

POZNAŃ STUDIES

IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES

102

**ON PREJUDICES,
JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHY**

Kazimierz Twardowski

**Edited by Anna Brożek and
Jacek Jadacki**

Rodopi

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IN PHILOSOPHY

POZNAŃ STUDIES
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POLISH ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, VOL. VIII

Kazimierz Twardowski

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AND OTHER TOPICS
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**Edited by
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Kazimierz Twardowski

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Anna Brożek
Jacek Jadacki

KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE LVOV PERIOD

There are two groups of problems
which are always interesting to discuss:
the newest and the oldest ones.

The newest problems are compelling because
there has not been time yet to elaborate on them.

The same concerns the oldest ones; they are forgotten [9].

1. In their "Introduction" to Kazimierz Twardowski's *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, Johannes L. Brandl and Jan Woleński wrote:

Although we do not want to deny that Twardowski's early work – dating from the period between 1891 and 1894 – forms the most important part of his *opera*, we do think that in his works written after 1895 Twardowski put forward many ideas that go far beyond what he had achieved in his early writings. Not only are many of these ideas interesting on their own, they are also historically important because they influenced the vies of philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School [Twardowski 1999, pp. 8-9].

Brandl and Woleński mention five "ideas": the decisive argument against psychologism; the distinction – essential for humanities – between actions and products; the conclusive defense of absolutism in the theory of truth; the satisfactory separation of *a priori* and *a posteriori* sciences; the clear postulate of... the clarity of philosophical language.

We are more radical in our appreciation of Twardowski's scholarly output. While accepting the second part of the opinion cited above, we reject its first part. We are inclined to claim that Twardowski's scientific achievements in both of the indicated periods, the Vienna period and the Lvov

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period, are at a comparable (very high) level,¹ and – at the same time – the scope of his investigations in the second period is much broader and more profound than in the first period.

Accordingly, it is our intention that this volume – which we treat as a continuation of the volume edited by Brandt and Woleński – constitute an illustration of our appreciation of Twardowski's *opera*. (The volume is an illustration rather than a justification of our opinion because it contains only a selection of Twardowski's texts written after 1895.²)

We present here a short survey of the content of papers included in this volume in order to facilitate an acquaintance with the ideas Twardowski presented in them. (The numbers in brackets indicate the respective papers.) Texts collected in this volume are annotated either by Twardowski himself, by editors, or by translators. Authors of particular notes are indicated by the following symbols: 'Ch' – Alicja Chybińska, 'D' – Izydora Dąmbska, 'B&J' – Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki, 'J' – Ryszard Jadczyk, 'JJ' – Jacek Jadacki, Twardowski's notes, as well as authors' notes in their "Introduction" are without signature.

2. Twardowski had a very rigorous view with regard to the conditions that have to be fulfilled by philosophical research if its results are to be included into the body of scientific knowledge. However, he did not share the (positivist) view that since neither sensual nor mental phenomena are the object of metaphysics (or, broadly speaking, of philosophy), then metaphysics is not a science at all [1]. In fact, apart from the aforementioned phenomena, there are some objects of different kinds (e.g. relations) which i.a. metaphysics is concerned with. Metaphysics provides a description of these latter objects and makes use of inductive and deductive methods which are also used by representatives of the natural sciences.

Twardowski was a supporter of the cumulative conception of philosophy. A far-reaching aim of philosophy is to construct a scientific synthesis of a theory of all objects (not only of sensual and mental phenomena).

¹ A broad presentation of Twardowski's views in the Viennese period is included in the book [Brożek 2011], pp. 258-278. A critical reconstruction of Twardowski's main ideas is given in [Jadacki 2009], pp. 275-299.

² We have started to publish a complete collection of Twardowski's lesser known works. Two great volumes (in Polish) have just been prepared under the title *Myśl, mowa i czyn* [Thought, Speech and Action]: [Twardowski 2013] and [Twardowski 2014]. Only these volumes – together with the planned volumes containing Twardowski's *inedita* – give us a true picture of the value of his philosophical results. Furthermore, English speaking readers have at their disposal (apart from this volume and the volume [Twardowski 1999]) the following translations of Twardowski's texts: [Twardowski 1894], [Twardowski 1898], and [Twardowski 1909].

Such a synthesis has not been formulated so far; however, some elements are ready at this point and some have to be patiently gathered. For, according to Twardowski, "it is better not to have such a synthesis than to have a fallacious one" [1, p. 41].³

3. Unlike in many other sciences, the central method of widening philosophical knowledge is not conducting experiments but conducting discussions among specialists. Thus, Twardowski paid a lot of attention to providing philosophers with appropriate «laboratories» in which they could conduct discussions (scientific societies, seminars, conferences). "Appropriate" means here such «laboratories» that guarantee the fulfillment of the postulate of "the only dogma" acceptable in science, namely the dogma saying that "dogmatism is the greatest enemy of any scientific work" [2, p. 48].

At the same time, Twardowski was convinced that those who want to be the rightful members of philosophical discussions should be prepared for them. In particular, Twardowski formulated the following rules of «profound» preparatory studies of philosophy [4]:

(1) The study of philosophy should not be started from the study of its history, although historical studies should be connected with systematic ones.

(2) The study of the history of philosophy should be started by studying the works of classical philosophers and only afterwards should one study textbooks on the history of philosophy.

(3) The study of philosophy should begin with the study of its propaedeutics, i.e. logic (an aprioristic discipline) and psychology (an empirical one).

(4) The study of philosophy should be preceded by the study of mathematics, as well as at least one discipline from among the natural sciences and one discipline from among the humanities in order to acquaint oneself with the methods applied in different sciences [3].

Twardowski supports postulate (4) with three arguments: (a) other sciences deliver material for philosophical research; (b) some sciences play a role of auxiliary disciplines with respect to philosophy, (c) the practical knowledge of methodological correctness in other sciences facilitates methodologically correct philosophical research.

³ Twardowski's view on the criteria of choosing scientific hypotheses and theories is worth mentioning. His opinion was that from two hypotheses explaining the same domain of phenomena, one should choose the one which explains a greater subset of this domain, which is not falsified by any phenomenon and from which one may entail every phenomenon more easily [11].

Among the auxiliary disciplines of philosophy – in particular, the disciplines which make putting and resolving philosophical problems easier – there is, i.a., the history of philosophy.

4. One of the main philosophical issues, according to Twardowski, concerns the question of the immortality of the soul (*scil.* «self»), i.e. the question of whether the human soul, after the death of the body, “does not cease to exist but instead continues to exist forever” either as a certain conscious continuation of the soul previously joined with the body, or without such a consciousness [13]. Twardowski called the first kind of immortality “individual” and the second kind “personal.”

Spiritists resolved this question – positively, according to them – through the experimental method. Those who make use of the deductive method try to deduce the immortality of the soul from the conjunction of the following hypotheses concerning the essence of man: that a certain “desire for constant self-improvement” and “craving for justice” are essential to human nature and that neither this desire nor this craving may be fulfilled “in this world.”

Twardowski considered the inductive-deductive method as the most appropriate for this question. It starts from stating the fact of the sense of unity of our soul (*scil.* the sense of having only one soul) and its identity within the boundaries appointed by memory. This one and the same soul is interpreted variously. Some philosophers identify it with the subject of experiences, i.e. with a brain (materialists) or with a substantial spiritual «self» (spiritualists). Others interpret the soul as a string of experiences (we can call them “asubstantialists”), etc.

A consequence of materialism as well as asubstantialism, is the rejection of the thesis of the immortality of the soul; spiritualists, in any case, do not reject it.

According to Twardowski, the thesis of the existence of the soul as the subject of experiences is evident and, as such, it does not require a proof. An opponent of this thesis – an asubstantialist – could not use the pronoun “I” in its ordinary sense. Using a witty, imagined dialogue with a “group of mental phenomena” as an example, Twardowski demonstrates what curious consequence treating oneself as such a group leads to. Such a «group» would not be able, for example, to indicate the method of deciding whether a given experience belongs to it or not (since belonging of such a decision to this «group» would be equally problematic); thus, such a «group» could not say about itself that it knows anything.

After establishing that the soul exists, Twardowski tried to justify the idea that the soul is simple [14]. If the subjects of experiences had some parts and a certain two experiences (e.g. audible and visual sensations)

were located in two different parts, then these experiences could not be compared; however, such comparisons do in fact take place.

Having proved that the soul is simple (*scil.* that it is a psychical atom), Twardowski states that it is also eternal, since its supposed destruction could not be explained in a natural way. Thus, one should agree that the natural eternity of atoms-souls is accompanied by the fact that they are created by God (being created by an eternal God does not require the souls to come later in time and thus not be eternal) and at a certain moment (e.g. at the moment of a man's birth) they are revealed in the spatiotemporal world.

5. Considering psychology and logic as propaedeutics of philosophy and also after changing his position to an antipsychological one, Twardowski paid a lot of attention to the analysis of psychological and metapsychological problems, *scil.* investigations on the borders of psychology, epistemology and methodology. According to Twardowski, psychologism in logic – *scil.* the view that logic is a part of psychology or should be based on it – cannot be sustained because of the following reasons: (1) “logic emerged and developed independently from psychology” [10, p. 134]; (2) theses of psychology (which are generalizations of experiential data) are only probable; theses of logic are certain (and, as a consequence, undoubted), and thus they may not follow from psychological ones; (3) psychology is a theory of real acts of thinking, whereas logic is concerned with evaluation of typical products of thinking (thoughts) with respect to their truthfulness [10].

Twardowski considered psychology as an empirical science, *scil.* a science which justifies its theses on the basis of experiential data – as opposed to political history, for example, which must reconstruct (past) facts on the basis of direct experiential data, i.e. testimonies, and «natural» history which explores the history of some fragments of nature [5]. Psychology refers to external or sensual experience (*scil.* extraspection) and to inner experience (introspection); the latter plays the role of the final foundation of psychology.

According to Twardowski – psychology differs from the empirical sciences *sensu stricto* in the following points: (a) it is based on perception but does not make use of observation (*scil.* systematic and careful following), since psychical facts flow too fast and focusing attention on them annihilates or at least modifies them, we may experience these facts only if they transform into memory traces;⁴ (b) it limits itself to exploring facts

⁴ Thus, we are not able to observe our own experiences: focusing attention on a given experience annihilates it. All our experiences, including judgments, are accessible only by inner

which are known indirectly and, additionally, are only our own experiences; (c) it often refers to the investigation of only the external symptoms of experiences. The difference between psychology and the historical sciences *sensu stricto* consists in the fact that only psychology makes use of experimentation; this fact, to some degree, makes up for the impossibility of using the method of observation in psychology.

For these reasons, one may say that psychology is a quasi-historical science: it lies on the border of empirical and historical disciplines; some parts of psychology (e.g. investigation of psychical life of sane people) are more similar to the first ones, whereas other parts (e.g. psychiatry) are more like the latter ones.

6. Psychology owes its position of a propaedeutic discipline with reference to philosophy to the fact that it is a theory of thinking.

The word “thinking” has several meanings: (a) in the colloquial sense, it refers to all psychical states; (b) in the psychological sense, it refers to psychical states, excluding the perceptive and emotional-volitional spheres (i.e. the latter being the sphere of feelings and wishes) and it covers both concrete and abstract thinking or only abstract thinking which takes place with the use of speech [10, p. 137].

There are three groups of phenomena of thinking (in the psychological sense): presenting something to oneself, judging, and “pondering, hesitating, comparing, devising, synthetizing, distinguishing, etc.” [10, p. 137]; the last group is “in constant relation” to the previous ones.

There are two structural contexts of the word “to think,” i.e. “to think of X ” and “to think that p ,” which proves the fact that presenting and judging are kinds of thinking. “Thinking of X ” means simply presenting (imagining or perceiving) X by oneself. However, “to think that p ” means to be convinced that p . Judging (being convinced that) consists in accepting or rejecting the existence of the object of judgment.⁵ Reasoning may be understood, according to Twardowski, as judging about judgments [8].

experience (becoming aware of them) which is, by the way, fallible. I may not be mistaken in becoming aware that I have a definite judgment; however, I may be mistaken in trying to know the properties of this judgment, through a reference to memory [11].

⁵ With Twardowski, one notices a characteristic hesitation which was also discovered by his students: could one assume possessing a logical value to be an essential property of judgments to define judgments without reference to the concept of truth or falsity? There is another possibility here. Yet, in one of Twardowski’s texts [11], “judgment” refers to any mental action “which contains truth or falsity” [11, p. 169]. External criterion of truthfulness, understood in such a manner, is adequacy to reality, and of falsity – inadequacy with respect to it. The inner criterion is whether “true” and “false” are adjectives which determine

According to the traditional view, the principal parts of judgments are their content and material. (The basic part of a judgment is a result of the partition of a judgment itself, not a result of the partition of a part of a judgment.) Twardowski claims that this traditional view requires a certain revision.

Judgments are expressed by sentences. Whilst there is an assignation between sentences and judgments, it is not one-to-one. The simplest sentences are very short, such as "I am sad"; however, they should be distinguished from elliptical expressions, such as "Good" [11].

Twardowski's precise distinction between act, content (i.e. product of act, as he later made precise) and the object of presentation is commonly known and treated as one of his main achievements, ensuring his strong position in the history of European philosophy. Twardowski accepted this distinction throughout his scientific activity but it is worth emphasizing that he proposed some modifications in his initial conception. Let us report what Twardowski said about this distinction in the papers gathered in this volume.

Acts and contents of presentations are their metaphysical parts (*scil.* abstract ones). The language counterparts of presentations are names; the content of presentations corresponds to the connotation of names, and the object of presentation corresponds to what a name refers to [10].

The object of presentation is something different from the content of it, since (a) when we make a negative judgment, such as "*A*-having-the-property-*B* does not exist," then we reject the existence of the object *A*-having-the-property-*B*, given in presentation, which serves as a basis of the issued judgment; but at the same time we are aware that in the content of this presentation there is something (namely, *B*) meaning that the object of this presentation does not exist in reality; (b) there are different presentations of the same object (i.e. one may present to himself the same *A* as a *P* or as a *Q*); (c) the expression "presented object" is ambiguous: it may concern either (in a determining sense) a real object which is presented by somebody or (in a modifying sense) a presentation of this real object.

7. Presentations may be divided into images (*scil.* concrete, visual presentations, or perceptions) and concepts (*scil.* abstract, non-visual presentations) [10, 11].

Objects of visual presentations "are or could be the basis for perceiving, whether sensory or extrasensory" (i.e. inner); conceptual images are not visual. (Images of contradictory objects may be only conceptual.)

the sense of nouns near which they occur (and therefore are determining adjectives) or which change this sense (and are modifying adjectives).

Not-visual images are indirect images, i.e. a necessary condition for them is to eventually have a certain visual image called an “auxiliary”; the role of this auxiliary presentation is sometimes played by an image of a language expression referring to the imagined object [11].

Images are primary or derivative. Perceptive images belong to the first category, while reproductive and productive images belong to the second one [10]. The difference between primary and derivative images is not quantitative but qualitative. Perceptive images differ from derivative ones in the following respects: (a) perceptive images are connected to the feeling of the reality of the object perceived; (b) the existence of the object perceived is independent from our will; (c) perceptive images are much more vivid than derivative ones.

According to Twardowski, the question whether some elements of spiritual life may be the object of a reproductive (memory) image has not yet been resolved in a satisfactory manner; besides, those who answer this question in the positive confuse the reproductive image of a given feeling with a feeling which is in fact experience and which appears as a consequence of recalling some circumstances or persons. The ability to recall a physical object is varied – some people recall visual images with greater ease, whereas other people recall auditory or motor ones better. The question of the durability of memory (relative and irrelative forgetting) is not resolved, according to Twardowski. He was a supporter of the dispositional conception of memory, which states that “any perceptive image creates or enhances the disposition for an image similar to the primary image to occur; the former is called ‘reproductive image’” [10, p. 149].

Productive images always contain some reproductive elements (e.g. memory tracks of sensations) and reproductive images always contain some productive elements.

Twardowski gives the following examples of laws of thinking: (1) “Any our act of presentation and any our act of judging concerns an object (somebody or something)” [10, p. 137]. (2) “A necessary condition for issuing a judgment on an object by us is to present this object to ourselves” [10, p. 137]. (3) “If a number of psychical functions (e.g. images) are connected in the mind, a disposition emerges as a result of which functions similar to other functions occur when a function similar to one of these functions occurs” [10, p. 154] and, at the same time,

the issue is not similarity between associated images, as is assumed by defenders of a separate law of association of images based on similarity, but rather, it is about similarity between an image provided at present and an image provided previously as well as between an image suggested or reproduced by the present data and an image which occurred in the mind simultaneously with the previously provided image [10, p. 154].

The associational strength of images is a result of many factors. Twardowski mentions the following: the vividness of primitive images which are initial points of association; the number of contacts of associated images; the time interval between repeated contacts; the number of images associated at a given moment; the time interval between images associated in a sequence of subsequent images; the direction of the association (i.e. which image is associating and which one is associated); the type of sense on which associated images are based; the general state of the associating organism; practice in the reproduction of associated images; the emotional tint of associated images.

8. Twardowski considered the essence and source of mistakes in thinking to be one of the most important problems, on the border between psychology and logic [8]. “Nobody voluntarily makes mistakes for everybody has a desire for truth” [8, p. 92], so what does mistaken thinking consist of and where does it come from?

Sometimes one distinguishes false presentations and false judgments. In fact, one may have false images or concepts but fault appears only when one thinks that these false presentations are not false. Thus, mistakes appear only in judgments; mistakes in thinking are simply false judgments. Mistakes must also be distinguished from not knowing whether p (for any sentence ‘ p ’).

Twardowski originally explicated the classical conception of truth, which states that truth consists in *sui generis* adequacy. In his approach, the relation of adequacy – in the case of true judgments – does not hold between the object of judgment and the supposed real object to which this judgment refers. This relation has to hold between the act of judging and its object. A judgment is true iff its act is adequate to its object, so: the positive judgment is true iff it accepts the existence of the existing object, and negative judgment is true iff it denies the existence of the existing object.

The source of mistakes of thinking, or false judgments, is in the fact that objects of judgments rarely “bear visible features of reality or unreality” [8, p. 96] (as for example the reality of some elementary ontic relations and the unreality of self-contradictory objects); usually, our presentations are imprecise and not exhaustive. Contrary to common expectations, making false judgments is not an issue of an act of will but of a drive; it is an inevitable effect of having certain presentations. This is why it is so difficult to refrain from making a false judgment.

Apart from mistakes caused by sensory illusions, one may divide mistakes into those grounded in: (a) memory; (b) an inclination to generalize (which leads to prejudices, common scientific views etc.) and to simplify (which leads to the conviction of simplicity of reality); (c) attention or

inattention concerning some elements of reality (which lead to improper emphasis on images); (d) in emotions or emotional «tendencies» (which lead to infatuation) and wishes (which lead to believing more readily in what is “beneficial for, or pleasant to, us,” [8, p. 115]); (e) speech – namely, its ambiguity and vagueness (which leads to verbal misunderstandings).

Twardowski proposed a detailed analysis of memory mistakes (*scil.* having their source in memory). They may concern, i.a., past time (here we have a hypothesis: “the time needed to imagine a given period of time influences this imagined time and its length” [8, p. 102]), the location of past events in time (here we have a hypothesis: “as far as a direct location is concerned, the vividness of a reproductive image is the most important factor” [8, p. 105]), and the presentation of a given object in a different way than it was presented in the perceptive image (here we have a hypothesis: deformations are caused by durability of associations), and forgetting (here we have a hypothesis: “the lack of a reproductive image has more or less the same meaning as the non-existence of a corresponding fact” [8, p. 108]).

9. Twardowski was a master of semantic analysis.

He paid a lot of attention to semantic analyses since he was convinced that the “univocality of terms is the most principal requirement of scientific language” [15, p. 215]: “in ideal scientific terminology, a separate name should correspond to each notion” [19, p. 293]. Ambiguity very often leads to paradoxes and confusion, even among scientists, because it is not always easily noticed.⁶

Twardowski was convinced that “making hypostases of abstract entities” [8, p. 98] is one of the most dangerous effects of ambiguity in the domain of philosophy. It occurs when one object has the same – but not identical! – properties as another object and thus one infers that some property is common to these things and that it has “a separate being.”⁷

However, Twardowski distinguished precision from purism, which he characterized as follows: “Linguistic purism is never strict and definite to such an extent that scientific language was unclear and ambiguous” [15, p. 215].

⁶ Twardowski presents the paradox of vacuum as an example: “The word ‘vacuum’ is ambiguous. In one meaning, it refers to the lack of space, and in the second meaning, it does not.” In the first case, one could perform the following reasoning: “Vacuum does not exist, for if there were vacuum between two sides of a container, there would be absolutely nothing between them. However, then one side would have to touch the other one” [8, p. 118].

⁷ Another source of hypostating abstracts is ambiguity of the word “is,” which occurs in many judgments. It may mean “identity, subordination, [or] inherence” [8, p. 117].

As examples of analyses of this kind, let us take, in turn: three metaphysical concepts ("part," "empirical," and "physical"), three epistemological-logical concepts ("truth," "independence of thought," and "prejudice") and three concepts used in ethics ("egoism," "pessimism," and "skepticism").

While presenting the analysis of judgments [11], Twardowski distinguishes different kinds of parts, namely: physical (mutually separable from each other and from the whole whose parts they constitute, capable to exist separately, e.g., the head as a part of the human body), metaphysical (or dependent, "which can be distinguished by thought in a given whole, which however cannot actually be divided from the whole" [11, p. 175]), and logical (or one-sidedly separable as, e.g., the concept of color with respect to the concept of blue).

Twardowski proposes [15] that we distinguish three concepts connected to experience: (a) the concept of being given, or the possibility of being given in experience (*scil.* experiencing), (b) the concept of making use of experience and (c) the concept of being an object, or the possibility of being an object of experiment. In order to refer to the concept (a), Twardowski proposes to use the term "experiential," to refer to the concept (b) – the term "empirical," and to the concept (c) – "experimental."

According to Twardowski, the concept "physical" has two groups of meanings [16]. The first group is composed of meanings which may be expressed as follows: (a) being used in research in physics; (b) being in close relation to research in the domain of physics; (c) belonging to the scope of research in physics. The following meanings belong to the second group: (d) concerning nature; (e) concerning bodies (or what is sensual); (f) concerning the human body. Twardowski proposes that we clearly distinguish "physical₁," signifying the first group of concepts, and "physical₂," referring to concepts of the second group.

10. The basis of the second (epistemological-logical) group of concepts is a pair: material-formal truth.

"Truthfulness" in the genuine epistemological sense refers only to judgments [12]. Such truths are called "material." In derivative epistemological senses, truthfulness refers i.a. to sayings, friends, etc. The term "truth" is also sometimes used in a non-psychological sense (e.g. "transcendental truth").

Formal (*scil.* logical) truth may be identified with a judgment stating the "logical relationship between other judgments, and therefore the relationship of reason to consequence" [12, p. 182]. As a consequence, formal truths are kinds of material truths, i.e. judgments "which claim that which exists or negate that which does not exist" [12, p. 181].

As far as the second concept is concerned, namely, the concept of independence of thought, Twardowski advised carefully distinguishing the freedom of convictions (*scil.* independence of thought) from the freedom of showing them in speech (*scil.* expression of thoughts) or in act (*scil.* acting in accordance with one's conviction) [7]. It is clear that the latter freedom is often violated. The freedom of (having such and such) convictions cannot be limited.

On the one hand, some people voluntarily resign from independence of thought, e.g. for the sake of convenience, or because of putting trust in convictions of a certain person or institution (e.g. the Church or a scientific institution). On the other hand, for some people, namely, for scientists independence of thought is a professional imperative.

Twardowski emphasized the fact that full independence of thought is impossible to acquire, since there is no area in which one may draw only from information gathered individually. We owe many of our basic convictions to our parents, teachers, educators, and, more generally, to our environment and traditions, and most of the time we are not aware of the dependence of our thinking on these factors. In a certain way, we are dependent on the language we use (see, for example, the tendency to reificate designates of names which are nouns) and on emotions experienced by us.

Finally, prejudice is a conviction which is accepted in advance, unjustifiable and false. It often happens that the source of prejudice is a generalization of accidental associations: since once, or several times, the state of affairs S1 co-occurs with the state of affairs S2, then states of the type S1 and S2 will always co-occur. Superstitions and relics are particular kinds of prejudices. Superstition is a prejudice concerning supernatural factors and their influence on human life. A relic is a prejudice which has its source in an unjustified extension of a relationship of states of affairs which occurred in past – to the present.

Prejudices do not only occur in everyday life but also in science. The best way of overcoming prejudice is, as Twardowski puts it, fighting against its foundations: “ignorance and the lack of a critical mind” [6, p. 80] as well as “mechanical repetition and accepting what one hears” [6, p. 80].

11. The ethical concept of egoism is a crucial concept of psychological and ethical hedonism. Psychological hedonism is the view that everyone's behavior is «necessarily» egoistic, *scil.* people always AIM at their own pleasure [20]. According to ethical hedonism, people SHOULD AIM at their own pleasure.

Psychological hedonism, according to Twardowski, has its foundation in “a double error: one of them is verbal and the other substantial” [20, p. 324].

A verbal mistake consists in an unjustified change of the usual sense of the word “egoism.” In its usual sense, an “egoist” is a man who aims at his own pleasure at the cost of the displeasure of other people; hedonists, however, understand the word “egoist” simply as a “man that aims at his own pleasure.” Not every action which is egoistic in the hedonist sense is egoistic in the usual sense of the word. Hedonists make a material mistake since it is simply not true that people behave egoistically in the sense of psychological hedonism: people do not take as aims of their acts only their own pleasure. One of the main reasons for the popularity of psychological hedonism is, on the one hand, the commonness of egoistic attitudes, and, on the other hand, confusing pleasure as a phenomenon that accompanies some human actions with pleasure as the conscious aim of these actions.

The second term used by ethicists, namely, the term “pessimism,” has two different but related senses: a practical one and a theoretical one. It is the same with the term “optimism” [21].

A theoretical pessimist claims that there is more evil than good in the world. A theoretical optimist claims that there is more good than evil in the world. A practical pessimist is inclined to see evil rather than good in other people, whereas a practical optimist is inclined to see good rather than evil in other people.

The controversy between theoretical pessimists and optimists is irresolvable according to Twardowski. In order to resolve such a problem, it would be necessary to know what people experience more frequently and with greater intensity: good or evil. This, however, cannot be known.

The positions of a practical pessimist and optimist are based on their dispositions and personal experiences, which are different in the case of different people. A reasonable man should be aware of it and beware of unjustified generalizations.

The third concept often used by ethicists is the concept of (ethical) skepticism. The analysis of this concept is based on noticing that there are general and particular skepticisms [18].

A general skepticism in its radical version claims that nobody is able to know anything. Such a view is self-contradictory, since proclaiming this view would be a certificate of having a certain knowledge, which would be in contradiction to the content of this view.

General skepticism in its moderate version (*scil.* relativism) claims that nobody is able to acquire absolute knowledge: every true judgment is true “AS REGARDS these or those conditions” [18, p. 239]. A kind of relativism is subjectivism stating that “the truthfulness or falsity of a judgment depends on the subject who makes the judgment” [18, p. 239]. Relativism and subjectivism – especially in the domain of axiology – is sometimes

caused by becoming aware (e.g. as a consequence of traveling) that in different parts of the Earth, people represent different states of knowledge.

Particular skepticisms (special, limited ones) claim that nobody may know anything in the definite domain of reality, or that nobody can gain any knowledge through this or that source of cognition. Here is where positivism (i.e. skepticism concerning everything that is not based on empirical data), religious skepticism and ethical skepticism belong.

12. Twardowski was convinced that scientific methods may be applied in ethics and, more broadly, in axiology as a whole, just like in metaphysics. He focused on justifying this thesis.

As Twardowski states, the question of the possibility of scientific ethics is connected with the question of whether ethical skepticism is justified. That is why Twardowski provided an in-depth analysis of this kind of skepticism [18].

Ethical skepticism is a variant concerning the possibility of constructing scientific normative ethics, i.e. ethics whose core is the thesis that “there are vital values and we are able to make statements about them in a scientific way” [18, p. 242], like “*A* has a positive (resp. negative) moral value” [18, p. 242]. In the theoretical version, it states that such values do not exist (*scil.* ethical nihilism), or at least nobody is able to know the objective difference between good and evil (*scil.* ethical agnosticism); in the practical version, it states that a possible knowledge of the difference between good and evil does not influence our behavior (*scil.* ethical pessimism).

The role of the foundation of ethical agnosticism is played by alethic relativism. Ethical relativism is the result of confusing sayings (which are often elliptic) with judgments; only the latter have a definite logical value. The subjectivist version of relativism leads either to *regressus ad infinitum* or to an inner contradiction; subjectivism is caused by confusing “judgments on real things [...] with judgments on presentations of things” [18, p. 250].

13. Alethic absolutism is connected to the problem of determinism [18].

Is it not the case that “every object of a rightly made affirmative judgment has an objective value in the present, in the past, in the future” [18, p. 251] resolves the controversy determinism-indeterminism for determinism? Kotarbiński claimed that it is the case, whereas Leśniewski was of the opposite opinion.

According to Twardowski – Kotarbiński’s conception is mistaken and the source of his mistake lies in “confusing two things: on the one hand, the possibility of judging in the present whether [given] judgments are true or false with, on the other hand, the actual truthfulness or falsity of

the judgments" [18, p. 254]. Kotarbiński *de facto* combines "truthfulness of a judgment which states the existence of a future event" [18, p. 239] with the "necessity of this future event." Let ' T ' designate the present. Let ' S_p ' designate some future event. Let ' S ' designate a judgment stating the occurrence of S_p . We thus have either:

(1) S_p has to (*scil.* it may not not) occur $\Rightarrow Z$ is true in T .

or:

(2) Z is true in $T \Rightarrow S_p$ has to occur.

Twardowski is convinced that instead of (1) and (2) one may say, respectively, that:

(3) S_p will occur $\Rightarrow Z$ is true at T

(4) Z is true at $T \Rightarrow S_p$ will occur.

The formula (3) states the dependence between truthfulness of judgment from the occurrence of the corresponding state of affairs, whereas the formula (4) – concerns the dependence of the occurrence of the state of affairs from truthfulness of corresponding judgment. In this second case, it is not a causal but logical determination: the truthfulness (in T) of judgment Z entails the truthfulness of the judgment that S_p will occur.

Since alethic relativism loses its own foundation, it may not serve as the foundation of ethical agnosticism.

14. Other arguments are also issued as justification of agnosticisms. It is stated that: (a) there are no ethical norms (resp. criterions) which are absolutely valid; (b) there are no norms which are commonly (i.e. always and in all societies) valid; (c) the terms "good" and "evil" have different meanings in different times and places [18].

These arguments have to be refuted, because: (a) norms which are treated as general judgments are in fact limited to a certain determined domain; (b) the fact that some norms are not valid in some periods and in some societies may be interpreted in a twofold manner: firstly, it may mean that these norms are not (in these periods or societies) accepted as valid, however, it happens that people are mistaken by accepting a given norm as valid; secondly, it may mean that these norms are formulated as general but in fact they are not generally applicable; (c) a change of concepts does not entail a change of norms.

15. Ethical skepticism may also be analyzed from the point of view of whether there are any criteria of good and evil [18]. There are the following possibilities here:

- (1) we have both definitions and the criterion of good and evil (dogmatism₁);
- (2) we have definitions but we do not have the criterion of good and evil (dogmatism₂);
- (3) we do not have definitions but we have the criterion of good and evil (dogmatism₃);
- (4) we have neither definitions nor the criterion of good and evil (theoretical skepticism);
- (5) we can only «define» good and evil intuitively (extreme intuitionism).

If one accepts combination (4), then one may claim that the terms “good” and “evil” cannot be theoretical terms and that they have to be exchanged with one of remaining combinations (e.g. by terms “ordered” and “prohibited”); however, such a resolution also raises theoretical difficulties (cf. ordered or prohibited by whom?).

The aforementioned ethical pessimism has two foundations: hedonism and determinism. According to ethical hedonism, “there should always be egoistic incentives behind [human ethical] [...] actions” [18, p. 264]. Psychological hedonism serves as a justification of this hedonism. The former claims that people are always motivated by egoistic factors. According to Twardowski, if psychological hedonism were true, the formulation of any ethical norms, including norms of ethical hedonism, would be useless. Maybe egoistic acts are frequent, but generalization of ethical hedonism is a false thesis. Such a generalization appears to be true only because its supporters understand the term “egoism” improperly. To be an egoist, it does not suffice to be a man who looks everywhere for his own pleasure (as hedonists claim); one has to, moreover, do so although his “own pleasure or distress is connected to someone else’s pleasure or distress” [20, p. 324].

On the other hand, even in this understanding of hedonism (probably “ipsism” is a better term for this phenomenon), psychological hedonism is false, since some acts cause pleasure to their actors but this pleasure is not the incentive to undertake these acts. Moreover, it happens that the actor takes pleasure in causing pleasure for other people.

16. The other factor which connects the problem of ethical skepticism with determinism is the question of the freedom of will [18].

Twardowski emphasizes that it is not a case of physical freedom which consists in the fact that:

$$(X \text{ decided to do } C \wedge \text{there are no external obstacles to do } C) \Rightarrow \\ \Rightarrow X \text{ will do } C).$$

The question of freedom of will is connected to determinism, since *X*'s freedom of will is defined as the lack of causes of *X*'s acts or resolutions. Both motives and *X*'s character (*scil.* a set of his dispositions) may play the role of such causes. It is not Twardowski's aim to resolve the controversy between determinism and indeterminism but to decide whether "determinism actually poses such a danger to ethics as it is claimed" [18, p. 271].

Twardowski's answer is negative, since if resolutions really have causes-motives and are influenced by the character of the actor,⁸ then nothing stands in the way of evaluating acts ethically with respect to these motives and this character. Generally, "even if some phenomenon is necessary, it never poses any difficulties to evaluate it" [18, p. 272]. However, the question arises whether *X* is responsible for *X*'s acts, undertaken as a consequence of *X*'s decision determined by motives and *X*'s character. According to Twardowski, if a given act is undertaken in such circumstances, i.e. may be ascribed to *X* or *X* is an actor of it, then *X* is responsible for this act against *Y* (if *Y* has the right to atonement): this act is his merit (if it is good) or guilt (if it is evil), so it deserves reward or punishment, respectively. The question of the existence of pleasure (resp. displeasure) connected with responsibility for good acts (resp. evil ones) is neutral for the determinism-indeterminism controversy. This is because, despite the fact that they have a "source" in past decisions, then their *raison d'être* lies in future decisions, "experienced after the first resolution leave a mark on the human soul," which sometimes changes his dispositions. The problem is not that we WILL ABLE TO ACT in such and such a way because of them but that we WILL REALLY ACT so and so. On this approach, pleasure and displeasure (*scil.* inner determinacy) have an educational function.

Twardowski claimed that despite the fact that the EXISTENCE of free will is not necessary for moral improvement, some people need to BELIEVE (at least instinctively) IN THE EXISTENCE of free will.

However, if determinism is a true thesis, then the reason for the existence of practical ethics (*eo ipso* formulating ethical norms) could be that some person "cares about the positive value of resolutions."

It is sometimes claimed that one may not construct such a system of moral norms which would enable us to evaluate every act falling under an ethical criterion. Twardowski was convinced that such a view may be effectively falsified simply by constructing such a system.

⁸ According to Twardowski, the total cause is composed of necessary conditions and the final cause. Together, they are sufficient for the occurrence of the effect [19].

17. Twardowski was interested in the question of whether “the problem of the freedom of will is resolved matters for ethics and criminal law,” as it surely happens in the case of religion (without the assumption of free will one would have to accept the dogma of predestination in the area of salvation) [19].

According to Twardowski, the question of free will is resolved in the negative; determinism is the most probable of all possible standpoints. Moreover, determinism may be reconciled with the main assumptions of ethics and criminal law more easily than indeterminism.

The details read as follows.

When we speak of freedom of will, the word “will” does not refer to the ability to have feelings and desires or to make decisions (nor to any of these abilities) but directly to these acts, to the acts of resolutions in particular.

