THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
OF KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI'S
DESCRIPTIVE SEMIOTICS

Jacek Juliusz Jadacki
Warsaw University

Introduction

A strange legend has lingered on for some scores of years in Poland: the legend of Kazimierz Twardowski. This legend has been propagated mainly by his outstanding pupils such as Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz or Roman Ingarden. According to this legend Twardowski preferred the thankless task of working in Poland in favour of secure career in Austria or in Germany. Secondly, upon his return to the country, he gave up his scholarly activity (its high point being the dissertation "On the content and object of presentation"), and he occupied himself almost exclusively with educational job.

But **maior reverentia ex longinquo**. It is high time to reject this confusing legend. The best way will be to show all the aspects of Twardowski's real scholarly achievements. This paper tries to do it with regard to the metaphysical basis of his descriptive semiotics.

Entities

There are two competing metaphysical hypotheses about the diversity of the world. According to the first, there are various kinds of existence. According to the second, there is only one kind of existence; they are entities alone, which should be consider as various. The controversy has not come to a head up so far. It seems that the simpler solution ought to be accepted, i.e. the second one. Even if there were various kinds and modes of existence, there would be always a common concept of existence in the most general sense. Within the compass of this solution we shall speak only about existential, metaphysical, and ontical categories of entities.

In respect of the existential category (in contrast to the way of existence, which is only one) we can distinguish: possible and impossible entities, factual

(i.e. existing) and intentional (i.e. unexisting[1]) entities, and, finally, real and irreal ones. Existence is no property and for that reason it is rather hard to describe the differences among particular existential categories of entities. What we can say, in any case, is that all the impossible entities (e.g. an oblique square, an unweighty body, speaking a hundred languages simultaneously) are intentional, but some of the intentional entities (e.g. the circle as a geometrical figure) are possible. On the other hand, real (e.g. a shrill tone, a tree, redness) and irreal entities (e.g. absence, change, space) can be factual as well as intentional.

The above existential and metaphysical categories intersect. From the metaphysical point of view we can distinguish individual and general entities, simple and complex entities, and ultimately physical and psychical ones.

An individual entity (e.g. the universe, the day prior to the battle of Marathon, the number thousand) is an entity, which, apart from components common to many entities, has at least one specific component. A general entity (e.g. number in general, triangle in general, judgement in general) is a set of components common to many entities — a set presented (i.e. imagined or conceived) as a certain homogeneous whole.

A simple entity (e.g. coexistence, equality, a spiritual being?) is an entity completely unanalyzable. A complex entity (e.g. a sequence of numbers) is an entity, in which we can isolate more elementary components. It is admissible to recognize all the particular relations to other entities as components of a given entity. Therefore we can speak only of relatively simple entities; allowing such an assumption, we must say, that there are no absolutely simple entities at all. We should distinguish simple and complex entities from entities presented (respectively) as simple, or as compex. (The object of perceptive presentation of the light — when moving from a dark space into the sunlight — is, at first, presented as simple, although, as a matter of fact, it is complex, because we can distinguish e.g. its colour, and its intensity.)

A physical entity (e.g. someone's brain) is a spatially extensive entity — sensually perceptible. A psychical entity (e.g. any state of consciousness) is devoid of spatial extension — and it is accessible only in individual introspection.

Every entity — irrespective of its existential and metaphysical category — is a homogeneous whole, created by various properties. Such a whole remains to its properties in the relation of possessing. Whatever can be distinguished in a given entity is a component of this entity: a concrete component, if it is distinguished factually, or an abstract component, if it is distinguished only intentionally. All the properties and relations among them — including, of course, relations of possessing — are abstact components of entities. Properties of different types (i.e. properties of a whole, including its homogeneity, properties of properties etc.) are material components; relations, on the other hand, are formal ones.

There are three main ontical categories of entites: things and persons (e.g. a piece of paper, Lvov, Stanislaus Augustus), states, and especially: properties (e.g. a colour), changes (e.g. motion, activity, suicide) and acts (e.g. writing), and,

---

[1] Twardowski's nonexistent entites are, perhaps, analogues to Meinongian subsisting objects.

finally, relations (e.g. fraternity). NB. The existence of a relation is independent of the existence of its members: a relation can occur even if one or both of its members are not present (e.g. presenting or naming — by anybody — a golden mountain, being — by a golden mountain — a part of the state that here is this mountain, the number four being greater than the number three). Phenomena (e.g. thunder, lighting, fire) can be regarded as either a kind of things or a kind of states.

Acts and products

Some states — namely acts — are connected with some phenomena and things, forming specific pairs with them: acts and products. Products are — in particular — entites that come into being thanks to definite acts.

There are among them relatively impermanent products, which can be separated from correspondent acts only mentally (by abstraction), and relatively permanent products.

Products of physical acts — i.e. physical products — are either impermanent (e.g. a cry as the product of involuntary crying, a jump as the product of involuntary jumping, a turn as the product of turning), or permanent (e.g. an impression as the product of involuntary impressing, a plait as the product of involuntary plaiting, a print as the product of printing). The latter ones — in opposite to the former ones — exist longer than the acts which have created them. All the products of psychical acts — i.e. psychical products[2] — are impermanent (e.g. a thought as the product of thinking, a sense as the product of sensing, a decision as the product of deciding).

