationships

Now, consider Ingarden's remarks on the dependency²⁰⁸ between musical works and other objects. From an ontological point of view, purely intentional objects, including musical works, are “existentially dependent” on real objects. They would not exist if not for other items. The review of the subjects on which musical works “existentially depend” and the relationships between them additionally shed light on the ontological status of a musical work.

Thus, musical works depend on the composer's creative acts. There would be no musical works if these acts did not take place. However, this relationship is only genetic. If the composer has once “brought into existence” a musical work, the work may last completely independently of his acts or memory traces, as long as the composer has provided the work with some other basis of existence.

First of all, the score may be such a basis of existence for a work. Musical notation plays an important role not only in recording the “finished” work, but also in the composing process itself. Without the ability to be notated, the great works of Ingarden's corpus would probably not have been composed. Musical notation reflects the structure of the composition, and on the other hand, it provides instructions for the performers. It is significant, however, that in the case of canonical compositions investigated by

²⁰⁸ Strictly speaking, the term “zależność” is used by Ingarden for only a certain type of relationship between objects. I use this term in a broad sense here; Ingarden sometimes uses the term “subordination” (“podporządkowanie”) in this sense.

Ingarden this structure and these instructions do not precisely determine the performance, leaving a certain “margin of interpretation.” In the case of works from the elitist corpus, this scheme usually defines only the pitches and their relative lengths quite precisely. The absolute length of the sounds, their volume and timbre are only approximate. So, musical notation, being a great help to the composers, is at the same time their limitation. The limitation which some of them, by the way, tried to overcome by various innovations in composition practices.

It is the schematic nature of the score that prompts Ingarden to the view that musical works are schematic objects and determines many different permissible, equally authorized performances; neither of them – not even the composer’s premiere – is the “only correct” performance. The fact that the score of a given work allows for many different performances raises serious difficulties regarding the problem of the adequacy of performance, which are at the interface between aesthetics, theory and music criticism. These include, for example, the question of whether the performer’s duty is to “be faithful to the notes” or maybe “faithful to the style.”

The question which arises here is the following: Is it the case that only the score allows many realizations while the work allows only (typically) one being correct or the possibility of many realizations (or even interpretations) is an immanent property of works? Ingarden seems to opt for the second solution.

Now, does each (adequate) performance of a musical work also constitute its existential basis? Note that the performance as an acoustic process passes, so it can only replace notes if it has been recorded in someone else’s memory or as a recording. Theoretically, it is possible to recreate (write down) a work on the basis of performance (like Mozart, who “stole” Allegri’s “Miserere” from the Sistine Chapel). However, it is not the case that the pattern itself can be accurately reconstructed on the basis of any implementation of the scheme. One performance can be “transformed” into a scheme in many different ways. Ingarden made the point that through one performance we get to know the musical work in only one aspect (as when we approach a material tree from one side only)²⁰⁹.

The most enigmatic existential basis for musical works (not considered in detail by Ingarden) are memory traces. They can occur to the composer and

²⁰⁹ So we have an interesting symmetry here: a given score may be realized in different performances, and a given realization may be “reconstructed” in different scores.

performer (especially!), as well as the listener. Let us focus on the performer here. A performer knows, for example, Sonata in B minor, Op. 58, by heart, when that performer has the disposition to play this work (lead to an acoustic performance), imagine it or put it in notes. The matter is relatively simple in the case of one performer, while in the case of a work such as Beethoven's symphony, this disposition is distributed among many performers (besides, in this type of performances, the performers usually use notes while playing).

In any case, the work lasts as long as its existential basis lasts. It is absent when there is no existential basis. Sonata in B minor will cease to exist if all the copies of notes, recordings, or traces of memory associated with it disappear. There may be no memory traces, as long as there are scores; there may be no scores, as long as there are recordings; and there may not be scores or recordings, as long as there are traces. If a given musical work is to last, then some real object, which is its basis for existence, must last in time. Mozart's *Sinfonia concertante for flute, oboe, horn and bassoon with orchestra* mentioned above in the example sentence, unlike, for example, the composer's Jupiter Symphony, does not survive until today, since there is no existential basis for this work.

A philosopher who examines the existential foundations of musical works should also decide whether the duration of the notes or recording is sufficient for the duration of the work, or whether there must be someone who is able to read the notes and listen to the recording. This is not a purely "theoretical" question, as the performance conventions not written down in the score, sometimes significantly affecting the properties of performances, are often difficult to reconstruct.

8. Ingarden's solution

Let us now turn to an internal critique of Ingarden's solution.