Further, the will (resolution) may be free in a double sense:

(a) in the physical (colloquial) sense, it is understood as “FREEDOM FROM OBSTACLES IN EXECUTING RESOLUTIONS,” i.e. when a resolved action does not encounter external obstacles;

(b) in the philosophical (metaphysical) sense, it is understood as the fact that resolutions are not determined by character (considered as the totality of dispositions) and intellectual or motional motives (which activate dispositions).

The existence of physical freedom (a) is a fact, although this freedom is limited to some degree.

However, we do not have philosophical freedom (b), since in order to make a resolution, the occurrence of some motives is necessary and, moreover, the following mental phenomena have to appear: a presentation of the object of resolution, lack of conviction of irrealizability of this object, and desire to realize it. One may often resolve to do this or that – but not always: it is possible only if appropriate circumstances occur. That is why remorse concerns not a certain resolution as such but motives and character which are the source of this resolution. According to Twardowski, a decisive argument for determinism in the area of acts of will is the fact that there are situations in which we can accurately indicate motives and dispositions which caused such and such a resolution on the part of a given person (if we only know enough about this person).

By the way, Twardowski shows that the so-called paradox of Buridan’s ass – showing the impossibility of making a resolution about which out of two identical bundles of hay is to be eaten – is only theoretical fiction, neutral from the point of view of the determinism-indeterminism controversy. In reality, all asses make such a resolution in the end: according

to determinists, they are inclined by given dispositions or motives, and according to indeterminists – by free acts of will.

Indeterminists claim that taking a deterministic standpoint makes the application of the concept of the so-called ascribing possible in ethics and criminal law. To ascribe the act *C* to resolution of *X* – and, as a consequence, to consider the act *C* as a merit or guilt of *X*, means to make a judgment that *X* is the actor of *C*, i.e. that *C* results from character of *X*. According to Twardowski, “ascribing” thus understood may be predicate to the acting man also on the grounds of determinism.

18. Among the reasons for ethical relativism, one could mention the ethical consequences of the theory of evolution for ethics. Twardowski, while not saying anything about the theory of evolution itself, nevertheless carefully analyzed these supposed consequences [17].

In connection with the widely diffused theory of evolution, there appeared a conception stating that “ethical convictions result from sexual selection and other evolutionary factors, as particular animal classifications do.” One started to consider every act which “conduces toward sustaining the life of an individual or the whole of mankind and at the same time does not allow these interests of particular individuals to become contentious” as a moral act. It leads to a change in ethical convictions accompanying changes in living conditions and, as a consequence, to “ethical anarchy.”

As Twardowski emphasizes, it is irrational not to accept the fact that people differ in their ethical (made on the basis of conscience), aesthetic (made on the basis of taste), and logical evaluations, *scil.* those of convictions with respect to logical value (made on the basis of reason). However, it does not entail that there are no commonly valid evaluations in the domain of conscience, taste and reason. Differences in opinions may have their source in the fact that we do not have a theory ordering these issues.

Supporters of evolutionary ethics justify their standpoint by the claim that there is no *analogue* of logical axioms in the domain of ethics, i.e. that there are no ethical axioms that are obvious for everyone in the way logical dogmas are (e.g. that a part is smaller than the whole). Twardowski did not accept this argument, drawing attention to the fact that if a logical dogma is to be obvious for a given person, it has to be fully understandable to this person. The same concerns ethical dogmas. That is why there is a need for the education of not only reason but also conscience. The second type of education is even more difficult, since the ethical development of an individual is overtaken by intellectual development and thus “there are more wise people than moral ones” [17, p. 233].

In the end, as Twardowski says, there are no “moral truths” that develop in the course of evolution but “people develop in respect of reason and

conscience and aesthetic taste and as a consequence, they get rid of more and more mistakes” [17, p. 235].

19. Among the particular ethical problems analyzed by Twardowski, there is, i.a., the question whether the norm “Do not lie!” is absolute. He declared as his standpoint that “an absolute prohibition of lying is untenable” [22, p. 334].

Lying is acceptable, i.a., in the following circumstances: (a) person *A* lies to person *B*, where *B* is a child or a mentally handicapped person; (b) person *C* misunderstands what person *A* says to person *B*, but *A* intentionally speaks in such a way that *C* is not able to establish *A*’s real intentions; (c) person *A* lies to person *B* not to the detriment of *B* but does person *B* a favor; (d) person *A* lies to person *B*, because it is the only way to save person *A*, *B* or *C*’s life or another important good.

20. Let us repeat that Twardowski was convinced that in axiology – including aesthetics – scientific methods may be applied.

In this area, he gave two examples of questions investigated in the domain of experimental (*eo ipso* scientific) aesthetics: the question of the criterion of beauty in art [23] and the question of what is the foundation of the evocative function of music [24].

Experimental aesthetics is made by those who make sets of experiments in order to check aestheticians’ hypotheses concerning aesthetical evaluations, or likes and dislikes. One such hypothesis says that “every object is the more beautiful the more evident the golden ratio is in it” [23, p. 341]. Twardowski shows that this hypothesis is, in principal, experimentally confirmed.

Traditionally, “the task of music was seen as recreating and inducing feelings of sadness or happiness in a listener, soothing his soul etc.” Twardowski poses the question of how such an evocation may happen. Pleasure occurs as a consequence of listening to music (independently from the text to which it is ascribed), since: (a) listening to music does not require any effort; (b) sounds of music are “pleasant”; (c) by listening to music, one has the sense of “the diversity and homogeneity of a certain number of impressions” [24, p. 346].

Each object which captures a certain diversity in a homogenous whole is beautiful. Moreover, the composition of a given structure (melodic, rhythmic or accord), evokes experiences of a similar structure in hearers.

21. Twardowski was an invaluable teacher and the founder of the greatest, with respect to the number of outstanding members, philosophical school in modern Europe. This is why his pedagogical views deserve interest and respect.

Twardowski's general pedagogical ideal may be summarized in the triple imperative: "Less teaching, more training, and educating whenever possible!" [9, p. 129].

The expression "*X* is educated by *Y*" is used in its appropriate meaning when *Y* is a man-educator ("life," "circumstances of life," etc. are not educators in this strict sense). In the first meaning, "education" may signify only some action (*scil.* educating), and in the second sense – the product of this action. Remembering this distinction, one says that "to educate" means the same as "TO DEVELOP A SKILL BY MEANS OF REGULAR PRACTICE," i.e. to develop "a talent to undertake some actions or to perform some functions" [9, p. 125].

Repeating a given action is, according to Twardowski, the only way to learn a skill in this kind of action.

To refer to intellectual skills, Twardowski proposed to use the term "practice." Thus "MORAL EDUCATION consists in practicing volition in order to acquire a skill in making appropriate resolutions" [9, p. 126], i.e. in resolving in accordance to ethical rules. In order for a pupil to achieve the aim, it is necessary for him to know these rules and to want to apply them.

On the first stage of education, the point of departure of gaining knowledge about rules is the obedience of the pupil to the educator and thus, the first motive of good behavior is punishment. Obedience as "the main means of practicing volition" [9, p. 127], is a successful mean under the condition that it is consistently enforced. "Leniency is the main sin of an educator" [9, p. 127]. That is why it is especially important to formulate reasonable imperatives. The rule is as follows: "[Teachers] must not expect from pupils more than pupils are able to do. [...] In turn, what pupils are able to do and what they should do has to be absolutely demanded from them" [9, p. 127].

At the second stage of education, obedience to an educator's orders has to be replaced with "voluntary obedience to the rules," motivated by "the pupils' unwillingness to make educators sad because of their disobedience" [9, p. 128], the fact "that our will is against God's will" [9, p. 128], "patriotism," etc. Also here, the consequence is obligatory; however, here it concerns the rules themselves.

The third stage of education is self-education: we become educators of ourselves and thus remain until practically the end of our lives.

22. Let us repeat that Twardowski claimed that knowledge of the history of philosophy makes posing and resolving philosophical problems easier. Therefore, the history of philosophy is an auxiliary discipline with respect to philosophy itself.

Twardowski's works from the domain of history of philosophy are not numerous. His only larger monograph in this domain is a little book *O filozofii średniowiecznej wykładów sześć* [*Six Lectures on Mediaeval Philosophy*] (cf. [Twardowski 1910]); the remaining historical-philosophical works are a few small papers on particular philosophers.

We have chosen five such short texts here, attempting to represent all epochs of European philosophy. Socrates is an ancient philosopher, Thomas Aquinas a medieval one; Leibniz and Spencer are examples of modern philosophers and Nietzsche and Bergson were contemporary (in a broader sense) to Twardowski.

Twardowski appreciated to some degree all of them, yet for different reasons.

He esteemed Socrates [25, p. 354] for being a “fanatic of the mind and conscience” and for being both an intellectual and a moral absolutist and objectivist. Socrates was convinced that we are able to gain knowledge about the world which is independent from us, there are absolute moral norms and they may be recognized. Realizing that the essence of scientific knowledge lies in laws was considered by Twardowski as Socrates' greatest achievement in epistemology. Socrates started to treat ethics as a science. Twardowski esteemed Socrates also for being faithful to the propagated norms. Among these rules, there was one saying that one has to be obedient to one's state regulations. Socrates was convinced that his condemnation to death was unjust, however, being obedient to the verdict, he committed suicide, in spite of the fact that his friends offered him help in escaping from his prison.

In Saint Thomas Aquinas [26], Twardowski esteemed, firstly, the fact that he “was able to integrate harmoniously and consistently [Albert the Great's views] with the results of his own constant reflections” [26, p. 361]. Secondly, he appreciated Aquinas' “brilliant comments” to Aristotle's writings. As Twardowski wrote, “Christian thought and Greek thought have never before and never again been so harmoniously integrated into one whole” [26, p. 363].

Twardowski held Leibniz and Spencer in high esteem [27] as they both realized the same great values: (a) universality, because they knew almost the whole of science contemporary to them and they had a great impact on it (Leibniz in the fields of philosophy, mathematics and history and Spencer in philosophy and sociology), (b) «conditionalism» – because they both had an inclination to see in any phenomenon a “tiny grain of truth” [27, p. 366], to look for “equalization of opposites” [27, p. 367]; (c) optimism, since they both believed that this world is “the best of all possible worlds” [27, p. 367], and “that the road to ever greater happiness is open for every human being” [27, p. 367].

23. One could think that Twardowski's attitude to Nietzsche must be highly critical [28]. These two philosophers differ in almost every respect. On the one hand, there is the tendency to exaggerate, intended illogicality, preaching, propagation of "ethics of masters" or egoism, anti-Christianity in Nietzsche – and, on the other hand: the inclination toward restraint, precision in expressing thoughts, the analytical method, propagating "morality of slaves" or altruism, acceptance of Christianity. In such a situation, "any polemic would be useless; to engage in polemics with Nietzsche would be ridiculous to the same extent as arguing with a stubborn child or a despot whose only wish is to impale me just on a whim" [28, p. 377]. According to Twardowski, the only way to show that Nietzsche is wrong is to show what lead him to his standpoint. The basis of Nietzsche's conception of a man being outside good and evil (*jenseits von Gut und Böse*) is the confusion of ethical intuition and physiological instinct. Neither a genius lead by ethical intuition nor a primitive conducted by physiological instinct need a normative ethical system. For a genius, the intuition suffices to evaluate behavior with respect to moral value, and for a primitive, instinct is sufficient to be well oriented: he simply does not recognize moral aspects of life. They are both outside good and evil; however, Nietzsche did not notice that they are not on the same side of this "outside."

Twardowski's criticism of Nietzsche was crushing but there was one thing which Twardowski appreciated in him: the German language of his writings, "brilliant, forceful, beautiful, and full of this mysterious power that rivets a reader's attention to the contents which are often repulsive with their harsh ruthlessness" [28, p. 370].

24. Twardowski's attitude toward Bergson was equally ambivalent [29].

He valued Bergson's "richness of ideas" and "finished form" of writings in which he presented these ideas.

He also appreciated the importance of some of the philosophical problems analyzed by Bergson, including the problem of the adequate description of changes. "Adequate" means here free from the corset of the conceptual apparatus induced by the language we use.

According to Bergson, changes, and movement in particular, perceived directly, without this corset, appear to be at first not infinitely divisible but absolutely indivisible (*scil.* simple). Two main sources of a false conviction about infinitive divisibility of movement are: incorrect interpretation of the fact that movement may be stopped at any place and confusion of infinite divisibility of the section in which something is moving with infinite divisibility of the movement itself. In short, a corset put on the description of a movement consists in the fact that movement – and time in which it takes place – is commonly described in categories of space. Secondly,

there are no objects which change; only changes exist. In some cases, e.g. when we listen to music, this conviction imposes itself as obvious: we hear some audible changes but it does not mean that some sounds change.

Twardowski has a lot of reservations about such an approach to changes and time. In particular, he was convinced that the source of Bergson's view on the *sui generis* presence of the past in our memory is the corset of the French language in which the word "*présent*" means both presence and the present. The conviction that only changes exist is based on the fact that Bergson's point of departure is only an intuition concerning a certain part of reality in which changes prevail and that he made an unwarranted extrapolation into the domain of the whole reality. These reservations formulated by Twardowski, are serious, since if they are right, they show that Bergson violated fundamental scientific imperatives: the imperative of precision in language and the imperative of carefulness in generalizations.

* * *

In the text on Nietzsche, Twardowski wrote:

Therefore, we know that in order to be read, to make a great uproar in the modern public sphere, and form a certain literary party, one does not necessarily have to write something truly beautiful, judicious and lofty. Quite the contrary: the best way to achieve that is advancing ideas either tickling society's fancy or rousing its indignation. And the one who can both flatter and outrage becomes the most widely-read author [28, p. 369].

It is obvious that Twardowski's texts do not have the properties which would make him a widely read author, as they neither "flatter" nor "outrage" the reader. Instead, they have the feature which Twardowski truly strived for: they are witty.

Nobody with a serious attitude toward philosophy can be disappointed with them.

EDITORIAL NOTE

1. One part of the papers collected in this volume has been translated by Katarzyna Janeczek and the others by Alicja Chybińska. All of the papers were additionally proofread by Glen Cullen and Aeddan Shaw. The translations differ in some respects. The papers translated by Katarzyna Janeczek are as close to the original with regard to the syntactic structure as possible, whilst those of Alicja Chybińska are somewhat freer. However, both translators sought to capture the «spirit» of Twardowski's Polish.

We have taken great care in unifying the translations terminologically. We also tried to use the terminology that has already been used in other published translations of Twardowski's papers, especially in the volume *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, mentioned in the "Introduction."

2. The Polish equivalents of parts of this volume were published on the basis of manuscripts after Twardowski's death. Some of them are shortened outlines used by Twardowski during his lectures. In the Polish originals of these texts, one often finds verbless sentences instead of full sentences. In English translations, these shortened expressions are usually completed in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. However, in the published translations there is also some grammatical and stylistic grittiness characteristic of the Polish originals.

3. Twardowski was a master of the Polish language and was very demanding with respect to philosophical terminology. First of all, he expected this terminology to be semantically precise. That is why, on the one hand, there are a lot of idioms and puns in his papers and, on the other hand, some parts of these papers are simply devoted to the semantic analysis of some terms.

These properties of translated texts caused many translational difficulties. The translators tried to find the best possible English equivalents of Polish idioms and to introduce indexes to English terms, when it was impossible to find satisfactory English equivalents to signify differences between the semantic nuances of different Polish words. The mentioned problems are always signaled in the translators' footnotes.

Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki

Kazimierz Twardowski

1.

OPENING LECTURE AT THE LVOV UNIVERSITY*

Let me begin my lectures on philosophy at this university with logic, that is, one of the most specific branches of philosophy. Thus, I feel obliged to commence with a few words referring to those questions which are on everyone's mind when dealing with a previously unknown representative of my profession. Among other things, logic differs from other philosophical disciplines primarily in that it was the first one to be scientifically justified and developed, yet it has undergone the least change. One would have to venture into very specific logical problems and the manner in which they are considered in order to recognize which scientific trend a given scholar is included in. Still, even if we learn that one person understands logic in a purely Aristotelian manner, or another person is partial to the views of Stuart Mill, we would not be able to determine what is the view of proponents of both trends in logic on some problems that divide philosophers into two vigorously opposing fractions. This is because the mentioned division does not originate in logic; it does not depend on whether one regards the syllogism as the fundamental method of reasoning or, as Prantl claims, a method of training dull minds; the division lies mainly in the branch of philosophy called "metaphysics" which is usually responsible for setting philosophical systems.

Idealism or realism, spiritualism or materialism, dogmatism or skepticism, monists and dualists, etc, are the emblems used by philosophers to

* The lecture was given in Lvov on the 15th November, 1895. It was prepared for print by Artur Rojszczak and published in Polish as "Wykład wstępny w Uniwersytecie Lwowskim (1895)" in *Principia* VIII-IX (1994), 225-236 [B&J].

praise their own intellectual achievements and criticize those of others. Moreover, they tend to select a name molded from the surname of some philosopher who they intend to follow, and whose teachings they regard as true. Idealists are further subdivided into Platonists, Berkeleyists etc., and so on in each of the mentioned specializations. Thus, when one encounters a hitherto unknown representative of philosophy, it is customary to ask which section of philosophy in the history of philosophy to place him in. I can assure you from my personal experience that whenever I tell someone that I practice philosophy, I am asked whether I am a proponent of Herbart, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza or Plato, Wundt or Kant. What do I respond to such questions? Inspired by Socrates, I ask conversely: What would be an analogous question directed at a representative of natural sciences? Would it be at all possible to inquire thusly, and what would such inquiry directed at a natural scientist mean? At this point, I am told: Oh, natural sciences are an entirely different matter, where one cannot speak of fundamentally different directions, or of mutually exclusive systems; but in philosophy, everyone has to be some kind of “-ist,” or “-icist” – *aut est talio, aut non est*.


It seems to me that those who attempted to justify the question they had posed actually revealed a lack of knowledge of vital properties both of natural sciences and of branches of philosophy. This is because they assumed natural sciences are vastly different from philosophy; that the difference between them is such as does not occur between any other fields of human knowledge. Is that in fact so? Is such a general statement justified? The more popular a notion is and the more prevalent it is, the less it can be trusted and the more critically one has to examine its legitimacy. Therefore, let us consider this question, at least briefly, as time allows, and let us attempt to understand the relationship between the natural sciences and philosophy.

Such a relationship may be approached in many ways. I shall not pause to discuss the otherwise very interesting relationship between the historical development of natural sciences on the one hand and philosophy on the other; however, I would like to note the relationship between the subjects within the scope of natural and philosophical sciences as well as the methods used to research them.

The very name of natural sciences indicates their subject. The things and phenomena which belong to the nature are the material background of natural sciences. Any body or attribute of bodies is within their domain. Whatever engages the senses as well as the sensory tools together with the organism which contains them constitutes the huge scope of natural sciences. Conversely, philosophical sciences focus on mental and spiritual phenomena; yet, this sort of specification of the subject of

philosophical study cannot be applied to all of them without exception. It is accurate as long as one means psychology, logic, ethics, or aesthetics; but it does not apply to metaphysics. This is because metaphysics does not study sensory phenomena as such or mental ones; thus, one might resolve that it has no *raison d'être*. In fact, positivists deny it any significance. However, they are wrong. Apart from sensory and mental objects, there are also others, which cannot be put in any of these categories, which are nevertheless closely connected to both. Various kinds of relationships are good instances. Is a similarity between two objects a sensory phenomenon or a mental phenomenon? Naturally, it is neither, although this relationship may occur both between sensory phenomena and between mental phenomena. Two tables or two kinds of movement are similar, just as two emotions or two sensory impressions can be similar. Another example is the relationship between cause and effect. Something sensory may be the cause (pressure) but also the effect (an object falling down); similarly, two mental phenomena may relate to each other in the same way as cause and effect (image and emotion). This relationship may even occur between a mental phenomenon and a sensory phenomenon: a resolution and movement of a member; but the causal relationship itself is after all neither sensory nor mental. Thus, the whole theory of relationships belongs to the domain of metaphysics. However, the issue does not end here. There are a number of problems concerned with neither intellectual nor sensory matters, which nevertheless relate to both intellectual and sensory things. The question about the origin of both soul and body is within this scope, as well as, the issue of the relationship of the sensory things to mental ones. When one asks about the purpose of the world's existence, one should search for the scientific answer in metaphysics. Thus, there is no shortage of issues which fall within the scope of metaphysics; there is no lack of relevant content. Only the narrow-minded approach of positivists prevents them from appreciating the significance of these problems.

From what I said about the object of metaphysics, it means that philosophy cannot stand in opposition to natural sciences, as philosophy contains metaphysics. Lack of time prevents me from explaining the matter further so let us settle for simply stating this fact, hopefully without any contradictions. Metaphysics, itself a branch of philosophy, deals with subjects closely connected to both the subject of natural sciences and the subject of other philosophical sciences. It also establishes a close bond between these two areas of knowledge, a bond based on problems common to both. This relationship can be symbolically presented in the following manner:



There is also another kind of relationship between natural and philosophical sciences. Certain problems the human mind engages in refer to phenomena caused by both natural and spiritual factors. The question of the emergence of human speech, or inducing sensory impressions through the movements of the ether or the air, or the creation of forms of social life – these are examples of such problems. Linguistics, sociology, psychophysics, although they constitute discrete sciences, still merge the natural and philosophical sciences together at their basic level.

Having determined the relationship between natural and philosophical sciences based on the subjects and problems they tackle, let us turn our attention toward the method. There is a common expression in German philosophy: “*die naturwissenschaftliche Methode*.” One can speak of the method of natural sciences as the only available manner of research in the field of nature, whose method is identified as the inductive method. Such an approach is not always precise, as there is a branch of natural sciences which has become thoroughly deductive, namely mechanics. Admittedly, mechanics had been an inductive science, but by creating broader and broader generalizations, it has been possible to formulate several underlying rules, from which specific rules of motion phenomena are deduced. Thus, the inductive method is not used in mechanics today. There are also other natural sciences with no trace of induction, that is, all purely descriptive sciences, like zoology. Only when we are concerned with the origin of certain species, do we begin to seek the causes of some phenomena and only then does induction occur as the only proper means to explore the truth. Therefore, the inductive method is not the only one at use in natural sciences. Deduction is present as well, alongside with classification. The same can be said about the philosophical sciences. One of them, namely: psychology, is primarily purely descriptive, and only when we deal with the origin of mental phenomena, or the factors which influence the development of the entirety of mental life, do we make use of induction in psychology. On the other hand, logic is a deductive science, just like mechanics; ethics and aesthetics should also be deductive sciences but there is still no agreement as to the fundamental laws from which specific

norms of ethic and esthetic evaluation can be deduced. The debate is about whether these general laws of ethics and aesthetics should be investigated inductively or if they are immediately obvious. The first case would suit mechanics while the other would suit logic.

Finally, what about metaphysics? Before we proceed to discuss whether deduction or induction should be used there, we have to concede that also in metaphysics there are purely descriptive areas, for instance, the above-mentioned theory of relations. The issue here is none other than describing and sorting individual relations as well as determining the conditions which have to be fulfilled in order for this or that relations or a few relations between subjects to occur. In this area of metaphysics, for instance, we have to discuss the question, raised by certain disciples of Descartes, whether spirit and matter, such heterogeneous substances, CAN affect each other. We ascertain the possibility of such interaction through deductive analysis, by analyzing the notions of mutual interaction and realizing that the notion does not encompass anything that might prevent it from being applied to any, even very diverse, subjects. Yet, if we do not consider the possibility of interaction between spirit and matter but rather, the question, already negated by Fechner, Wundt, Paulsen and others, of whether this interaction in fact takes place, then it is impossible to do without induction. Similarly, induction is necessary when we want to consider the ultimate purpose of the universe and the individuals living in it. While gathering experience concerning certain entities and relatively short periods, through further and further generalizations, we reach results referring to the future inaccessible to experience. Thus, induction plays a significant role in metaphysics. The question of whether the world has always existed or it began its existence in time was determined by Aristotle through a most subtle, yet precise, deduction; such questions, only accessible through deduction, are common in metaphysics. The difficulty lies in discovering the general rules which could underlie deduction, since a significant feature of deduction is that it is derived from general judgments, whereas induction is based on particular judgments. The transformation metaphysics is undergoing nowadays refers to those general rules, used as a starting point for deductive reasoning. With just a few exceptions, it was commonly thought that the general rules could not be reached through induction, that the rules have to be *a priori*, that they cannot be drawn from experience, that they have to be above experience, and that they have to be drawn from concepts within the human soul. Thus, everyone could extract the notions, make statements and rules out of them, and in turn confidently proceeded to deduce the laws of the universe from the latter. However, since no two souls are equal, each person started with different assumptions and reached a different conclusion, hence the existence of

such a multitude of opposing systems, and the constant controversies of philosophers, the utter lack of consent, led to general distrust followed by disdain and contempt. Philosophy created one a priori system after another, philosophers forced out new ideas, whereas natural sciences advanced slowly but steadily through quiet, systematic work based on facts. Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Robert Mayer, Kirchhoff, Helmholtz, Fechner, Maxwell and Hertz led the way, based on facts, to use induction to reach general rules which would serve as a basis for far-reaching deductions, which would be verifiable through experience. That did it for philosophy. When post-Kantian speculations collapsed and there emerged a terrible mental void which feeble minds struggled to fill with the gospel of materialism, philosophy awoke. Herbart and Trendelenburg, Lotze and Brentano called for the improvement of the lamentable state of affairs. They rejected putting forward theses which were seemingly a priori but in fact were arbitrary. They focused on the analysis of facts and phenomena themselves and drew inspiration from the method delivering such great results in natural sciences. Thus, a new époque began for philosophy and especially for metaphysics.

The present state of metaphysics may be compared to that of mechanics before Galileo. Plenty of research material has been collected and a system to account for this profusion has been attempted, but it was only Galileo who began to actually build the system. Still, it did not emerge at once. Many more discoveries had to be made and many more facts researched more thoroughly in order for mechanics to assume the final form known today.

Much has already been done in metaphysics, a lot of the elements to build the system have been assembled, and there have been many attempts to build one. However, all the work has been premature; it went unnoticed that many of the elements are still missing, that the groundwork has not been fully established and thus, whatever was built on this base was riddled with holes and crumbled to pieces. Yet, the individual elements remained untouched, unless they were useless. Thus, the work of a whole generation was not entirely pointless, since although it did not bring any of the effects it aimed to achieve, it was not futile. It demonstrated which element has no everlasting value and should be discarded, and therefore induced a certain natural selection from among various theorems and standpoints, thus facilitating the work of the following generations and demonstrating that also in this field of human knowledge progress is possible.

The time has not yet come to put forward a philosophical system. I mention "a system" rather than "systems" as there is only one true philosophical system. Still, we do not know it, and may never learn it. A perfect system was achieved in mechanics, as its object is clearly defined and is

within clear boundaries, and the study itself refers to relatively straightforward and uncomplicated phenomena. But what of the idea of metaphysics encompassing the whole universe, its past and future and all that is infinitely small and infinitely big in it? Will it ever come into possession of all the particular bits of information which can be used to build a edifice of knowledge without any holes or flaws, one not exposed to breakdown from the start? I cannot say what will be but I do know that there is still a very long way to go, even though we are closer than Indian and Ionic philosophers. Let us not study the future, let us not speculate, but rather let us do our part. Since we admitted that we are yet unable to build a philosophical system, let us gather data which may prove useful at some point in the future. There is no shortage of problems, so let us treat them one after another, one man the first problem, another man the second one, and thus we shall procure an ever increasing number of points of support for mankind. This copious material will aid to orientate in the universe.

While I speak against attempting to build philosophical systems, I realize that I can easily be accused of trying to deprive metaphysics of its most significant feature. Metaphysics is usually expected to present overall results of research conducted by special sciences. After all, it would not be so without a philosophical system – many would think. In the face of this objection one has to keep it in mind that, in accordance with the definition of the subject of metaphysics presented here, any metaphysical question concerns a synthesis of results of particular research. If we know that the world had to have a beginning instead of having eternally existed, the conviction refers both to subjects studied in natural sciences and subjects which concern psychology. However, if we know that the mutual interaction of two objects provides a statement concerning their quality, then we are in possession of a law which can be applied both to material and spiritual objects, as well as to both of them at the same time. Thus, everything we tackle in metaphysics is merely a partial synthesis, and it is beyond doubt that we are not in possession of a complete synthesis which would encompass all data without exception; this is a fact which cannot be dismissed by any speculations. Still, it is better not to have such a synthesis than to have a fallacious one, and – as I mentioned before – we cannot yet afford a true scientific synthesis.

Let us now return to our initial question. I attempted to demonstrate that there are no gross inconsistencies between philosophical and natural sciences; on the contrary, one branch of philosophy, namely metaphysics, addresses issues of interest to both natural sciences and the remaining philosophical sciences. I also strove to demonstrate that the methods used in philosophical sciences, especially metaphysics, are no different from ones often used in studies of nature. It follows that classifying philosophers

and assigning labels to them is not justified when we take into account the current state of the science. Naturally, differences of opinions between philosophers still exist, but these also exist among natural scientists. How many theories are there with which natural scientists attempt to explain the phenomenon of earthquakes? How many various ways are there to explain the origin of animal and plant species? Weismann contradicts Darwin, and Hamann speaks against them both. Even in mechanics there is a great difference of opinions as to the manner of deduction. Kirchhoff wished to eliminate the notion of force; Mach followed his footsteps; but this in turn raised a strong opposition. Differences of opinions and contradictory trends occur in natural sciences as well. Yet, the differences of opinions are always related to one contentious question under discussion at a given point. Therefore it may be, and often is, the case that two natural scientists agree with each other in all questions except one, for instance, that both are proponents of the theory of evolution but in the question of the inheritance of acquired qualities, one of them adheres to Charles Darwin's standpoint, whereas the other sticks to August Weismann's views. Then, if one of them calls the other a Darwinist, he only wishes to state that the other is of the same opinion as Darwin on a given questions, but that he does not intend to discredit the rest of his knowledge. However, this is exactly the case in philosophy. If I said to someone that I was, for instance, a Spinozist, I would automatically condemn myself and my whole philosophical work to reprehension on the part of those who are not Spinozists. If, on the other hand, I stated that I was a proponent of Thomistic philosophy, I would encounter dismissive smiles from almost all the philosophers from North Germany as well as many others. This state of affairs is certainly unsound, and although there is room for *mutatis mutandis* in politics, on the other hand, it insults science and those who give themselves up to study.

All sciences draw truth from where they find it; each scientist, whether studying nature, history, or mathematics, adopts those propositions put forward by his predecessor which are justified, and discards those whose falsity can be proven with substantial arguments. Why should only philosophy be different? Why would every philosopher have to start *ab ovo*, and condemn without adequate examination everything a predecessor stated only because the latter was some kind of an "-ist"? No, this cannot be, and I sincerely hope that the time of such actions is passing if not gone altogether. We should not be concerned with this or that system, or adherence to this or that direction or philosophical school, but rather with scientific truth and its reliable justification. If anyone objects on the grounds that it is eclecticism, we can easily respond that this is not about the name but rather about the issue, and the mentioned action is not dissimilar to what occurs in other sciences. Would anyone condemn a contemporary physicist

because he teaches one issue according to Newton, another according to Kepler, another according to Galvani, another according to Faraday, and yet another according to Bunsen, and call him “eclectic”? Probably not. Therefore, he has no right to call us so.

This is because philosophy is also a science, a skill, just like any other; its objective is to seek the truth, and there is only one truth in every subject. No person is in possession of all the truths but if one directs us toward it in any way, we shall readily and gratefully accept it. Apart from seeking truth, science has no other ambition. The search for truth does not compel anyone to attempt to find it on their own or ascribe its discovery to their own contribution. If everyone who deals with philosophy truly appreciated its scientific mission, they would not divide it into trends and sub-trends, or into proponents of various little systems and sub-systems, but instead, they would attempt to achieve a common aim with common means and aim to search for truth through scrupulous research based on substantial arguments, without patronizing others, and keeping it in mind that “all the world will make him proud, whom the truth hath subjected unto itself” (cf. [Thomas à Kempis 1441], p. 93).

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

ADDRESS AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE POLISH
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY IN LVOV*

Whenever we witness a new natural phenomenon, we inquire about its causes. We wish to know what induced it; we want to find out from which preceding phenomena the new phenomenon necessarily and inevitably had to emerge. Yet, whenever we witness a consequence of conscious human labor, we inquire about the aims of the laborers rather than the causes which contributed to its emergence. This is because we do not doubt that the work was undertaken with a particular aim in mind; what is more, we demand that the work be always conscious of the aim. This is how we act in daily life. Therefore, one should consider the new creation of conscious labor, which the Polish Philosophical Society certainly is, and inquire about its aim and raise the question, not about the reason but about the aim of its existence. Since it is a philosophical society, we ought to remember that, from the philosophical point of view, perception through the perspective of cause and through the perspective of aim are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the idea of establishing a philosophical society certainly emerged due to the purpose this Society is to serve. At the same time, there have been causes which gave rise to this idea. Let me linger on the causes before I proceed to discuss the aims.

* The lecture was given in Lvov on the 13th February, 1904. It was published in Polish as “Przemówienie na otwarciu Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego we Lwowie (1904)” in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* VII (1904), No. 2, pp. 239-243 [B&J].

Since man is ζῶον πολιτικόν, a social animal, it is no wonder that people generally seek each other's company, avoid being alone and gather together happily, especially those individuals who are close to each other because of common activities or interests, passions and aspirations. Therefore, since some individuals exist who feel appointed to scientific work in the field of philosophy, their coming together seemed inevitable, an upshot of their coexistence in the same city. Thus, we began to meet on certain days of the week, listening for an echo of our own thoughts and ideas in each other; we read works of others as well as our own, urged by the need to analyze various problems together. This was the beginning of the Society; this was the Society *in potentia*. We were the ὕλη, the substance which, according to the words of Philosopher, is one of the four elements of any being. Just as in nature, in our case the matter also had to take its form; what started had to lead through κίνησις to the emergence of a actual being, made of matter and form, as any σύνολον. Naturally, there was also ἀρχή τις κίνησις as well as *causae efficientis*, which consisted of all preparatory activities necessary to put into action the ideas of the Society. Thus the Polish Philosophical Society emerged from the great need to work together, both creatively and critically, from the need to give and receive feedback, from the need to bring together all those who care deeply about philosophical scientific work.

Yet, someone might want to remind us that *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*. After all, there are so many scientific societies. Here a new one comes into existence. The financial situation of the existing societies is mostly poor. Why would we want to multiply them? I already partly addressed this objection by attempting to demonstrate that our Society came into being *propter necessitatem* rather than *praeter*. The establishment of a philosophical society was an inevitable consequence of significant animation in philosophical studies and of a growth in the number of people researching the field. The scope of existing philosophical organizations, like The Philosophical Section of The Copernicus Society in Cracow, or the Student Philosophical Circles in Cracow and Lvov, are too narrow, or they mainly serve didactic purposes. Our purpose is different. Let me speak more of the purpose, the fourth element of being, the *causa finalis*, complete with *causa materials, formalis* and *efficiens*.

The purpose of our Society is determined in the statute. It states that our aim is to support scientific work in the field of philosophy and to spread philosophical knowledge.

In our country, an organization serving those purposes had not been established before. Other sciences have their own centers where the scientists of these fields gather. Philosophical sciences have never had one. Naturally, this society aims to become to philosophy what other societies

are to other sciences, in the broadest sense. Generally, we wish to achieve our aims with identical means as those in those other societies. However, the means will differ slightly. In the Philosophical Society, various discussions and debating certain philosophical questions will be more prominent than in other societies. Admittedly, discussions take place also in other societies; however, there they are only a side effect of their activity, whereas in our society they will be one of the main forms of activity. This results from the character of the philosophical sciences. These sciences exist within the reach of far-ranging abstraction and deal with questions which are invariably connected, directly or indirectly, with man's spiritual life, easily exposing the issue to numerous mistakes on the part of the researchers, usually when comprehending the actual state of affairs and consequently, verifying hypotheses is the hardest. Nowhere else are facts so easily overlooked; nowhere else are they interpreted so erroneously, as in the area of facts which is the subject matter of philosophy. Thus continuous peer control is indispensable; it is impossible to forgo hearing the judgment of one's coworkers who, seeing the matter from a different point of view, can successfully prevent it from being perceived from one side only. Therefore, common discussion of problems as well as endeavors toward their resolution have to occupy the foremost place. The base for the discussion will be short papers or longer lectures; both will take place only in the exclusive circle of members of the Society. Moreover, the society will organize lectures for wider audiences in order to create an interest in philosophical questions; these lectures, as well as publications, will attempt to facilitate the acquisition of some philosophical education, which is after all an integral part of general education, on a par with historical, natural and literary education.