Some acts are directed at some entities.

Entities — things in particular — to which physical acts are directed, are the material of these acts (e.g. sand, in which there is a tace of a footprint). The product of a physical act directed at a certain material is not this material itself but a new (created by the act) structure of this material: the product of a directed physical act inheres in the material of this acts.

The entity, to which a certain spiritual act is directed, constitutes the object of this act (e.g. a landscape imagined by somebody). Acts, which are directed at some objects, make up intentional acts.

Products would be distinguished from quasi—products, i.e. from entities, which are similar to products of a certain act, but de facto came into being not thanks to this act, but in another way (e.g. a design of the nervures of a leaf, a natural plexus of strings, a vein of a precious stone).

There are, among other things, two appearances since one distinguishes between acts and their products. Firstly, as it has been mentioned, some products — namely relatively permanent products — exist longer than the acts creating them. Secondly, some properties of products do not belong to acts

---

[2] It would be very interesting to compare Twardowski's spiritual products with Diltheyan products of the human spirit.

creating these products. (For instance, the definition of a concept is not the definition of conceiving. It happens that a dream comes «false», but not an act of dreaming. A quesion — but not questioning — can be unintelligible.)

Components of consciousness

Spiritual acts and their products[3], which can be only mentally separated, are empirical components of consiousness, i.e. psychical facts. They are cognizable only be self-consciousness. Only states of own consciousness are immediately cognizable by a given human being.

The basic kind of spiritual acts is presenting. It is the necessary condition of all other, secondary, kinds of spiritual acts, in particular: judging, feeling and deciding. On the other hand, judging is the necessary condition of feeling and deciding.

Presenting and judging, as well as reasoning, are kinds of thinking. They are, alternately, thinking o f something (e.g. of Sphinx), thinking t h a t something is such-and-such (e.g. that somebody is in a position of trust), and thinking a b o u t something (e.g. about the solution of a riddle).

All — and only — secondary spiritual acts are bipolar. Allowing, rejoicing, and desiring are positive acts. Denying, worrying and refraining are respectively negative ones.

Basic, as well as secondary, spiritual acts are intentional acts: they all require certain objects.

Dispositions are spiritual conditions of spiritual acts. They are only hypothetic components of consiousness.

Act, content, and object of presentation

The product of an act of presentating is a content of presentation. This content is what is presented i n a given act. The object of a given act is presented b y the content of this act.

Every presentation has exactly one object. And every entity — including impossible, intentional, and irreal entities — can become the object of a presentation.

Components of a content are not components of the presented object. They are (co)presentations of the last components — a component being the complex of them — and relations among these (co)presentations. A content is not in relation of possessing to the object of presentation.

Components of a presented object (co)presented by a certain content are a t t r i b u t e s of this object. Not all the components a r e such attributes, but

---

[3] Products of psychical acts will be identified below with the contents of these acts, and contrasted with objects, only some of which are components of consciousness. Thus, Twardowski, like Brentano, was an ontological realist.

all of them — if they are known — c a n become the last ones. No object is presented (or imagined) as a whole, but the homogeneity of it is always its attribute.

Some presentations (e.g. a presentation of a country without mountains, of an eye of the human being, or of the father of Socrates) are not a part of the content of the presentation with which they cooperate.

The difference between an act, a content and an object of presentation, is real, not just logical. One of decisive arguments is that sometimes these entities belong to different domains of being. Firstly, a given content of presentation is an existing entity whenever the act of this presentation exists; whereas the object can be an existing, as well as non-existent and even impossible entity. Thus the existence of a content does not condition the existence of an object. Secondly, the act of presenting is always a real entity, the content — is irreal, whereas the object can be a real entity, as well as an irreal one. Thirdly, two presentations with different contents (e.g. the presentation of the city located at the site of Roman Juvavum and the presentation of the birthplace of Mozart) can have the same object. Fourthly, some propierties of an object of presentation cannot be properties of the corresponding content. For example, the object of a presentation of the golden mountain is extensive, golden etc.; the content of this presentation is neither extensive, nor golden.)

Images and concepts

One can distinguish between presentations, which are images, i.e. intuitive presentations, and which are concepts, i.e. unintuitive ones.

The intuitiveness of images consists in their concreteness and vagueness. A given presentation is concrete, if attributes of its object are (co)presented by the content in an undifferentiated way, and consequently are not differentiated in this content. (Auditory impressions, received during a perception of violin sounds, blend, and even if someone is able to distinguish violin sounds from e.g. piano sounds, he does not distinguish components of the former sounds.) A given presentation is vague, if only components of the presented object are explicitly (co)presented by its content. (In an image of a toothache the feeling of the ache is in general explicit; on the other hand, the impressions of drilling or extracting are vague. In an image of a painter looking at a slope of any mountain colour properties of a landscape will be explicit, while in a image of a timber dealer — the height and girth of trees growing on this slope. When we imagine a face of any person, the features of this face — the profile, the form of the lips etc. — appear sometimes more explicit than, for instance, the colour ot the eyes.) Only entities, which are, were or could be perceived or selfperceived, can be intuitively presented objects.

There are perceptive, reproductive and productive images. Perceptive images are fundamental, all other images are derivative.