By adopting the above-mentioned assumptions and following the above-mentioned procedures, Ingarden determines that musical work is a purely intentional, quasi-sound (and quasi-temporal²¹⁰) object, and is schematic in relation to acoustic performances. It is a product of the composer who created it, "immortalized" in the scores and realized in performances.

²¹⁰ By the way, a satisfying explication of this mysterious "quasi" would be a real step forward.

Let us add that Ingarden also recognized other works of art (literary works, and later also architecture and paintings) as purely intentional objects (having only ontically different existential bases). It is worth emphasizing that this is an original and elegant solution to the problem of the ontic status of works of art as such²¹¹.

Repeating Ingarden's investigations may raise some difficulties, especially for those who either do not feel they have the ability of phenomenological cognition of objects, or even do not believe in the possibility of such cognition. However, one may theoretically accept the assumptions that Ingarden describes to the test and admit a wide range of ontological categories of objects. It must then be stated that the concept proposed by Ingarden corresponds to "pre-scientific" intuitions and, additionally, fits perfectly into his general ontological assumptions.

When one looks at various criticisms of Ingarden's approach to musical composition in contemporary philosophy of music, we may easily see that his position is never analyzed "from inside." Ontologists of music, especially radical ones, read Ingarden through the prism of their own intuitions and from that perspective it is usually not acceptable.

9. Revision of the question

Let us now have a look at a possible external critique of Ingarden's solution.

Let me start by saying that I would prefer to consider Ingarden's questions in a semantic formulation. Instead of considering what a musical work is, I would prefer to ask the question like this: What does the expression "Sonata in B minor" and "musical work" refer to?

Let us precede further investigations by some semiotic distinctions accepted in the Lvov-Warsaw School. All expressions which may be subjects or predicates of subject-predicate sentences belong to the semiotic category of names. Simply speaking, there are two semantic functions of names: denoting and connoting. The denotation of, for instance, the name "human"

²¹¹ Ingarden revealed that he proceeded to research musical works with the hypothesis that every work of art is a purely intentional object and at the same time has a multi-stratified structure. While the first hypothesis was confirmed, the second was not: the musical work turned out to be a single-stratified object as a result of Ingarden's research. The question of what a stratum of a work of art is should be left aside here.

is the set of all designates of this name, namely the set of all humans. Names are general if they have more than one designatum; names are singular if they have only one designatum and are empty if they do not have designata at all²¹². The connotation of the name "human" is a minimal set of properties which taken together determine the denotation of this name, namely it is a minimal set of properties shared by all and only designates. It is sometimes assumed that only essential properties of designata should belong to connotations of names. This is how in semantic investigations the questions of essence appear. Instead of indicating the essence of musical work, a "semantically oriented" philosopher would prefer to speak of a connotative definition of the name "musical work." Indicating the ontic category of designata is the starting point for such a definition.

Now, the name "Sonata in B minor" corresponds to the name "work of music," as the name "Chopin" to the name "human," and thus as a singular name to the general name superior to it.

Let us then specify the question and ask: "What is the connotation of the name 'musical work'?" As mentioned above, external criticism of a given scientific concept may consist in undermining the legitimacy of the question posed. In the face of this type of questions two allegations are made: namely that they are irrelevant or unsolvable.

The objections of the first type, according to which the essential and definitional questions posed by philosophers are irrelevant, are often put forward by representatives of non-philosophical sciences. In the case of a musical work of this type, the accusation comes from music theorists who claim that they do not have to establish any definitions of terms referring to the object of their investigations, they do not need to know the "essence" or even the ontic category of the objects they deal with, and nevertheless deal with (or savor) them effectively. Likewise, physicists would say in this case that they do not have to deal with the ontology of elementary particles in order to work "effectively" in their discipline.

Yet, determining the ontic category of musical works sheds some light on the methodology of music theory. Let us note, for example, that we have no direct access to musical works as purely intentional objects, but only indirect access, through the ontic foundations of such objects. What is more,

²¹² I am omitting here the problem that such definitions of kinds of names are of use only when we indicate in advance the domain of objects from which we can select designata. If any object may be a designatum, then there are no empty names.

up to a point, certainly back in the time when Ingarden was writing his text, the main basis of research into musical works was the score since such existential foundations is simply the easiest to study. It is only in recent decades that other existential foundations have been included in the research, especially recorded performances. The establishment of the ontic category of an object and its dependence or independence in relation to other objects validates these or other research methods and the assessment of their methodological status.