Since I mentioned the Society's publications, let me note at this point that our Society may well become one of those scientific societies in Lvov which does not issue its own journal. Such publications, published by other local societies, are assuredly most useful, and nearly always indispensable, but there is a certain drawback to them, namely: they impose a strain on the societies' budgets. As a result, the societies are faced with the need to seek various subventions, since the membership fees cover barely half of the costs associated with the publication of an independent periodical. Even despite the subventions, some societies find themselves in a difficult financial situation. Our Society will not face such problems as we do not intend to publish our own journal. After all, *Przegląd Filozoficzny* has been in print for nearly seven years; it more than satisfies the current needs for this sort of periodical. Thus, *Przegląd Filozoficzny* will suffice as a substitute for our own journal for the members of our Society, more so that we will be able to receive *Przegląd Filozoficzny* on favorable terms, by courtesy of

the publisher, Dr. Weryho. In turn, the Society's own publications will consist of either Polish translations of foreign classic philosophical works or reprints of older Polish works which are unavailable and yet worth propagating, or original monographs. By refusing to commit to any schedule and intending to publish works only as funds allow we will avoid the financial concerns which hinder other societies and prevent them from expanding their useful activity.

The widest possible application of discourse and the lack of our own periodical are the two features of formal nature which shall characterize our Society. Still, there is a need for a third feature concerning the very spirit of the institution: it will strive to attract all our researchers in the field of philosophy but also all courses of their work, all directions represented in their views. The Polish Philosophical Society shall not serve one philosophical direction while excluding all others, as it shall strive to encompass all the directions. It should not be one-sided, but rather, comprehensive. The Society's only dogma shall be the conviction that dogmatism is the greatest enemy of any scientific work. Just as all spokes of a wheel are united in the middle although they come out of different points on the circumference, also the Society will strive to be united in all fields of work and all philosophical views toward one goal: to explore the truth. One way toward this aim [is] scientific criticism. It should save us from any bias or clichés, either imposed or adopted voluntarily. Therefore, let it be a good omen for us that we begin our work on the centenary of death of the man who, more than any other, contributed to scientific criticism seeping through to philosophical research. Immanuel Kant resolved to annihilate philosophical dogmatism; his life's work will be sufficient as our motto and agenda. According to his requests, we shall always strive to pay attention to the bases of our statements and views; we shall not be misled by the pretencepretense of erudition, mindful of Kant's dialectic of pretencepretense. Yet, again according to Kant, we shall not claim that dispassionate, scientific, logical mental processes fulfill all human needs. Still, we shall not adhere slavishly to Kant's beliefs; we shall apply the same method to his beliefs as he taught philosophers to apply to others'. Thus, let the memory of Kant live on, not only on the centenary of his death. Let it accompany us in our work so that we strive to avoid the mistakes he always tried to eradicate, although, being an imperfect human being, he could not escape them himself.

If criticism is at all a necessary condition of success for any philosophical work, then it has to be admitted that the Polish Philosophical Society should be guided by it all the more. The direct influence of Kant's work has been fairly insignificant in the development of Polish philosophy thus far. Yet, his indirect influence has been very strong. The greatest moments

in the development of Polish philosophy were under the influence of German post-Kantian philosophy which adopted many of Kant's ideas but did not take into consideration his critical spirit. This is precisely why it degenerated into unprecedented dogmatism – and collapsed. Consequently, also Polish philosophy collapsed under this influence. Just as shallow materialism was in Germany, also in Poland, perhaps not equally shallow, but definitely somewhat superficial, positivism was the answer and reaction to the previously built castles in the air. Following the great wealth of philosophical constructions and speculations, there came a time of stagnation, the proof of which [is] a low level of general philosophical education, as well as disregard for philosophy, which predominated until quite recently.

This lamentable situation would not have come to pass had our philosophical thought not slavishly adhered to German idealistic philosophy. Kant's spirit, appealing from the works of Jędrzej Śniadecki, Jaroński and others would have prevented this. Nevertheless, we should not be allowed to cry without reservation, "Let us return to Kant!" After all, there is also considerable danger in this slogan. It would be dogmatic to claim that only Kant is able to teach us something. We should make use of the lessons our own history of philosophy provides. This is where various foreign influences are manifested. Wolff, French sensualists, German idealists, positivism: these are the main directions dear to our philosophers. These directions operated partly one after another and partly simultaneously, thus absorbing our own philosophical thought to a greater or lesser extent and leaving it ingrained with unilateralism. This should not have been the case. The conditions of our cultural development allow for a different position, also in the development of philosophical work. We should not be unilaterally influenced by only one trend, or even only one nation. Neither the English, nor the French, nor Germans should be our sole guides; instead, we should follow them all. Luckily for us, the three leading nations in philosophy are equally foreign to us, and thus, equally close. We must not dogmatically assume that one of these nations is *κατ' ἐξοχήν* a philosophical nation; we must base our work on what each of them accomplished. We must not allow ourselves to be controlled by foreign influence, but rather, we must control it ourselves and, with the aid of what seems significant after thorough examination, contribute to the common work in our own ways.

Therefore, let no one draw the conclusion that we wish to follow German philosophical thought just because we launch our project on the centenary of Kant's death, but rather, that we keep in mind the fact that Kant was the one who combined elements of German philosophy with elements of English philosophy and, hitherto underestimated, French philosophy. By merging those influences and combining them in a great synthesis, he

led the way we shall also choose. May our work benefit not only us but also the whole society and may it become a significant contribution to science: with this fervent wish, we commence our activity.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

PART I
METHODS

HOW TO STUDY PHILOSOPHY?*

The question which appears in the title may be answered in numerous ways depending on the aspect of philosophy which one considers. These aspects include the way one understands philosophy, fields and directions of philosophy, and the aims of studying it that one sets for oneself. Some general rules may be formulated if we take into account a real study of philosophy, which consists of developing skills in solving philosophical problems without any assistance – and not a STUDY of the meaning and origins of the most common philosophical terms and basic information. These rules are derived from the general features of philosophy and are therefore independent from the conditions which determine a certain way to study philosophy.

The first rule – which is usually overlooked – states that neither studying the history of philosophy, nor reading companions and textbooks concerning philosophy or its particular branches, like logic, psychology, ethics etc. should be undertaken before the study of philosophy.

This may seem both paradoxical and to contravene a commonly accepted way to begin the study of philosophy; however, when compared to the methods of studying non-philosophical sciences one can see why this rule is right.

Someone wishes to study mathematics or biology. Do they begin with familiarizing the history of mathematical and biological science, or with reading companions and textbooks which present a broad view of these sciences? They reject the first approach, as there is no point in reading

* The paper appeared in Polish as “Jak studiować filozofię?” in *Widnokręgi* I (1910), No. 1 (1st March), pp. 1-4 [B&J].

sources which concern the history of a science with which they are not yet familiar. They reject the second one as well; not only are they likely to be confused by a mass of detailed information, but they would also be insufficiently knowledgeable about the subject, remaining on the surface of the science without understanding its deeper core.

Admittedly, one may point out differences in the relationship between the history of philosophy and philosophy, the history of mathematics and mathematics or the history of biology and biology. Despite this objection being sound, it does not support the claim that the study of philosophy should *BEGIN* from the study of the history of philosophy. Yet what follows from this objection is that the study of philosophy has to be *RELATED* to the study of the history of philosophy. Meanwhile, one may be an outstanding mathematician and still have no knowledge of the history of mathematics.

However, beginning the study of philosophy with a study of the textbooks of the history of philosophy would be impractical. The study of textbooks, provided their style is accessible is a useful way of gaining general, encyclopedic knowledge of the history of philosophy. In turn, the study of academic textbooks of the history of philosophy should include studying carefully selected classical works of philosophy featuring all periods of its development.

A textbook of the history of philosophy may provide excellent commentaries on the study of philosophy. Yet the study of philosophy must not be restricted exclusively to such historical commentaries. Analogically, the study of the history of arts is not based on a textbook of the history of art. Noticeably, great philosophical systems share some features in common with great masterpieces of art.

A similar rule is applied to the study of any particular branches of philosophy. Anyone who truly wishes to study logic or psychology, ethics or aesthetics, or the theory of knowledge, should pin down a given problem and try to understand it as deeply as possible; monographic papers may be helpful in doing that. The aim is to analyze the problem from various angles and perspectives, and to reveal the aspects that have been hidden before. [Let us compare an entrant to philosophy to an] entrant to Medicine who becomes familiar with anatomy and wishes to know the human body. They begin with analyzing a single muscle, instead of the whole body. When a new student of philosophy begins to work their way through specific problems in this way, they will eventually become proficient in solving such problems in general and further address more complex issues. They may then study systematic representations of these problems, but before that the representations are not useful. The same rule applies when dealing with other branches of philosophy.

[Secondly,] the order of studying particular branches of philosophy is important as well. An entrant to mathematics does not begin with differential equations, nor a novice chemist with its organic branch. Both in mathematics and chemistry, there are some basic branches [which should be introduced firstly]. Philosophy has such basic branches as well – logic and psychology; that is why they contribute to the propaedeutics of philosophy. In order to justify this statement a separate work is required. Yet it would have no value for either philosophers or people who are not acquainted with philosophy. While the former do not need such justification, the latter would find it useless. It is enough to highlight the fact that logic and psychology represent two types of methods of research, and these types are applied to philosophical study as well. Logic uses *a priori* methods and psychology empirical ones. It is difficult to state which of them precedes the other but mature minds are not bothered by that. It is enough to say that one has to begin with one of these two sciences. Otherwise, “ethical” and “aesthetical” papers will appear which lack both a logical background – like a detailed knowledge of the conditions under which an *a priori* method may be applied or the need to define notions in a precise way, and a psychological background, such as a knowledge of the laws that govern human mental life and, especially, of these mental facts which are situated on the border between psychology, ethics and aesthetics!

Above the entrance to the Platonic academy was an inscription. According to this, people who did not possess a mathematical education were not allowed to enter the institution. This prohibition expressed great truth, although it was limited [to mathematics]. Having extended the meaning of this prohibition to philosophy, one may say that the study of philosophy should not begin – explicitly and straight off – with philosophy. As philosophical questions are usually of a highly abstract nature, they require skill and proficiency in studying them, which cannot be acquired by study alone. Anyone who is not prepared to conduct scientific research and who begins to study philosophy with the intention to acquire scientific methods in practice, will find themselves conducting non-methodical philosophy. Unfortunately, such widespread cases dispose other scientists toward a dismissive standpoint to philosophy, while dismissal is [wrongly] caused by non-methodical philosophy. Therefore, it is absolutely crucial that the serious study of philosophy be preceded by a preparatory course which includes instruction in the research methods of other sciences. Mathematics is one of those sciences because of its methodical character and wide application in experimental psychology and probabilistic logic. Another science should be an empirical one. It would provide a countervailing approach for the purely deductive and CONSTRUCTIVE tendencies that are characteristic

of mathematics and would make the application of the results of empirical sciences to philosophy easier and more efficient.

Everything that was sketched, though in a general form and without sufficient justification, in this article is directed against a widely accepted approach toward the study of philosophy which is limited or equaled to the study of companions, textbooks, outlines, introductions etc. This approach has its merits; it allows one to gain a general look at philosophy, just like a short sketch («catechism») of instrumentation lets us know what role in an orchestra a given musical instrument has. However, one cannot learn how to orchestrate a musical piece just by reading such a catechism, no matter how carefully it is studied.

The study of philosophy should consist, first of all, of a deep analysis of philosophical questions. Philosophers should take into account the historical development of these problems but focus on solving them in a substantial way and according to the methods of scientific research. These requirements can be fulfilled only when the study of philosophy begins with its basic branches and when it is preceded by acquiring practical knowledge reached by practicing other sciences.

This way is neither easy nor short; it is laborious and arduous. Yet a blind lover of philosophy that has a desire for its total possession yields a profit neither for himself nor philosophical thinking.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

ON SCIENTIFIC PREPARATION FOR PHILOSOPHY*

The current tendency for reorganizing and restructuring our educational system, which has been growing in popularity for some time, has emphasized once more contrasts between the advocates of a humanistic approach in the curriculum of middle school and their opponents, i.e. these who stand for a mathematical and physical approach. The arguments of both sides are based on the benefits that both approaches bring about, in terms of FORMAL AND MATERIAL EDUCATION. The problem is highly complicated, especially because of the fact that apart from substantial and factual questions, other issues are also being taken into consideration. Moreover, the viewpoints of both sides are determined by personal and emotional factors which derive from intellectual skills and other preferences.

Contrary to other academics and people opting for various practical needs, philosophers have to take a different position. Philosophers must not agree with either the first, or the second side. They have to accept the demands of both sides as equally justified. Anyone who wishes to deal with philosophy and be useful in doing so should obtain both a humanistic and a mathematical-physical education at a proper level. By a “proper level of education” we mean the level that exceeds the limits of middle school curricula in both fields; moreover, it involves specializing in one humanistic science and in one other science, and in mathematic as well. It seems that there is no other sensible view apart from the one presented.

It is assumed that scientific knowledge concerning non-philosophical questions is generally required to study philosophy seriously and

* The paper appeared in Polish as „O przygotowaniu naukowym do filozofii” in *Ruch Filozoficzny* V (1909-1910), No. 6, pp. 97-99 [B&J].

effectively. Therefore, it is rejected that a young entrant to philosophy, and an academic-philosopher-to-be, may obtain philosophical knowledge only. In order to realize why this BELIEF is faulty, one needs to be aware of three things. Firstly, non-philosophical PARTICULAR SCIENCES often provide philosophy with data subjected to philosophical analysis; any further generalizations formulated within particular sciences may be considered within philosophy. Secondly, some particular sciences serve an auxiliary role toward philosophical sciences. Thirdly, the need for methodological correctness within philosophical sciences may be satisfied solely by accepting methodological rules which are valid within particular sciences. Hence there are three reasons why philosophers need to obtain scientific education beyond philosophy itself. Therefore, it is clear that philosophical education cannot be based on only one isolated science, whether it be humanistic, physical or mathematic. Philosophers should be educated within these three branches of human knowledge.

If one needs more evidence, it is enough to consider some examples and realize the consequences of neglecting this demand. Let us imagine, on the one hand, philosophers who have obtained only a mathematical education. While these philosopher may be effective in the field of theoretical logic, they will face serious difficulties in dealing with other fields of philosophy, like the METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE, not to even mention psychology. Trying to avoid, then, the risk of “sinking into an abyss of truisms,” they will adopt a mathematical WAY OF UNDERSTANDING PROBLEMS to questions which should not be answered in this way. Therefore, a countervailing support is needed [in such cases], that is an education in the field of empirical science. On the other hand, let us think about somebody who is educated within one empirical science, such as physics, only. Physicists not only cannot independently solve problems concerning the methodology of historical sciences, but will also face more serious difficulties while studying psychology without a general background in physiology and biology. However, psychologists cannot do without mathematics, or rather without the auxiliary aspects of mathematics. It is clear thereby that both the study of philosophy and individual philosophical investigations need to be based on a non-philosophical education at a proper level. Otherwise, philosophy becomes one-sided, which leads to an advanced, far-reaching specialization. Meanwhile, the idea of specialization is irrelevant to the very essence of philosophy. Another much more serious danger occurs when one tries to avoid specialization but, having insufficient scientific education, ends with superficiality.

Proper non-philosophical sciences, which every philosopher should be acquainted with, include the history of philosophy. The history of philosophy is a branch of history and therefore is not a philosophical science.

However, a relation between the history of philosophy and philosophy differs from a relation between, for example, the history of mathematics and mathematics. In spite of the fact that understanding a historical development of mathematics assumes that one has been previously familiar with mathematics itself, one may still effectively deal with mathematics without knowing its history. On the contrary, philosophy and the history of philosophy are inseparable. [Firstly,] one who does not investigate philosophical issues themselves cannot seriously look at the history of philosophy. [Secondly,] investigating the historical background is usually a necessary means of formulating and solving philosophical problems. Therefore, the study of philosophy has to be followed by the study of the history of philosophy. Obviously, the scientific way of approaching the history of philosophy, which was sketched in this article, is available only to those people who are able to read principal, basic philosophical texts in Greek and Latin.

Clearly, a postulate of scientific preparation for philosophy is in fact an ideal and therefore almost to be completed fully. It was called “almost impossible” as there were cases which succeeded in reaching the ideal, like Aristotle or Leibniz. However, it does not occur very often, and philosophers usually approach this ideal to a greater or lesser degree. It consists in agreement between the subject and direction of both the scientific preparation for philosophy and to philosophy itself; on the one hand, a particular interest in a certain field of philosophy requires a relevant scientific preparation to operate within this field; on the other hand, the choice of a certain kind of scientific preparations influences the choice of philosophical problems to be addressed and the way of addressing them.

Admittedly, this situation is far from perfect, and perfection is what we should strive for. And anyone who criticizes these requirements as being too demanding should remember one thing. Philosophy is highly beneficial [for people], and that is why it may not only be demanding but also may demand from philosophers too much!

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

Kazimierz Twardowski

5.

**ON THE METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE
METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH***

Preface

In order to elaborate on the method of psychology and to stipulate the essential character of psychological research, I am going to compare the method of psychology with the methods of other sciences which are also based on experience. The results of my considerations are to be used as a baseline for a comparative methodology of scientific research; moreover, they may help to classify psychology in the system of sciences.

This lecture was delivered on 11th October, 1909, in Warsaw, during the first general meeting of 1st Congress of Polish Neurologists, Psychiatrists and Psychologists. A printed version of the lecture which is published in the Proceedings of the Congress will permit my ideas to reach a wider audience, including psychologists and non-psychologists, and especially historians and natural scientists. After all, the cooperation of researchers dealing with various sciences is required to develop a comparative methodology of scientific research.

Lvov, January 1910

* The text appeared in Polish as *O metodzie psychologii. Przyczynek do metodologii porównawczej badań naukowych* (Warszawa: Księgarnia E. Wendego i Sp., 1910) [B&J].

Content: 1. Introduction. 2. Object of psychology. Psychology and experience. 3. Experience and history. Reconstruction of facts. 4. Empirical sciences (in a narrow sense) and historical sciences. 5. External or sensual experience, and internal experience or introspection. 6. Observation and perception. 7. Impossibility of observation of psychical facts. 8. Reconstruction of psychical facts. 9. Analogy between psychology and historical sciences. 10. Reconstruction of mental life of other people. Psychological and historical documents. 11. Place of psychology among empirical sciences (in a narrow sense) and historical sciences. 12. Methodological character of the nature of particular branches of psychology. 13. Evidence of internal experience and the value of results of psychological research. 14. Importance of experimental method to psychology. Introspective experiment. 15. Application of experimental method to the study of psychical life of other people. 16. Psychological, psychophysical and psycho-physiological experiments. 17. Conclusion.

1. Even if there is no common agreement about the nature of a given science, it may still develop correctly. While neither sociology nor physics are nowadays precisely defined, both of them are developing and sociological and physical research is conducted. Scientific research consists of a number of activities which comprise the *METHOD* of research, or the method of a given science. And once the method is established, it may be theoretically analyzed and, [for example,] considering its assumptions and varieties, one may also compare it with the methods of other sciences. Therefore, while psychologists have not agreed so far about the nature of psychology, one may still refer to the *METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY* and try to find out what this method consists in. What should be assumed is simply the existence of psychology and its own separate object. It is not questioned nowadays. Quite the contrary, it is confirmed by the facts which give us more evidence than any reasoning does; among others, there are separate departments of psychology and congresses of psychologists are organized, or people mention psychology among other sciences of a similar character, which took place during the last congress in Amsterdam or in this congress.

2. Broadly speaking, the *OBJECT OF PSYCHOLOGY* consists of *PSYCHICAL LIFE*, and the nature of phenomena which contribute to it is not going to be discussed. Therefore, psychology is a study of any psychical life, no matter where this life is; it analyses complex forms of psychical life and makes them simpler and then recognizes similarities, regular connections and relations between facts, forming eventually “psychological laws.” Therefore, psychology deals with psychical life just as physiology deals with the body and bodily life, and in both of them statements are based on sensual data which is considered to be the most reliable source of knowledge. While this kind of science is called “empirical science,” *PSYCHOLOGY* is an *EMPIRICAL SCIENCE*. Some prefer to call psychology “experiential science,” yet it raises some doubts. The word “experiential” is ambiguous

and “experiential science” means either “based on experience” or “using a method of experience.” The difference between the two meanings of the term discussed is clearly visible in the case of astronomy: astronomy is a science which is based on experience but just any experiential methods may not be used within the field. Moreover, scientific terms should be clear and unambiguous wherever possible. That is why the term “experiential” should be always replaced with adjectives like “empirical” or “experimental,” according to the relevant sense.

3. Within various empirical sciences, we may find some of a special nature which differ from the others. For whilst empirical research concerns facts, such as phenomena, things, living entities, and relations between them, facts are not given directly in experience; moreover, some facts may even not be given in this way, like facts which have already happened and have then passed forever. Past facts and relations between them are studied by history. Yet they are not given in experience and therefore history has to RECONSTRUCT these facts on the basis of other facts; the latter are given in experience and they are called “historical sources,” in the broadest meaning of this word, including for example documents, chronicles, monuments, inscriptions etc. Naturally, history is not interested with mere sources but with ideas or conceptions which are transferred by sources and need to be interpreted and reconstructed. Historians may see sources and then study and describe them as well as use them for justifying their statements. Thus historical sources are given in experience and history is an empirical science, even though the mere facts which are studied by history are not given in experience. What differentiates history from physics, physiology and many other empirical sciences is merely the necessity to reconstruct its field of study.

4. However, apart from history *Κατεξοχήν**, there are also other empirical sciences which have to reconstruct their field of study on the basis of other facts which are given in experience. This concerns, for example, a theory of the development of organic beings, which is adequately called the “history of development.” Then there is a large branch of geology called “historical geology.” In turn, theories about the emergence of the Solar System could be called “the history of the universe,” by analogy with the history of the Earth. All of these sciences – another example is paleontology – are of a historical character because they deal with facts which have irrevocably passed and subsequently have to be reconstructed. Proper analysis of the facts and relations between them, which is always a definite

* *Κατεξοχήν* in Greek, to a great extent [C].

aim of scientific research, should be preceded by reconstruction of the facts on the basis of other facts, namely the facts given in experience. If one accepts that there are some empirical sciences of a specific, in a sense, character, then they agree with the division of empirical sciences into two groups: EMPIRICAL SCIENCES IN A BROADER SENSE AND HISTORICAL SCIENCES. While the former study facts which are directly given in experience, the latter deal with facts which have to be reconstructed on the basis of other facts which are given in experience. Obviously, what happens quite often is that there are branches of the first character and some of the second one within a given science.

5. Then which empirical group does psychology belong to? Undoubtedly, psychology is an empirical science in a narrow sense.* It investigates facts given in experience which contribute to so-called psychical life and we experience these facts. It is because we experience facts that our psychical life is created. When we perceive light and colors, when we hear voices, when we taste and smell or feel high and low temperature, we not only experience sensual qualities, but we are also aware of the process of experiencing. In other words, we know that we see, hear or feel. While we are hearing a voice, we therefore know that we are hearing it at this very moment. In other words, when a voice is given to us, i.e. when we state it, confirm, or perceive, the [act of] hearing of this voice is given to us as well, i.e. we state, confirm, or perceive that we are hearing the voice. Therefore, in such cases, our experience provides us with two kinds of facts: with external or sensual facts, such as lights, colors, voices etc., and with internal or psychical ones, like the perception of lights and colors, hearing voices etc. which are together called “feelings.” That is why we shall distinguish external or sensual experience and internal experience or introspection. All the examples listed above share a common feature that external experience coexists with internal experience. In some cases, one may have only introspective experience, and not have any external experience, as when one does not experience some feelings.

Let us consider the following situation: with silence surrounding us, we recall a certain melody by heart by imagining how it sounds; in this situation, we do not experience feelings of a given kind, i.e. we do not experience this melody: we are just thinking about it. By contrast, we experience thinking about this melody, or recalling it by heart. In other words, we experience then a psychical fact, i.e. we are given an internal experience or introspection without an external or sensual experience. By analogy with

* Hereinafter abbreviated to “empirical science_N” [C].

recalling some mental fact, we may experience other mental facts as well, such as considering something, having doubts, feeling disgusted, being irritated, making a decision to do something etc. Moreover, introspective experience is proof of our psychical life and, therefore, it is a source of our knowledge of psychical facts.

6. Considering what has been already said, it would actually seem that, without any doubt, psychology is an empirical science in a strict sense: while facts which are studied by psychology are given to us in experience, psychology is an empirical science in a strict sense and not a historical science which has to reconstruct its facts. However, there is a pivotal difference between psychology and other empirical sciences_N, such that psychology may not be unquestionably classified as one of such sciences. The difference consists in the fact the psychology may not be based on the method which is called “*observation*” in French and “*Beobachtung*” in German. While physicists, chemists, biologists and astronomers normally observe phenomena which are studied by them, psychologists, on the contrary, may at least notice or perceive – in French: *remarquer* and *appercevoir* and in German: *bemerken* and *wahrnehmen* – facts of psychical life which are given to them in experience.

I employ foreign terms as Polish terminology has not been clearly defined yet* and sometimes “*observation*” is translated as “*spostrzeżenie*” and “*appercevoir*” is translated as “*postrzegać*.”

While this choice is justified by the history of the Polish language and meets the requirements of radical linguistic purists, it breaks the rule of clear and unambiguous scientific style. That is why, it is recommended to use Polish terms “*obserwacja*” (“*observation*”) and “*spostrzeżenie*” (“*perception*”) instead of an ambiguous pair “*spostrzeżenie*” and “*postrzeżenie*.” After all, the problem is not of a verbal nature but it concerns phenomena which the words refer to. At the level of phenomena, the difference between perception (called: *Wahrnehmung*, *apperception*, or *spostrzeżenie*) and observation (*Beobachtung*, *observation*, or *obserwacja*) becomes clear when one understands that OBSERVATION consists of a series of systematically subsequent PERCEPTIONS and the very idea of observation is to carefully observe a given phenomenon and understand its phases and features. Naturally, phenomena may be analyzed in this way, i.e. they may be observed, provided there is time for doing that. Phenomena which normally last for a very short period of time, such as a lightning strike or a body that is falling down, cannot be observed. On the contrary, short-lasting phenomena

* Besides, there is no such problem in English [C].

may be perceived or only noticed, and unless they are “fixed,” one cannot analyze them and their features. Phenomena may be fixed with the use of artificial means, like a photographic plate which produces an image of lightning; finally, they may be slowed down by the use of an Atwood machine or Galileo’s gutter.

7. By analogy to researchers dealing with the natural sciences who face difficulties with lightning or falling bodies, psychologists have a similar problem with facts of psychical life which are given to them in experience. Like lightning, psychical facts also last for a short period of time and, therefore, may not be observed, i.e. studied in a careful and systematic way. Psychical life flows all the time, which explains why we may just observe, or perceive, the facts which mental life consists of; and there is no photographic plate to fix its phases. Even if we were able to stop, or disable, psychical life it would not make much sense: apart from the «dynamic» character of psychical phenomena, there is also another factor which makes observation of mental life difficult. Namely, we cannot pay attention to a given psychical fact at the time while it is happening. Meanwhile, it is a necessary condition to conduct an observation. When we are angry, we cannot pay attention to our anger and when we are trying to solve some mathematical problem, we cannot focus on our exact process of solving; any attempts to do that lead to expelling a given phenomenon from our psychical life; the phenomenon, however, was intended to be a mere object of our observation. Someone was right when they noticed that a thinking person cannot be divided into two separate «beings», one of whom would think and the other would observe the process of thinking. Therefore, in order to understand the phases of anger or the process of solving a problem, we have to think about them just *ex post*. Then we may try to recall what happened in our mental life when we were angry or when we were solving a puzzle; by doing that, we are more likely to understand our psychical facts, to identify some of their features and list subsequent phases. The simpler a fact, or a complex of facts, was, the more precise our recollection is, [and] the less amount of time has passed since a fact took place, the better our recollection is. However, no matter how precise our recalling of mental facts is, it is never as precise as any observation made within natural sciences. Unlike, for example, a physicist, a psychologist CANNOT OBSERVE psychical facts while they are happening; therefore, psychologists have to rely on memory which enables people to recall past phenomena. However, this method is significantly less precise than the use of a photographic plate.

8. For the reasons described above, PSYCHOLOGY becomes similar to historical sciences, in a given sense, and, therefore, it may be called

a “QUASI-HISTORICAL SCIENCE.” On the one hand, psychology is not a purely historical science, for mental facts are given to us in experience, though in introspective experience only, and historical facts are not given in experience at all. On the other hand, we must agree that psychologists study psychical facts which have already passed and they have to reconstruct them, like historians do; recalling something which was perceived some time ago is also a kind of reconstruction.

Thus, if historians reconstruct historical facts on the base of documents, psychologists realize past facts of psychical life with the use of memory and they perform actions which are analogical to actions performed by historians because recollection by memory of something previously perceived is also a certain kind of reconstruction.

9. There is one more analogy between psychology and history, and it emphasizes once more an important difference between psychology and other empirical sciences in a strict sense. Researchers studying the latter field may observe together, or in a group, some phenomena. [Moreover,] not a part but the whole facts which are studied by empirical sciences in a strict sense may be observed, at least in principle, by scientists. On the contrary, psychologists are not given these opportunities. Firstly, they may perceive, and then recall and analyze, only psychical facts which comprise their own psychical life. Therefore, the scope of psychological experience is significantly narrower than the whole psychical life which contributes to the field of psychology. It reveals another similarity between psychology and history: psychologists have access to the facts of their own psychical life only and the psychical life of other people is inaccessible to them; the same concerns historians. By analogy with HISTORIANS who CANNOT GO BACK TO THE PAST and perceive facts which they wish to study, PSYCHOLOGISTS CANNOT PUT THEMSELVES IN THE SHOES OF OTHER LIVING BEINGS and experience the psychical facts of these beings. Historians may experience a few facts at least, namely those which occurred not so long ago, provided that the facts may be classified as a PART OF HISTORY at all. Yet facts and events which were experienced by historians hardly comprise the whole field of history, i.e. the whole past of mankind. Moreover, for events described by historians which are not recent, there is a risk of subjectivity; historians' reports on events are based on their own experience and, therefore, they are inevitably analyzed from a subjective point of view. As a result, historians end up producing diaries instead of studying objective history, as Julius Caesar's did. The same concerns psychologists; relying on their own mental life, they offer individual and subjective descriptions of their own psychical states, like the confessions of Saint Augustine or Jean Jacques Rousseau. The works of Augustine, Rousseau, or Caesar may be used at

least as a source for scientific psychology or history but they do not contribute to scientific psychology proper. [To sum up:] facts which are experienced by psychologists do not suffice to form scientific psychology.

10. Psychology needs to investigate the psychical life of other beings as well and to apply an additional method of research not to rely on subjective introspection only. Because of that, psychologists have to use other means in order to know, at least indirectly, the psychical life of other beings which is not given to them in experience. Therefore, psychologists study the mental life of other beings on the basis of the variety of their EXTERNAL SYMPTOMS, both long- and short-lasting. By the symptoms, I mean all voluntary and involuntary actions and functions of a body which accompany the facts of psychical life, from heartbeat to complex reactions or uttering a sequence of sentences which express the psychical facts experienced by a speaker. Another example of external symptoms are all the PRODUCTS of psychical life, either individual or social, including every work of animal skill and human hand, speech, customs and traditions, beliefs, social institutions etc. Naturally, psychical life which is manifested through external symptoms and products is given indirectly and, therefore, it needs to be reconstructed by means of them. Thus the work of psychologists and the work of historians are similar, as historians reconstruct facts on the basis of documents. Therefore, it is justified to use the term “PSYCHOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS”; moreover, this expression reveals an analogy between psychology and history, which is of grave methodological significance.

11. Now it is clear that PSYCHOLOGY, being an empirical science, BELONGS TO BOTH GROUPS WHICH WERE CREATED AFTER METHODOLOGICAL DIVISION OF EMPIRICAL SCIENCES. Psychology is an empirical science in a strict sense because it investigates, in an original and basic sense of this word, facts which are given in experience. However, while both the facts and experience are of a special character, they may be perceived only; moreover, only a part of the whole psychical life may be perceived at all. Only the facts of psychical life which have passed may be investigated and, therefore, psychical facts have to be reconstructed with the use of memory. And in order not to focus on their own psychical life only, i.e. in order to study the whole psychical life, psychologists have to reconstruct the psychical life of other beings on the basis of external symptoms and products. From this viewpoint, the method of psychology is similar to the method of the historical sciences. Thanks to the fact that psychology uses the method of experience, which is a serious means of cognition, researchers have direct access to at least a part of the facts which are studied by them; by contrast, historians do not have this opportunity. However, the method of psychology does not include observation, and observation is the very factor which makes

experience scientifically valuable. That is why the methodological advantages of other empirical sciences_N are beyond the scope of psychology. On the contrary, it has to deal with all the disadvantages of the historical sciences which cannot observe phenomena just when they are happening like other sciences do.

12. Psychology is classified somewhere between empirical sciences in a strict sense and historical sciences; the same concerns all the branches and specializations of psychology. SOME BRANCHES ARE METHODOLOGICALLY CLOSER TO EMPIRICAL SCIENCES IN A STRICT SENSE AND SOME ARE RATHER SIMILAR TO HISTORICAL SCIENCES. For example, when a psychiatrist studies pathological forms of mental life, they investigate facts which have never been experienced by them as healthy people. Therefore, psychiatrists study external symptoms and products of pathological psychical life, like physiological functions, a way of behavior and other activities, as well as speaking, writing or letters etc. of mentally ill people. The results of such investigation enable them to reconstruct pathological psychical lives. The same method is applied to the study of the psychical life of animals. What these cases have in common is that researchers use the data which is obtained from a reconstruction of the psychical life of other beings, whose psychical life is different than researchers'. Naturally, the more differences there are between psychologists' mental lives and the mental lives of other people, the more hypothetical and uncertain that reconstruction is. The same concerns history: the longer time ago facts which are studied by historians happened, the more differences between the situation nowadays and the situation of that time there are. In other words: the longer time ago something happened, the less precise its reconstruction is. When, in turn, we study the mental life of adolescents, the reconstruction of psychical facts is less important than introspection: we investigate then the facts which are often familiar to us from our own experience. In such cases, our method of research becomes more similar to the method of empirical sciences in a strict sense. Yet the method of empirical sciences in a strict sense is never going to be fully applied by psychology, which was explained above.

13. It may seem that EVIDENCE of internal experience as compared with delusive sensual experience is APPARENTLY CONTRADICTIONARY to the great DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING RESULTS of psychological research which are ultimately based on internal experience. However, when one understands the character of the method of psychological research, it turns out that there is no contradiction. Admittedly, internal experience is certain and, therefore, not deceptive but just to a certain degree, i.e. inasmuch we report on our own psychical facts by means of quick perceptions; therefore, intuition suffices to do that. Yet as far as a more complex analysis of mental facts,

like establishing similarities and differences, or relations between them, is required, psychology has to employ a method which is analogous to a method of history. And the method of history consists of several hypothetical factors, which does not allow for making firm and certain statements.