Perceptive images (e.g. an image of an orange just seen, an image of a melody just heard, an image of anger just experienced) are images taking place

during perceiving. Sense impressions or psychical elements are components of the content of a perceptive image. Sense impressions arise as immediate effects of stimula acting upon sense organs. The existence of psychical elements is sometimes called in question. The justification of the fact that apart from images of physical objects there are also images of psychical objects is the fact that there are concepts of the latter objects. Because every concept — as it remains to be seen — is based on corresponding images. The formula: **nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu** keeps its force as regards external as well as internal images.

The content of perceptive images is a synthesis of some components: sense impressions of psychical elements. It is rather hard to describe the nature of this synthesis. The content of a perceptive image is at most only a part of the content of a perception. Every perception consists of such a content, corresponding impressions, and also the judgement on the existence of the object of the constitutive image. Thus, perceptions are a kind of judgements.

Reproductive images (e.g. an image of the judgement that Cracus is a historical personality, given long ago and no longer accepted; and image of an affection in the moment of death of a friend, not being alive long ago; an image of a melody heard some time ago) are memorial reproductions of perceptive images.

The following components form involuntary (e.g. an image of a dragon in a dream) or voluntary (e.g. an image of joy to be experienced at some future moment when dreams come true) productive images: the underlying image, and particularly the reproductive image of the entity similar to the object to be productively imagined; an image of judgement that neither assigns to the productively imagined object such properties that **de facto** are not properites of this object at all, or denies it the properties that it in fact possesses; an image of the initially imagined object but with the first properties or without the second properties mentioned above.

Components of the content of a concept are: an underlying image and images of some judgements concerning the object of this underlying image, and intentionally changing it.

Among concepts there are synthetic and analytic ones. Objects of synthetic concepts (e.g. concepts of a stormwind which broke a tree, of a monarch, of God) are things or persons. The underlying image of a synthetic concept is a (reproductive or productive) image of an object similar to the object which is to be conceived. The component constituting the content is the image of a judgement either predicating on the object of an underlying image **de facto** properties which are not possessing by this object, or denying properties possessing by it. A synthetic concept is therefore a manqué productive image: it has not the third factor of the latter. Objects of analytic conceptions (e.g. concepts of the shape of full moon, of the height of the town hall tower in Lvov, of resemblance of two faces) are entities, which are neither things, nor persons; they are properties and relations. The underlying image of an analytic concept is an image of the object which also possess the property to be conceived (thought), or a sequence of such entities among which the relation to be conceived

(thought) occurs. The imagined judgement which is actually false — which forms an analytic concept, predicates on corresponding objects the absence in them of properties or relations, other than distinguished by the concept. Thus, synthetic concepts are also **sui generis** manqué productive images.

Both kinds of concepts occur in two forms: virtual (described above) and abbreviated, **scil.** hemisymbolic or symbolic. In the hemisymbolic form an act of conceiving includes an image of the name signifying the object of the concept and the corresponding underlying image. In the symbolic form conceiving amounts to the first of indicated factors.

Concepts, as well as images, can be either singular or general.

Singular images (e.g. an image of a certain face with individual features) are such that by their contents individual properties are explicitly (co)presented. By contents of general images (e.g. an image of the violin sound in general) properties common to entities subsumed by the imagined object are (co)presented.

Singular concepts (e.g. the concept of God, the concept of the universe, the concept of the number one thousand) contain an additional imagined judgement, predicating that the attributes conceived or ascribed in remaining judgements include individual attributes. On the other hand, the content of a general concept (e.g. the concept of number in general, of the triangle in general, of the judgement in general) contains additionally an imagined judgement, predicating the commonness of mentioned attributes. Concepts containing neither the former nor the latter additional imagined judgements are incomplete concepts.

Every general presentation — like any presentation — has exactly one object. It is a certain general entity, i.e. a set of all and only the properties common to all the individual entities falling under a given general concept. Indirectly a general presentation refers to objects of all presentations — singular ones in particular — subordinated to this general presentation. The object of a general presentation constitutes a part of each individual objects, subsumed by this object[4]. The object of a general presentation — and of a general concept in particular — should be distinguished from the range of this presentation, i.e. the set of all the entities that can be presented by means of it.

Adequacy of concepts

Concepts are estimated first of all in respect of their adequacy. There are different degrees of adequacy. A given concept is more adequate, in proportion to the number of the components of the object of it that are attributes, i.e. are (co)presented by the content of this concept. (The concept of a bird as a fledgy animal, laying eggs, having two legs and two wings is more adequate than the concept of a bird as a fledgy animal.)

The adequacy of a concept ought to be distinguished from its clearness and strictness. A clear concept (e.g. the concept of a monkey as a four-handed

---

[4] This subsumption is, like in Frege, and ontological relation.

animal) is the concept with the content including characteristic attributes of the object of the concept, i.e. attributes that make it possible to distinguish this object from others. A strict concept (e.g. the concept of the pentagon, the concept of the ruthenium, the concept of the Milky Way) is a concept, for which there is a classical definition, strictly indicating its content: signifying the underlying object by means of **genus proximum** (e.g. for a concept of a painter: a man), and the imagined judgement by means of **differentia specifica** (in our example: who paints pictures). Only synthetic concepts can be defined. It is impossible to give any definition to analytic concepts — as well as to images — unless their objects are treated as wholes with some properties of higher types. Thus, all the strict concepts are synthetic ones.