The second type of objection to Ingarden's questions, stating that these questions are unsolvable, is formulated by those who do not believe that objects have "essences" or, to put it in a semantic stylization, that names have connotations (understood as above). Those who reject "essences" or connotations, i.e. various types of anti-essentialists, must consider seeking answers to these questions a hopeless task.

Certainly, various difficulties arise in establishing the "essence" of an object (or, as I would prefer to say, the connotation of a name). The most important difficulty is what we should take into account when making such a determination. In a semantic formulation, this difficulty should be expressed as follows. In everyday life as well as in science (e.g. in music theory), we call various objects "musical works:" this term appears in various contexts. When establishing the aforementioned essence (connotation), should all such contexts and all objects to which language users refer in these contexts be taken into account? Natural language, as well as the language of the humanities, can be so "flexible" that any determination of the essence of all such objects, or a connotation that would cover all uses of a given name, is in fact impossible. This does not mean, however, that one should stop looking for answers to these kinds of questions. In the sciences, including philosophy, it is permissible and usually advisable to establish the connotation of terms in such a way as to regulate the existing empirical "thicket." Such regulation usually begins with a certain limitation of the corpus of analysis: to some selected objects only, or to some occurrences of the term. Another solution is to provide for the term that we want to define connotatively only partial characteristics, e.g. indicating only sufficient conditions or only necessary conditions for belonging to the expression's denotation. It is better to have stipulative or partial definition than to have no definition at all.

10. Revision of the corpus

As we know, Ingarden decided to limit the corpus of analysis to the works we called “elitist,” i.e. he took into account only some of the items considered to be musical works, or, in other words, only some of the items that are in ordinary speech called “musical works.” This choice of the corpus may not suit everyone. If one treats Ingarden's philosophy of music simply as a philosophy of any music, and if all objects that we commonly call “musical works” are subsumed under it, the theoretical explosion of this conception seems inevitable.

When we look at various criticisms of Ingarden's conception of musical work, we may easily see that it was attacked from this point of view: various authors, from (Lissa 1966) to (Simons 2021) try to show that Ingarden's approach is inappropriate with respect to some musical phenomena, such as avant-garde music, popular music *etc.* Such criticism is surely justified but it is EXTERNAL CRITICISM. It just means that they are rejecting the “aristocratic” starting point of the research.

Let us assume that there are certain items that are more or less commonly regarded as musical works, but which do not fall under Ingarden's conception. In general, it can be said that if a theoretical conception does not cover certain items, one can either change the theory or simply acknowledge the existence of such items, but consider them to be items outside the domain of that theory. In our case, works that allegedly falsify Ingarden's conception of musical work may be regarded by the defender of this conception as objects that are not musical works in Ingardenian sense.

To make it clear, let us take the following analogy. The chemists defined water as H_2O (let's say that this is the chemical essence of water). They did it, dealing with selected real samples of fluid just like Ingarden dealt with some selected “samples” of musical works. Now those who attack Ingarden's conception from outside behave like those who would attack the chemists' approach by pointing to a fact that the fluid that flows in the River Thames is not pure H_2O but contains other elements. We may try to provide a definition of what we call “water” commonly but it would not be of any serious theoretic use. We may try to provide a definition that would cover everything what people call “music” in their everyday life but probably it would be equally useless.

Moreover, if we look more closely at these various examples from outside Ingarden's corpus, we may also come to the conclusion that some of them, taken from some point of view, are covered by Ingarden's solution.

Take, for example, improvised works and electronic music. Does their existence really falsify Ingarden's conception? Ingarden himself mentions improvised works in his text. He admits that in the case of improvisation, no notes are written down, but a purely intentional object does appear, namely, it is built over the performance, which – let us add – can be fixed in recordings or memory traces and performed again.

On the other hand, works of electronic music are works in which the authors attempt to omit the performer as a link between their compositional idea and the listener. The works are recorded by the composer directly onto a sound carrier (formerly just on tape, today on a digital medium). Due to easy access to artificial sound generators, such compositions can even be used by “composers” who do not read notes. In this case, however, it seems permissible to insist that a musical work is a purely intentional object, although it can no longer be considered a schematic object (at least in one sense of the term “schematic”).

I also see no insurmountable theoretical problems with compositions having different versions (or editions) or with aleatoric works (cf. Simons 2021). In the first case, it is a question of convention whether we state that there is, for instance, one Sibelius's Symphony No. 5 which allows two kinds of performances or realizations (3-movement and 4-movement) or that there are in fact two Sibelius's No. 5 symphonies (5' and 5'', let's say). It is similar with the problem of various editions of the same work, and, let us add, various transcriptions, paraphrases *etc.* We have to decide CONVENTIONALLY whether there is one work in various versions or many various works²¹³. I sympathise with the second option because the problem of authorship may be more easily resolved then. In case of aleatoric music, let us note that aleatoric works differ from non-aleatoric ones only in this respect that they determine the performances to the lesser degree²¹⁴.