14. Thankfully, psychology nowadays has one advantage over other sciences which are compelled to use the historical method only: psychology may use experiments. Experiments may be applied to psychology thanks to the fact that even though psychical facts are constantly occurring, the majority of them are not irrecoverably lost. On the contrary, this is not true for historical facts. History cannot be repeated and, truly, mental facts that have passed are not repeatable either. However, they may somehow occur once more, and the similarity between two given psychical facts is much bigger than the similarity between two historical facts. As a result, psychology is placed between historical sciences and empirical sciences in a strict sense; even though psychical facts are not repeatable, the similarity between one later psychical fact and a former one may be so close that they may be considered as identical. Admittedly, the similarity between two psychical facts is not as close as the similarity between an act of a book falling down a table today and a year ago; yet it is much closer than the similarity between two historical facts of the same kind. It happens quite often that there are two separate psychical facts which are so similar that may be considered as identical; moreover, they may be brought about at will, though only to a certain extent. And what consists in bringing about phenomena and facts under certain conditions is the method of experiment. THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD IN PSYCHOLOGY IS A KIND OF COMPENSATION FOR THE FACT THAT OBJECTS STUDIED BY PSYCHOLOGY CANNOT BE OBSERVED. Introspection allows us to at least notice in passing or perceive a mental phenomenon and mental life may be analyzed *ex post* only, or after it has passed. The problem is that a phenomenon which was just noticed, or perceived, cannot be carefully analyzed. However, when one brings about the same phenomenon more than once, they may perceive it more than once and, therefore, notice more aspects and features of that. Thus we may put together particular perceptions to create an image of a phenomenon. In the same way, we create images of sensual phenomena: we experience and then familiarize features and aspects of phenomena on the basis of a sequence of perceptions. The only difference consists in the fact that scientists who use the method of OBSERVATION may analyze a series of perception within one phenomenon, while psychologists have to study not a singular phenomenon but a sequence of similar phenomena. They put together separate perceptions of similar phenomena to create an image

of one phenomenon which somehow consists of aspects and features of a sequence of phenomena which were perceived. This method applied by psychology is a substitute for proper observation as psychical phenomena cannot be observed. Because of that, the experimental method in psychology is significant. It may be called as well “psychological experiment in a proper sense” or “INTROSPECTIVE EXPERIMENT,” which means an “experiment which removes the disadvantages caused by the fact that a proper observation cannot be used in psychology, or which at least controls for them.”

15. Apart from an introspective EXPERIMENT, psychology uses the experimental method to study the PSYCHICAL LIFE OF OTHER BEINGS AS WELL. Besides, application experiments in psychology prove once more that psychology is methodologically superior to historical sciences. While historians are not able to create historical events, documents or historical sources at will, psychologists have this opportunity. By the use of the experimental method in the study of other beings, psychologists are able to bring on a number of psychical facts, as well as their external symptoms; then, observation of these external symptoms enables psychologists to reconstruct the psychical life of other beings on the ground of them. Because of that, even an indirect study of psychical life – as an investigation into the psychical life of other entities may never be done in a direct way – is still objective. Thanks to the fact that psychology uses an experimental method to study the psychical life of other beings as well as using the method of introspective experiment, it has abundant data to be analyzed and, moreover, it may compare and control the results of study which are established in two ways.

16. Therefore, from a methodological point of view, the experimental method plays a vital role in psychology. However, the use of experimentation does not do wonders; a fact which is seemingly ignored by the people who have been discouraged by the results of experimental psychology obtained so far and, in consequence, are skeptical about it. Their skepticism is caused by some misunderstanding as well. One should bear in mind that experimental psychology, or psychology which applies the experimental method of study, was introduced not long ago. Therefore, there are still some difficulties in establishing the methods of experimental psychology. The experimental method in psychology is inspired by the experiments which are used in physics and physiology. Not surprisingly, a psychological experiment is usually applied to solving psychophysical and psycho-physiological problems. Other applications of the experimental method to psychology, in a narrow sense of the term “experiment,” which was initiated by the 1885 study of memory of Ebbinghaus, are still being worked out. So, quite understandably, the application of the experimental

method has not yet provided us with results which would add something new to studies conducted by pre-experimental psychology; moreover, some kinds of psychical facts are hardly analyzable by the experimental method at all. However, the significance of psychological experimentation is constantly growing. Nowadays, it is applied to one of the most, as we may say, spiritual areas of mental life, that is, to human thinking; undoubtedly, it is going to yield promising results. Apart from PSYCHOPHYSICAL and PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL experiments, PSYCHOLOGICAL experimentation is becoming appreciated in psychology. Introspection is likewise properly understood, though it has been suggested, theoretically at least, to abstain completely from the use of the introspective method of research. After all, psychologists study the psychical life of other beings on the basis of their experience of their own mental life which is introspectively known to them. Therefore, the main aim of psychology is and will always be to study the aspect of psychical life which is given in essential experience, although it cannot be observed in a proper sense.

17. By assuming that INTROSPECTION IS ESSENTIAL TO EVERY KIND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH, psychology as a science becomes more serious: it is internally strengthened by established results and it proves its position to other sciences. Nowadays, a few people would disagree that psychology is an individual and independent science, yet this is not rooted in metaphysical considerations about the nature of psychical facts; they are not convincing, and it is not likely to change in future. Psychology used to be in danger of being classified as a branch of some other sciences but nowadays this is not going to happen. This change of attitude was caused by the fact that a special character of psychological method of research was understood. That is why elaborating on the method of a given science is crucial both from a purely theoretical and a practical point of view, though it may not directly influence the science itself. Namely, by analyzing the method of a given science, we may understand its nature and improve our research, i.e. avoid blind routine and define the aims and means of research.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

ON PREJUDICES*

There are certain streets in Lvov where one would search in vain for the number 13. 11 is followed by 11a and then 15. I live on such a street myself. Another example is Długosza Street. Why is that? They say people do not want to live at number 13. Why? Some just shrug. Some say openly that the number 13 is unlucky, fatal. If it was displayed at the gate, it would bring bad luck to the building and its inhabitants in the form of misfortune, fire, death etc. Others pay no attention to it and claim it is a PREJUDICE. We often hear this word in other cases, for instance, when someone is leaving our house. As he is leaving, we usually still have a conversation by the door; then he really does leave the apartment and as we attempt to shake his hand, he says: "Let's not shake hands over the threshold." Some people are wary of shaking hands over the threshold, or crossing hands while shaking that of another, whereas others consider this anxiety a PREJUDICE. It is sometimes the case that someone inviting a group of friends believes that thirteen people sitting together at one table is an impossibility, but there are others who consider this to be a PREJUDICE. Numerous examples of such PREJUDICES can be quoted here. The things considered by us or others to be a PREJUDICE are fairly common. It is also apparent how these prejudices clearly influence human behavior. It is not uncommon for people not to rent an apartment, despite its appeal, because the building is number 13; some hunters would rather stay at home instead of going hunting when they see an elderly lady on their way out, or someone wishing them good

* The lecture was given in the series of Common University Lectures in Lvov on 18th March, 1906. It was prepared for print by Ryszard Jadcak and published in Polish as "O przesądach" in *Edukacja Filozoficzna* XIII (1992), pp. 145-151 [B&J].

luck etc. Thus, some succumb to certain beliefs or convictions which others call “prejudice” and even sneer at.

What are those so-called *PREJUDICES* then? How does it come to pass that they play such an important role in some people’s lives whereas they have no influence on the lives of others? In fact, where do they come from?

We must search for the answer to this question in psychology, that is, the study of man’s spiritual life. After all, every *PREJUDICE* is a kind of conviction, and convictions, together with our emotions, strivings and desires, make up the entirety of our spiritual, psychical life. Since a *PREJUDICE* is a kind of conviction, then it begs the question of how it differs from our regular convictions. After all, no one considers all of someone’s, or their own, convictions to be *PREJUDICES*.

The word “prejudice” itself hints at an answer this question. We sometimes say that we should not prejudge a conclusion of an issue upon someone, that is we should not forejudge it or decide it in advance. Someone might, for instance, ask us if the business he is about to open will bring him due profit. We might respond that it is hard to prejudge the question but that it seems that this kind of business may not be profitable. Thus, we mean to say that it would be advisable to withhold a conclusion until he determines in practice whether the business is profitable or not. We intend to state that by answering the question immediately, we predict the fate of the shop without data on which to base the prediction. Similarly, a doctor, when asked about a patient’s health, often cannot judge in advance whether the patient will recover. However, this is not enough to speak of *PREJUDICES*. Admittedly, if we say the business will not bring profit, or that someone will not recover, we superimpose one view in a way, but that does not mean we succumb to *PREJUDICE*. There is more to it than this. In these cases we do not refer to prejudices as the uttered sentences are based on some data. It is not taken from thin air; the doctor had encountered similar cases; he observed that people rarely recovered. In the other case, we accumulated certain experience which tells us such businesses do not bring much profit in our situation. In short, we can point at a reason for our judgment as well as justify it, at least to some extent. This is precisely the difference between a *PREJUDICE* and any other judgment: there is nothing we can say to explain or justify it. For instance, how would we justify the belief that a person who, on getting up in the morning, touches the floor with his left foot first, will be in a bad mood that day? How do we justify the conviction that washing a newborn’s head will harm it? How do we justify the idea that wishing a hunter good luck will bring the opposite effect? How do we justify the opinion that a ring worn in the left earlobe will strengthen one’s eyesight? Everybody who upholds these *PREJUDICES* will say that this is

simply the case, just because. They are unable to justify these beliefs, and therefore they cannot convince anyone of their validity.

Then is every preconceived convictions without any justification a PREJUDICE?

This claim is not entirely accurate either, since no one will call a legitimate and accurate conviction a “PREJUDICE” even if it is preconceived and lacks justification. After all, it might be the case that someone will acquire a conviction which is impossible to justify at first but which someone will succeed in justifying at a later time. Such convictions are not called “PREJUDICES.” Franklin acquired the conviction that lightning is an electric spark. Columbus was convinced that he would reach dry land if he continued to sail west. His contemporaries believed this to be a PREJUDICE but it turned to be only apparent prejudice, in fact this conviction was accurate. Thus, we can only regard a preconceived and unjustified conviction as a PREJUDICE until it proves to be accurate and justifiable; then it becomes apparent that it was not in fact a PREJUDICE but rather it was mistaken for one.

We may very generally define a PREJUDICE as a preconceived, unjustified and erroneous conviction, or in other words, a preconceived and totally unjustifiable conviction which perceives a connection between unconnected matters.

Thusly understood PREJUDICES can assume many forms and concern various matters. I have previously cited several examples of fairly common PREJUDICES. Yet, there are also other kinds, among which those PREJUDICES which concern the link between supernatural agents and human life received a separate appellation. It is known that various peoples still adhere to the tradition of opening the windows and doors in the house where someone is dying. This is done so that the soul might leave the house. Another case is the ritual of chasing away illness. Another example is the conviction that saying certain words aloud will bring disaster on the head of a given person. Another one is the conviction that picking a fern flower at midnight on Midsummer night, along with certain other conditions, will make one see their future as clear as day. St. Andrew’s day is another.* Not all convictions are based on the assumption that in those cases certain higher powers, either good or evil spirits, aid or harm people, or that they are directly involved in human affairs. This sort of PREJUDICE has a distinct name; it is commonly called “superstition.” Thus, “superstition” is a PREJUDICES concerned with the relation between supernatural agents and people’s

* This is probably a reference to the Polish *Andrzejki* customs, observed on 29 November, that is, on the eve of Saint Andrew’s Day. This evening sees young girls pour liquid wax into water and foretell their future from the shapes that form [B&J].

lives. Naturally, also this kind of a PREJUDICE is truly a PREJUDICE only if it is unjustified, based on anything and false. This is the reason why certain people think of some convictions as superstitions, PREJUDICES, and others consider them as truths; [as] for instance, all spiritualistic practices. Some people claim that the convictions that spirits communicate with us, as well as the conviction that we may attempt to communicate with spirits, are not only unreasonable but also inaccurate, whereas others regard these beliefs as legitimate.

Since superstition is only a kind of prejudice, then everything I shall claim about PREJUDICES further on shall also refer to superstition except that superstitions possesses certain features, inherent to its special content, which other PREJUDICES do not have.

Having established what PREJUDICES are, we can now reflect on where they actually originate. How do people come to harbor convictions which are fundamentally and essentially false as well as impossible to justify, and follow their guidelines in their daily lives?

A detailed analysis of each and every PREJUDICE is impossible to conduct. One would have to research the history of PREJUDICES, of their origin, spreading etc. It is often impossible to pinpoint the place and time of origin of many PREJUDICES. However, in some cases the source of a PREJUDICE can be discovered. Based on these cases, we may also extrapolate that other PREJUDICES followed a similar path.

Let us consider the PREJUDICE about the number thirteen. The source of it is here quite clear. There were 13 people at the Last Supper. One of the participants endured martyrdom, another committed suicide. These two tragic incidents, both invoking terror, were tied to extremely important moments which shaped human development. Also today, when 13 persons sit at a table to dine, many people seem to believe that at least one of them will die soon after. It is undoubtedly true that some of these 13 people who took part in the dinner may in fact die soon. Naturally, two thoughts which arise in one's mind simultaneously, tend to elicit each other [...]. A thought of the house which a friend used to live in elicits the thought of the friend himself, as we saw that friend when visiting him in that house, and thus, the house is connected in our mind to the friend. These associations often bind together thoughts without an apparent, significant connection. After all, there is no real connection between the house and the friend, and yet, we connect these two thoughts. After some time these connection become looser; for instance, if the friend only lived in the house for a short time, and now we always visit him in a different, new house, the connection between the friend and the previous dwelling may fade completely. However, sometimes the association [is] very strong and lasting. This is especially the case when emotions were involved at the moment the two thoughts

were first connected. For instance, it is easy to neglect to remember which street the cab stand is on; however, if we have witnessed a cab driver run over and kill a man, then the sight of that street will long afterward remind us of that accident. This is because we got frightened. Frequent repetition of the two notions together has the same influence as a strong emotional bond. The association between the thought of the house and the thought of the friend is stronger in our mind if he lived there for 10 years instead of only a year or a month.

These issues are commonly known. The said association of thoughts takes place entirely without participation of our will, mechanically in some measure. Just as mechanic pressure will dig a furrow in the ground or in a tree, the coexistence of two thoughts in our mind will create a connection, association between them. Let us now apply these ideas to our example.

In the case of the Last Supper, we do not only listen to the story of the 13 participants, but we also participate emotionally in the events. Thus, all of the thoughts which create a mental image of these events are associated with one another. The number 13 is associated in our thoughts with death. From then on, the number carries a fatal stigma with it. This association does not wane, on the contrary, it tends to be reinforced. After all, every generation hears the story of the Last Supper, and in addition, the connection between the number thirteen and death is sometimes confirmed and a new incentive occurs. No doubt it is sometimes the case that 13 people dine together and soon afterward, a month or six months later, one of them dies. "See, and it was so recently that we dined together," people tend to say then, "and now he is dead." "And there were 13 of us," someone might add cryptically. Thus – a fresh confirmation, a new reinforcement of the association.

The whole formation mechanism of such a PREJUDICE is very transparent then. A so-called generalization is created. As a result of associations, a single connection, as in the example of the Last Supper, is expanded to include all suppers and feasts in similar conditions, that is, with thirteen participants. It seems to us that since the number 13 and the death of a participant occurred together then, it must necessarily be so henceforth. We become accustomed to considering the connection which exists in our minds to be a real connection between facts. Since 13 and death were connected in our minds, we believe this connection must also occur in real life.

One can easily imagine that other PREJUDICES may have emerged in a similar manner; for instance, a mother washed a baby's head once and, not being careful enough, thus affected its health. In this way, an association is formed in the mother's mind between washing the baby's head and illness. Since illness caused by washing babies carelessly may have occurred commonly and in many places, this naturally gave rise to the

prejudice that one must not wash a baby's head as it is unhealthy. As is evident in this and the previous example, an imagined cause replaces the actual cause of the occurrence as a result of an association. The number 13 was not the cause of Christ's death, just as water was not the cause of the baby's illness. Yet, since these circumstances coincided with those, they formed an association as they were more noticeable, and the mental connection began to be considered as real.

Let us quote another popular example. There are numerous so-called social and collective *PREJUDICES*. For instance, people who pursue one profession do not like to encounter people of another profession; a higher rank government official believes a National Treasury official to be inferior to him etc. A wealthy individual does not like to encounter a poor one etc. They are convinced this would be improper. An average land-owner believes it would be improper for his son to become a merchant, a journalist, or, God forbid, an actor. This kind of *PREJUDICE* is also clearly influenced by associations – profession, superiority, servility. There were times when indeed, there existed a social difference between different social classes and professions, which had different rights and thus were separate from each other. This sort of separation is long gone now, and even ceases to exist where it has survived the longest, that is, among the reigning families. However, over the centuries a close connection was formed in people's minds between belonging to a certain profession and relationships to other families or members of other professions. Another connection concerned one's ancestry and a certain profession, for instance, between noble lineage and war craft, or between land ownership and shunning bourgeois activities. Thus, the said association lasts unbroken until today although in fact there is no such association any more. Moreover, a new association emerged between wealth and lineage, between holding certain offices and higher education etc. Even today, people holding certain offices think of themselves as being in a higher position than others.

Here, as well as in the previously analyzed examples, we encounter generalizations and an unjustified broadening of certain events and relationships well beyond the established boundaries. We are prone to perceive what was once connected with each other as belonging to each other. Superiority in one aspect is combined with superiority in another direction in our minds; thus, we tend to generalize the superiority where it is not justified, just as, for instance, we generalize the inferiority of the left hand and the left side of the body and tend to believe that, since we are less skilled in performing everyday activities with our left hand, getting up left foot first will necessarily negatively influence our activities and disposition etc.

If a certain PREJUDICE does not originate from an isolated fact, like the one connected to number 13, but rather from actual long-lasting relations which are wrongly extended to the present times and are the basis for generalizations about the present times, we speak of RELICS. Social and collective prejudices belong in the category of RELICS, and probably also such PREJUDICES as not shaking someone's hand over the threshold or not presenting anyone with a needle. It used to be that there was only one word signifying a guest and a stranger and that a stranger was often an enemy. Therefore, when someone approached one's house, one would be cautious, refrain from shaking hands with him over the threshold; one would take a good look at him before greeting him. This was again extended to include any instance of shaking hands in the present. Another example: it used to be the case that friends bestowed swords on each other. They made an alliance and exchanged their swords or armor. Then they cut their skin and offered their mixed blood to the gods as a token of their alliance. It seems that a remnant of this custom is still visible in the conviction that one has to sting a person to whom one gives a needle or another sharp object as a present.

The above examples should suffice to demonstrate that ultimately PREJUDICES of any kind are always formed due to certain psychological mechanisms and due to the fact that relationships or connections which were once received or accepted are then retained, wherein they are further reinforced all the more when a number of external circumstances foster this reinforcement. Naturally, it stands to reason that justifying a PREJUDICE is impossible. Although it is true that two participants of the Last Supper died shortly afterwards, or that washing a baby's head may lead to illness, or that previously certain families were engaged in warfare while others were merchants, no one is able to justify that is has to be so everywhere, always and nowadays. Still, since despite the lack of justification, PREJUDICES still persist and are commonly cultivated, there has to be another reason apart from the mere mental association, and it is that people who adhere to PREJUDICES get attached and used to them, and do not even want to get exposed to any evidence against the veracity of PREJUDICES. They are only able to see what the PREJUDICES confirm and they ignore whatever speaks against them. After all, how many people live under the number 13 or dine in a group of 13 people without any harm? Not to mention the example with the Moon and the weather.*

* This fragment probably concerns the prediction that if the ends of the crescent new moon face upwards, the weather is going to be fine, but if they face downwards, it is going to rain [B&J].

There is no need to cite examples of how important PREJUDICES are in our daily lives. Countless examples abide everywhere. I know people who will not sit at a table as the thirteenth person, or who will not commence a journey on a Friday, or who will not shake hands over a threshold, or who will not let their sons tackle with trade and will not allow their daughters to marry a merchant. But it is only when we realize that PREJUDICES are present in science and not only in daily life that we begin to realize the true power of PREJUDICES. People who were primarily meant to guard themselves against PREJUDICES succumb to them unwittingly. Here are a few examples.

Cause is often similar to effect. Thence a whole array of sympathetic remedies: asthma was treated with the lungs of a fox, because it is able to take deep breaths; saffron was used to cure hepatitis. Another idea was that two dissimilar things cannot influence each other, e.g. body and soul ([see examples] from the lecture in Vienna in 1894 in *Ognisko**).

Thus, PREJUDICES impeded the progress of knowledge at times, but not for long. They had to yield to the facts. They yielded relatively soon in science; after all, scientists' minds are critical and trained and they cannot ignore arguments in the long run. Not so in everyday life. Here, PREJUDICES are carried from generation to generation like a resilient disease. It is much worse when they interfere with hygiene or social development. Benefits of PREJUDICES have yet to be demonstrated, whereas plenty of damage has been done: the situation of a doctor in the countryside, or economic decline of whole families as a result of moving away from artisanal work etc. This is why everyone who values healthy progress must necessarily fight with PREJUDICES. What is then the instrument of this fight? One can never really eradicate a given PREJUDICE itself – try it – but they must be deprived of its base. This base consists of ignorance and the lack of a critical mind. Vacuity, mechanical repetition and accepting what one hears are the most fertile ground for all kinds of PREJUDICES. The aim is to teach people to think independently, reasonably, critically, and accustom them to be aware or whether their convictions are justified or not. The only way leads through promoting science and education, since education and science endow us with the treasure of knowledge and enrich our lives, and at the same time free us from the obstacles which prevent individuals and societies from sound development.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

* This is about the lecture entitled "On scientific prejudices" [B&J].

INDEPENDENCE OF THINKING*

An individual who would not want to be independent, at least in some aspects, such as materially, financially, is hard to find. Everyone wants to be independent, that is, everyone wants to have as much money as he needs to satisfy his needs. If someone does not have such an amount, he has to beg or borrow, and thus, becomes dependent on those who provide the money, as they acquire certain rights with respect to him, for instance: the right to be shown gratitude, the right to demand interest and the return of the loan, and otherwise: the right to sue him and to conduct repossession.

Apart from this direct material dependence, there is also another, more indirect. Whoever earns money, whether as a craftsman, a writer, an office worker, or a lawyer etc., depends to some degree on those who pay for his work. This dependence can be more or less pronounced, depending on the kind of profession, but its existence is beyond doubt. Bearing in mind this point of view, it becomes clear how convenient the situation is of a person who produces by himself most of what he needs to survive, that is, a farmer, or in general, the owner of land which can feed him. Such a person can be truly materially independent. The only person who can be compared with him is an investor who, often without actually working, achieves enough income to survive, either from his stocks or real estate.

* The lecture was given as the inaugural lecture of Common University Lectures series in Lvov on 4th November, 1906. It was prepared for print by Ryszard Jadczyk and published in Polish as “Niezależność myśli” in *Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa* XXXII (1996), No. 1, pp. 121-127 [B&J].

Yet, apart from financial, there are also other kinds of independence, which are nevertheless not equally desirable by all people. When one manages a business, runs an independent business, or occupies an executive position in a company or a social organization, one is invariably independent, at least in comparison with those who he manages, those under his command, those who, generally speaking, have to do whatever the superior orders, whereas the superior manages his and his subordinates' work according to his opinions and wishes. However, the position of a superior, a director etc., does not only entail more work but also much greater responsibility compared to any subordinate's responsibility. This is why many people prefer to work in a dependent position and do whatever others demand of them, as this is simply more convenient. Thomas à Kempis mentions the following among the four things which "provide great tranquility of heart": "It is much safer to obey than to govern."¹ Such a dependence in operation, convenient to a greater or lesser degree, is not only the domain of strict monastic life but also of work of all sorts of lower rank clerks and officials.

If the statement that independent work is not ideal for all people is true, then the question arises of what is the case with independence of thought in this regard. Does everyone crave independence of thought or are there any people who voluntarily waive their independence of thought for whatever reason? In order to respond to this question, we have to establish what independence of thought is and what it involves.

Firstly, we must distinguish independence of thought from what is usually called "freedom of convictions." When peoples and nations fight for the freedom of religious, national, political, scientific and other convictions, as is the case now, under the tsar's rule, strictly speaking, the struggle does not concern freedom of conviction itself but rather the freedom to express and manifest one's convictions, or the freedom to act according to one's own convictions. No power can suppress the freedom of convictions per se; everyone can think whatever they wish as long as they do not manifest their thoughts in word and deed. As a German proverb states, that *Gedanken sind zollfrei* ["Thoughts are toll-free"], which means that authority does not and cannot impose any constraints whatsoever upon thoughts or convictions. Let us not analyze the freedom to express one's convictions in word and deed and let us rather discuss the freedom of convictions themselves, and in order not to confuse the freedom of convictions themselves with the freedom to express and manifest, I called them "independence of thoughts."

¹ Cf. [Thomas à Kempis 1441], p. 11.

On the basis of what has been stated so far, one might draw the conclusion that there is no use talking about independence of thought, that is, the freedom to harbor certain convictions in one's soul. Since anyone is allowed to think whatever they wish, at least secretly, then everyone has complete independence of thought. One might stop at stating this fact.

Still, two questions come to mind.

I have already raised one of them by enquiring whether there are people who voluntarily waive freedom of thought. After all, thinking is also a kind of work; actually, it is one of the most important lines of mental work; the more independent this work is, the more arduous it becomes, and therefore it might be more convenient to follow the thoughts of others, to think in the way others have thought before us and the way people around us think. It has doubtlessly been the case for most of us that someone who we have attempted to convince of the fallacy of his reasoning responded: "There is a lot of truth in what you are saying, but the standpoint has always been opposite so why should I differ in my standpoint?" Ones who respond thusly are representatives of so-called vacuity; this is not to say that they harbor no thoughts whatsoever, but rather, that they are devoid of autonomous, independent thought. It is certainly convenient not to ponder alone upon various issues and to adopt a commonly accepted opinion, or at least one that has been accepted by one's environment. Thus one is able to save himself the effort and the pain of being rejected because of one's opinions.

There are also other instances of voluntary waiving independence of thought in favor of someone else's thought where one is not guided by convenience.

This is precisely the case when someone is so convinced of the rightness of another person's opinion that, confident in its superiority, relinquishes independent consideration of the issue which, in his opinion, someone else can consider better than him. The personal trust one feels toward someone and trust in that person's intellectual superiority play a determining role in such cases. This is also the case when one trusts organizations and institutions rather than individual people. Someone who truly believes in the teachings of the Church will not think independently also in other fields, unconnected to faith, and will make a so-called *sacrificium intellectum*, that is, a sacrifice out of one's own thought, surrendering it to the teachings formulated by the clerical authority. As for scientific problems, do we not all forgo independent thought and do we not adopt views established by those who do autonomous research, who enrich science with new facts and establish its practical uses? ([see] e.g. orthographical rules established by Academy of Sciences.)

Someone might say there is a significant difference between subjecting one's thought to a certain set of religious beliefs and subjecting it to the laws of science. Indeed, there is a difference, there is in fact more than one. However, the issue here is to analyze what these two cases have in common, and that is undoubtedly the fact that in cases which one is unable or unwilling to explain and resolve on one's own, one's thought is dependent on the views presented to one as a whole.

In all the above mentioned examples (faith in someone's authority, in the authority of the Church, or the authority of science), subordinating our own thoughts to someone else's thought is a voluntary act. After all, there might occur a reason to withdraw one's trust from someone, whence one will think independently of that person's views. One might resolve to become independent from only some religious beliefs, to change one's faith or abandon it altogether. One might also lose confidence in the truths proclaimed by a certain science or by science in general and attempt to explore various issues independently of that science.

It would seem this was possible. Still, it is not exactly so. Although it is true that one can subordinate one's thinking to someone else's, entirely voluntarily, it is doubtful whether one can also voluntarily and freely remove one's thought from under someone else's influence and make it independent. Thus, the other of the mentioned issues can be formulated as follows: Can a person achieve complete independence of thoughts? Considering this questions, we see, first of all, one great obstacle to independence of thoughts.

The obstacle consists in the fact that a person living in a society constantly has to depend on someone's opinion, someone's assertions and statements. It is impossible to investigate and research on one's own all that is necessary in one's daily life. A housewife discussing prices of food based on information from her cook, a doctor diagnosing a patient based, at least partly, on the information from the patient himself, a farmer inquiring about prices of grain from a merchant or, in the best case, from a newspaper – none of them think and reason independently, but rather, in close dependence on others who for their part depend on further factors. Even in the cases where one evidently wishes to have opinions that are independent of other people's, it is not always possible in all respects; for instance, an examining justice who is questioning a person accused of perjury certainly wants to recognize the whole case and to formulate an indictment, regardless of lies of the accused whose words the justice certainly does not trust. Still, he cannot entirely rule out the influence of the testimony on his own views on motives of the crime etc. Parents as well as tutors are in the same position when they attempt to find out which of the two deceitful children started a fight. They do not believe either of

the children yet they must form an opinion about their guilt based on the testimony of these two deceitful children. Such examples are abundant and each of them can prove that one cannot do anything in life without having to depend on someone else's opinion and statements, and thus, modeling their thinking on the way others think.

One might say: all of this is connected to practical, everyday life, where one is always so dependent on one's environment in very many ways that he obviously cannot be independent in his thinking and reasoning. If one is not concerned with practical affairs of daily life, one can surely emancipate himself from all these influences and think purely objectively, disregarding what others think or have thought about a given issue.

We certainly do not have to rely on someone else's opinion in matters concerning everyday life; we can either form our own opinions or, if that proves impossible, forgo having an opinion altogether. Yet, exactly this is impossible in real life, as in order to be able to exist, one has to have some sort of opinion as the basis for one's actions. However, in areas more distant from the immediate necessities of daily life, one might forgo having any opinions; for instance, deciding on whether a company is eligible for a loan or whether the school one wants to send his child to is good is a matter of relying on someone else's opinion. This is when one seeks information with people he trusts. After all, one cannot forgo his opinion without having to assume all the risk, but at the same time, there is no opportunity to form an opinion before granting the company credit or sending the child to school. On the other hand, when one begins to wonder about what electricity actually is, or what is the purpose of human life, then one can rely on the opinion of those who deal with such issues professionally or, if one does not want to depend on the opinions of others, he can reflect on these questions and conduct research or ascertain that one will not reach any viable conclusions this way and resolve: These are topics to which I cannot really contribute much, nor can I form any opinion on them.

No doubt there are relevant cases where one is not forced to rely on someone else's opinion. It is obviously true. But does one really think independently when one does not rely on the opinion of others? It is hard to answer in the affirmative without reservations.

In order to free oneself from the influence of another person's opinion, one has to realize that the opinion is or may be an influence. Yet, can we not succumb to someone's view unwittingly, unconsciously? Not only is it possible but it happens all the time. How many people read daily newspapers which represent certain political views and present facts and views in the light of party policy? The reader of these journals may think he has formed his own opinion about political events, whereas in fact one has to be a very experienced and independently thinking person in order not to

unwittingly succumb to the suggestions exerted by the journal on a daily basis. If one wants to remain truly independent in political issues, he must read newspapers issued by various fractions so that their influence balances out. Other people listens to sermons delivered by the same priest every Sunday and similarly, they adopt his way of thinking. Others go to meetings where certain issues are discussed in the same spirit and are also influenced by this spirit. Still others may have a friend who they love and respect and do not even realize how strongly the personality of the friend influences them, so that they think their thoughts and see reality through his eyes. All those people deceive themselves in believing that they think independently; their thoughts follow paths treaded by others and they themselves believe they are directing their thoughts.

It is sometimes the case that someone notices this relationship between his own way of thinking and someone else's, and decides to free himself from this influence. Total success is rare in this respect, and usually the person simply fails. If the influence of someone else's thinking became even somewhat established, its consequences will forever remain in one's soul. One might forget about it, but often, after years, come up with an idea which would never have formed had a foreign opinion not laid groundwork for it.

Moreover, the entirety of one's thoughts develops on the background created by the thoughts of others. One is not born with a ready to use set of opinions. Instead, one learns to think; his views and opinions are gradually shaped. At first, he does not have any personal opinion on the issues and affairs around him. The views of other people surrounding a child will at first become his views. Whatever the child hears at home, from his parents, and further on: from his playmates and his teachers at school – it all gives a certain direction to his thoughts and either directly instills certain views in him or prepares groundwork for the formulation of certain views and prevents other views from forming. The influence of remarkable teachers is clear in their students – both in art and in science.

A boy raised in a wealthy, aristocratic home, where there is a lot of talk of the nobility of the family, where servants express their obedience to him in every way, and on the other hand: a lad who was born and raised in a basement apartment, ill-treated and chided by everyone – which one of them in their later lives could possibly begin thinking completely independently of those thoughts put in their hearts by their environment when they were children? Will there not remain in their souls an echo of those youthful experiences? If not, then why is it so difficult to accept it when a great lord and nobleman is an outspoken democrat?

Thus, family traditions, upbringing, the environment, reading, company – all of this influences our thinking and creates a dependence and we are unable to completely discard this burden. The dead rule the living

– said a certain philosopher of the 19th century*; all that our ancestors believed and all that they saved in tradition and books as well as social institutions, all of that is shared by all of us through our upbringing and binds us, gives our thoughts and views a direction, which we often cannot change in any way.

Thus the circle of other people's thoughts on which our own thoughts depend is gradually enlarged the closer we look. However, this is not the end. Apart from the thoughts of others there are also many other factors, even more powerful, on which the origins of our thoughts depend. Let me quote a few of them as examples.

I shall begin from human speech, which is closely connected to thought. Human speech does not only exert an indirect influence over our thinking as a tool which thoughts of others use to enter our consciousness, but is also able to give our thoughts direction and make them dependent on it solely through its form and structure. For instance, there are some nouns which denote existing people or things: "a table," "a bush," "a man," "a fly" etc. No wonder then that we associate these words with an image of something which really exists when we utter them. The same is the case when we speak of an event that "it happened by accident," or when we say about someone that "he had always been oppressed by bad luck," or that "happiness accompanied him all the time." We think then that the ACCIDENT is as real as a man, and that BAD LUCK OR HAPPINESS are some kind of entities which rule over people's lives. This influence of language on our thinking reveals an influence of a higher rank, that is, the influence of the way our minds work. Just as every being is forced to move according to the shape of its limbs which it uses to get around, one can only think as long as the means of thinking allow. A dog walks on four legs but cannot fly like a bird. Similarly, the flow of human thought can necessarily only move in such a way, in such directions and within such boundaries which are possible for a human mind. These ways, boundaries and directions are strictly limited by the way our minds work. The fact that our entire outlook on the world largely depends on the number, kind and interrelations of our senses has already been raised repeatedly and so only a few words in this topic will suffice. How would we perceive the world if we were able to see more colors or if we were deprived of the sense of hearing? How would the world manifest itself if our sense of smell was as acute as a dog's and if we identified objects around us according to their scent instead of their shape and color?

* See Th. Jefferson's adage: "The dead should not rule the living" [B&J].

Just as in the case of the senses human beings are endowed with, thinking is also dependent on certain constant and unwavering methods of understanding. Primitive man saw living entities everywhere in his surroundings; he peopled trees, water and mountains with gods and goddesses and called the Sun and the Moon “deities.” We remember this naïve period in the history of mankind with certain indulgence. Yet, do we not act in the same or similar way when speaking of forces of nature? Does it not reveal the inclination of the mind to understand the environment according to people’s own nature? Do we not ascribe human qualities to «inanimate» nature speaking of planets which revolve, of stones which press down against the ground, of the light which travels through space with incredible speed? Is there not an inevitable correlation between our way of thinking and the necessity to understand everything according to ourselves in the concept of the Higher Being which we cannot envisage other than by ascribing human features to it, albeit magnified to attain infinite perfection?

Moreover, this universe of our thoughts, dependent on the above mentioned factors which condition the manner and partly the content of thinking, is also invaded by another element, unrelated to thought, which also exerts its own influence: human emotions and temperament. We believe in what we like. When two people utter contradictory opinions and one of them is likeable whereas the other one is not, we tend to accept the opinion presented by the likeable person. Thus, personal preference may influence the whole direction of human thought for a lifetime, depending on, for instance, whether certain subjects at school were taught by a likeable or a disagreeable teacher. Likewise, if we do not like someone, it is more difficult for us to believe praise of that person, whereas if we like someone, it is equally difficult to believe negative opinions of him. Therefore, what we think of someone depends on what we feel toward that person. One hears plenty of negative opinions about certain classes, professions, or the opposite sexes which, on closer examination, turn out to have sprung from the feeling of injustice or from personal disappointment and such! If one could wean his thoughts from his emotions, he would think differently in this and similar cases. He would probably change his mind in many instances, if not for the fear of embarrassment or ridicule in public opinion! Yet, shunning such emotions is impossible as it would be physically and morally fatal for man, which is why our way of thinking will always be dependent on our emotions and temperament. This is also the reason why we can rarely change the flow and direction of someone else’s thoughts; we attempt to persuade, to argue the case, we quote numerous arguments, and our opponent is not even able to empathize with our course of reasoning, because emotion governs

their thinking. This is emphatically the case in politics. I do not know of a case where a conservative would manage to convince a progressive to change his mind, or the other way around. Now we know why. After all, we can safely say that, the choice of becoming a conservative or a progressive does not only result from a person's upbringing and the influence of the environment in general, but, first of all his temperament and all directions of his interests. Similarly, whether someone is a pessimist, even living in prosperity, or an optimist in great poverty, depends on his temperament.