Act, contexture, and object of judgement

Judging is not joining or disjoining presentations. Of course, not every composition of presentations is a judgement; some of such compositions create new presentations (e.g. the concept of insolvency and the concept of a firm produce the concept of insolvency of a firm), others produce orders or questions. On the other hand, not every judgement is a composition of presentation (e.g. some subjectless judgements).

Judging, as a matter of fact, is an act **sui generis.**

The product of an act of judging (i.e. making judgement) is a judgement. W h a t is judged (or adjudged) in a judgement, is its contexture. The contexture of a judgement is the analogue of the content of a presentation. The contexture of all judgements is the same: it is the existence (or the occurance) of something. The existence is taken here «intemporally»: as the past, present or future realness. In this connection, the temporal determination expressing itself in the tense of a verb belongs to the object of judgement. (For instance, in the judgement that Pericles existed, the object is «past» Pericles. In the judgement that this man will be my father-in-law, the object is my future father-in-law. In the judgement that the weather will be fine tomorrow, the object is tommorow's weather.) And, for example, if a given judgement stating the realness of the future event is true, then the occurance of this event is logically necessary, i.e. the truth of the sentence "This event will happen" bears (logically) the truth of the sentence "The future event exists".

Judgements vary with regard to quality of acts and with regard to their objects. The act of judging itself is, strictly speaking, undefinable, because it is unanalyzable. Acts of judging, as to their quality, are of two kinds: they consist in either allowing or denying the contexture of a judgement, i.e. of the existence of an (ab)judged object. Thus, judgements as to the quality of acts can be affirmative or negative. The scheme of any judgement is consequently the formula "$\pm$ (there is) A".

Depending upon the way a conviction (i.e. a «potentialized» judgement) arises the following kinds of judgements can be distinguished: perceptions, i.e. judgements given when corresponding impressions are experienced or psychic

elements grasped; reminiscents, i.e. convictions founded upon memory; pieces of informations, i.e. convictions borrowed from credible persons; and, finally, axioms. Inference is a special kind of conviction, i.e. a conviction acquired by means of reasoning, or making judgements on argument-consequence relations between judgements.

Judging, or an actualized conviction, cannot be gradated in the respect of its intensivity. If somebody speaks of the instability or stability of convictions, then he really attributes these properties not to judging itself but to the personality of the speaker (depending on the degree of his readiness to give definite judgements and of his courage in uttering them).

Allowing or denying the existence of any entity does not constitute an ascription or refusal any property to this entity because existence is not a property. Existence cannot be presented in any concept; it can only be (ab)judged (i.e. allowed or denied).

The object of a judgement is an entity to w h i c h this judgement refers: the existence of what is (ab)judged. Every (simple) judgement has exactly one object; «nothing» is not susceptible to judgement. The object of a judgement can be an entity of any kind, e.g. another judgement (for istance in the judgement: I do not believe that he is able to do this work). Allowing an affirmative judgement referring to any entity is allowing **implicite** this entity itself.

In terms of their object we have, first of all, singular and general judgements. Singular judgements (e.g. the judgement that human beings cannot fly without mechanical assistance) are judgements concerning particular facts. General judgements (i.e. laws) are judgements concerning necessary dependences among phenomena. They can be logical or physical laws. Logical laws (e.g. the judgement that ghosts exist or do not exist) concern necessary coexistences or necessary sequence; they are **a priori** judgements, i.e. their justification does not appeal to experimental data. Physical laws (e.g. the judgement that if somebody is a man, he must die) — and probably singular judgements too — are **a posteriori** judgements, i.e. they are experimentally justified.

The background (i.e. the necessary condition, but neither the sufficiant condition nor a component) to forming a judgement on any object consists in the presentation of this object. Having, in particular, a concept of any object, we can make judgements on this object thanks to the fact that this concept consists of imagined judgements on the object of an underlying image. In the case of relational judgements (i.e. judgements concerning relations) we should have three concepts (i.e. concepts of the relation and of its two arguments) to (ab)judge the object; in the case of arelational judgements only one concept is enough.

Judgements can be simple (e.g. the judgement that there are revenants) or complex. The judgement is complex, when giving it we must give at least one other judgement. (For instance, allowing that I am well, I must allow that there is a state of health, and that a certain state occurs in my body. Allowing that the square is a quadrilateral, and that the sum of angles in a quadrilateral is equal to 360°, I must allow that the sum of angles in the square is equal to 360°.)

Judgements which are made should be strictly distinguished from judgements which are only presented. The presented judgements are not judgements at all; they are, as a matter of fact, presentations of judgements.

Truthfulness of judgements

The analogue of the problem of adequacy in the area of presentations is the problem of truthfulness in the area of judgements. To make, for the first time, a true judgement on any object (or, strictly speaking, a sequence of such judgements) is to cognize this object (or acquire knowledge of it). And inversely, to have this knowledge is to have a disposition to making such a judgement.