²¹³ It is an old quasi-problem here, where to draw a line between denotation and non-denotation of vague expression.

²¹⁴ Cf. also Lipták (2013) who argues that Ingarden's conception, after some modifications, copes well with avant-garde works.

11. Revision of assumptions

Phenomenologists claim that at the starting point of their research they reject all theoretical assumptions and rely solely on “pre-scientific” beliefs. I consider such a position to be utopian, if only because pre-scientific beliefs themselves are permeated with assumptions consciously or not consciously derived from science.

The position that seems much more promising to me is not so much that we construct the conception of a musical work in an “unfounded attitude,” but that we follow philosophical, and in particular, ontological assumptions of ready-made theories of musical objects (just like the ontologists of physics examine the assumptions of physical theories *etc.*). Based on even a cursory review, it can be stated that these assumptions differ significantly in the conceptions of different periods and different intellectual environments. It is enough to juxtapose the ontology underlying the concept that a musical work is “pure form” or “pure structure” with the ontology of the integral conceptions of a musical work which considers the work to be part of culture and includes its genetic horizon and actual reception.

Besides, I am inclined to argue that Ingarden's assumptions are by no means “pre-scientific:” that he draws from his own “classical” (traditional) musical education²¹⁵. Whether Ingarden was not aware of this, or merely did not want to admit it as a phenomenologist, it is difficult to determine.

Naturally, Ingarden's liberal ontological assumptions can be revised. For example, a consistent reist (that is, a philosopher who accepts the existence of nothing but things) would only have to identify musical works with scores, possibly with people playing, or claim in an absurdly sounding statement that musical works do not exist, and the name “musical work” is an empty name. It is always puzzling to me that the main Polish version of reism was formulated by Tadeusz Kotarbiński, being... a son of a pianist. An ontological nominalist like Simons could also come only to a similar conclusion:

All the real things and events that Ingarden so richly and insightfully describes genuinely and UNPROBLEMATICALLY EXIST: they include composers, musicians, instruments, concert venues, composition activities, performances,

²¹⁵ As an interesting fact, I add that Ingarden played the piano well and efficiently read orchestral scores.

rehearsals, recording, experiences of making and listening to music, scores, instruments, broadcasts, means of playback, *etc. etc.* But what about Ingardenian works, pieces of music, melodies, and other musical entities we so readily discuss, and which are not among these? In their case, I recommend a revisionary rather than a descriptive metaphysical standpoint. In strict and philosophical truth, *THERE ARE NO SUCH THINGS* (Simons 2021).

Another solution in the spirit of “less liberal” ontology is to consider the name “Sonata in B minor” as ambiguous and referring, at least in some senses, to things or at least some spatio-temporal objects such as scores or performances²¹⁶. In this approach, the term “Chopin’s Sonata in B minor” is not only ambiguous but in some senses also general (since there are many such performances or scores-tokens). And this is where this solution breaks with musicians’ intuition. By musicians as well as music theorists, names such as “Chopin’s Sonata in B minor, Op. 58,” are considered singular and individual (proper). In my view, when we use the term “Sonata in B minor” in reference to, for example, a certain specific performance of the Sonata in B minor or the score of this sonata, we are speaking metonymically: having in mind, in fact, this-and-this performance of Sonata in B minor or this-and-this scores-token of this Sonata.

I will not elaborate here in detail the problem of placing Ingarden’s conception within various ontological debates, for instance between realism, and antirealism, fictionalism *etc.* It is simply because I often found these debates cloudy. Instead, let me state that the starting point in such debates is to establish the sense of terms such as “to be,” “to exist,” “object,” “real” *etc.* (we may take some terms from this list as primitive, of course). Now, assume that we distinguish existing from being in such a way that “to exist” means “to be localized in space-time”²¹⁷. If Ingarden would accept such convention, he would have to admit that musical works do not exist (since they are not localized in space). Now suppose that we do not distinguish existing from being and assume, for instance, that something is/exists if and only if it possesses at least one property²¹⁸. Accepting such a convention, we have to state that musical works in Ingarden’s sense do exist as there are properties

²¹⁶ Cf. (Jadacki 1989).

²¹⁷ This is Jadacki’s convention which I find very useful.