These two examples probably are sufficient proof of the fact that the course of human thought depends on a vast array of elements which, explicitly or implicitly (unwittingly), have a lasting or temporary, decisive or less vital impact on human thought. Therefore, independence of thought seems to be an unattainable, impossible to realize, ideal.

Yet, ideals also specify the course of action and its aim which we strive to reach, even while realizing we never fully will. Attached to our ideal of independence of thought, we endeavor to free ourselves from the influence of those factors which muddy our thoughts. Independent thought is only concerned with one truth: logic; independent thought is not concerned with whether it is old or new, whether it is consistent with the general opinion or not, or whether it is generally accepted or not, whether it is pleasant or hard to accept, whether it is ours or another person's, and even whether it is beneficial or harmful for the owner of the thought. The only relevant question is whether it is true and logically valid.

How many people cherish in their hearts an ideal of independent thought? There are not many of them but they exist; independent thought constitutes the content and aim of their life work. Each ideal has its propagators, who advocate it in deed and word who display its value and attempt to lift themselves and others toward it. Artists are advocates of beauty, whereas scientists are advocates of independent thought. Nowhere except for the circle of scientists is independent thought elevated to the rank of a life principle; they are the only ones who consciously work toward making thought as independent as it is humanly possible.

Thence the meaning of science for society is apparent. It does not only bring society a number of new laws, thus providing numerous benefits, but it also cultivates the ideal aspect of independent thought, which is being objective, free from prejudice and secondary considerations, dispassionate, intrepid and adamant. Just as an artist wishes to introduce the whole society to the ideal of beauty, also a scientist wants everyone to internalize the ideal of independent thought like he had. Thus, any activity devoted to spreading education should propagate passion for knowledge gained through independent thought and not solely the acquisition of knowledge.

Success in this area will not only result in people being better educated but also in them being better by being less prejudiced, and more mindful of the truth.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

Kazimierz Twardowski

8.

ON MISTAKES OF THINKING*

Lecture 1

4th May, 1900

Errare humanum est. But if *cuiusvis hominis est errare, nullius nosi insipientis est in errore perseverare*. In order to recognize and correct mistakes and avoid them in the future, one has to know why their thinking is mistaken.

Admittedly, common sense prevents us from making mistakes, just like certain linguistic intuitions prevent us from violating the rules of grammar. But it is not enough. Some situations are unclear and one would have not made a mistake if they had known about that. Similarly, somebody would have avoided the hole in a bridge if they had noticed that there was one.

One may rightly argue that logic helps us to avoid [mistakes in thinking]. Yet logic – or at least the logic presented in textbooks – is also not sufficient. In order to avoid temptations in life, one has to be familiar not only with ethical rules but also with temptations themselves. Likewise, one has to know not only the logical rules [of proper thinking] but also a list of possible mistakes.[†]

* The lectures were delivered at the Lvov University in 1900. They were prepared for print by Ryszard Jadcak and published as “O błędach w myśleniu” in Kazimierz Twardowski, *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych* (Warszawa: WSiP, 1992), pp. 165-202 [B&J].

[†] Twardowski’s remark next to the text: “*Nur des Wissen ist d. Leben u.d. Irum ist*” [J].

This is important for two reasons: it prevents our own mistakes of thinking and helps to recognize that other people are not right in their thinking. Theoretically, it comes down to the same thing.

Opportunities to make mistakes [happen] at every turn. Otherwise, one could not explain why people err so often. Nobody voluntarily makes mistakes for everybody has a desire for truth.* When people know the risk, they are more likely to avoid it, which is a purely practical consequence of science on mistakes of thinking.

However, it [i.e. this science] is of theoretical importance as well. A mistake is a certain kind of fact. To classify mistakes and to recognize their causes are tasks of two sciences, logic and psychology. One should explain this situation. Thus every comprehensive coursebook of psychology should include one chapter [about that problem]. They usually do not, and only delusions remain. In textbooks of logic, in turn, there is only one branch dedicated to such questions: fallacies of reasoning and fallacies of entailment.† Admittedly, [this kind of reasoning-based mistake in thinking] is the most common but not the only one.‡ Yet there are other kinds as well. Some mistakes are not based on reasoning, especially the ones which emerge in practical life. Therefore, the aim of my lectures is to complete logic and psychology [as regards mistakes of thinking].

We have to state precisely WHAT A MISTAKE OF THINKING IS. WHAT IS A MISTAKE, WHAT IS THINKING?

Let me start with the second question. The word “to think” has two main meanings, which leads to a difference at the level of grammar. [1] “I am thinking about someone or something.” [2] “I think that it will not harm you.”§ In both cases, the word “think” refers to mental activities but they [i.e. activities] are different in both cases. [Ad. 1] “To think about” means to realize something, imagine, or represent something in a concept. For there are two ways in which we realize or represent things to ourselves; thus we have representations or images – and concepts.

An object is what is present in my soul. An object is anything which we may represent to ourselves. Something. Some object may be imagined if we are able to perceive it or [even though we are not able to perceive it]

* Twardowski’s remark in brackets: “Knowledge – Aristotle” [J].

† Twardowski’s remark above this phrase: “Extralogic” [J].

‡ Twardowski’s remark above this phrase: “The most dangerous for science” [J].

§ In English, the difference of two meanings of the word “to think” is marked at the level of grammar (Present Continuous versus Present Simple use of the word). In Polish, in both cases there is the same form of a verb [C].

we would be able to perceive it provided that we have seen a similar object before.* Examples [can be given].

I should add that there are THREE KINDS OF IMAGES. Firstly, images may be divided into [1] original and [2] derivative. [Secondly,] original images are perceptual, and derivative images may be further divided into [a] creating and [b] recreating. Anything which cannot be an object of an image may be an object of a concept.† Thus the meaning of this word is so wide that it refers to God and a mathematical point, an atom and a soul, the Earth and the universe. There are not only general concepts. Thus this is the first meaning of the word “to think:” “to think ABOUT something” or “to represent something to ourselves.”

[Ad. 2] THE SECOND MEANING of the expression “to think THAT” may also be expressed by words “to suppose,” “to have this view,” “to be convinced about.” Thoughts of this [kind] can be expressed as statements, either in an affirmative or negative form.

Both kinds of thinking are called in scientific terminology “the act judging,” or “to make judgments.” “Making judgments” should not be confused with “expressing judgments,” and, consequently, a “judgment” is not a “saying.” Saying is a kind of sentence in a grammatical sense. Judgments are defined in various ways but we are not going to deal with them; anyone will grasp my idea. Judgments are simply affirmative and negative statements, conceptions, convictions etc.

Now the question is WHICH KIND OF THINKING we mean while discussing the problem of mistakes of THINKING. May we make a mistake when we imagine something and represent it to ourselves? We may, as it seems. For example, I may imagine Solvejg as a man, or an atom as an entity which is observable through a special complex microscope, or gold as a metal with the atomic number 16.

All of them are false images and concepts as it is usually said. But *distinguendum est*. As long as I just represent something to myself, there is nothing that would be mistaken. A mistake comes out when I am convinced that the object of my representation looks exactly as I am representing it. And then we deal with a judgment and thinking in the second sense. And it is so indeed.

Only judgments may be mistaken. Images and concepts may be called “mistakes” inasmuch they are made on the basis of mistaken judgments or they lead to mistaken judgments. The examples given below are mistaken

* Remark above this phrase: “*in oculus*, concretely” [J].

† Remark above this phrase: “[What] may be thought” [J].

in this sense. Likewise, there is “unhealthy water,” “unhealthy skin,” “a deep book,” “tasteful furniture” etc.*

Lecture 2

10th May, 1900

Therefore, mistakes of thinking mean mistakes of judgment. One has to distinguish between mistakes of thinking (*error*) and the lack of knowledge (*ignorantia*). I am wrong, i.e. I make a mistake, when I wrongly recognize someone as someone else. On the contrary, I show lack of knowledge when I do not know who the man is. Obviously, lack of knowledge may lead to numerous mistakes. For example, I may not recognize someone and, as the result of that, I may make a judgment that they were not here or there. While lack of knowledge is the lack of judgment, a mistake is a false judgment.

What then do mistakes of thinking, or falsity of judgment, consist of? It does not concern the lack of truth; error is not only *privatio*; it is completely positive. While the truthfulness of a judgment consists of its correspondence with reality its falsity is the lack of such correspondence. Yet these notions need to be further explained. What does “correspondence” and “lack of correspondence” mean? Obviously, one has to consider what “reality” means as well. Otherwise, it is not really accurate.

We will notice it at once. [I will begin with] some remarks on a judgment. A judgment is not an association or a synthesis of some concepts. A judgment is a psychical phenomenon *sui generis*. I am not going to justify this statement now. [A judgment is] an act or activity commonly referred to as an affirmative or negative statement, or opinion, or view. A judgment is definitely not an association of concepts or images. I would like to point out that, neither GREEN TREE, nor even this complex with the addition of the copula “is,” is a judgment since such a connection occurs also in questions, like “Is this tree green”? Neither affirmation nor negation exists independently; they always require an object. When one confirms or rejects something, they always have something [i.e. some object] in mind. An object is not the same thing as a subject. The difference between subject and predicate is, above all, of grammatical and not logical significance. Objects are always mentioned in judgments, like in the following examples:

* There follows a large fragment of text which is crossed out few times with a thick black line [J].

GOD EXISTS, WEATHER IS GLOOMY, A DOG IS BARKING, A TREE IS GREEN, THE ROOT OF 25 IS 5. While there are only two kinds of acts of judging, anything may be an object of a judgment. Anything that can be represented in any way is a potential object of a judgment.

Yet the question is what is affirmed [when we state something] and what is rejected. We affirm or reject that [an object] is. It can be shown in the examples given above. Therefore one deals here with existence, or the so-called reality of an object.* So, we should indicate an object; and the third element, so-called content, does not need to be explained for it is constant, it does not change. Therefore, it is clear that defining truthfulness as correspondence of a judgment with reality is not really accurate. It should be understood as correspondence of an act with an object. Then affirmative true judgments are judgments which accept the existence of existing [objects] and negative [true] judgments are judgments which reject the existence of non-existing objects. It is applied respectively to false judgments. The same concerns living and non-living beings, natural phenomena, relations, features etc. So mistakes of thinking consist of [judgments which] «tell» us that something which does not exist – exists or that something which exists does not exist.

Now we are provided with a definition of a mistake or false judgment.† However, a principal question has to be posed in connection with this definition: why do such mistakes occur? Yet affirming existence or not-existence of particular objects does not depend on our will. What leads [i.e. influences] us is an object [itself] which is given in image or concept, or we deduct from other judgments that an object exists. When I imagine people sitting in front of me, I involuntarily accept them as real and reject that they have two heads. The same is true when I represent to myself that the square root of 25 is equal to 5 or that 3 is not equal to 4. Judgments based on reasoning are made in the same way as judgments based on images and concepts, since reasoning, or entailment, always consists in judging on judgments. For example, I think [i.e. I have a judgment that] the [square] root of 256 is 16 because [I know that] 16 times 16 is 256. The second judgment is the base for the first; it [the second judgment] entails the first one. Therefore, if I accept one judgment, I accept the second one as well; the relation between the [two judgments] consists of the fact that if the first judgment is true, then the second is inevitably true as well. So in this case, the relation between judgments is the object [of another judgment]. When I realize this relation, I may accept or reject it, but it does not depend on

* Remark after this sentence: “Content of a judgment” [J].

† Typed remark next to the text: “[Rabier 1886], pp. 349” [J].

my will. In a sense, a discreet object which I represent to myself entails that accepting or rejecting of its reality. [As we remember,] representation itself is not true or false. What then do mistakes of thinking come from?

Admittedly, if existing objects always entailed affirmative judgments and unreal [objects] entailed negative judgments, thinking could not be mistaken. Yet thinking may be mistaken, which means that mistakes still somehow occur.

This, in turn, proves that apart from the reality or unreality of objects, there are some other factors which accepting or rejecting an object depends on. It is clear: our knowledge of objects is gained through our presentations of objects only but neither existing nor non-existing objects bear visible features of reality or unreality. Some relations, like equality between two objects which are equal to a third one, or our own present psychical phenomena have such a feature of reality. [Respectively,] some objects containing contradictory features, like a round square, have a feature of non-reality. But even in these [evident] cases, features of reality and non-reality may not be visible, because the representation of an object is imprecise.

It suggests that the way in which we represent objects is important as well. And the less visible a feature of reality or non-reality is, the more important the way of representing objects becomes. According to the way I represent an object to myself, I make an affirmative or negative judgment on that. For example, I am thinking about my friend. As he has died, I do not believe in his reality. But when I am dreaming at night, I believe [that he is real]. When somebody tells me that Mr. *X* has come and is waiting in my room, I do not believe that until I have seen it. I represent to myself the equality of the [square] root of 121 and 11. In the last case, I am not tempted either to accept or to reject [this judgment] until I have represented to myself the [square] root of 121, that is: until I have realized that [11] is a number which gives 121 when it is squared and until I have represented to myself 121 as a number which is a product of 11 times 11.

Lecture 3

11th May, 1900

Therefore, it is clear that everything depends on how we represent objects to ourselves. Some objects are represented in such a way that their feature of reality or unreality is visible immediately; in other cases, these features are more or less hidden. And sometimes one cannot identify the features of reality or unreality of objects until they have compared a given object

with other ones, that is, they represent at once two objects and the relations between them. For example, in order to accept that the windows in my room look out north-east, I have to imagine the rising sun and the way in which the sun shines at my window etc. To put it briefly: the way of representing things is crucial. Somebody who would always represent things in a precise and complete way and, moreover, would always represent every relation between a given object and other ones, would always make true judgments. We [normally] do that while making judgments on the objects which can be represented in a precise way, such as equality of the result of “1 plus 1” and 2, a fact that a part is smaller than a whole, our mental phenomena or a round square.

At this point, a common way of understanding true and false representations becomes absolutely important. Namely, representations are true when they lead to making a true judgments, and they are false (or mistaken) when they are imprecise and incomplete and therefore they lead to mistakes. That is why Descartes claimed that representations are materially true or materially false; according to him, the former provide us with material for true judgments, while the latter give material for false ones. Judgments are true or false, and this is the real essence* of truth and falsehood. Now we know why mistakes of judgments exist.

But here we face another problem. Why do we make judgments when we cannot have a full and precise presentation of an object? Undoubtedly, abstaining from judgments would be advisable in such situation. However, unlike Descartes claimed, one is not always able to abstain. Now I am only signaling this fact and I will discuss it in detail later on. Descartes overestimated the influence of will; it seemed to him that every judgment, without any exception, is an act of will, and, in consequence, if one does not perform an act, then the judgment is suspended. However, this is not true.

We make judgments involuntarily, or at least our will does not affect us in a direct way. For example, when I want to make a judgment on the product of 36 times 42, I do some actions which depend on me. However, just when I finish multiplying, a judgment is immediately made. It works in a way round as well. I may try to abstain from some presentations, and therefore from relevant judgments as well. But when a presentation appears, a judgment is immediately also being made. Judgments are made in this way only. Truly, one can abstain from making judgments when they recognize that a judgment contradicts other judgments but it does not depend on their will. Unless some antagonistic factor which precludes issuing a judgment comes out, a judgment is made. It is because one has

* Remark above the word “essence,” in brackets: “Form” [J].

a drive to make judgments like one has a drive to take other actions which are needed to keep and develop both individuals and the whole of mankind. A drive to move sustains unless something makes it impossible, the same concerns a drive to eat (a feeling of being full is an antagonistic factor in the latter case). A drive to make judgments means simply to make affirmative judgments. It is caused by the fact that whenever we present something to ourselves, then we accept it as real provided that something does not interrupt us. [The following facts speak for] the existence of a drive of this kind...^{*} 1. Common conviction that reproductive images have their objects. Naïve realism. One has no logical justification to be convinced that colors etc. exist. Yet even though one knows that colors do not exist, they cannot abstain from having such a conviction. 2. Conviction of the existence of objects of reproductive images. When we recall a town in which we were [some time ago], we are convinced that it looks like it was [when we saw it] provided that one told us that something has changed. And then we are surprised: the house which we remember is not there anymore etc. [There is something like] a belief that reproductive images have their objects. Numerous illusions belong to this group.[†] For example, when I perceive a painting in perspective or when I confuse a tree with a person. 3. Belief that productive images have their objects. Children who believe in witches and other monsters give us evidence in this case. It suffices to evoke an image by a suggestive story, and then one believes that what they are told about is real. [This belief] is sustainable, which is clear when we consider primitive tribes.

Moreover, [there are] numerous examples of images which are partly reproductive and partly productive from a physiological standpoint; besides, from a psychological point of view they do not differ from original images. [Here we have hallucinations, which are experienced when one is awake or asleep. One could ask whether concepts undergo similar mechanisms. As it seems, they do not because we begin creating concepts when antagonistic factors have already countervailed this “blind” faith. Yet there are numerous situations which prove that a drive appears just when an antagonistic factor stops working. One of them is a kind of mistake in thinking which we are going to become familiar with; that is making hypostases of abstract entities, [such as] matter, energy, atom, personification of virtues and vices, mythology. Therefore, such a drive undoubtedly exists, yet only is it not withheld. When, then, is it withheld? It occurs when

^{*} An incomplete sentence in the original [J].

[†] An additional remark in this place: “That are merged with primitive ones” [J].

a judgment cannot be made because it would be inconsistent with another judgment that has been previously accepted.*

Lecture 4

17th May, 1900

The most important judgments which are [usually] accepted are: 1. Logical principles taken for granted, axioms; 2. Laws of nature. They [perhaps (1) and (2)] are expressions of previous perceptions and that is why a new judgment which would be inconsistent with them is immediately rejected. 3. Judgments based on memory. Perceptions. For example, touch is an antagonistic factor for hallucinations or visual illusions. 4. Finally, judgments which we accept from other people, as long as we accept them as true.[†]

Examples which have been given above suffice to establish that a drive is not always active and why children are more affected by drives than adults and the same is true for educated and uneducated people. Therefore, we claim that abstaining from judgments causes some difficulties because of the existence of a drive. Moreover, sometimes one has to make judgments in order to act. It is clear that we often make judgments on objects whose presentations are not precise and not comprehensive: either because of our drive [to make judgments] or because of a need when a drive is not directly being recognized. So-called curiosity is a willingness and a drive to make judgments. We feel SORRY for objects when we cannot make judgments, and that is why sometimes we prefer to make any judgment than to abstain from them altogether. Scientific education of the mind consists of, above all, [acquiring a skill of] conjoining the highest curiosity with the biggest patience to fulfill it. We are not so patient in everyday life; scientists are sometimes not patient either. That is why we err and make judgments on objects which are not sufficiently presented.[‡]

We may say that we make (false) judgments for two reasons. Firstly, we simply have a general inclination to make judgments and in particular,

* Typewritten remark in the margin: “[Rabier 1884], pp. 274.” Below that, there is a remark in pen in the margin: “How can they work if we are not aware of these judgments? Because there is a strong disposition to them (by analogy, people face difficulties when trying to change the style of their handwriting because they have a disposition to their usual style” [J].

[†] Remark in pen in the margin: “When there is no obstacles (like during hypnosis or sleep), a drive is fully active. It looks forward the moment to awake”[J].

[‡] Remark in the margin: “[Rabier 1886], p. 352” [J].

to accept presented objects as real (existing). Secondly, the factors which would make us abstain from succumbing to this inclination are not always active. So [we have here] *causa efficiens* and *causa deficiens*. Now it is clear why we make judgments on objects which are not sufficiently presented and in which an act does not correspond with an object.

Thus we know the general sources of mistakes. They are the same as the sources of true judgments. It all depends on whether our inclination to judgments makes use of strict presentations and whether factors which counteract making judgments appear if there is such a need. As in many other situations, the inclination to judgment brings fruits when it functions properly, however, when it works excessively, it works to the detriment of our thinking.

Having a fact of mistakes of thinking explained, we shall turn to other problems. Two problems concern our lecture and both of them have to be solved to elaborate the problem of mistakes of thinking. (1) How particular mistaken judgments are made, i.e. a) why presentations are imprecise in a given case and lead to making judgments which do not correspond to them and b) why no antagonistic factor works in such cases. In other words, the first problem concerns reasons which contribute to circumstances in which the tendency to make mistakes appears.

Moreover, we have to consider (2) what the nature is of a particular imprecise presentation. What does a given mistake consists of? Admittedly, we know that any mistake consists of accepting something unreal as real (and the other way round) but there are a number of mistakes concerning various objects. For example, I am looking at a square tower in the distance but I am thinking that it is round. What does this imprecise [image] consists of? Is there any lack of something in a presented object or is there too much of something in it? Or are some elements missed or replaced by other ones? Why is a presentation imprecise? Why did something prevent me from issuing a judgment that the tower is round? Especially as in some situations we do abstain, for example when we see a stick half-dipped in the water but we still know that it is not broken.

[Now I shall give] an example of a second problem. Apart from mistakes of perception, there are as well mistakes of recalling, arithmetical mistakes, wrongly made hypotheses etc. The first problem concerns classification and description of CAUSES, due to which we are more likely to make a mistake, or temptations which our thinking is affected by. The second problem is: what mistake, or a mistake of what KIND, has been made. As it often happens, certain causes bring about certain defined mistakes, which means that some element of the first classification is related to some element of the second classification. Yet mistakes may have various causes as well: the same kind of mistakes may have various causes and the same

causes may bring about various mistakes. What shall we do, then? Above all, we have to exclude from our discussion the mistakes which concern perceptions in a direct way, i.e. so-called sensual illusions.* Sensual illusions, which are complex issues, are analyzed by a separate branch, the psychology of senses; it does not call for an explanation during this lecture. Principally, the problem of sensual illusions remains in the field of our interest but we ignore it for practical purposes.

What we are going to discuss may be divided either by causes of mistakes or kinds of mistaken judgments. These kinds can be further divided by objects or the base of judgment (judgments based on memory, reasoning etc.). It is very difficult to carry out a pure and disjunctive classification, thus for practical purposes, we have to make a little compromise. Above all, we shall focus on avoiding mistakes and then recognize the main reasons and kinds of mistakes of judgment. After that, we shall make a systematic classification [of mistakes] that would be based on the standpoints mentioned above.†

I shall begin with judgments made on the basis of memory, i.e. judgments on things from the past. Judgments of this kind are frequently linked to perceptions, which can be recognized even in everyday life when one says: “As far as I remember...” Yet memory is not very reliable: people are likely to remember things in an incorrect way or not remember the proper time when something happened, or they may remember nothing at all.

Lecture 5

18th May, 1900

Illusions of memory. Among various kinds of illusions of memory, illusions of time are what we shall begin with.‡ Firstly, ILLUSIONS OF LENGTH OF TIME THAT PASSED. Certainly, the same period of time that passed may seem to be either long or short. Moreover, it is claimed that people tend to overrate very short periods of time and underestimate the long ones. And when we try to imagine last month and last year, both of them seem to us to be shorter than they actually were, but a year seems to be relatively much shorter than a month. What is the reason for that? It is likely that the time

* Remark in pen in the margin: “Perception, illusion, hallucination” [J].

† Below this sentence there is a line made in pen from this place to the margin; remark above this line: “Memory” [J].

‡ At the beginning of this sentence, there is a typed remark in the margin: “Illusions of memory.” Below this, another typed remark: “J. Sully, *Illusionen*, 227 ff.” [J].

needed to imagine a given period of time influences this imagined time and its length. Admittedly, time of imaging and imaginary time may seem to be independent from each other. For example, when I compare a day and an hour and I conclude that an hour is shorter than a day, I have to imagine both of these situations (both of these “times”) simultaneously.

However, when I compare how long it takes to play *Z dymem pożarów* [*With the smoke of fires*]* and a gamut, I have to admit that the former imagining took a longer time than the latter. This problem may be solved when we differentiate between two kinds of presentations. When one employs CONCEPTS,† they may have presentations of long periods of time but they [i.e. presentations] last for a short period of time; in such a case, the time of presentation does not depend on the time spent on [the process of] presenting it. On the contrary, when we IMAGINE time, then both periods are dependent on one another but are not equal.

This dependency is due to the fact that one may IMAGINE only full time while it may have a concept of both full and empty time.‡ Therefore, when we imagine full time, we always imagine what takes place in it.

However, when one wishes to imagine in a detailed way a certain event that lasted for some time, for example, a piece of music, they have to image subsequently every moment which this event consisted of. It would prove that imaginary time is equal to the time of imaging but it is not. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, we are usually not able to remember a past event in a detailed way. The longer ago it took place, the less we remember. Moreover, we face difficulties in remembering events which happened not so long ago, such as yesterday. Secondly, [as a consequence of the first thing] we are often satisfied with simplified versions of last. Namely, we reconstruct the main transitions between subsequent phases of an event but we do not reconstruct the phases which lasted for the same period of time; that is, we reconstruct only the elements which are needed to reconstruct these transitions. It becomes evident when we try to recollect a journey which we made in the past, or some piece of music on the basis of the score, or even yesterday. There are permanent “later” and “later” etc. Thus it is clear that we are always wrong about how long a given event from the past lasted; *ceteris paribus*, the longer ago an event took place, the less things we remember, and in consequence, past events seem to last for a shorter period of time than they actually lasted. Not only is the time

* A patriotic song which enjoyed almost the status of a national anthem in Poland at the end of 19th century [B&J].

† Remark in pen above it: “and the symbols of feelings” [J].

‡ Remark in pen above it, in brackets: “Analogous space” [J].

that passed no longer present, but it also shrinks. It is like in a spatial perspective. Mistakes which we made because of that [time confusion] are not dangerous, for we usually do not employ our memory to estimate the time that has passed: we know that memory is not reliable in this case and thus we use other indirect means. For example, we stipulate the beginning and the end of something, and thanks to that we know how much time went by.

Our judgments about the time that is passing in opposition to the judgments about the time that has passed are of special importance. [Let us imagine] a walk by the seaside. The sea is at its lowest level and we do not have a watch. But time flies and we do not notice that it is almost low tide which means that we will soon be unable to go back. It is often claimed that the length of time which is passing depends on the fact of whether we pay attention to situations and events which are taking place. Let us think how time passes while we are looking at a clock. Naturally, it is going by very slowly. However, this straightforward explanation is not always sufficient and, moreover, it needs to be explained as well. Why does time pass slower when we pay attention to it? Because there are more points indicated in such a period of time or the period of time is divided into a number of parts, which may be compared with straight and dotted lines. Yet such an explanation is still not satisfactory. Let us consider another example. I am in a very good mood as I am having a nice time at a party but I am going to leave soon. I look at my watch all the time not to be late, and time is flying. However, in light of the remarks which have been made above, it should be passing slowly. And the other way round: when I experience awful pain, like a toothache, and I am hardly bored, and I do not look at my watch at all, then time passes incredibly slowly – for example, at night. These situations need to be explained in a different way. What these two cases have in common is that we pay attention to the end of some period of time: Oh no, I must leave! Ah, when will this pain end?! Yet by representing to ourselves a period of time from a given moment to the end, that is, by representing to ourselves a relevant event which lasts for a certain period of time, or even by representing a certain moment which would end the period, at the same time we have a desire for ending one thing and, respectively, for not ending another. The desire for a sooner or a remote ending makes us represent it, which is related to the rule of contrast.* For in comparison with a presented time, essential time seems to be longer or shorter, respectively, and the context mentioned above may have to deal with it.

* Remark in pen in the margin: “Gray or black, white; pleasant, unpleasant feeling” [J].

Namely, we pay attention to the fact that we are *STILL* in pain and thus we divide a period of time into numerous parts. By analogy, periods of pleasant time are also being divided into parts, but the difference is that in the latter case, the parts are really short. However, it is possible that even the periods of pleasant time are divided into big or long parts. For example, time flies when we live a regular, systematic and well-organized life such that we do not notice that the whole week has passed. Surprisingly, when we travel and every day is completely different than the next, we have a feeling that time is passing slowly. What is the reason for that? We would rather expect that it work the other way round: for our systematic life is routine and the time of travel means joy and new experiences. Anyway, it proves that a division of time plays a crucial role. In everyday, routine life, there are no significant, remarkable passages; events and time pass like a smooth line. On the contrary, in an exceptional mood of life, when we have a lot of new experiences, our time is more divided and it is composed of many parts; thus it seems to be flying. That is why it is transitions between subsequent events that make the *DIFFERENCE*.*

To conclude the part concerning estimating of the length of time: it is clear that everything depends on the way of presenting time. Images seem to shrink and stretch, they become confused with each other; there are also feelings and desires which are linked with contrasting images.

Lecture 6

23rd May, 1900

Another problem that is related to judgments based on memory is the localization in time of past events. It may be done in a direct or indirect way. We localize the time of events in a direct way when concepts[†] are employed or when we recall things by referring to particular events which happened at a particular time. For example, when I answer a question “When did a friend of mine move to his new house?” by saying: “When I came to Lvov,” and “I know that I came to Lvov four and a half years ago, in the autumn of 1895.” *INDIRECT* time localization takes place when I recall some event without comparing it to other events, such as: “It happened a long, long time ago.” We rarely use an indirect localization

* Remark in pen in the margin: “Adolescence seems to be shorter than childhood” [J].

† Remark in brackets above it: “Reasoning” [J].

in time as a DIRECT one is more useful and inevitable as well: people are used to associating things.

What is a mechanism of both types of localization in time? As far as a direct one is concerned, the vividness of the reproductive image is the most important factor. Yet vividness may be misleading as well. *Ceteris paribus*, the more vivid an event is, it means that less time has passed since it happened, and therefore, the more vivid an event is, the less time has passed. However, vividness may be caused by other factors, which takes place when a reproductive image is merged with a perceptual one. For example, when we visit a place in which we spent a happy or sad time, our emotions make our images more vivid: "It seems to have happened just yesterday!" It works the other way round as well. When our recreating image is weak, it may seem that an event happened longer ago than it actually did. For example, we read a newspaper article about a prisoner who has left prison and whom we heard about some time ago. Only a year has passed but we have a feeling that it has been longer. Another example is the trial of a savings bank, which shows at the same time that an indirect localization of time is not reliable. I do not know whether it happened a year ago or earlier, in spring or summer.* I remember that I had a coat when a verdict was delivered. It was warm in the courtroom so I sweated but it might have happened in spring or summer. Then I begin associating this event with other past ones. For example, as people have said: "There will not be winter for Mr. Winter has died," it had to happen ca. autumn. Then I recall that Mr. Winter had died before the verdict was delivered. It is convincing but there is not enough data and I am still not sure. Therefore, I try to associate this event with something else. For example, I remember that the trial was held in the same year when I could not have been chosen as a juror. But I am still not sure about the time of the year, whether it was in early spring or rather in the beginning of winter. I eventually remember that somebody, who was concerned with the trial, wanted to rent her rooms out to students after the holidays but they had not done so by the time the trial would have been completed. And then I finally knew that the trial took place after the holidays. This is an example taken from everyday life. It shows a full mechanism of directly recalling things and the source of possible mistakes. Mistakes may result from associating mistaken events or mistaken ways of association with events and the time when they happened. For example, the fact that I had a winter coat in a courtroom and that it was warm may have happened during some other hearing. In my case, it was not possible because I usually do not participate in other hearings, but in general it could

* Remark in pen in the margin: "So I look for indirect means" [J].

have happened.* As far as a false mood of associations is concerned, it may have occurred that I was in a jury not a year before the process but two years before that. In such a situation, an association is useless. Similarly, it is the same with the person who wanted to rent a room to students.

This is why my presentation of all the phenomena, one of which was the trial in the example above, may be spoiled and mistaken. We are most likely to make a mistake when we have to decide which of two events happened earlier. The problem consists in the lack of benchmarks. I would face great difficulties to state with certainty which of two people: Hoszard or Smolka, died earlier. I cannot remember that because I find no associations between these events and other ones, which would indicate time when they happened.† THE METHOD OF AVOIDING MISTAKEN associations between events and the times when they happened is as follows: we should avoid localizing events directly and when we localize them in an indirect way, we should avoid elements which are based in direct localization. For example, in the case presented above, I remember that I had a winter coat; but it may be doubted. Therefore, we should try to localize events as simply as possible, i.e. we should base our localization on facts defined in terms of time and subject. For example, we may check information in a newspaper. And then the psychological process is simple: we have two events which are clearly associated in terms of time; namely, we may easily check when a newspaper was published and then we know when the trial was held.

Let us turn to other illusions of memory which happen when we represent things in a different way than they actually were. It should be stressed that I do not mean the cases when we are aware of the fact that we do not remember things precisely and thus we carefully make judgments. On the contrary, I mean such situations when we are convinced that we remember something precisely but, as it turns out later on, we are wrong; it concerns both the features of an event and the time when it happened. For example, I might have been convinced for a long time that I took my Matura exam on a Friday. Yet when I looked at my Matura certificate, I realized that it was a Monday. Why? Because it is claimed that 13 is an unlucky number. In response to such an opinion, once I gave an example that I personally took my Matura exam on the 13th day of the month and I still passed it. What happened here is that the unlucky number was confused and then associated with an unlucky day and, as a result, two concepts were replaced. This is why we remember things in a different way than they actually are

* Remark: "I could have been wearing a spring coat as well" [J].

† Remark in pen in the margin: "Direct evidence given by our memory is not helpful at all" [J].

or were. There is no reproductive image which would be almost fully accurate. Some elements are added and some are deleted and, provided we do not realize it, we will make a mistake. The more additional elements there are, the bigger and more serious a mistake will be.

These additional elements may lead to another illusion as well. For example, it may seem to me that something happened, I may be convinced that I remember it – but in fact it did not happen. There may be two kinds of such situations. (1) I may be convinced that I had taken my key with me when I left my house but it turns out that I did not. What is the reason for that? I usually take my key when I leave the house, so I have a very vivid image of this action. For I notice every day that I take my key, the image is present every day as well. And this is why I eventually make a judgment which is strongly associated with the image. In the same way, I may be strongly convinced that I did something, although in fact I only resolved to do it but did not succeed. Two convictions, i.e. a conviction that I resolved to do something and a conviction that I actually did something, are so related to each other that they may be easily confused. I am going to write a letter or to talk with somebody and I am convinced that I have. (2) The second group includes situations labeled as cases of *paramnesia*. I am convinced that I have already seen something, such as some event or somebody, which I am looking at now. I am convinced that I remember something but later it turns out that I did not remember it for things happened in a different way. In the previous case, things were presented as a productive image, and in this one – as a perceptual one. What does it consist in? It is hard to answer this question, although the authors of numerous papers have tried to solve this problem; see for example Lalande's dissertation published in the XVIIIth volume of *Revue Philosophique*.^{*} Perhaps the problem of "hallucinations of memory" may be explained in the following way. Perceptual images consist of, among others, some reproductive factor, which can transform the whole perceptual image into a reproductive one. When a perceptual image is vivid and it is associated with some judgments if we perceive things which have already been perceived by us, then our reproductive images are being confused with perceptual ones and we make judgments about the things which we perceived. Thus it is clear that such judgments may refer to the whole perceptual image and not to its part.[†] This is a very strong illusion but perhaps it is not harmful; all the more, it rarely happens.

^{*} Cf. [Lalande 1893] [B&J].

[†] Remark in the margin: "It is often explained as a reverse hallucination. Physiological foundations" [J].