The truthfulness of a judgement is the correspondence between the quality of this judgement and its object on account of its contexture. Thus, an affirmative judgement is true if its object exists (i.e. if this judgement concerns an existing entity); a negative judgement is true if its object does not exist. An affirmative judgement is, respectively, false, if its object does not exist; a negative one, if its object exists.

The above definitions indicate only the nature of truth but not the criterion of truthfulness. They presuppose, besides, a certain metaphysical assumption: the existence, at least in some cases, of objects apart from given judgements about them. Some people try, for that reason, to construct a criterial and assumption-free definition. There are three other conceptions apart from the one presented above: coherentionism, transcendentalism, and pragmatism.

Coherentionism cannot be accepted because, i.a., it leads to allowing that no judgement would be true if only judgements consistent with all judgements given at any time were true. It does not exactly determine, moreover, the set of true judgements (since not all the consequences of a given judgement are palpable). And finally, it contains **circulus in definiendo** (because the notion of consistency presupposes the notion of truth).

Transcendentalism should be denied because it either allows truthfulness to be decided on the basis of a treacherous sense of certitude (that we have to do with the duty of allowing a given judgement), or it is encumbered with **circulus in definiendo** (because a judgement would be true, if we allowed in it what we t r u l y should allow; thus the duty of allowing a judgement is a duty on account of obtaining a true judgement).

Pragmatism — on closer examination — appears to be a doctrin concerning judgements which are a s s u m e d to be true, and in this interpretation it loses much of its paradoxicality (since there is really a certain connection between m a k i n g judgements and their usefulness), and, in consequence, it does not contradict the conception accepted here.

Truthfulness and falsity are, strictly speaking, properties of judgements, i.e. products of judging. One can predicate them to other entites only mataphorically. We can speak of judging as a certain act that it is i n d i r e c t l y true or false, i.e. just or unjust, when the product of this act is, respectively, true or false. A presentation can be indirectly called "true" or "false" when it is a pre-

sentation (of a certain object), conditioning, respectively, a certain true or false judgement (on this presented object). When we define the other entities as "true" or "false" (e.g. true friendship, a false diamond, an untrustworthy man), we express in an abbreviated form the thought that certain judgements are, respectively true or false (e.g. the judgement that it is the friendship, is true; the judgement that it is a diamond, is false; the judgements of this man are untrustworthy).

All the true judgements (i.e. truths) are true always and everywhere; thus they are absolute truths. Pseudoarguments of relativists are apparently justified, only when judgements are confused with sayings (or sentences).

Truthfulness and falsity ought to be distinguished from evidency and inevidency as well as from probability and improbability (and also from certitude).

If a presentation, being the condition of an (affirmative) judgement, is such that the existence of the object of this presentation cannot be disallowed (or denied), then this judgement is evident. If a presentation of a respective object (i.e. understanding the presentation conditioning a corresponding judgement) is not sufficient to allow the existence of this object, then a judgement on this object is inevident (e.g. the judgement that this man has betrayed the confidence placed in him). Evident judgements contain (from analytic judgements) logical axioms (e.g. the judgement that parallel lines intersect in infinity), and (from synthetic judgements) existential theses about facts accessible to our internal experience (e.g. the judgement that I exist). Thus, all the objects of an internal experience are existing entities. Evident judgements can appear to be true or false. For that reason, the allowing of these judgements ought to be precede by their confirmation, and denying, by their falsification.

In opposition to truthfulness and falsity, which are properties of judgements being made, probability and improbability (as well as certitude) are properties of presentations of judgements (i.e. of presented judgements). Probable judgements are presented judgements, which c a n be true but it is not known whether they a r e true. (For instance, the judgement that the Earth probably revolves round the Sun means that it is not understood whether the judgement that the Earth revolves round the Sun is true or false but we tend to make this judgement because it seems to be closer to truth than its negation.) If it were known that a presented judgement, which can be true, i s really true, then this judgement would become certain. Judgements (being only presented) which are internally contradictory (i.e. absurds) are improbable; such judgements cannot be true.

Probability and improbability are sometimes metaphorically axcribed to entities other than presented judgements, in particular, to objects, to which these presented judgement would refer, if they were made.

Conclusion

The metaphysical basis of Kazimierz Twardowski's descriptive semiotics consists of the conceptions: the pluralistic conception of being, the bipolar con-

ception of act, the intentional conception of consciousness, the triadic conception of presentations, the presentative conception of images, the allogenic conception of concepts, the constructivistic conception of universals, the gradient conception of adequacy of concepts, the idiogenic conception judgements, and the classical conception of truthfulness of judgements. The general outline of Twardowski's philosophical views presented above, is based on his works published in German and in Polish between 1892 and 1925. This schematic reconstruction is hoped to facilitate not only the understanding his semiotics[5] but also the study of the great migrations of ideas within Central-European circle of civilization in our century.

Appendix

It is possible that we can facilitate the study of the migration of ideas, bringing to effect a certain semantic paraphrase of some fragments of Twardowski's views which have been reconstructed above in a traditional manner.[6]

Let "A" be the proper name of a certain entity, having properties of being a_1, a_2, ..., a_n. Thus, according to Twardowski, we have:

$A \overset{df}{=}$ such a single x, that x is a_1, x is a_2 ,..., and x is a_n.