²¹⁸ Of course, to make this convention work, it is necessary to determine when we agree to recognize “something” as the property of something.

that possess (for instance, they are created). Other terminological conventions are of course equally admissible. The point is that without them the participants of ontological debates seem to be lost in the fog.

12. Revision of method

Certain elements of the phenomenological method, especially those requiring the researcher to have special abilities, “insights,” *etc.*, are also being questioned. There are, however, less mysterious methodological procedures with which this phenomenological approach can be replaced.

The students of Twardowski mentioned in the introduction to this text talked in this case about the analysis and construction of concepts (Łukasiewicz) or analytical description (Czeżowski)²¹⁹. Let us assume that our goal is to analyze the concept which is the connotation of the name ‘N.’ In the case of an analysis in the style of the philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School, in order to make such an analysis, we refer not to “mysterious” phenomenological intuitions but to “ordinary” empirical sources: to a certain material corpus (designata of the name ‘N,’ instances of a concept) or a verbal corpus (occurrences of the name ‘N’ in certain contexts). One of the main differences between the attitudes of phenomenologists and those of analytic (“Lvovian-Varsovian”) philosophers is that while phenomenologists confine themselves, at least in their declarations, essentially to the material corpus, analysts are more likely to rely also on the verbal corpus. Analytic philosophers look in particular at how the names of objects under study are used in natural as well as scientific languages. It seems that Ingarden eventually acquired an analytical attitude under the influence of his colleagues from the Lvov-Warsaw School and he also readily referred to the verbal corpus, although he “officially” denied this procedure.

The key here is what the end point is of the method of analytic description is. Czeżowski clearly writes that the analytical description leads to the formulation of definitions of expressions or general laws (principles) of a given theory. Ingarden also emphasizes that the definitions of expressions are, in phenomenological considerations, a point of arrival rather than a starting point for deliberations. Therefore, the phenomenological method

²¹⁹ I have described these procedures in detail in a book (Brożek 2020).

and the method of analytical description are used at the preliminary pre-theoretical stage of research²²⁰.

In the end, it seems that the strategies used by Ingarden, if only devoid of the mysterious “depths,” may be considered as analytic methods²²¹.

13. Conclusion

Let me repeat once more that in this chapter I focus only on some motives of Ingarden impressive book on musical work and omit such important elements as the role of aesthetic experience, and the socio-cultural dimension of art. All these elements require separate elaboration. These closing remarks are also of a limited scope.

There is one more significant difference between the analyses carried out in the spirit of the Lvov-Warsaw School and phenomenological investigations in the Ingardenian spirit. If I understand the intentions of phenomenologists correctly, when we have two different analyses of the same phenomenological object, only one of them can be “accurate” (i.e. reveal the “true” content of the idea or the “true” essence of an object). Yet, from the Lvovian-Varsovian point of view, different analyses of the same concept or object may be correct due to different points of view and different evaluation criteria.

Ingarden’s conception, after some modifications and getting rid of vagueness, could be accepted in principle as adequate in terms of the elitist

²²⁰ I will repeat Ingarden’s words cited in the introduction to this volume: “I encounter the postulat [...] [of starting with definitions] almost constantly in my talks with members of the so-called Lvov School, especially those who promoted logicism in Poland in the period immediately after World War I. Without such definitions, they argued, no conversation could be held. They replied to all attempts to circumvent this essentially nonsensical postulate, when one wants to apply it in general, with the famous “I don’t understand,” with which they tried to shut the mouths of all their opponents (Ingarden 1919 (version Ingarden 1963), p. 302). There is probably a misunderstanding here: there is no doubt that LWS members felt the need for conceptual analysis leading to the formulation of a definition.

²²¹ Similar opinions are expressed by Thomasson and Simons: “Ontology, in Ingarden’s hands, thus bears close resemblance to the sorts of conceptual analysis that became common in analytic philosophy in roughly the same period (Thomasson 2020), “[Ingarden’s] method is not itself essentially phenomenological, and is perfectly accessible to an analytic ontologist” (Simons 2021).

musical corpus and liberal ontological assumptions. This conception should however be supplemented with such an approach to music in which the focal point would be on acoustic musical objects which for Ingarden are only possible realizations of a compositional idea. Musicians and music lovers wait impatiently for the next Chopin Piano Competition in Warsaw just in order to hear, among others, new performances of Chopin's of Sonata in B minor. To prepare such performances many skills and a lot of effort are required: a bit of talent, musical knowledge, years of patient practicing, a great amount of sensibility and enormous mental resistance. Of course, these performances let us know the work of composer better. But they are also works *per se*.

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