Lecture 7

1st June, 1900

Yet there are more sins against memory, both positive and negative ones, and perhaps they are the most important. What does it mean when one says “I forgot [about something]?” It means that there was no reproductive image and, in consequence, no results of the image. Therefore, mistakes of thinking which are caused by a lack of knowledge or ignorance may result from temporal ignorance, that is, the lack of relevant images and concepts. For example, I wrongly recognize somebody as a student of Law because I forgot that he told me that were going to give up Law and study Philosophy. Moreover, lack of memory may lead not only to false particular statements but also to false general statements. If I forget about cases which are contradictory with a generalization, I am more likely to make a false generalization.*

It is clear that the lack of a reproductive image has more or less the same meaning as the non-existence of a corresponding fact.

For when we state that something has happened, our statement is based either on our memory, i.e. our past perceptions, or evidence given by somebody else, or reasoning. However, we may still forget about all these bases; we may not remember that we perceived something some time ago or that somebody told us something or that we conducted this reasoning by ourselves. And if we forget about it, then relevant facts «cease to exist» “for ourselves.” In such cases, we tend to recognize the lack of factors which would support a claim that something exists as a sign that the thing did not exist at all. This is a fundamental mistake; moreover, it leads to further mistakes. Why do we make this fundamental mistake? We make it just because in both situations presented above, our psychical state remains the same. Therefore, we make the same judgments in both situations.

Now we are going to discuss another reason for mistaken judgments. Memory enables us to make a number of true judgments but it is responsible for making mistakes as well. There is also another ability of our mind which may be understood as a base of memory, or rather as general symptom of it. I mean the ABILITY TO BECOME SKILLFUL AT DOING ANY ACTION. Thanks to that, every action, when repeated, is performed with greater ease

* Remark in pen on the reverse: “Memory is often illusive when perceptions are concerned: [this is a] separate category of mental illusions. Sully often reads out “the great language” instead of “The great Language” because the title of a chapter was “on Language”. We are convinced that we see our friend looking out of a window but we are wrong for our friend has moved to another house. This is also the case when one forgets about something” [J].

and less effort; an action which was done once is easier to repeat. This is a general law which applies to both the physical and psychical worlds. For example, the first and the second folding of a paper etc. Like associations, memory [is] just a special form. The ability [in question] is called “memory” when it concerns images, and it is called “association” when one becomes skilful at creating psychical phenomena, on the basis of associating them with other phenomena. I would like to discuss the second case. This is an inborn inclination to make judgments, which may be compared to a general drive to believe that objects of our presentations are real. Bacon called it *idola tribus*, that is, idols, prejudices, false beliefs which result from human nature, from its organizations; thus they are inclinations and tendencies to make mistaken judgments, and they are common to all people. Apart from them, Bacon wrote about *idola specus*, or the prejudices of the cave, which means mistaken judgments and inclinations to make them which are characteristic of individual people. I shall come back to the problem of *idola specus*, as well as to *idola fori* and *idola theatri*, later on.

Now we are concerned with *idola tribus*. Bacon is right when he considers all mistaken judgments which are a result of the organization of our senses as *idola tribus*. According to our program, I am not going to discuss this problem in depth. I would rather deal with, above all, so-called *expectatio casuum similium*, or a DRIVE TO MAKE GENERAL STATEMENTS. A given image and a relevant judgment made on the basis of an image – for example, an image of a man of an olive complexion and a judgment that this man is dishonest – become associated with each other. In this case, original judgment consisted in an image of some individual [i.e. a man] who has some features [i.e. being-dishonest]. Yet our images are always somehow vague; some elements of an image are removed in time, and some others, which concern the features, remain; it is the elements which are not removed from an image that become the basis of an association. Our judgment was therefore associated with an image of a man of an olive complexion. And that is why when the image appears, we are likely to make a similar judgment. There are a number of situations in which such an association takes place. For example, I am convinced that when I enter the room, I will see then the furniture which I expect to see. When I look at a person’s face and notice some specific expression on it, I become convinced that that face is associated with a psychical state. Obviously, in the cases presented above, it is not only a judgment but also an image or a concept which are the base for judgment that is being associated. But the fact that some image is one part of an association, while a judgment is the other one, is caused by the fact that an image, which is similar to the former ones, was created.

Lecture 8

15th June, 1900

It is also a source of numerous prejudices. It happens quite often that some phenomena are [accidentally] associated with each other but we believe that they are always associated; for example, thirteen people sitting around one table. Such situations are influenced by other factors as well, but I am not going to discuss it now. Another mistake which belongs to this category is known as *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*,* which is, namely, a cause-effect relation. Cause and effect are associated and when I think about a cause, a relevant effect is immediately associated with it; it results in numerous mistakes.

Association may lead to mistakes in one more situation. For we associate certain convictions with certain behavior, it may work other way round: certain behavior may make use of having certain convictions; see for example (Laplace 171). Another example: somebody was told that Friday is unlucky day and therefore it is not recommended to begin a journey on Friday. Somebody is not sure whether this is true or not but he does not want to risk it and decides to leave on Saturday. Provided that such a situation is repeated, the behavior enhances our conviction and we eventually become convinced that Friday is an unlucky day.

A similar mechanism, though applied in the other direction, works when somebody goes on making up fantastic stories about himself and his heroic acts and eventually accepts them as true. Making up stories in the latter case and behavior in the former one serve the same role; they are associated with certain judgments.

However, such a process may have even more serious consequences when it is applied to a scientific activity. The more often a judgment is made, the closer association between the judgment and a relevant image or concept is. And then, when we present to ourselves some objects, we are likely to make certain judgments which were once associated with these objects. In other words, we are used to making certain judgments on certain objects, and as a result, we face serious difficulty in changing our opinion on the objects. When we deal with the whole complex of objects and judgments mutually connected, the force of our habit becomes even stronger. It explains why we find it difficult to repudiate the convictions which are ingrained in us; we tend to stick to our convictions and hypotheses just because of our habits and without any regards to undeniable facts. The history of science confirms that such situations do really happen. Let

* Remark above it: "Comet war" [J].

us recall, for example, how unwillingly new inventions and discoveries are welcomed by scientists; it was the case of, among others, the theory proposed by Copernicus; the discovery of aerolites rejected as false by the French Academy at the beginning of the century, Columbus' discoveries etc. The list of similar examples of misleading habits and associations could be extended but it is pointless. What we are interested in is the way in which we may avoid such mistakes, and there is only one solution: we just have to remember that associations may be misleading; we should critically approach our thinking and realize that some judgments which we make may be insufficiently justified.

Let us turn now to another source of mistakes of thinking which is also related to the organization common to all mankind. Our mind has a need to grasp phenomena economically, i.e. to organize as many phenomena as possible in one concept, or one law. Because of that, our mental states are often contradictory to reality, for phenomena represented in the mind seem to be more regular and organized than phenomena that really exist. Let us compare this with a popular claim that monism is superior to dualism for according to monism, there is only one substance, or only one kind of substance. What is presupposed in such a claim is a belief that a single reality is better than a dual one. But it has not been proved so far.

Such a standpoint underlies other theories as well. For example, [it is present in a claim that] celestial bodies move on curved paths. The Eleatics claimed that the universe is a ball, and according to Pythagoreanism, there are ten celestial bodies for ten is a perfect number. Nowadays the principal rule of classifications and categorizations is similar. Let us think about the Kantian system or Hegelian dialectics, the division of the history of philosophy into periods and looking for a necessary parallelism between the development of modern and ancient philosophy. [This tendency may be easily revealed in science as well]: in physics, it is a reductionist approach to phenomena which are claimed to be reduced to one specific phenomenon, namely to movement and the unity of forces; in chemistry, it is a tendency to understand empirically simple bodies as complex entities composed of hydrogen pre-atoms. The materialist approach to history is popular because it has one more advantage: it perfectly simplifies our understanding of history. And, besides, both in the case of materialism and other new inventions or discoveries, the same mechanism works: we have a tendency to neglect the significance of any new rule. This kind of mistake is going to be discussed in detail later on. What should be highlighted now is the fact that a tendency to simplify and an inclination to make general statements play crucial roles.

Thus we have a tendency to believe that the universe is structured, regular and well organized. For example, [let us consider] a lottery. If some number has not won for a long time, many people would choose it;

or somebody who dreams about a son is upset when only sons are born in other families; he thinks that it lowers the probability that he will have a son. Thus it is clear that our tendency to recognize uniformity, regularity and almost symmetry in the world is closely related to our feelings and emotions. And this is the most important source of mistakes of thinking: our feeling and emotions, and drives and desires. Besides, it is commonly known that one of the strongest feelings, i.e. passion, may be completely misleading and deceptive.*

Lecture 9

28th June, 1900

We are interested in both the mechanism and main manifestations of this deception. Yet what should be highlighted at the very beginning is the fact that feelings and emotions never directly influence our convictions. If we merely WISH to believe in something, it does not mean that we actually believe in it. There is one more element needed which would not be a feeling itself but which mediates between a feeling [and a further conviction]. This mediating element is our attention. It is clear that INATTENTION leads to numerous mistakes. Due to inattention, some elements of an image are brought out while other are concealed, which affects not only our perceptions but also our judgments which are based on memory. For example, when we see some object which has an intense color, we are more likely to confuse its shape or location; this is an illusion (meteor). As far as reproductive images are concerned, we confuse objects for some elements are brought out and we fail to notice a difference; thus we may confuse a stranger with someone with whom we are familiar. But it is not only inattention, that is, paying not enough attention to important elements which is a source of mistakes. On the contrary, we may be wrong when we do notice some elements. I am not going to deal with the theories of attention. I accept the theory which seems to meet the biggest number of requirements of any scientific theory. I thus accept that attention is a preparation stage, which we are either aware or unaware of, for some images, concepts and judgments.

On the grounds of this approach to attention, it is easy to explain why inattention may lead to mistakes of thinking. [Let us imagine the following situations.] I wear a new hat and I walk down a street in Lvov. I am paying

* Remark: "Fear doubleth all." Words in the margin: "*Der Wunsch ist der wille des Gedanken*" [J].

attention to the hat. I am thinking about it and wondering whether other people will notice it. It seems to me that they are. Or when there is a stain on my jacket, I wonder whether other people will notice it. Thus I pay attention to other people paying attention to my hat and the stain on my jacket. For I am constantly presenting to myself, paying attention— as I am thinking about it — thus I am paying attention to my act of paying attention to the hat and the stain. And I am likely to expect that other people would pay attention to the hat and the stain as well. Similarly, when I pay attention to the sun whose rising over the horizon I expect soon, I am prepared to state that the sun is rising. To sum up, it happens quite often that when we expect some situations to occur, or when we just wait for a signal to start some action, then we are likely to do this action too early, or before the signal has appeared. For instance, when I am told to start running when I hear “Three, two, one – go!”, I am likely to start when I hear “two.” Duels and experiments testing our reactions to something provide us with further support for this claim. And our claim for the power of attention is justified by a well-known experiment: auditory and visual sensations could have been realized in the same time. Yet they are not, and we firstly realize one of them, and then another one, for it depends on what we pay attention to.

Thus our preparation for performing some action under a certain condition may be so strong that it would result in performing the action in spite of the fact that the condition is not realized. This was shown in the examples presented above: By being just prepared to state that other people are noticing my new hat or a stain on my jacket etc., I might have actually stated it.* Another example: a man who feels guilty about some deed is likely to suspect that other people find him guilty as well, even though he is sure that they have had no chance to hear about the deed. Nevertheless, he interprets any sign as proof that other people know about it; he acts like a child who suspects that its parents are going to punish it. The reason for such reactions is as follows: both a man and a child expect certain reactions from other people and by paying attention to certain details of what they see, they interpret them as a sign of guilty and anger respectively. A guilty conscience needs an accuser. Similarly, when we are afraid of something, we pay attention to what we are afraid of, or when we expect something, we pay attention to the object of expectation. That is why a proverb says that fear has a quick ear.

* Remark in the margin: “What is taken into account as well is the behavior of people who favor making such a statement and what is rejecting is the behavior of people who do not favor it” [J].

Thus in all examples listed above, it was our attention that plays the role of the indirect, in some sense, cause of mistakes. Yet what makes us pay attention to a given object is our feeling. For it is clear that some image, which is related to a certain sense, concept or judgment, may cause that some psychical phenomena are being replaced by other phenomena. The latter, in turn, last for a longer period of time and we pay attention to them; we are more likely to [experience] the phenomena which are present in our mind than those which are absent. The same mechanism is applied when a teacher tries to make students interested in some problem or when we try to focus somebody's attention on a different thing than that which this person was concerned with. So we pay attention to judgments which are associated with some feelings, even if the judgments in question are only presented judgments, i.e. the ones which we would like to make or which we are afraid of. In such cases, we are more likely to associate a feeling with a judgment via our attention. Yet as such a judgment does not have a real basis, it is mistaken. I am going to give some more examples.

I mentioned a situation when one overrates their chances of winning a lottery. Another factor plays a vital role in this case: my mind pays attention to the chance to win and as a result, not only am I likely to make an imagined judgment "I will" win but also I may actually make it. We often feel attached to some theories or hypotheses. In consequence, we exert much effort to find confirming data for our hypotheses and theories and we are also likely to make judgments which would confirm them.

There is not only a weak but also a strong version of an indirect influence of feelings on convictions.

In a strong form [of indirect influence] it is not a feeling itself that appears and causes ability to judge and as a consequence a judgment itself but some permanent and strong emotional tendency is given and this ability causes us to make a judgment which is favorable or unfavorable to this ability.

For example, we are likely to appreciate people who we like and, on the other hand, we notice the disadvantages rather than the advantages of people who we do not like. This should be explained in detail. Attention plays also a crucial role here. A father reacts to an ugly deed of his son by saying: "Impossible." In such a situation, emotional tendency conflicts with a judgment which is to be made. Thus one judgment is held up and replaced by another judgment which would agree with a tendency.

Lecture 105th July, 1900

What was said last time may be concisely paraphrased as: we are likely to believe in, or accept, things which are beneficial for, or pleasant to, us rather than things which are neither beneficial nor pleasant.* It may affect not only the process of forming our own standpoint, but also our acceptance or rejection of the opinion of other people. This is why some people are able to tug at our heartstrings: by referring to our emotional tendency, some statement is presented as pleasant or beneficial for the listeners if this statement agrees with their emotional tendencies. Canvassers are trained to play such tricks; first they provoke us to experience certain emotions, that is, they evoke or strengthen a certain emotional tendencies, and then they gradually persuade certain convictions. For example, in Demosthenes' time, the advocates of Macedonian politics frightened their opponents by telling them about the horror and terror which would transpire without Philip's conquest. They were being threatened; when they eventually began to fear formally, they wished for one thing only: to avoid a disaster. Then they were told that if they surrendered, Philip would not violate their rights; they were told that certain decisions were beneficial for them. And they eventually agreed and believed in what they were told. Another example: we may present a number of selected facts to somebody in order to cause him to quarrel with somebody else. When a feeling of anger has successfully been evoked in one person, we may present to him with a new set of facts. If these fabricated facts and the convictions related to them agree with this person's emotional tendency, that person is likely to believe in them.

Emotions may have an even stronger influence. They not only evoke mistaken convictions which indirectly favor certain feelings but also such convictions that indirectly favor it.

Everybody wishes to succeed in discussions. This is common to all mankind. Yet if they also wish to have a conviction that they *do* succeed, they have to claim the same statements during the whole discussion. Thus they have to justify those statements by providing new arguments for them and offering counterarguments against their opponents' claims; in short, they have to do everything not to be forced to admit that they were wrong. It explains one more phenomena as well: *esprit de contradiction*, or the willingness to disagree. Namely, people tend to appreciate their own standpoint and depreciate the standpoint of other people. That is why they are

* Remark in pen in the margin: "Biased judgments" [J].

unwilling to accept that other people are right; they would rather neglect other people's claims and deny them, even if they have not considered those claims and even if their objections are not sufficiently justified.

There is one more way in which emotions may cause mistakes of thinking. Expressions of speech are often emotionally loaded. Yet it is not the most important factor which makes language logically impractical. Language is misleading in many ways which I shall discuss now.

We often complain that some misunderstandings are caused by speech; this confirms the fact that speech is really the source of many mistakes.

Yet it does not concern our own judgments but judgments which are made by other people; in other words, there is a risk that we may accept another judgment than the one which our interlocutor wished to make. For example, when Croesus turned to the Delphic oracle before the war with Cyrus, he was told: Κροῖσος Ἄλυσ διαβες μεγάλων ἀρχείων διαλύσει ["Croesus crossing the Halys will destroy a mighty empire"]; he interpreted this prediction as an announcement that he would destroy Cyrus' state. Mistakes caused by the misleading character of language do not always lead to such tragic consequences but they are still serious. Our thoughts are always expressed by words; we have to use words when we talk to other people but also when we think. There are two reasons for that: firstly, we inevitably associate some words with other ones even when they are not needed at a given moment; secondly, thinking about a sphere of concepts, abstraction without the aid of words, is impossible. Analytical concepts are suitable examples. And for analytical concepts are needed in other ones, words are necessary.

Lecture 11

6th July, 1900

That is why speech is misleading.

This is the cause of the fact that speech influences our thinking; it is a necessary but imperfect means and may lead to mistakes.

We are going to investigate this mechanism in a moment. Thus the first problem is that words and expressions are ambiguous. Yet it is impossible for every thought to be expressed by a separate word.* There are numerous examples of this.† For example, the sentence "X plays the piano" may be

* Several sentences which originally followed this sentence were crossed out thus we do not include them [J].

† Remark in the margin: "Thus according to Erdmann 1900" [J].

twofold interpreted; either as “*X* normally plays the piano” or as “*X* is – generally – able to play the piano.” Or another example: “a new stamp” means either a new kind of stamp or a very old stamp recently included into somebody’s collection.

Or when one “has a thirst,” they may wish to drink something or to receive some consolation, knowledge etc. All expressions mentioned above are so-called relative words which need to be completed. And as we normally do not complete them in everyday situations, they are misleading and lead to misunderstandings. “Poles” is another ambiguous expression. One meaning of this expression is opposed to the meaning of the word “Jews.”

In another one, Jews may claim Polish nationality. Another example is mother tongue, or racial features or origin.

Yet these criteria are not precise; if one organized a competition for Polish people only, it would be confusing to judge who may be counted as a Polish man and who may not.

Some words, such as a “straight line” in mathematics, stand for precise concepts. Meanwhile the denotation of [ambiguous] words, i.e. the objects which the words refer to, may be graphically represented as circles which have blurred, wide boundaries. Unfortunately, numerous scientific terms also have blurred boundaries. For example, the word “quality” is supposed to have seventeen meanings in economics: capital, work; in philosophy especially: “substance” and “soul.” It may cause numerous controversies and result in serious mistakes, some of which have been present in philosophy for ages. Let us see the example: the word “is” is used in a huge number of judgments. “A square is a geometric figure with four straight sides of equal length and four straight angles.” “A fish is a vertebrate.” “This movement is fast.” The word “is” was treated in all cases in the same way: its meaning was not differentiated. In consequence, the judgments having such forms were not differentiated either. Meanwhile, there are great differences between them: identity, subordination, inherence. Or let us consider another example: the word “me.” So many trivial theories were initiated by the problem of “me”! All these “selves” wander about philosophy but could not be precisely defined! In politics, there are similar words as well: “liberalism,” “power,” “people,” “nation” etc.

Therefore, when we do not want to be misled nor wrong, which is of particular significance both in science and in everyday life, we should strive for the precise use of words. Whenever precision is impossible, we are allowed to make arbitrary decisions. People such as lawgivers or those who normally deal with the interpretation of rules and regulations are often in such situations. [They have to define precisely expressions like] “juvenile worker” or “industry.” Meanwhile, there are not many scientific terms which could be defined only arbitrarily. All the more, one should differentiate between

the actual definition of a word and the stipulation of a word's content. For example, it is difficult to judge whether a mummy falls under the concept of corpse. According to one meaning, it does. Yet according to the law, it does not. A notion of "night time" is also interesting. On the one hand, "night time" may mean a certain period of time during a night which lasts longer in the winter and shorter in the summer; besides the words "winter" and "summer" have to be previously defined as well. On the other hand, "night time" may mean the time when it is dark, though "darkness" needs to be defined as well. Meanwhile, the meaning of "night time" has great legal consequences for the time when a theft took place influences the punishment for it.

It would seem that such problems are not challenging for scientists may deliberately choose the proper meaning of a term. Yet the problem of imprecise and misty meanings of terms is still present in science. Let us recall a well-known example: a vacuum does not exist for if there were a vacuum between two sides of a container, there would be absolutely nothing between them. However, then one side would have to touch the other one. The misunderstanding results from the fact that the word "vacuum" is ambiguous; in one meaning it refers to the lack of space and in the second meaning it does not. Consider an example from everyday life. We may give a legal example. In law, one accepts a rule that whoever has associated with a guilty person is suspected as well. Such a person was in connection with a criminal, so one may suspect that person is also guilty.

"Supposing" and "to suppose" do not mean exactly the same. Or another example: "You are weakened. Drink this wine or this cognac. It is strong, it will strengthen you." Meanwhile, the strength of alcohol and physical strength are something completely different. Additionally, there is one more false principle, or a kind of *idolon*, that is, an assumed similarity between cause and effect. Or "strong" and "strengthening." Another example: the expression "lack of money" may mean either a lack of currency or capital to be invested ("financial market," "high price of money"). Thus when someone who does not professionally deal with finances is told about a "lack of money," they would rather understand that there is no currency. Ambiguous words appear in theologically-social reasoning as well: the word "church" may refer to the whole parishioners or the clergy or to a confession etc. Another example is given by Cicero: "*Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne honestum est bonum igitur, quod est, honestum est.*" In the first sentence, "laudabile" means "what is morally appreciated," and in the second one – "what is commonly appreciated by people." [That is, things like] money, social position etc.

Mistakes resulting from ambiguity may be disastrous. For example, the meanings of "collective" and "distributive" must be distinguished. All angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; if all, then also angle *A* and

angle *B*: the mistake is evident. Let us consider another example. The role ascribed to great men and geniuses in the development of social life and civilization is in fact not played by them.

Instead of Columbus, someone else might have discovered America as well, or someone else might have discovered the law of gravity instead of Newton, and the ideas of Copernicus might have been made up by other person etc. As a result, they were in fact superfluous and their discoveries might have been made without them. It is true. However, it seems that the other people who would have made discoveries instead of Columbus, Newton and Copernicus would have been labeled great men as well. The proof is as follows: as each of them, that is each individual, is superfluous, all of them are superfluous. This is how a man who wastes some money says: "If this cost and subsequent one will not make me poorer, so...."

He is convinced that he will not become poorer also as a consequence of the sum of such expenses.

Similarly, people are convinced that neither the first nor the second excess will be harmful etc.

Lecture 12

[No date]

The ambiguous word "the same" has two meanings. In the first, «precise» sense, it means "identical," in the second, «less precise» one, it means "of the same kind."* For example, two houses are made of the same material; I had the same idea as someone else; he suffered from the same disease that I did. All the statements just mentioned are imprecise but they are not problematic: they do not make communication difficult. However, we also say that one thing has the same features as another one, which means that their features are common or equal. Then we are likely to become convinced that some objects actually have some common features, or that there is some set of features which is identical to certain group of objects, or that every object belonging to such a group has the same core of features. As a consequence of subsequent mistakes, there appears the conviction that

* On the back of page 89 of this typescript, Twardowski wrote down the following expressions: "to slap someone's face" – "to mess up someone's face"; "to die" – "to kick the bucket"; "to lie," "to depart from the truth" – "to say an untruth"; "violet" – "*viole odorate*," "rich" – "wealthy"; "smell" – "aroma"; "actor" – "comedian"; "supper" – "evening meal"; "chief" – "head (of provincial government)"; "courage" – "bravado"; "egoistic" – "selfish"; some expressions were illegible [J].

such a core is a separate entity or that this common, imaginative factor has a substantial nature. Plato made such a mistake; in his Σοφιστής he tried to prove the existence of non-corporeal objects. He maintained that justice and wisdom exist, so they are existing; but they are not corporeal. So, there exist non-corporeal things. This argument is quite right as long as we do not repeat Plato's mistake and do not consider wisdom as something like man, tree or stone, i.e. as a thing existing by itself.

In other words, perhaps because of the nominal forms of abstract entities, Plato considered them to be things. In consequence, he took what was common in many similar objects and abstracted things from them and transformed them into ideas. Aristotle criticized Plato for separating them but he follows Plato in this respect: he names these common features εἶδος, το τι ην εἶναι and does not treat them as abstract but considers them to be self-existing. Even God is such a pure form.

In this case, the meaning of the word ["abstraction"] is hardly related to the primitive one.

Examples which have been discussed shall provide convincing data that the ambiguity of words is pernicious. Thus we shall strive for giving precise definitions of the terms [which we use]. Meanwhile, the process of hypostatizing abstracts is highly fraught. For example, consciousness is a feature of psychical phenomena but is wrongly transformed into an essence. The same happens in physics: energy is an instant factor extracted from phenomena by way of abstraction. We should not return to antiquity to meet the process of raising such abstractions on the level of divinity as it was made by the Eleatics with being, Plato with ideas and Aristotle with form. People remark on forces in nature, these forces are reduced to one force and finely people transform these forms into something like a divine entity. The natural itself, i.e. the totality of phenomena is presented as God.

And one more remark on the reason for ambiguity. Ambiguity may also be caused by a so-called subsidiary end which is connected with emotions. Let us consider it in an example.*

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

* The next sentence was crossed out. Instead of this sentence, Twardowski wrote in pen: "The last king of Poland Stanislaus Augustus" [J].

ON THE NOTION OF EDUCATION^{*†}

At the very beginning, I would like to explain why I decided to discuss the problem of education. Presenting this question to professionals seems to be highly appropriate because the problem of education is well-known and broadly discussed, and even clichéd; it has already been presented in a number of books and articles, in dissertations and encyclopedia entries, as well as having been discussed in lectures at congresses. What is the point, then, of elaborating on this problem once more, especially at this great congress which takes place in the capital of the province and one of the most vivid centers of Polish culture? Certainly, the participants of this congress expect to hear something new and modern and something which is more relevant to contemporary problems than the problem of education. Why have I made up my mind and decided to discuss this

^{*} The lecture was given at the Congress of Polish Pedagogical Society in Lvov on 5th July, 1911. It was prepared for print by Ryszard Jadczyk and published in Polish as “O pojęciu wychowania” in Kazimierz Twardowski, *Wybór pism psychologicznych i pedagogicznych* (WSiP, Warszawa 1992), pp. 411-422 [B&J].

[†] It is challenging to present the very idea of this article in English. The whole lecture concerns the Polish notion of “*wychowanie*” (noun). “*Wychowanie*” and the verb from which the noun is derived, “*wychowywać*,” are in fact hard to translate. I chose the word “education,” although it may raise some doubts. In English, there are two groups of verbs which are related to the Polish word “*wychowywać*.” On the one hand, there is obviously a verb “to educate,” on the other, there are such verbs as “to bring up,” “to care for,” “to raise” (a child) etc. However, according to my intuition, none of these words convey fully the idea of Polish “*wychowywać*.” “To educate” is related, above all, with teaching and learning, which shall result in gaining some knowledge or developing some skill. Therefore, it seems to have strongly «instrumental», or technical, meaning.

problem, thereby exposing myself to suspicion that I do not realize what educators actually demand and require?

In brief, I have chosen this problem precisely because it is an old and clichéd one. I am convinced that there are two groups of problems which are always interesting to discuss: the newest and the oldest ones. The newest problems are compelling because there has not been time yet to deeply elaborate on them. The same concerns the oldest ones; they are forgotten, they became familiar and do not raise particular interest any more. In spite of that, the very problem is still present; it requires our attention and discussion. Therefore, we face here one of the most dangerous splits between theory and practice: our activity is deprived of reflection and becomes a thoughtless routine.

I am afraid that one such problem is that of education. We are fed up with such questions and have no interest in dealing with them. However, they are still important and require our attention because it is vital to understand what the notion of education consists in. For there are a number of educators* everywhere and people are educated in many situations: at home, school, church, or work. That is why the process of education is always present in our life. However, not many educators would answer the question what education consists in, and those who would manage to do so may not be aware of whether their theoretical assumptions are consistent with their actual actions.

I am going to shortly review the notion of education, then point out the main problems which are connected with this notion and finally draw

Naturally, people are taught, or educated, not only at school and they may learn various things, from mathematics, to playing the piano and a familiarity with traffic regulations, but the results are still CONCRETE. However, perhaps we see the difference between (a) "learning mathematics" and (b) "learning moral rules" or (a) "educating on drug abuse" and (b) "educating on making resolutions." All examples concern teaching, but (b)'s examples seem to be more abstract and «deeper» and less typical for education than (a)'s. On the other hand, words like "to bring up" (a child) are associated with the physical, or material, aspect of the relationship between parents and children; in other words, they concern nurturing rather than things like forming the character of a child. Meanwhile, the Polish notion "*wychowanie*" which is discussed by Twardowski conveys the idea of education AND the idea of bringing up children but is not identical to any of them. Therefore, translating "*wychowanie*" as "education" is not the perfect choice but I could not find any better solution. The readers of this translation are asked to bear in mind that Twardowski's understanding of "*wychowanie*" differs from the English sense of "education" [C].

* I chose the word "educator" instead of "teacher" because of the problems explained in the previous footnote. Admittedly, the use of the word "education" implies that the one who educates is a TEACHER, but it would miss the point of Twardowski's idea. Twardowski's "educator" is not limited to institutional education and teaching, as we shall see in the text. Besides, the same concerns "pupils" (and not "students") who are educated by educators [C].

your attention to the consequences of the notion of education. My lecture is hardly revelatory, yet I hope to present well-known problems in a new way. Whether you benefit my speech or not, I am not the one to prejudge.

To start with, the notion of education has its proper and improper senses. Education in the improper sense means that there is no educator in the proper sense of this word, i.e. when there are no people who educate. It happens when one says “someone was educated by their life” or by “their home environment,” or speaks about the “school of life.” When one says that their work, or some difficulties, “have educational effects,” they also use the word “education” in the improper sense. It is clear what this is caused by: when one states that they were educated by life or by difficulties, they admit that these factors have the same effect as the effect which an educator has on a pupil. I am not going to discuss the word “education” improperly understood but to focus on its proper sense.

However, another division needs to be made. The word “education” is ambiguous, like a number of other words of this kind, even when one considers its proper sense only. Let us compare two sentences in which the word “education” is used differently: [(1)] “Somebody is wholeheartedly involved in educating their children” and [(2)] “Somebody is uneducated/well-educated.”* In the first sentence, the speaker refers to a process of educating, i.e. education is understood as some activity, or action, which influences someone else. In the second sentence, education is understood as the result or product of the action of educating. People who are educated have some features which are caused by the process, or action, of education.

Therefore, one has to distinguish between education understood as an action and education understood as the product of this action. Division into actions and products was introduced in my paper *O czynnościach i wytworach* [*On actions and products*].† We are all familiar with other examples of these divisions, such as “to draw” and “drawing,” “thinking” and “thought,” “speaking” and “speech,” “describing” and “description”

* As it has already been said, Polish verb “wychowywać” is, in a sense, unique and therefore hard to translate into English. It covers several elements, above all bringing up a child (“wychowywać dziecko” = “to bring up a child”) and educating somebody but also having good manners (“wychowany człowiek” = “well-mannered man”). In both examples given by Twardowski in Polish, the word “wychowanie,” or other forms derived from it, appears. However, it is not marked in English, which may make this passage barely understandable to English-speaking readers. Twardowski’s examples translated literally would be: (1) “Somebody is wholeheartedly involved in bringing up their children” and (2) “Somebody is ill-mannered/well-mannered.” That is why I have modified the examples to make them understandable [C].

† Cf. [Twardowski 1912b] [B&J].

etc. In these cases, there are separate linguistic forms which distinguish between action and product. Yet this difference is not always marked [deciding – decision]. For example, the word “education” means both the action of educating someone and the product of this action; the same concerns words like “reasoning” or “understanding.”*

When the notion of education is analyzed, either the action of educating or the product of education may be considered. However, they are hardly separable. For an action of educating is undertaken in order to make a pupil educated, or to provide him with education, and education is an aim of educating. When one educates a pupil, the intention is for that pupil to be educated about something or to do something. Therefore, the means of educating depend on the aim of educating, and they have to be relevant and adjusted to the aim. When one wishes to educate a pupil to decide quickly or to be assiduous, they undertake some actions, and when they try to educate a pupil to be healthy and strong, they undertake actions of other kind. In turn, other actions are taken to educate a pupil to be a beggar, or a thief, or a ruler-to-be, or a good mother and wife. As far as all of these actions of educating differ in terms of their aims, the means which are needed to complete the actions differ as well. Therefore, it seems that there are no “actions of educating” in general, but that actions are always related to the aims, or products, of educating. For various kinds of education, such as physical, intellectual, or moral, various kinds of relevant actions are required.

However, in spite of a variety of means and aims, the particular kinds of education listed above have some common features which are present in all of them. Therefore, it is compelling to think about this common core of particular kinds of education and, in consequence, understand its nature, as well as the character of kinds of education.

Now, we may put it in the following way: “TO EDUCATE”[†] MEANS “TO DEVELOP A SKILL BY MEANS OF REGULAR PRACTICE.” The words “practice”

* In the next sentence, Twardowski suggests differentiating between two meanings of a word “education” (education-action and education-product); he refers to two aspects of a verb “*wychowywać*” (“to educate”). In Polish, this verb has two different forms: imperfective (“*wychowywać*”) and perfective one (“*wychować*”). Twardowski’s idea consists in coining one noun from the imperfective form of a verb (“*wychowywanie*”) and another one from the perfective one (“*wychowanie*”). The former, then, means education-action and the latter education-product. This solution cannot be applied to English in which the perfective and imperfective aspects of a verb are not indicated in this way. A pair of English words which would be close to Twardowski’s suggestion is “educating” (action) and “education” (product), though it seems artificial in most cases. Whenever possible, in contexts where Twardowski explicitly used the word “education” understood as action, I translated it as “educating” [C].

[†] Remark in pencil above this word: “in the broadest sense” [J].

and “skill” have been chosen on purpose, while the former means some action and the latter means some product of an activity. And, admittedly, a skill is the result of practice, or practicing. Skill* is a talent to undertake some actions or perform some functions. One cannot develop a skill in some field unless they have a talent for this field; skill consists in developing an ability which may be incipient but at least already exists. And practice consists in performing the actions in which we are going to become skilful. At the very beginning, practice requires a lot of effort and it is not very effective. But then we sharpen our skill and achieve much better results. However, practice is effective only when it is supported by some other actions. The effectiveness of action is sometimes weakened by weariness and similar negative influences; on the other hand anything that positively influences the development of the organism increases the effectiveness of an action; because our organism consists also of these abilities which are trained by us.

Physical education is a good example of what has been said above. Apart from avoiding the things which make us weaker and striving for things which make us stronger, we need something else to achieve the results of physical education. What physical education requires as well are strength and agility exercises, the ability to do particular activities and so on.

“Education” has been defined in a broad sense as undertaking some actions regularly in order to develop a skill. The notion of training [*kształcenie* in Polish] may be understood in a similar way. One says about “education for educational purposes” as well as “training for educational purposes.”† However, there is a difference between the notions of education and training. Firstly, training consists in mere practice only and no additional actions contribute to it. Secondly, the kind of skill which one wishes to develop determines whether one deals with education or with training. TRAINING‡ concerns developing intellectual skills, memory, reason, imagination, or acuteness while EDUCATION focuses on other skills. Apart from developing skills, training comprises gaining knowledge to some extent as well, and that is why one refers to “material training”

* Remark in pencil above this word: “disposition” [J].

† Typewritten remark between this line and the next one: (*kształcenie – czynność, wykształcenie – wytwór*). Twardowski juxtaposes here a pair of words – the first of them means “training” – which sounds similar in Polish, although the former means action (i.e. the action of training), and the latter means product (i.e. the product of training). This juxtaposition is hard to translate, as there is no adequate English word which would mean product of training [C].

‡ Typewritten remark above this word: “in a general sense” [J].

and “formal training.” Nevertheless, one may still refer to the training of volition, or character, which is not an intellectual skill.*

Thanks to what has been said above, a notion of education in a general sense becomes clearer. As long as training in a general sense concerns an intellectual kind of human activity,[†] i.e. reason broadly understood, moral education concerns human volition. Thus intellectual training consists in acquiring[‡] a skill in making appropriate judgments and conducting reasoning, while moral education deals with acquiring a skill in making appropriate resolutions; for the latter skill is called volition, or moral will.