Let "i" be the name representing a certain perceptive or reproductive image of A, in which the property a_k is distinguished. Thus we have:

$i \overset{df}{=}$ such a single x, that x is a_k.

Let us notice that the copula "$\overset{df}{=}$" stands for the formula "is presented as", the fragment of definiens "such a single x that" — for the formula "which" inserted after the variable in the function "x is a_k" (e.g. "x, which is a_k", "something, what is a_k"). Gold, for instance, can be presented as something yellow, metallic, shining etc.; ache — as something painful and irritating etc.

Let "i_p" be the name representing a certain productive presentation of an object, distinguished from A only by the fact that it has the property of being b_k instead of a_k. Then we have:

$i_p \overset{df}{=}$ such a single x, that: x is similar to A, and x is b_k, whereas A is a_k, and not b_k.

We can read it in the following way: i_p is presented as something that is like A, but being b_k, and not a_k. Thus, a grey black (horse) would be presented as a black horse, but gray, and not black; five-sided lawn — as something that is as an elliptic lawn, but five-sided, and not elliptic; satyr — as a man with hooves instead of legs. The formulae before the colons would correspond to the underlying image, and those after the colons to presented judgements.

---

[5] It is reconstructed in my paper *Kazimierz Twardowski's descriptive semiotics* (in press).

[6] As early as 1925, Tadeusz Czeżowski indicated the possibility of expressing Twardowski's views in the language of logical calculi. In such an interpretation we would speak of individual terms and variables instead of speaking of individual and general presentations. The place of made and presented judgements would be occupied by sentences and propositional functions.

Let "c" be the name presenting a certain synthetic concept of the object imagined by the presentation represented by the name "i_p". Thus, according to Twardowski, we have:

$c \overset{\text{df}}{=}$ such a single x, that: x is similar to A and x is b_k.

We can read **definiens** of this formula: something that is as A, but being b_k — or shortly: A being b_k. For instance, a point would be conceived as something that is like a dot, but inextensive.

Two last formulae can be regarded as **quasi-ostensive** difinitions of the terms "i_p" and "c". The proper name "A" would be here an ostensive element. We should remember, however, that these formulae refer to presentations as i n d i v i d u a l psychical acts (i.e. to presentations of gold, gray black horse, five-sided lawn, satyr, point, and later on, the circumference of a circle — experienced in a definite moment by a definite person). Thus we whould either accept that the respective terms ("gold", "grey black horse" etc.) name single universals or get rid of the realistic consequences by means of replacing the operator "such a single x, that" by the operator "such any x, that", or shortly: "such x, that". But to return to what we were saying: let us notice, firstly, that with the aid of such definitions certain expressions are really introduced into language. Secondly, the next step consists in replacing the proper name in **definiens** by the appelative name, defined in advance **quasi-ostensively**. The relics of such definitions in dictionaries are formulae with **definiens** including phrases "somewhat like", "like", etc. Compare for instance:

antelope $\overset{\text{df}}{=}$ a cud-chewing deer — l i k e animal

cornet $\overset{\text{df}}{=}$ a wind instrument s o m e w h a t   l i k e a trumpet

marmalade $\overset{\text{df}}{=}$ preserve l i k e jam, made of oranges etc.

Of course, neither antelopes are deers, nor cornets are trumpets, and marmalades are not jams.

Let "c_a" be the name representing a certain abstract concept of the property of being a_k, characterizing the object A. Thus, we have:

$c_a \overset{\text{df}}{=}$ such a single x, that $x = a_k$ and A is x, and for every y: if A is y,
then $y = x$

We can freely read **definiens** of this formula like this: something that is equal with a_k and characterizes A as the only attribute (i.e. property being presented) of it. For instance, the circumference of a circle can be conceived as something that characterizes the circle apart form its surface. The following formulae are short versions of this kind of definitions in dictionaries:

oval $\overset{\text{df}}{=}$ egg-shaped

red $\overset{\text{df}}{=}$ the colour of blood

sweet $\overset{\text{df}}{=}$ having a taste like honey

It is possible to give the hemisymbolic formula for "c" as well as for "c_a":

$c \overset{\text{df}}{=}$ such a single x, that: x is similar to A and x is c (sic!)

$c_a \overset{\text{df}}{=}$ such a single x, that $x = c_a$ (sic!) and A is x

The corresponding symbolic formulae would be like these:

$c \overset{\text{df}}{=}$ such a single x, that: x is c (sic!)

$c_a \stackrel{df}{=}$ such a single x, that $x = c_a$ (sic!)

If these interpretations are adequate, some indicated formulae have explicit circulus in definiendo.

Thus, the general formula for the names representing incomplete presentations would have the following form:

$a \stackrel{df}{=}$ such x, that $F(x)$

According to Twardowski, this formula bears:

$E!x: a(x)$

The fact that every presentation has exactly one object does not mean that this object is an existing entity.

For an individual and general complete presentation we have respectively:

the $a \stackrel{df}{=}$ such x, that: $F(x)$, and for every y: $F(y)$ if and only if $y = a$

an a (i.e. a in general) $\stackrel{df}{=}$ such x, that: $F(x)$, and for every y: $a(y)$ if and only if $F(y)$

The first formula is about something having F as individual property of a, and in the second one, as common property of a-s. For instance, the property of being the day prior to the battle of Marathon, characterizes exactly one day of September in 490 B.C. On the other hand, triangle in general is characterized only by triangularity, trilaterality etc., as the properties common to all (individual) triangles.