At this point, the relation between pedagogy – understood as a science of education – and psychology and ethics – understood as two basic pedagogical sciences – is clear. As MORAL EDUCATION consists in practicing volition in order to acquire a skill in making appropriate resolutions, PSYCHOLOGY is to stipulate how this process should be conducted, and ETHICS is to specify what the appropriateness of resolutions depends on. I am not going to discuss in detail various ethical problems. For our purposes, the choice of a given ethics is hardly important: any ethics [i.e. ethical statements] is always, or may be, formulated as a set of rules. And in the process of educating, we aim at developing in a pupil a skill in making decisions according to the rules.

The aim of educating which was mentioned above can be achieved only through practice, that is, the practice of making resolutions according to some rules. This is the main – and characteristic – aim of educating and it may be achieved by typical means of practicing, like any other things. Therefore, it requires persuading a pupil to repeat actions in doing which they are to be skilful. It means: actions need to be repeated, which leads to developing a skill for making resolutions according to the rules.

Two conditions are then to be fulfilled in order to achieve the main aim of moral education. A pupil has to know the rules and they have to be willing to apply them, i.e. to have MOTIVES to make resolutions according to the rules. At an early stage of educating, pupils are familiarized with the rules by way of orders given by an educator. Therefore, there is actually one rule: “Listen to your educators,” and that is why obedience is essential to education. Anyone who is aware of this treats acts of disobedience seriously. Without obedience, there is no education. In order to make a pupil obedient, some means of PUNISHMENT is applied. Punishment is used as

* Remark in pencil in this place: “Education concerns not a ready man but consists in transforming a child into an adult man” [J].

[†] Whilst it does not in English, the Polish counterpart of the word “training” does have the meaning which was given by Twardowski [C].

[‡] Typewritten remark above this word: “remembering accurately” [J].

motive at an early stage of educating and it makes a pupil resolve to act according to one rule: BE OBEDIENT. Therefore, obedience is the main means of practicing volition.

However, the means of obedience is effective provided that it is applied WITH CONSISTENCY: an educator must not concede their orders. Conceding once means that all results of previous education are ruined, so mildness is the main sin of an educator. But it has other implications as well: educators have to be very careful while giving orders and requiring obedience from a pupil. Even one hasty order which cannot be fulfilled by a pupil has disastrous consequences.

I am not sure whether educators are aware of that. However, as it may be observed, orders are not always enforced, either for theoretical reasons, such as a view of the relation between adults and children, or practical reasons, like laziness or sympathy. Meanwhile, consistency is essential to education. An order is issued with the giver's intention of making a pupil resolve to act in a given way, which means that a pupil must not be allowed to consider resolving to act in any other manner. Naturally, they are likely to consider something else when they notice that such thing does not lead to negative consequences. That is why for teachers, who are also educators, a very important imperative may be derived: they must not expect from pupils more than pupils are able to do. In turn, what pupils are able to do – and what they should do – have to be absolutely demanded from them.

These ideas may seem to be outdated. Admittedly, we are living in the “age of children” when it is pupils, and not educators, who seem to establish the rules [of educating]. In my opinion, this is wrong. Moreover, I have a feeling that in spite of the undeniable progress which is characteristic of contemporary times, there is a rather regressive tendency in the field of education and training. Sometimes I think that education and training were much more effective in the past. Therefore, going back to previous methods would lead to progress rather than regress in the field of education.*

My viewpoint on the principle of the absolute obedience of pupils toward educators, which should be required from pupils in order to practice their moral will, is actually not so outdated. To understand why, the following things have to be realized. The rule of obedience is applied only at an early stage of education; otherwise, education would not make any sense and would turn into animal training. The more intellectually developed a pupil is, the less important the rule of obedience is. Instead of treating educators' orders as the main source of resolution, [older] pupils have to voluntarily obedient to the rules, which are not «embodied» in educators

* Illegible remark in pencil at this place [J].

any more but rather stated by them. Then a new stage of education gradually begins. At the previous stage, a natural fear of punishment was the main motive of resolution, but even then other motives might have been created, for example pupils' unwillingness to make educators sad because of pupils' disobedience. But [later] new motives need to be created and pupils need to be encouraged to make resolutions. Religious motives, such as fear of punishment or that our will is against God's will, play a crucial role. However, it is not recommended to build education upon religious principles alone: if one loses their faith, they will lose motives to make appropriate resolutions as well. That is why there is need to create other sort of motives of appropriate resolutions, which may come from patriotism, the understanding of one's own business, or noble ambition. They are created to make a pupil resolve to act according to some rules, and not on a whim, capriciously or emotionally. Undoubtedly, this aim may be achieved provided that proper incentives are created. At this level of education, not only a pupil's will, but also a skill to experience new feelings and thirsts is practiced. Pupils are made to resolve to act appropriately but also to experience new feelings, apart from fear of punishment and a willingness to avoid it alone.*

CONSISTENCY is a crucial factor also at this stage. At the previous stage, consistency mattered as much as absolute obedience to a given order was considered. Now orders are not given so often, and new means, such as images, hints, or persuasion, are introduced. However, even at this stage an educator must enforce their orders and be consistent about the rules which are established and presented to a pupil. Again, it is not always like that. In many cases, various rules – established by teachers, priests and parents – are contradictory! Sometimes even the rules established by a father are bent by the mother and the other way around. This is all caused by the fact that people are not aware what education actually consists of and that *PRACTICE* in making resolutions appropriately is essential to education. May one call it education if pupils are not practicing such a thing?†

The final stage of education is when a pupil leaves an educator and education is, as one may put it, completed. However, it seems to be a false conviction that education may be completed at all. On the contrary, at one point the third stage of education begins. Admittedly, it differs from previous stages, yet all stages of education share a common feature: they all consist of practicing volition to make resolutions appropriately and to become as skilful in doing that as possible. The only difference is that at

* Remark in pencil: "This is a criterion of character" [J].

† Remark in pencil: "Then effort...", the rest of the remark is illegible [J].

the third stage of education we do – or should – practice on our own, without an educator's supervision. The third stage of education means as much as self-education. Perhaps hardly anyone – apart from a saint, a stoic sage or an ethical genius like Socrates – would claim that they are sufficiently skilful in making resolutions appropriately. And therefore there is a life-long need to practice. In order to achieve the third stage of education, i.e. self-education, one has to pass through the previous ones which are the foundation of and preparation for the third stage. That is why the second stage of education has to be relevant to the results of education which have been gradually reached. Above all, at the second stage educators need to create motives which will work at the third stage as well, i.e. encourage people to self-educate and enable that self-education. At the second stage, educators need to form pupils' character.*

Therefore, the notion of moral education, which seems to be a kind of education, actually consists in PRACTICING volition to make resolutions appropriately. This viewpoint is not revealing but I wanted to draw your attention to some ideas which always need to be considered in the process of educating. If I were asked to concisely express the essence of my lecture, I would put it in the following way: less teaching, more training and educating whenever possible.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

* Remark in pencil: "Make thoughts ready for education" [J].

PART II

PSYCHOLOGY AND SEMIOTICS

PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING*

INTRODUCTION

1. On the Meaning of the Word “Thinking”

1.1. The word “thinking” has many meanings. In some cases, it encompasses all kinds of actions, functions and psychical conditions, as well as all aspects and courses of consciousness. This is how Descartes (1596-1650) used the word *cogitare* (*anima* means the same as *res cogitans*). Apart from the most general one, there are also other, more particular meanings of the word “to think.” For instance, we may speak of a person as thoughtful or thoughtless, or use the word in other meanings in various grammatical constructions when we say, for instance: “to be thinking about something,” “to think that...” or “to think on something.”

1.2. Therefore we must distinguish the following: I. a popular, common meaning of the word “to think,” that is the meaning used by Descartes, and II. the psychological meaning of the word “to think.” Thinking in the psychological sense does not encompass the entirety of mental life, but rather certain aspects of it, namely, all that is not perception and does not belong to the sphere of emotions, desire, craving or will.

* The lectures were delivered at the Lvov University in 1908-1909. They were prepared for print by Jacek Jadacki and published as “Psychologia myślenia” in *Filozofia Nauki* I (1993), No. 4, pp. 127-149 [B&J].

1.3. The psychological meaning of the word “to think” may be broader or narrower. “Thinking” in the broader sense encompasses all mental functions and activities, without exception, which do not belong to the sphere of perception or to the emotional-volitional sphere, regardless of whether thinking is concrete or abstract. Thinking in the narrower, psychological meaning encompasses solely abstract thinking, that is, the kind of thinking which can only be carried out with the use of speech. This meaning is used to state that man (as opposed to animals) is a thinking entity.

1.4. Since abstract thinking is based on concrete thinking and is constantly intertwined with it, the psychology of thinking must necessarily take into account both concrete and abstract thinking; thus, its object is thinking in the more general, psychological sense.

2. The Aims of the Psychology of Thinking and Its Relationship to Logic

2.1. The psychology of thinking as a branch of psychology aims to describe, analyze [and] classify occurrences of thinking as well as to detect and formulate laws governing occurrences of thinking.

2.2. The relationship of the psychology of thinking to logic is not always well understood and aptly presented. There are those who define logic as the science of thinking, or the science of correct thinking, and are inclined to simply see logic as psychology of thinking, [and] thus, a component of psychology, or at least a certain application of psychology. Thus, in their opinion logic should be based on psychology, unless it is already a part of psychology. This view, called “psychologism,” is untenable. Even if we disregard the historical fact that logic emerged and developed independently from psychology, the following arguments speak against it.

A. The results psychology arrives at are only probable, never certain in the logical or precise sense (the so-called physical certainty is only an immensely great probability; the so-called moral certainty is a probability of a degree sufficient to be guided by it in one’s actions). The results of scientific research in the form of laws occur as generalizations of experiential data in empirical sciences (that is, sciences based on experience), which include psychology. Since there is no guarantee that future experience will not influence a change of generalizations derived from previous experience, generalizations are not certain in the strict sense of the word; they are instead more or less, or sometimes even extremely probable. This very nature of being only probable is manifested in the fact that the results

in empirical sciences can reasonably be subject to doubt; yet, it is impossible for the results in mathematics, which is a non-empirical or a priori, science which leads to certain results in the strict sense of the word. This is because mathematics does not deal with facts, but rather matters of detached or abstract concepts (called “abstractions” in short) as well as the relationships between these matters. Those arguments are not based on the observation of facts but on the analysis of concepts and on deduction. Logic reveals the same nature as mathematics. Also the statements of logic are certain in the strict sense of the word; they are apodictic and independent from experience, logic also being an a priori science. Since this is the case, statements and results in logic cannot be based on statements and results in psychology, since statement *Y* is based on statement *X* when statement *X* is a premise, an argument, or generally speaking: a reason of statement *Y*, and statement *Y* is a result, an thesis, or generally speaking: a logical consequence of statement *X*. If a reason is a probable statement or contains at least one probable statement, the consequence cannot be a certain statement and instead [is] only a probable one. Therefore, the certain statements of logic cannot be based on the probable statements of psychology; psychology cannot be the base for logic.

B. Similarly, it is impossible to regard logic as a component or a certain application of the psychology of thinking, since the object of logic is substantially different from the object of the psychology of thinking. The psychology of thinking deals with the actual, real course of mental processes of thinking entities; it formulates the laws governing such thinking (for instance, that the condition for all thinking is making present the thing one is thinking about, or that making present the objects of thinking can be replaced by making present symbols of these objects, or that one cannot harbor two beliefs which are inconsistent with each other), and derives the mentioned laws from experience, by generalizing its data. On the other hand, logic does not deal with the actual course of thinking at all. When assessing a logical justification of e.g. a court order, or a father’s opinion of his son, or a widely held belief one does not ask what the conditions of the thinking were which led to the court order, for instance, which mind dealt with it and what mental circumstances accompanied it. This is because the object of logic is *THOUGHT*, *NOT THINKING*; not a mental function but rather its product. (Analogously: the phenomenon of sweating is studied by physiology, as it is a physiological occurrence, whereas sweat, which is the product of this physiological process, is studied by chemistry.) The difference between thinking and its product is very clear when, among other things, one considers the relationship of both of them to speech; for instance, the meaning of the word “the Sun” is identical with the thought of the Sun; making present or realizing the meaning of the word “the Sun”

is identical with THINKING of the Sun to oneself. (Thinking is equivalent to having a thought.) Similarly, when one is dealing with a whole sentence: the meaning of the sentence, “Lvov lies on the River Poltva” is A THOUGHT, A CONVICTION, a judgment that Lvov lies on the River Poltva. Yet, HARBORING this THOUGHT, this conviction, [...] [is different from] ISSUING this JUDGMENT OR JUDGING. These are mental facts, whereas a thought, a conviction, or a judgment is a product of these facts. (Bolzano (1781-1848) was the first to clearly note this difference.) Although ultimately suppositions originate from a mental act, or from the mental function of thinking, they can still be analyzed in isolation from this function; what is more, it is possible to construct judgments which have never been issued. Discussion of judgment is the domain of logic, which studies them according to their veracity or falsity, whereas psychology deals with the function of judging, that is, a certain kind of a function of thinking. (Judgments as products of individual thinking of various individuals are not the subject matter of logic. Instead, logic deals with typical forms of judgments, which can be detected in judgments issued by various entities, or artificially constructed.)

This difference of subject matters between psychology and logic is the reason why laws formulated in psychology and logic have diverse meanings (disregarding the fact that the former are only probable whereas the latter are certain). Psychology claims, for example, that harboring two contradictory beliefs is impossible, whereas logic claims that of two contradictory judgments or beliefs, both cannot be true and both cannot be false.

2.3. Thus, logic studies the veracity (and falsity) of judgments, whereas psychology deals with judging, regardless of the veracity or falsity of judgments as products of judging, as well as all existing functions of thinking other than judging. The relationship of the psychology of thinking to logic is analogous to the relationship of the psychology of counting to arithmetic and algebra as the study of numbers.

Confusing the rules of logic and the psychology of thinking does not only stem from the fact that words like “a belief” or “a judgment” etc. are accepted as similar in colloquial speech and the difference in the meaning of mental functions and their products is neglected, but also from the fact that the word “logic” has always meant two different things. Logic is not only interpreted as the theoretical study of the veracity of judgments, but is also viewed as the whole of rules and guidelines which should be followed in thinking so that reality does not stand in opposition to the products of thinking, that is, so that these products are true. Naturally, these guidelines, rules, or in other words: norms, are based on the study of the veracity of judgments, that is, logic in the proper sense, but the collection and interpretation of these guidelines is as different from logic as, for

instance, a set of rules of accurate calculating differs from arithmetic as the study of numbers. Therefore, one must distinguish technology, which is the art of accurate thinking, from logic, which is the study of the veracity of judgments. Thus one will avoid the danger of confusing logic with the psychology of thinking.

3. Subdivisions in the Psychology of Thinking

3.1. The psychology of thinking is further subdivided into two areas: a general analytical one, and a detailed one of a more synthetic nature. The former deals with dividing thinking into functions which form parts of it, then describes these functions, studies relationships between them and determines the conditions of these functions' occurrence. The latter examines how these functions of thinking form specific thought processes in various kinds of thinking entities, according to the circumstances in which the thinking occurs. Thus, the former area deals with functions of thinking whereas the latter deals with directions and types of thinking.

The whole field of the phenomena of thinking can be divided into three groups. The first one encompasses functions thanks to which we making present, realize something, or: thanks to which something is given to us. What happens in our minds when something is given to us, the function of making present something, is called "PRESENTING SOMETHING TO OURSELVES," or, in short, "presenting." We rarely settle for presenting something to ourselves; presenting is usually connected with another kind of mental function, that is, realizing whether what we present of is only IN OUR MIND or it REALLY EXISTS. This assessment of presented objects according to their reality, that is: existence, is the other kind of mental function, called "JUDGING"

Still, NEITHER of these functions exhausts the topic of thinking. There are also other functions of thinking, for instance, pondering, hesitating, comparing, devising, synthetizing, distinguishing etc., which shall not be treated [...] as separate [here] but as being in a constant relation with the basic functions, due to their close association with the basic functions.

3.2. From what was already mentioned regarding the topic of the basic functions of thinking, one might derive two basic (psychological) laws of thinking:

- I. Any of our acts of presentation and judging concerns an object (somebody or something).
- II. A necessary condition for issuing a judgment on an object by us is to present this object to ourselves.

Admittedly, we may present an object without issuing a judgment about it, but it is impossible to issue a judgment about an object without having presented it first.

3.3. What we present and what we judge shall be called “the object of presenting” [or] “[the object of] judging.” The word “object” will be used in a broader meaning than in colloquial speech, as it denotes everything which we can think about in any way. An object in this sense is also called “*ens*,” or “entity” in philosophy.

Ens, as the scholastics claimed, is *summum genus*, is a transcendental notion, *quia omnia genera transcendit*. Entity or *ens* can *habere actualem existentiam*, that is, be something real, existing, but can also be *ens rationis*, that is something which is only thought and therefore does not exist. *Entia rationis* can be *possibilia* or *impossibilia*. *Ens* is *unum, verum, bonum*; this means that it can be the object of presentation which the presented object distinguishes from others, or it can be the object of judgment, which determines whether the object REALLY exists or it is only in one’s mind, or it can be the object of desire of a given object as a GOOD. Therefore, an object is described in light of its relationship to the person presenting, judging, or desiring the object; this is also why the notions of subject and object are commonly accepted and at the same time closely related in philosophy.

ON PRESENTING

CHAPTER I. ON PRESENTING IN GENERAL

1. On Presenting and Presentation (Act, Content and Object of Presentation)

1.1. The action or the function of presenting, what happens in the mind when something is GIVEN to us, is called “the act of presenting,” as opposed to the presented object. Apart from the act and the object, we should also distinguish the product of this act, different from the object, which is often called “the content of presentation.” Analogously, a punch is distinguished from the act of hitting and the object of hitting, and a reflected image is distinguished from the phenomenon of reflection and from the reflected object.

1.2. When we compare presenting with the corresponding parts of speech, that is, with the so-called names (that is, categorematic words, as opposed to syncategorematic words which express something only in combination with other words), we can conclude that the act, content and object of presentation corresponds to a threefold function, that is, a threefold set of names (understood in the broadest sense), namely:

Every name mentions an object or some objects.

Every name has certain meaning which is made present to us when we hear or read it.

Every name indicates that the persons using it are presenting something to themselves, are thinking about something.

The first function of a name concerns the object, the second: the content, the third: the act of presenting. The content of presenting is called "the immanent object of presentation" in medieval philosophy, as opposed to the object in the proper meaning of the word.

1.3. The need to distinguish the content from the act stems from the fact that the action of presenting concerns various objects. Thus, the psychical state in which we present the object *X* to ourselves and the psychical state in which we present the object *Y* to ourselves have something in common, namely: in both cases we present something to ourselves. On the other hand, the difference between them is that we present the object *X* to ourselves in one of them, and the object *Y* in the other. What is common to both of the states is called "the act of presenting," whereas what distinguishes both of the states is called "the content of presenting." The act and the content do not exist in separation from each other; yet, we may distinguish between them only through analysis and abstraction in psychical states in which we present something. Analogously, we distinguish motion and direction as well as the speed of motion in certain physical phenomena (in falling, running etc.). Motion, or the change of place, is common to all of these phenomena; [they] differ from each other in the direction and speed of movement.

1.4. The need to distinguish the content from the object of presenting stems [from two facts].

A. [Firstly, it stems from] the fact that judgments are issued which negate the presented objects. For instance, when issuing the judgment: "Blue gold does not exist," we negate the existence of an object called "blue gold" which was granted when we presented it to ourselves. Yet, apart from the non-existing object called "blue gold," something else is granted, that is, what the difference is between presenting blue gold and presenting yellow gold, which is exactly what makes our presenting a presenting of

blue gold and not something else. What our presenting makes a presentation of none other than blue gold must exist since our presenting blue gold exists; therefore, it cannot be identical with the object of presenting, as this object does not exist.

B. [Secondly, it results] from the fact of the existence of the so-called interchangeable presentations. For instance, when we are presenting to ourselves e.g. [current] British king, and then the [current] emperor of India, we imagine the same person, and thus the same object, both times but we do it in different ways, as first we realize the meaning of the first name, and the second time we realize the meaning of the second name; these meanings differ from each other although the two names mention the same object. The difference between our psychical state when we present to ourselves the British king and our psychical state when we present to ourselves the emperor of India is [...] [precisely] the content of presentation of the object which is not identical in those two cases.*

1.5. Therefore, the terms “presenting” and “making present” etc., are ambiguous, as the act of presenting makes us both the content and the object present to us. (Analogously, “to paint [Mr. X],” “to sculpt Mr. X,” “a portrait of Mr. X.” Mr. X corresponds to the object whereas a portrait of Mr. X corresponds to the content.) There is also ambiguity in the terms: “presented,” “thought,” and “imagined.” A certain object, for instance: a horse which exists, can be imagined by someone at the same time; here the term “imagined” has a determining sense, as it determines the relationship of the real horse to the subject imagining it. Yet, the phrase “an imagined horse” can be interpreted as a juxtaposition of the real horse; then the term “imagined” has a modifying sense, since the imagined horse is not a real horse then; it is not a horse at all, but rather an image of a horse.

1.6. Based on the above distinction, the ambiguity of the term “presentation” can be assessed. The word is often used in such a way that it signifies either the act and the content together, or even the act, the content and the object together; sometimes “presentation” is understood as only the content and is thus juxtaposed with conceiving and the conceived of object. Therefore, when using the term “representation,” one has to be aware and make others aware of the meaning it is used in. To be more precise, the term “presentation” is used in psychology when both the action and the content are meant.

* Twardowski means here Edward VII, King of the United Kingdom and Emperor of India from 21st of January, 1901 to the 6th of May, 1910 [B&J].

2. On Various Methods of Presenting and Various Kinds of Presentations

2.1. The most general division of presentations is between concrete, visual, pictorial ones and detached, abstract, non-visual, non-pictorial. The former are called “images” whereas the latter are called “concepts.” When the object is given us as concrete, we imagine it; when it is abstract, we conceive it. The same object can be presented as concrete or abstract at times, but there are also objects which can only be presented in an abstract manner. In the division of presentations into concrete ones and abstract or detached ones, these words are used in a meaning different from that in grammar; it should also be noted that, contrary to the popular view, concepts do not always have to be general but can also be individual. Abstract presenting occurs later in the development of the human mind than concrete presenting, and is always based on the former.

2.2. By classifying presentations into images and concepts, we give a narrower meaning to the term “image” compared to its meaning in everyday life and the one used by many philosophers who also include concepts among images, whereas we place these two words on the same level and oppose one to each other. Still, although we limit the use of the term “image” to a concrete, pictorial presentation, at the same time we broaden its meaning in this area beyond the meaning usually ascribed to it. This is because *WE IMAGINE* objects not only when we make them present in our memory or phantasy but also when we perceive them they are concretely given to us.

Admittedly, we are not only presented with the object in the moment of perceiving it, but we also directly feel its presence, so to say. Despite of that, it is still true that the object is specifically presented to us and therefore there also exists in our minds a presentation of this image. We call this kind of images “perceptive,” as opposed to images which originate in the memory or *REPRODUCTIVE*, and presentations which originate in the imagination or *PRODUCTIVE* ones. Reproductive and productive images are collectively called “derivative” or “representative,” whereas perceptive images are called “primary” or “presentative.”

2.3. Perceptive images do not fall under the concept of thinking in the broader psychological meaning; only reproductive and productive images do. Although usually it is very easy to realize whether we are dealing with a primary image or a derivative image, the difference between primary and derivative image is not as easy to put into words and definitions.

2.4. There is another difficulty in making the distinction between reproductive and productive images. Although in their case it is easy to put the difference between them into words and definitions, it is not always easy to recognize whether we are dealing with a reproductive or a productive image, which is because every productive image is partly reproductive, and every reproductive image is partly productive. This is because productive images always contain reproductive elements (colors, sounds etc., perceived previously), and only the combination of these elements is new. On the other hand, reproductive images are never an absolutely exact copy of perceptive images, but rather, they depart from them and transform them to a greater or lesser degree. This is precisely the source of numerous illusions of memory, which can have a negative effect on practical life (witnesses' testimony etc.). Therefore, the distinction between reproductive and productive images can only be drawn roughly; we will call "reproductive" those derivative images which are closer to perceptive ones and therefore more dependent on them, whereas "productive" images [will be] the ones which depart from perceptive ones to a greater degree and are therefore less dependent on them, as they contain a set of elements not derived from perceptive images.

2.5. Considering the difficulties in precise determination of the difference [between] primary and derivative images, one has to content oneself with drawing a general characteristic in the following manner:

A. Primary images are combined with the very familiar for everybody sense or feeling of the actuality of the imagined object; this sense or feeling is lacking in the case of derivative images. In the case of primary images, it is imposed with great force and, together with all the accompanying emotions etc., it gives a specific character to the whole psychical state; this sense or feeling can be dulled only in very exceptional cases (during certain lucid dreams).

B. Perceptive images cannot usually be either provided for oneself or removed only through an act of will; what is necessary is a certain change in the conditions which are partly independent from one; the ability to arbitrarily induce primary images borders to a greater or lesser degree on pathological states of mind. On the other hand, derivative images obey our wishes within quite broad limits. We can induce them and remove them depending on the external conditions by simply resolving it.

C. Derivative images are less intense in comparison with primary images, less pronounced and distinct, more faded. Admittedly, there are significant differences between individuals in this respect, but usually there is no doubt about the lower intensity of derivative images.

2.6. The need to describe more accurately the difference between primary and derivative images in the aspect of their *INTENSITY* gives rise to two views on their relationship. The first, qualitative, claims that primary and derivative images differ from each other in their core, like for example a real face and a photo of it. The other, quantitative, claims that the difference [between] primary and derivative images consists solely in the fact that the former are of lower intensity [and] the latter are of higher intensity; thus, their relationship is analogous to the relationship between, for instance, a quieter and a louder sound. The second view is present in Aristotle, then in Hume, and is quite common among contemporary psychologists. One of them, Rabier, justifies his view by referring to: (A) inner experiences, (B) the fact that primary and derivative images exert the same effects both in the physical and psychical areas, and (C) the fact that we often do not differentiate between primary and derivative images [in the following situations]: (a) when derivative images are very intense, (b) when derivative images are very weak, (c) when derivative images seem very intense under special circumstances (lucid dreams etc.). However, these arguments are not convincing. As for the argument cited in (A), one has to keep it in mind that, firstly, a vivid memory of previously experienced emotions etc., often leads to the return of these emotions, which are then presented in primary rather than derivative images; secondly, although our inner experience certainly informs us of what occurs in our minds (e.g. when we imagine something), it does not inform us of the essence of the occurring phenomenon. Arguments (B) and (C) are based on the assumption that phenomena which lead to identical effects, or phenomena which we do not easily differentiate between, may differ from each other only in the quantitative aspect. Yet, with respect to the facts mentioned in (B), it should be noted that there are numerous examples where phenomena which differ from each other in quality rather than in quantity lead to identical effects. Moreover, it is possible that physiological processes corresponding to primary and derivative images only differ in quantity from each other, whereas the primary and derivative images themselves differ in quality from each other. As for the arguments mentioned in (C), it should be noted that inability to differentiate between two objects usually occurs when there are slight gradual transitions between them; still, these transitions do not have to be quantitative but can also be qualitative (for instance, between different color hues). Thus, the arguments quoted by Rabier in favor of the quantitative theory cannot withstand criticism.

The theory itself encounters numerous problems. If the quantitative difference is to refer to objects in perception, in memory and in imagination, then it is difficult to comprehend the meaning of the statement

that, for instance, a shape given in derivative image is weaker or less intense than a shape in given primary image. (If one assumed that the lesser intensity of the derivative shape concerns not a shape as supraposed, sensual elements, that is, colors which form the foundation for the imagined shape, one would create a new difficulty resulting from the fact that reconstructing a shape can only occur based on sensual components which are different in quality from those connected to the primary shape.) On the other hand, if we want to refer the quantitative difference between the primary image and the derivative image to the act of imaging, we face the fact that whatever we can say about the tension of the act of imaging, this tension usually appears [as] greater for a derivative image than for a primary image, so that the opposite of the discussed theory is the case. Finally, it is impossible to determine whether the content of the derivative image is less intense than the content of the primary image, as it is impossible to compare the content of both in this aspect. Therefore, the quantitative theory, whatever the meaning ascribed to it, encounters difficulties, and additionally, it goes contrary to facts, for instance, when it is applied to sounds provided primarily and derivatively. After all, is the only difference between a perceived *fortissimo* sound and the same sound reproduced that the latter presents itself as less intense? How about a *pianissimo* sound? In that case, would the difference between a heard *pianissimo* and a replayed *fortissimo* have to vanish? Yet, this difference is easy to notice. Thus the quantitative theory must be discarded. Since the attempts to both describe and determine the qualitative difference between derivative images and primary images (for instance, that in comparison to primary images, derivative ones are less detailed in some aspects and more detailed in other aspects; they are also generally weaker than primary ones) either encounter theoretical difficulties or are incompatible with facts, the difference [between] primary and derivative images must be recognized as a elementary one, connected to experience but impossible to describe or determine (just as it is the case with the difference [between] the color red and the color green, or [between] a pleasant and an unpleasant feeling).

CHAPTER II. ON IMAGES FROM MEMORY (ON REPRODUCTIVE IMAGES)

1. On Memory in General

1.1. Memory is usually defined as the ability to reproduce images, [and] therefore, as the ability thanks to which objects which had been perceived can be provided again even though they are not perceived any longer. The ability to reproduce lies at the base of all, even the most primitive, experiences, hence its immense importance for life and thinking. Yet, memory is only a partial condition (a part of condition) for recreating; in order for images to be reproduced at a given moment, it is not enough to remember them; other conditions have to be fulfilled as well. Those other conditions are called “direct” or “closer” whereas memory itself is called “indirect” or “an indirect condition for reproduction.” The reproduction itself can be carried out in two ways: either without awareness that the object of reproductive image had been perceived previously, or with that awareness. In the second instance, we speak of remembering something, whereas the first case can be described as “reproducing” in the narrow sense of the word. The first case can also be called “unconscious reproduction” and the second, “conscious reproduction.” The so-called localizing of memories, that is, the awareness of when the reproduced object was given to us in perceptive image, is tied up with conscious reproduction.

1.2. In order to research farther and closer conditions of reproducing images, one has to begin with posing the question of what, in general, the subject of reproductive images can be. The question concerns both the capacity of memory, that is, the proportion of the number of reproductive images to corresponding perceptive ones (if we take into consideration other notions beside the number, that is, also the kinds of reproductive and perceptive images, we may speak of multilateralism and unilateralism of memory), and its stability, that is, the time in which the perceptive image can still be reproduced in memory. The issue is whether we can think of everything we perceived and whether we can always recall what we had perceived, even after a long period of time passed.

2. On Objects Possible to Reproduce from Memory

2.1. When attempting to realize whether there are objects which can be given in perceptive images but cannot be reproduced, we come across the question of whether emotions belong to this group. After all, many psychologists speak of the memory of emotions and do not doubt the possibility of reproducing emotions in memory. Still, they express it in such a way that we are led to believe they regard as a case of reproduction of emotions any fact where an emotion, induced previously by a perceived object, comes back when we reproduce the object in our memory. Still, it is clear that in this case we do not in fact reproduce the emotion in our memory but rather we experience it again, whereas we reproduce the object itself, without seeing or hearing it. Here it is not reproduced color or sound etc. that would be an analogy of emotions REPRODUCED in this sense, but the data on primary images in the form of hallucinations. (The objection that we are subject to illusion in hallucinations as these colors or sounds are not present at a given moment, while the emotion thusly REPRODUCED is there, concerns an issue which departs from the topic of psychological properties of primary images; moreover, emotions REPRODUCED in the mentioned way are fully analogous also in this respect to primary images of a hallucinatory nature, [which consist in the fact that] for instance, an unpleasant emotion experienced at the thought of a past event lacks an equally OBJECTIVE foundation present in the hallucination of a color or a sound.) However, at this point we are concerned with the question of whether we can reproduce emotions in memory without experiencing it and, analogously, how we can reproduce colors, sounds etc., in memory without perceiving them. There is no doubt that we can in fact present emotions in an abstract or symbolic manner; the doubts concern the question of whether we can present it concretely, that is, to conceive of previously experienced emotions. The current state of research does not allow for a decisive response to that question. The case is similar with the question of whether we can concretely reproduce pain in our memory.

2.2. As far as physical objects are concerned (colors, sounds, smells, tastes, temperatures etc.), not everyone has the ability to concretely reproduce all kinds of these objects. Some people have difficulty reproducing colors, but easily reproduce sounds, for some it is the other way around. Some cannot concretely recreate smells or tastes. There are great individual differences in these respects.

2.3. This circumstance gives rise to the theory of types of thinking, also called "types of images" or "types of reproducing" (Charcot). Three main

groups have been established: visual, auditory and kinesthetic, according to the dominance and intensity of reproductive images for different individuals in the range of objects seen, heard [or] felt with muscle contractions. Although many aspects of this theory still need more precise formulations and more thorough research, it has already proven its great fertility and usefulness in many cases.

3. On the Durability of Memory

3.1. Based on the fact that every man remembers and is able reproduce in his memory at least some perceived objects, we may pose a question of whether this ability to reproduce, once acquired, remains forever or deteriorates in time. The phenomenon of the deterioration of the ability to reproduce is called “forgetting” and it can be concluded on the basis of common experience that the ability to reproduce indeed deteriorates in time. However, a line must be drawn between two kinds of forgetting; we say that we forgot something both when we are unable to reproduce something at a given moment where the reproduction occurs later, thus proving the existence of the ability to reproduce itself when direct conditions for reproducing were lacking; as well as when the reproducing a perceived object never occurs at all and the reason for it might be either loss of memory (indirect conditions for reproducing) or certain circumstances under which the direct conditions for reproducing never occurred. According to the data above, we distinguish between: (I) relative or limited forgetting, and (II) absolute forgetting, which can be constitutional (loss of memory) or functional (lack of direct conditions for reproducing). The question of whether absolute constitutional forgetting exists can only be resolved hypothetically and has to be based on the analysis of typical cases of forgetting (amnesia) provided by the pathology of memory loss.

3.2. Amnesia can be total or partial. Total amnesia can be temporal, phasal, progressive and innate. Out of all kinds of amnesia, only the progressive kind allows us to assume that absolute constitutional forgetting may exist; all other cases of total amnesia indicate either relative or absolute functional forgetting. In the cases of partial amnesia, only those which are initial symptoms of total progressive amnesia let us infer the existence of absolute, constitutional forgetting. However, cases of partial amnesia are also crucial for the psychology of memory for other reasons, as they very clearly confirm the so-called law of progression or reversion (Ribot’s) amnesia, according to which images acquired latest are forgotten first (as well as detailed images being forgotten before general ones), and images

acquired the most recently are forgotten as last; naturally, *ceteris paribus*. Moreover, cases of aphasia often treated together with partial amnesia indicate the possibility of broadening the notion of memory so that it encompasses also the ability to reproduce mechanical movements. We speak of organic memory, or perhaps more precisely: muscle memory, whose deterioration explains the symptoms of aphasia, whereas the so-called «blindness (deafness) to words», as a special case of mind blindness (deafness) belongs as a symptom to the scope of memory disorders in the narrower (psychological) meaning of the term.

3.3. Hypermnnesia is the opposite of amnesia and consists in unusual stimulation and intensification of the ability to reproduce, mostly thanks to unusual direct conditions, that is, those closer to reproduction. As cases of hypermnnesia demonstrate, certain images are sometimes reproduced which the person reproducing would never think to have retained in his memory and been able to reproduce. Therefore it is crucial to exercise great caution in acknowledging the existence of absolute constitutional forgetting, although those who tend to claim it does not exist may go too far as well. After all, durability of memory is much greater than we tend to assume based on common experience; the ability to reproduce in one's memory previously conceived objects is usually retained throughout one's life, not including relatively rare cases of a pathological nature, although this ability is manifested only toward some part of previously perceived objects.