So much for presentations. Now, let us proceed to judgements.

Every (made) judgement is, according to Twardowski, represented by the formula:

There is (resp. is not) such x, that $F(x)$

It concerns also traditional categorical judgements. Because we have:

Every P is $Q \stackrel{df}{=}$ There is not such x, that: $P(x)$ and it is not the case, that $Q(x)$

No P is $Q \stackrel{df}{=}$ There is not such x, that: $P(x)$ and $Q(x)$

Some P are $Q \stackrel{df}{=}$ There is such x, that: $P(x)$ and $Q(x)$

Some P are not $Q \stackrel{df}{=}$ There is such x, that $P(x)$ and it is not the case, that $Q(x)$

Thus, consequently, all these judgements can be interpreted as existential.

As we see, the general formula of any sentence is build with the aid of the functor "there is" or "there is not", which has any name as its argument.[7] This functor does not behave like a predicate. Consequently, the following formula is intolerable:

*There is not such x, that $F(x)$, and there is x

It is possible to regard the idea that objects of presentations can be non-existent, as the manifestation of denying the pseudo-implication:

*If such x, that $F(x)$..., then there is such x, that: $F(x)$

The functor "there is" (or "there is not") is the universal functor creating sentences with the aid of names. The functor "that", on the other hand, is the universal functor creating names with the aid of sentences:

---

[7] Let us recall that if "existing" meant the same as "real", this interpretation would be inconsistent with the current understanding of existential judgements. But Twardowski distinguishes existence from realness.

(the fact) that there is (resp. there is not), such x, that $F(x)$

Such a nominalization can be, at least sometimes, made in natural language with the aid of the phrase: "existence (resp. non-existence) of something being F" or "F-ing of something".

The following connection occurs between making a certain judgement and allowing that the object of this judgement exists:

Q makes the judgement that there is (resp. is not) such x, that: $F(x)$

— if and only if — Q allows (resp. denies), that there is such x, that $F(x)$

We find a certain difficulty in interpreting Twardowski's view that truthfulness (and falsity) characterizes originally judgements (being made) and not sentences, whereas probability (and certitude) characterizes presented judgements. One can write neither:

"There is such x, that: $F(x)$" is true — if and only if — there is such x, that $F(x)$

because one would ascribe truthfulness to the sentence, nor:

(The fact) that there is such x, that $F(x)$, is true — if and only if — there is such x, that $F(x)$

because here one would ascribe truthfulness to the presented judgement. On the other hand, we should have, perhaps, two formulae for probability:

(The fact) that there is such x, that $F(x)$, is probable — if and only if — it is possible that (but unknown whether, there is such x, that $F(x)$

or:

"(Such x, that) $F(x)$" is probable — if and only if — it is possible that (but unknown whether) there is such x, that $F(x)$

My own feeling is that such a «de-psychologizing» interpretation projects interesting light on Twardowski's descriptive semiotics and its relevance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list contains Kazimierz Twardowski's works consulted in this paper.

Abbreviations:

RAF — Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne. Lwów 1927, Książnica—Atlas, p: XVI,448

WPF — Wybrane pisma filozoficzne. Warszawa 1965, PWN, p: XXXV,396

1892 — Idee und Perzeption. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung aus Descartes. Wien, Konegan, p: 46

1894 — On the content and object of presentations. A psychological investigation. Translated and with an introduction by R. Grossmann. The Hague 1977, Martinus Nijhoff, p: XXXIV,106

1895 — Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji. RAF p. 343-356

1897 — Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii. WPF p. 92-113

1897a — (Letters to Alexius Meinong. 1897-1899 — in:) Philosophenbriefe. Aus der Wissenschaftlichen Korrespondenz von Alexius Meinong. Graz 1965, Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstadt, p. 143-149

1898 — (Items concernig philosophy — in:) Encyklopedia Macierzy Polskiej. Zbiór wiadomości z wszystkich gałęzi wiedzy. T. I i II. Lwów, Macierz Polska, p: XII,788 + IV,1052

1898a — W sprawie klasyfikacji zjawisk psychicznych. RAF p. 33-42

1898b — Wyobrażenia i pojęcia. WPF p. 114-197

1899 — O pojęciu poczytalności karnej w świetle psychologii. Tezy odczytu. RAF p. 446-447

1899a — Psychologia nauki poglądowej. RAF p. 43-63

1899b — Życie umysłowe człowieka. RAF p. 429434

1900 — O tak zwanych prawdach względnych. WPF p. 315-336

1901 — Formalizm logiczny a myślenie. Słowo Polskie 1901 nr 135 p. 3

1901a — Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki do użytku w seminariach nauczycielskich i w nauce prywatnej. Lwów, Towarszystwo Pedagogiczne, p: 224,XVI

1904 — O przedstawieniach pojęciowych. Autoreferat. RAF p. 409-410

1905 — Etyka i prawo karne wobec zagadnienia wolności woli. Więź t. 20(1983) p. 123-159

1906 — W sprawie klasyfikacji uczuć. RAF p. 411413

1906a — O sceptycyzmie etycznym. Etyka t. 9(1971) p. 171-222

1907 — O idio- i allogenetycznych teoriach sądu. WPF p. 198-199

1910 — Myśl i mowa. Streszczenie odczytu. RAF p. 424-425

1910a — O filozofii średniowiecznej wykładów sześć. Lwów—Warszawa, H. Altenberg, E. Wende i Sp., p: 138

1910b — Psychologia myślenia a logika. Streszczenie odczytu. RAF p. 424

1911 — O czynnościach i wytworach. Kilka uwag z pogranicza psychologii, gramatyki i logiki. WPF p. 217-240

1911b — Wykłady z logiki. Lwów, (mimeographed lecture), p: 292

1912 — Nauki humanistyczne a psychologia. Ruch Filozoficzny t. 34(1976) nr 1-2 p. 17-24

1913 — O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju. WPF p. 241-291

1920 — Co znaczy "fizyczny"? WPF p. 349-353

1922 — O prawdzie formalnej. Ruch Filozoficzny t. 7(1922-1923) nr 1-3 p. 37b-38a

1924 — O istocie pojęć. WPF p. 292-312

1925 — Teoria poznania. Wykłady z okresu 20.04 — 23.06.1925. Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej t. 21(1975) p. 239-299

There were consulted also the following works of other authors:

Bakies, Bogdan

975 — Twardowskiego koncepcja przedmiotu jako korelatu aktu. *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* r. 11 (1975) nr 2 p. 11-48

1976 — Struktura wewnętrzna przedmiotu według Twardowskiego. Ibidem, r. 12(1976) nr 1 p. 5-22

Biegański, Władysław

1912 — Teoria logiki. Warszawa 1912, E. Wende i Spółka, p: VIII,642

Bleustein, Leopold

1928 — Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia. Archiwum Towarzystwa Naukowego we Lwowie; Dział II, Historyczno-Filozoficzny t. 4(1928) p. 359-453

Borzym, Stanisław

1984 — Bergson a przemiany światopoglądowe w Polsce. Wrocław 1984, Ossolineum, p: 340

Czeżowski, Tadeusz

1958 — W sprawie terminu "konkretny". Ruch Filozoficzny t. 18(1958) nr 4 p. 175

Dąmbska, Izydora

1938 — Konwencjonalizm a relatywizm. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny t. 15(1938) z. 4 p. 328-337

Findlay, John Niemeyer

1933 — Meinong's theory of object and values. Oxford 1968, Oxford University Press, p: XVI,354

Gromska (Tennerówna), Daniela

1914 — Istnienie jako "treść" sądzenia i sądu. Uwagi na marginesie teorii sądu Prof. Twardowskiego. Przegląd Filozoficzny t. 17(1914) z. 4 p. 465-483

Gumański, Leon

1960 — Logika klasyczna z założenia egzystencjalne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Toruńskiego z. 4 p. 3-64

Husserl, Edmund

1901 — Logische Untersuchungen. B. II. T. I. Halle an der Saale 1913, Max Niemeyer, p: XII,508

Ingarden, Roman

1931 — O dziele literackim. Warszawa 1988, PWN, p: 496
1966 — Uwagi o niektórych twierdzeniach ontologicznych w książce Kazimierza Twardowskiego pt. *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen.* Ruch Filozoficzny t. 25(1966) nr 1-2 p. 21-35

Kokoszyńska, Maria   p. 166-176

1948 — What means "relativity of truth". Studia Philosophica t. 3(1939-1946)

Kotarbiński, Tadeusz

1937 — Kazimierz Twardowski. **Przegląd Filozoficzny** r. 40(1937) p. 1-7

Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, Seweryna

1977 — Teoria wiedzy Kazimierza Twardowskiego. (In:) Polska myśl filozoficzna i społeczna. T. III. Warszawa 1977, PWN, p. 85-125

Pomian, Krzysztof

1973 — O filozofii Kazimierza Twardowskiego. **Więź** r. 16(1973) nr 4 p. 40-50

Pręgowski, Piotr

1927 — Le concept, le judgement et l'attention. Paris 1927, Libraire Gebethner et Wolf, s: 104

Skolimowski, Henryk

1962 — Kazimierz Twardowski and analytical philosophy. **Polish Perspectives** v. V(1962) no 12 p. 30-39
1967 — Polish analytical philosophy. London 1967, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p: XII,276

Struve, Henryk

1910 — (Kazimierz Twardowski). (In:) Historia logiki jako teorii poznania w Polsce. Warszawa 1910, p. 390-395

Szabała, Henryk

1980 — O analityce Kazimierza Twardowskiego. Fragment. **Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Filozofia i Socjologia** 1979 (de facto 1981) nr 3 p. 35-44

Witwicki, Tadeusz

1935 — O reprezentacji czyli o stosunku obrazu do przedmiotu odtworzonego. **Archiwum Towarzystwa Naukowego we Lwowie; Dział II, Historyczno-Filozoficzny** t. 16 z. 2 p. 213-334

Wolniewicz, Bogusław

1977 — Semantyka Fregego. (In:) Gottlob Frege, Pisma semantyczne. Warszawa 1977, PWN, p. VII−XXXII