4. On Indirect, or Further, Conditions of Reproducing (on the Essence of Memory)

4.1. A person who «remembers» an object, that is, is able to reproduce it and remember it, differs in a certain respect from a person who does not remember this object, namely: in having the «memory» of that object. Thus, the word «memory» not only signifies the fact that someone may reproduce certain images in certain conditions, but it also signifies real factors determining the possibility of this reproduction. Here the question arises of what these real factors are, that is, what memory is.

4.2. Two answers to this question turned up in philosophy and psychology. One of them, called «the theory of sameness» (*scil.* of perceptive and reproductive images), professed by Plato, as well as by Bouillier and Herbart in contemporary times, claims that perceptive images do not cease to exist the moment the perception ends, but rather they continue in an unconscious state (under the threshold of consciousness) until certain conditions

(the so-called direct or indirect conditions of reproduction) bring them up again. Thus, reproduction or remembering those long hidden, dormant images consists in perceiving them again. Memory is interpreted as a kind of a reservoir, according to a commonly used expression. Yet, this view, albeit pictorial, does not meet the requirements of scientific research. First of all, it regards images as things or entities, forgetting that an image is an action, a function, a course. Moreover, it does not take into account the problems inherent to the notion of unconscious images or the fact that reproductive images differ from perceptive ones both in the extent of vividness and in different temporal features used to present the represented objects; these differences themselves EXCLUDE the identity of reproductive and perceptive images. We CAN PROBABLY only regard as identical an object of reproductive images and a perceptive IMAGE BELONGING to it, and this identity of the object gave rise to, among other things, a FALLACIOUS THEORY of the identity of images.

4.3. Nowadays almost all psychologists follow the so-called dispositional theory of memory and regard memory as a special case of practice. Practice is what we call a disposition, an ability to perform an action, acquired or enhanced through performing that given action. It is not only any action but also any phenomenon in general which creates or enhances a preexisting disposition toward recurrence of the same or similar phenomenon (the law of practice). Such acquired or enhanced disposition is manifested in the fact that a repeated occurrence of the phenomenon is performed more easily. This greater ease consists either in the fact that a recurrence of the phenomenon does not require as many or as complicated conditions as the original occurrence, or in the fact that the phenomenon occurs in a more prominent fashion than originally, under unchanged conditions. Deliberate repetition of the phenomenon (action) aimed at creating or improving disposition is called "training." (Excessive repetition of an occurrence leads to dulling of the disposition, whereas infrequent repetition leads to the deterioration of the disposition.) All functions and dispositions of organisms, both physiological and psychical, as well as the function of imagining, are governed by the law of practice.

4.4. If memory is defined as a special case of practice, then we may state that any perceptive image creates or enhances the disposition for an image similar to primary image to occur; the former is called "reproductive image." Greater ease with which reproductive image occurs, as compared to primary image, consists mainly in that reproductive image occurs despite the lack of external conditions (incentives) necessary for primary image to appear. On the other hand, if we include the notion of memory in the concept of practice, we gain the possibility to apply to it all laws which

the emergence of practice is subject to. Moreover, based on the close relationship between psychical phenomena and processes or courses occurring in the cerebral cortex, we may reduce memory to physiological practice, that is, to dispositions created in nerve cells and groups of these cells, that is, nerve centers, and in nerve fibers which connect the cells and the centers. Thus, it may be stated that the ability to reproduce images consists in the fact that nerve centers, stimulated by an external incentive, obtain practice in this action, and thus, a disposition toward a similar action when the external incentive ceases to provide stimulation. This disposition of cells and fibers can be explained by changes in the structure of molecules, or changes in chemical composition and other similar effects induced by the primary and subsequent work of physiological processes. According to this hypothesis, these changes would constitute those residual traces of primary images remaining in the brain. If we accept this hypothesis, we will be able to explain both individual variations in memory capacity and all symptoms of amnesia and hypermnesia; the hypothesis will also clarify the fact that what is usually perceived as a homogenous memory unit is in fact composed of a vast number of special memories, that is, dispositions toward reproducing particular images and particular groups of images.

4.5. Expanding the formulated laws of practice to encompass groups and complexes of images and phenomena in general, as completely separate phenomena never occurring in actual mental life, we may state the following:

If a given complex of phenomena occurs, a disposition for a complex consisting of such phenomena to occur again emerges or increases.

Thus, there emerges, or is enhanced, the disposition for any phenomenon within the complex to occur again, as well as the disposition for the complex as a whole to occur again, [and] therefore, the disposition for the phenomena to subsequently occur together, somehow in solidarity with each other. This is why other phenomena from within the complex occur whenever one of the phenomena from the complex is subsequently induced. For instance, if a person had a whole group of perceptive images induced by adequate stimuli, it is sufficient for one of these perceptive images to subsequently occur when induced by adequate stimuli in order for other images from this group to occur in the form of reproductive images, although the stimuli which induced these images in the perceptive form no longer exist. The physiological theory of practice and memory explains it as follows. If stimuli α , β , γ influence centers a , b , c , physiological processes A , B , C occur in these centers, accompanied by images X , Y , Z . The courses taking place in centers a , b , c create or enhance the disposition of these centers toward the courses of these processes. However, these

centers are connected to each other with nerve fibers which conduct the stimulation of every center to centers connected to it. Thus, center *a* is not only stimulated with the stimulus α , but is also stimulated by the spreading stimulus from centers *b* and *c* through the fibers which connect *a* to *b* and *c*. The same happens with center *b* with respect to centers *a* and *c*, as well as with center *c* with respect to centers *a* and *b*. In turn, nerve fibers transmit the stimulus between centers and also acquire a disposition toward transmitting a stimulus again. Thus for instance, if, in future, only stimulus β works on center *b*, inducing process *B* in it, accompanied by image *Y*, the stimulus of center *b* is carried along nerve fibers to centers *a* and *c*, inducing in them physiological processes *A* and *C*, accompanied by images *X* and *Z*, although it occurs in the absence of stimuli α and γ which had induced processes *A* and *C*. Courses *A* and *C*, accompanied by images *X* and *Z* occur now thanks to practice, disposition acquired by centers *a* and *c* for these courses and thanks to practice, disposition acquired by nerve fibers to transmit stimuli. This act of acquiring a disposition toward transmitting stimuli by nerve fibers is called “paving associative paths” by physiologists. Thus, a physiological hypothesis is used to explain the so-called association of images and psychical phenomena in general.

5. On the Association of Images

5.1. The emergence of dispositions discussed in the previous chapter cannot be examined directly as dispositions are not available for observation. We assume them hypothetically in order to explain certain phenomena which are called “current correlates” due to their determining dispositions. Therefore, also the emergence of memory (remembering something) can be examined only on the basis of its current correlates, that is, on the basis of the phenomena of reproducing. These phenomena of reproducing are subject to a certain regularity, as the emergence of a certain reproductive image in one’s mind is conditioned by the image which is already present in one’s mind in a given moment. Every image already present in one’s mind leads to and reproduces another one in one’s mind. There is a relationship of association between these two images. Thus, two images are associated when such a relationship emerges between them that one of them, occurring in the mind in the future, will suggest the other. (It is inaccurate to also-call this suggesting, reproduction of one representation by another “an association.”) The relationship of association may also occur among more than two images, as well as between something other than images, for instance, between presentations in general, between presentations and

convictions, between presentations and emotions, etc. So far, there has been no research into the degree to which association of presentations, and especially images, constitutes the base for the association of other psychological phenomena and functions, as psychology has mostly dealt with the association of images. Plato was already familiar with the laws governing it and Aristotle was the first to formulate them by compiling the conditions under which a image present in one's mind suggests (reproduces) another image. Specifically, he stated the following three conditions: similarity, contrast and neighborhood or proximity, which may be participation in one space or sequence in time. Thus, whenever a certain image in one's mind suggests another, it occurs based on one of the relationships mentioned above.

5.2. With time, the four laws of association derived by Aristotle faced attempts to reduce their number. It was first achieved with association based on contrast, which was reduced to one of the other laws. Then the law of association of images based on coexistence in the same space and sequence in time was reduced to a new law of tangency. This law states that a relationship of association is created between psychical functions, and thus, also between images, if those functions or images occur in the mind together, that is, simultaneously or one immediately after the other. This law of association of images based on their tangency, that is, contact with each other, is presented as an application of the law of sameness of co-practice. The law of tangency differs from the former law of proximity (coexistence in space and sequence in time) in that it concerns the relationship between images themselves, whereas the law of proximity concerned coexistence in space or sequence in time of objects of images, and as such, the older law assumed a so-called internal association, that is, a dependence on objects and content of images, whereas the law of tangency introduced a so-called external association, that is, an association consisting in a kind of an encounter of images in the mind, regardless of the object and content of images.

5.3. Thus, instead of the former four laws of the association of images only two were introduced: association based on similarity (internal association) and association based on tangency (external association). However, many psychologists go even further in cutting the laws of association and reduce association based on similarity to association based on tangency. Yet, a certain difficulty emerges here. Association based on tangency presupposes connecting images in the mind, as a result of which at least one of these images occurring in the mind suggests the other one. It seems this cannot be applied to cases where an image which suggests a reproductive image occurs in the mind for the first time; for instance, when a portrait

seen for the first time reproduces an image of a familiar person, or when a language heard for the first time reminds us of our mother language. After all, the image of a portrait which occurs for the first time cannot have had a connection with the image of the familiar person. Therefore, there are still psychologists who maintain the law of association based on tangency.

Yet, neither similarity *per se* nor similarity observed between two objects can be the foundation for associating images of these objects. In the first case, all objects similar to each other would have to be associated; in the second case, image *B*, suggested by image *A* as a result of similarity observed between those two objects, would have to have been in the mind before for us to observe the similarity between them at all. Therefore, whatever is supposed to be the consequence of association based on similarity would simultaneously be the condition for association based on similarity. The case is no different when someone states it is not the issue of similarity between objects but rather of the similarity between images. After all, it is not clear what should be the similarity between image *A* which is supposed to suggest image *B* and the mentioned image *B* as long as image *B* is not yet present. In this case, we could only determine that these images are similar on the condition that we imagine the non-existent image *B* which our conscious mind has no information on yet. Anyone claiming that the issue here is also similarity observed between image *A* and *B* would find himself in an analogous vicious circle, as was in the case of attempting to explain the case through similarity observed between objects.

Therefore, there is no way for similarity to be the foundation for association of images, and so, cases of associating based on similarity can also be reduced to association based on tangency in the following way. Image *A*, comprised of elements *mnop*, suggests an older image *B* of a similar object because the older image *B* of a similar objects contains in part the same elements as image *A*, comprising of elements *mnr*s, for instance. Therefore, elements *mn* are associated with elements *rs*, and whenever they occur in one's mind as elements of image *A*, they also suggest elements *rs*, as a result of which one has the whole image *B* in his mind. In turn, elements *rs* are associated with elements *mn* based on tangency. Admittedly, this explanation faces the charges that similarity of two objects, or two images, does not always consist in the equality of parts of their elements, as it is maintained in the explanation. Yet, even if this is indeed the case, there is no harm in assuming that there are some common elements in neural processes accompanying images of similar objects which cannot be divided into two equal parts, the neural processes being very complex in their nature. This way, cases which are seemingly exceptions from association based on tangency can be reduced to this form of association.

5.4. Nevertheless, similarity, which is never the base for the association of images, does play an important role in reproducing images associated based on tangency. Strictly speaking, one cannot say that one of the associated images leads to the other when it reoccurs in our mind. This is because a past image never reoccurs, nor does an image equivalent to it occur, only one that is more or less similar to it. As a result, the law of association, in its broadest and most exact form, must be formulated as follows:

If a number of psychical functions (e.g. images) are connected in the mind, a disposition emerges as a result of which functions similar to other functions occur when a function similar to one of these functions occurs.

Naturally, the issue is not similarity between associated images, as is assumed by defenders of a separate law of association of images based on similarity, but rather, it is about similarity between an image provided at present and an image provided previously as well as between an image suggested or reproduced by the present data and an images which occurred in the mind simultaneously with the previously provided image.

6. On Exactness or the Force of Association

6.1. The question of why only some remembered images from the group of all the remembered ones are reproduced at a given moment is addressed by the law of association: only those images are reproduced at a given moment that are associated with other images which occur in the mind at this moment. One can and should ask further, though, why out of all images associated with images present at a given moment only some are reproduced. The issue of which images associated with an image present in the mind at a given moment are suggested depends most of all on the exactness or force of association which exists between the image present at a given moment and image which previously encountered it in the mind. This force or exactness can be inferred indirectly from various traits which characterize reproduction.

The force of association between two images is deemed the stronger the more durable the association proves to be, that is, the later the first association suggests the second, counting from the moment the association emerged. The force of association is also the stronger the faster and more inevitably one image suggests the other. These matters are known from everyday experience; as we tend to say: we remember a thing «better» when we remember it longer, and the more accurate the memory, the faster we will remember the thing. Experimental psychologists have devoted 25 years of work to a more precise quantitative definition of the force

or accuracy of association manifested in the above mentioned properties. Due to Ebbinghaus's contribution, who was then followed by other psychologists with their improvements, methods useful for such research were created.

All of these methods of research can be reduced to two typical ones: the so-called method of saving (*Ersparnismethode*) and the method of apt reminders or reproductions (*Treffermethode*). The substance of these experiments are series of syllables without meaning, which makes these images new to an individual and not associated yet. The method of saving consists in the fact that when learning such a series by heart, by reading or listening to it [and] so repeating it the required number of times, in time, when we want to learn it again, we need a smaller number of repetitions. The number of saved repetitions is indicative of the force of the association created between the series of syllables through learning them initially. As for the method of apt reminders, we do not repeat the row until we remember it completely, but rather we repeat it a certain number of times; after some time has passed, we check how many syllables from the series suggests other syllables from this series accurately and aptly. If we have means to assess the force of association quantitatively in this method, we are able to research which circumstances influence the force of association and to what degree.

6.2. One such circumstance is the vivacity of primary images between which the association is created. For instance, stressed syllables as opposed to unstressed ones (Müller-Schumann), numerals printed in color among ones in black, draw powerful associations. Common experience demonstrates that things which draw attention to themselves tend to be remembered better than things which do not draw attention to themselves.

6.3. Moreover, the force of the association of images is influenced by the frequency with which they are tangent I mind and thus, the frequency with which they repeat (*repetitio mater studiorum*). Experimental research shows that the force of association grows somewhat more slowly than the frequency of repetitions which create and enhance the associations.

6.4. Apart from the number of repetitions, [and] therefore, the frequency with which images are tangent in the mind, another strong influence on the force of association is distribution of these repetitions in time, as the repetitions may either be condensed (cumulated) or scattered (spaced). For instance, we may repeat a series of syllables 30 times in a row or repeat it consecutively in sets of 10. The results of research presented by Jost in 1897 demonstrate that scattered repetitions make associations stronger than condensed repetitions do. Jost also wondered about the influence of

the method of distribution, that is the degree of scattering, on the force of association, and found out that the force of association grows together with the degree of scattering. He put the results of his research as well as those of Ebbinghaus's experiments into the following two laws:

- I. If one of two associations occurred earlier and the other – later, repetition is worth more for the second one.
- II. If one of two associations occurred earlier and the other – later, the force of association of the earlier one decreases less with time.

The state of affairs described in these laws corresponds exactly to Ribot's law of regression which Ms. Steffens justified as an experiment (1900), at the same time supplementing Jost's laws with a new law, which states that out of two associations which are equally distant in time, the stronger one loses its force faster than the weaker one.

6.5. The force of association also depends on the number of associated images which had occurred in the mind simultaneously. For instance, an association occurring between images *a*, *b*, *c* and *x* may be too weak for image *x* to occur as a result of the reoccurrence of image *a*, or image *b*, or image *c* but image *x* may occur as a result of simultaneous occurrence of images *a*, *b* and *c*, which cooperate in a way in order to reproduce image *x* by mutual enhancement of the force of association of each of them with representation *x*. Everyday life as well as experimental research provide plenty of examples. Cases of the so-called motor aphasia also confirm the hypothesis [that] the force of association depends on the number of images associated with each other, where motor images play a major role. Rhythm (and rhyme) is especially worthy of attention as a factor which enhances the force of association.

6.6. Another factor which influences the force of association is the arrangement of images being tangent in the mind, their configuration as it were. In a series of images, those placed at the beginning and at the end of the series share a stronger association than those in the middle of the series. Research conducted in this field demonstrates that this is not only due to side factors connected with the placement of images (for instance, due to a fresher impression of the first image or the lack of images interfering after the last images). The position occupied by the images in the series also plays a decisive role in their force of association.

There is an important issue connected to the position in a series occupied by associated images, namely: whether consecutive images are associated in general, or if only simultaneous images are, and another question: whether only images immediately following each other are associated or if images which do not immediately follow each other, which are separated

by other images, are associated as well. As for the first question, Münsterberg claims that all associations of consecutive images should be reduced to associations of either simultaneous images, at least during some period of their duration, or images with accompanying movements (of organs of speech etc.). As for the second question, experience drawn from daily life as well as experiments conducted in order to solve this question demonstrate that also images which do not immediately follow one another are associated, and the association is the weaker the more «distant» in time the images are, that is, the more other images stand between them.

6.7. The influence exerted by the position of images on the force of their association is also connected with the influence of the direction in which the association is made on the force of association. If two images are associated, e.g. *X* and *Y*, based on the fact that image *Y* followed image *X*, then it is easier for image *X* to suggest to us image *Y* than the other way round. Since the ease with which an association is reproduced can be *ceteris paribus* regarded as indicative of the force of association, then it may be stated that the association between *X* and *Y* is stronger in the direction from *X* to *Y* than in the opposite direction. Some scholars compare this sort of common experience with pathological cases provided by the so-called optic or visual aphasia and suspect that physiologically, separate associative paths and separate nerve fibers correspond to each direction of association. Thus they wish to find an explanation for the difficulty or impossibility of reproducing a series of images in the opposite direction to that in which the association had been created between the elements of the series. However, Claparède provides another, and much simpler, explanation. He notes that reversing the series of images does not only lead to switching the images but also to breaking the series of elementary processes whose groups contribute to certain images which are part of the series.

6.8. The force of association of various images depends also on which sense the associated images originate from. A number of problems rise here, for instance, whether the fact that two images belong to the scope of the same sense provides more force to their association than if they belonged to different senses. Other problems are: the influence of the kind of sense on the force of association, the relationship between the kind of sense and the direction of association due to the force of association, etc. Research in these areas is greatly impeded as, not to mention other circumstances, the dominant role of visual images and constant suggestions of images concerning expressions of speech preclude conducting the experiment with unrestricted combinations of conditions.

6.9. Even more problems pile up against experimental research of the influence of the general condition of the organism at the moment of emergence of association on the force of association of images. This force undoubtedly depends on whether the organism is rested or tired, whether it is digesting or fasting, what its diet is. Another factor influencing the force of association is definitely the time of day when the associations occur, as well as a whole range of other circumstances which may sometimes escape our attention. There is also strong argument in favor of the idea that the force of association is *ceteris paribus* different for young and old people, as well as for men and women, but the impossibility of complete isolation of all relevant circumstances stands in the way of researching these issues thoroughly.

6.10. The influence of practice on the force of association has not been researched well enough but it is unquestionable. When one gains practice in reproducing certain images, one automatically gains practice in reproducing similar images, so that images which are similar to ones which have already been associated are associated more strongly than completely new images. Important practical tips result from this for educating memory, but so far, there is no accurate data as to the boundaries and degree of this so-called co-practice.

6.11. Finally, the emotional character of images greatly affects the force of association, due to which certain images become absorbing and attract attention, as opposed to other images which are neutral. Greater force of association of non-neutral images can be explained partly with greater intensity of physiological processes accompanying such images, and partly with the fact that non-neutral images create relationships with a greater number of other images than neutral images. The strong emotional character of certain images sometimes generates much stronger associations than even the most frequently repeated encounters of them in the mind (repeating). This is the root of the so-called preferential associations, or many prejudices haunting our minds, etc.

6.12. The discussed factors which influence the force of association either reinforce each other when they operate together or they interfere with each other; therefore, the force with which two images are associated is a resultant of a number of factors. Yet, although it is impossible to determine precisely the amount of influence exerted by each of the factors, they are decisive in which images are recreated at a given moment.

6.13. Having stated that generally (and a possible exception will be discussed further on) a given reproductive image is in our mind because it was suggested by an image immediately preceding it with which it is associated,

another question can be posed: where did the previous image, suggested reproductively, come from? There are two possible solutions. Either the suggested image was suggested based on association, or it comes from another source. This other source could be a sensory stimulus which induces a perceptive image which suggests, based on the association, some reproductive image, or a physiological process, which does not in itself induce a perceptive image but, by acting on cortical centers, stimulates them to such action which is accompanied by an image; in turn, this image leads to a reproductive image associated with it. (This only concerns the so-called passive, or mechanical, thinking; as for active thinking, occurring under the influence of intentional attention and will aimed at a specific target, there are also other factors to consider.)

6.14. Some psychologists claim that reproductive images may emerge in our minds irrespectively of their association with other images present in the mind at a given moment, and call these images “free” (*representations libres, frei steigende Vorstellungen*). They justify this statement with the fact that we cannot always provide images with which the occurring reproductive images would be associated; moreover, sometimes certain persistent reproductive images keep occurring even though they are not connected with the images present in the mind at a given moment. However, thus far psychologists’ opinions on these free images are divided, and even those who defend them admit that usually it is the laws of associations that govern the mechanism of reproductive images.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

THE THEORY OF JUDGMENTS*

Introductory Notes

Research on various problems in the field of logic constitutes a sizeable part of philosophical work from the last fifty years or so. Independent and extensive publications of handbooks of logic and numerous monographs, which have been and still are printed in relatively large quantities, especially in England and Germany, testify to that fact. As a result of such great interest in logic on the part of scholars, there has been a kind of a revision of almost all theorems specific to the field, which were part of a centuries-long tradition, sanctioned by Kant's famous dictum on the invariability of Aristotelian logic. Nowadays no one believes in this invariability, and those who proclaimed it forgot that also mathematics, which is based on a priori data in the same degree as logic, has always developed and is still developing.

Therefore, almost all traditional theorems in logic have undergone critical analysis. Based on this analysis, some of them faced more or less fundamental changes – suffice it to note how the theory of induction has developed – whereas in some cases of theorems, agreement has not yet been reached, as in the case of the theory of judgments. There is still a very animated fight on this issue. After all, a judgment is in some measure the central point of any mental activities which logic deals with, and the

* The lectures were delivered at the Lvov University in 1902-1903. The fragment, included here, was prepared for print by Jacek Jadacki and published as "Teoria sądów" in *Filozofia Nauki* IV (1996), No. 4, pp. 155-173 [B&J].

formulation of numerous other logical theorems depends on how the study of judgments will ultimately be formulated.

It may therefore seem all the more peculiar that one of the theorems of former logic, very closely connected to the study of judgments, has not been revised yet. I refer to the traditional view of fundamental parts discernible in any judgment regarded as a whole. Admittedly, we are in possession of dissertations on one detail of this issue, discussing the question of whether a subject and a predicate have to be distinguished in each judgment. However, these dissertations concern the section of judgments which I do not mean to call “fundamental” in the present dissertation, although they have long been considered as such: «the form» and «the matter» of judgments. Whether each judgment consists of a subject and a predicate is a question which only partly concerns the judgment, namely: the one usually called «the matter»; this question may be, and has been, treated as independent from the one I selected as the subject of the present paper, which can be formulated in the following manner. Is a statement valid which distinguishes form and matter in judgments as fundamental parts? If not, how can it be changed?

In order to prevent any misunderstandings as to the aim of the present dissertation, it is necessary to explicate which meaning of “part” I am using and what “a fundamental part” means. We do not always speak of parts with the same meaning, as there are various kinds of parts. The basis for division of parts into various kinds is the relationship which occurs between separate parts of a whole with respect to their mutual separateness. On this basis, [three types of parts] have to be distinguished: [physical parts, metaphysical parts and logical parts.]

I. Physical parts [...] [are] parts which can exist not solely as parts of a whole consisting of them but also as separate parts. We say of physical parts that a whole can be divided into them. Parts which the human body may be divided into can serve here as an example: the head, the torso and the members are physical parts of the human body. Parts which collective wholes are comprised of, for instance the army, are also physical parts. A shared feature of physical parts is their mutual separateness.

II. Metaphysical parts (also called logical by some) [...] [are] parts which can only exist within the whole they belong to but cannot exist without the whole. We do not speak of metaphysical parts that a whole can be divided into them, but rather, that they can be discerned within the whole. Thus, shape and color are metaphysical parts of corporeal objects. We distinguish any object’s color from its shape and vice versa; color and shape exist only as parts of the thing and do not exist in themselves; they are inseparable from each other and from the whole.

III. Apart from mutually separable and mutually inseparable parts, there are also one-sidedly separable parts. Some call these parts “logical.” When comparing the notion of color with the notion of blue, we note that the notion of color is included in the notion of blue as its part, whereas there is no notion of blue as a part in the notion of color. The notion of color cannot be separated from the notion of blue but the notion of blue can be separated from the notion of color, that is, thinking of blue, we necessarily think of color, since blue is a color; however, thinking of color, we do not necessarily think of blue. Thus, the notion of color is called “a logical part” or “one-sidedly separable from the notion of blue.”¹

We shall not limit our research of judgments to any of the mentioned kinds of parts, but instead, we shall attempt to demonstrate fundamental parts of judgments regardless of whether they are logical, metaphysical or physical [parts]. Therefore, we shall take into consideration not only those elements which already exist in our minds before they are used to create judgments and are unprocessed material which requires processing and framing in order to create a judgment. On the contrary, we shall focus also on those parts of a judgment which are inseparable from the judgment, which exist and perish together with it; only when we manage to enumerate all these fundamental parts will we pose the question of their interrelationships, which will successfully end the classification of parts according to the above mentioned kinds.

Yet, we shall discuss only the fundamental ones instead of all parts of which judgments are comprised. I call “fundamental parts” all those parts which we obtain through dividing the whole, as opposed to other parts which emerge from dividing parts of the whole. Thus, fundamental parts of the human body are: the head, the torso, hands and legs. Jaws, fingers, toes etc., are not fundamental parts, as they are parts of parts, namely: of the head, hands and legs.

Therefore, the question of whether there is a subject, a copula and a predicate in every sentence, or whether there are also so-called subjectless judgments, does not fall within the scope of this dissertation because, as will be demonstrated in the course of the argument, a subject, a copula and a predicate are parts of a certain part of a judgment instead of judgment as a whole. I also exclude from this dissertation the question of whether judgments, as mental phenomena, should be ascribed certain

¹ The first who distinguished various kinds of parts was Aristotle (see *Metaphysica* A, 25; 1023 b, 12-25). Medieval philosophers put Aristotle’s notions into a more precise form which is now present in the study of kinds of parts in handbooks of logic. Cf. [Stöckl 1868], p. 295, or [Höfler 1890], §15.

power (intensity) ascribed to manifestations of will and to emotions. If judgments possess power, then it is undoubtedly a (metaphysical) part of judgments; yet, it is not a fundamental part, as it is not a part of a judgment as a whole but only of one of its parts.

Having made these introductory observations, let me proceed to the point.

1. The Standpoint of the Theory of Judgments on Logic

What is logic? There are various opinions on this issue. Still, although definitions of logic presented in handbooks of this branch of philosophy differ greatly from each other, they have a shared element. After all, there is no doubt that the meaning of logic is tied more or less strictly to the claim that logic is concerned with analyzing the conditions under which the human mind reaches true cognition. Differentiating between truth and falsity is a kind of a background against which the whole construct of logic is developed; no one would call "logic" a study which had nothing to do with this distinction.

If then the notions of truth and falsity play a decisive role in any system of logic, it is obvious that the mental activities to which we ascribe the notions of truth and falsity are a kind of an axis around which all research in the field of logic revolves. Those activities are judgments. The standpoint someone assumes toward certain logical debates depends on their opinion of judgments. Since researchers in the field of logic do not agree AS FAR JUDGMENTS ARE CONCERNED, then there must also be a great difference of opinions in all the other fields of the science.

Naturally, this is indeed the case. Among a great number of handbooks and other works exhausting the topic of logic, which have recently emerged, especially in England and Germany, it is hard to find at least two which would determine the activity of judging in the same manner. This is the source of general confusion, also in the area of the theories of inference, which constitute one of the broadest aspects of contemporary logic, unless they are inductive inference. Appalling chaos is a feature of contemporary research into logic, since everyone begins with a different premise and ends up with different results.

This state of affairs is not as noticeable in the practice of thinking and competent research. This is because theorists' views of mental activities do not influence the activities themselves. We may have highly contradictory opinions in the subject of the substance of judgments but we all always judge in the same way. At a time when difference of opinion on certain notions in logic has never been greater, this so-called rigorous research has

made unprecedented progress. Yet, even this research is based, however unwittingly, on the same principles of logic which constitute the subject of great controversy. A similar phenomenon is common in other branches of human knowledge. Since the times of Mill in England and Riemann in Germany there has been animated discussion of the origin of axioms which mathematics is based on. Some believe them to be a priori statements while others seek generalizations based on data derived from experience. However, this fundamental difference of opinions has not managed to stop the progress made both by mathematics itself and sciences which make use of it.

On the one hand, it would be inappropriate to fall into skepticism or agnosticism as a result of the disagreement about fundamental issues in logic. On the other hand, one cannot be indifferent to such a state of affairs. Philosophers are often criticized for being unable to reach an agreement on the discussed problems, as well as for the fact that philosophy presents a lamentable picture of science in which there is no certain set of claims accepted by everyone which could constitute the groundwork for further research and further progress. This charge becomes the most serious when directed at logic, which is not only supposed to discuss fundamentals of philosophical science, but also those which all other sciences are based on.

Admittedly, one cannot deny that the number of commonly accepted statements in philosophy is smaller than in any other field of science. Still, it is not true that there is no consistency between philosophers in this field. It is easy to recognize for anyone who deals with philosophy that the difference of opinions is only apparent and consists in differences in formulation of ideas. After all, nowadays we lack formal education in the field of philosophical sciences which dealing with Aristotle's philosophy and medieval philosophy used to provide.

2. On the Method of Conduct in Research of Judgments

Still, it is certain that the difference of opinion as to the question discussed in the present dissertation is only apparent. Philosophers do not only have different opinions on what judgments are but they also have different thoughts on the subject. There is no lack of various theories and therefore, if one would like to learn and determine what judgments are, he may begin to doubt the possibility of resolving this question.

As it seems to me, the reason for this state of affairs is the issue that mental facts were not accounted for accurately. When I look through contemporary handbooks of logic, I have the impression that research on judgments has not been done appropriately. Certain chapters in works by

Sigwart, Erdmann, Drobisch, Mill and many others present a ready classification of judgments based on a claim they had assumed. This claim tends to be explicated at the beginning of the chapter concerning judgments, which is followed by an analysis of the psychological meaning of particular kinds of judgments. Upon reading these analyses, one cannot help thinking that particular authors only interpret judgments in the light of their own theory, and that this theory, based only on research of several judgments, influences his opinion on the rest of judgments, which have not been adequately addressed in the construction of this claim. Yet, a theory of judgments may emerge from induction conducted on the basis of any kind of judgment, since only then does it naturally encompass all judgments and is an expression of their essence.

When attempting to determine judgments, one has to analyze them impartially, and because any classification of judgments based on their logical properties already contains partial solutions to the problem, one has to research judgments without attempting to classify them. One needs to compile all kinds of judgments, examine each of them separately and conduct psychological analysis. Having done that, one will be able to compare the results of these analyses which are common for all individual judgments. Then, one should base his theory of judgments on these common features. This is the same direction as the one assumed in natural sciences in order to create a theory which would encompass all individual phenomena belonging to one group. Here, the starting point is a precise description of all the phenomena one wishes to examine; common features of these phenomena will later serve as the basis for the theory. Having put forward a theory, naturalists strive to test it by using it to explain other phenomena than those which had been the basis for the theory, which do not however belong to the same kind of phenomena. If it appears that at least one of these phenomena cannot be subordinated to the supposed theory, the theory must be corrected or abandoned; yet, one must never bend the facts or forcibly subsume them under the theory. The mentioned method of induction followed by verifying the theory through deduction should be assumed when dealing with judgments.

3. Continuation. Inner Experience

It might surprise the reader that I speak of the theory of judgments in the same manner that is used when speaking of physical theories etc., whereas there are considerable differences between these theories and explanation of mental phenomena. After all, in psychology one does not have to pursue hypotheses and theories through more or less complex reasoning in order

to explain the essence of phenomena, but rather, one is free to pursue inner observation, which is a simpler and seemingly more certain way. Why invent hypotheses and theories about the essence of judgments, when inner observation will clearly indicate what judgment is if one pays attention to this mental activity?

The first and foremost response to this objection should be that inner observation does not exist. The condition for any observation is paying attention to the phenomenon one wishes to observe. Yet, it is obvious that paying attention to one's own emotions of sadness or joy and the course of images which occurs in one's mind, one eliminates these emotions and these images from the mind. One cannot at the same time be ecstatic and pay attention to one's ecstasy. What is true for ecstasy also concerns all other mental states and activities.

However, there is a certain possibility of learning about mental phenomena, which does not however consist in observation, but only in internal perception. When one feels resentment toward the person standing next to him, he knows about it and can feel the resentment. One cannot observe the resentment, since the moment one directs his attention toward the emotion engulfing him, the feeling ceases to exist in him. Still, one can perceive this emotion, since being aware of an emotion is no different from perceiving it. This perception is infallible, like all perceptions which refer to the states and activities of one's own mind. These perceptions form the basis of the so-called inner experience. This experience is infallible as to what is inside us; it tells us that we think of, or imagine, a dragon or a triangle; that we claim something or deny something; that we strive for something or want something.

Apart from the perception of the phenomena of the mind, one also has memory. One cannot observe his own anger, but he remembers it even when it has passed. With the help of memory, one can recall the course of anger and explore its properties based on the reproduction of the anger in one's memory. Yet, this is not observation of anger, as one can only observe present events; remembering bygone events, which belong to the past, cannot be called "observation." Still, it is clear that memory is not infallible. It may seem that one's anger triggered by the sight of a given person subsided when the person spoke to one but one's memories might be inaccurate as to the reasons and the intensity of that anger. Still, the memory of past mental events is another basis for inner experience; thus, it inherently results from it that the experience as a whole may be incorrect.

Therefore, one's knowledge of mental phenomena and experiences consists of two elements. One of them is inner perception, which is infallible, and the other is the memory of recently passed mental phenomena, which is often incorrect. Naturally, research based on inner experience cannot be

infallible since the basis for the experience does not guarantee its infallibility. When the issue is only to determine the state of one's mind, there can be no mistakes. One cannot be mistaken as to whether one has the impression of the color green at a given moment, or whether one accepts as true a given judgment, or whether one likes a given dish, or whether one wants to leave the room. However, when one wants to determine what the impression is of the color green, or what the properties are of the judgment accepted as adequate, one must pay attention to the impression, to the judgment; then these inner experiences cease to be present; they are only in one's memory and they can be examined only via memory. This problem is the source of many errors and the great difference of opinions in the field of psychology, which is based on inner experience.

4. The Ability to Control Inner Experience

Despite its drawbacks, inner experience will always remain the basis for all professional psychological research. Without this experience we would know next to nothing about the activities of our mind. This experience is in fact sufficient when it leads to consistent results and when there is no difference of opinion as to the data it provides. However, this consistency is relatively rare and it usually concerns simpler mental phenomena. As for more complex problems, a reliable source of knowledge is visibly lacking. Therefore, alongside inner experience used in such cases, it is proper to use methods which would counterbalance the influence of factors which introduce erroneous notions into our research. This incentive gave rise to experimental methods, for instance, which are used in the psychology of sensory impressions. This method would not lead to a conclusion in the issue at the core of this dissertation. Admittedly, attempts to use it in order to explain various facts concerning judgments have been made by professor Münsterberg. Yet, his research leaves us with the impression that such states of affairs do not in the least explain the problem, but on the contrary, they greatly contributed to even more confusion and complications, as they are based on erroneous assumptions. Surely, no chromoscopes or kinographes will instruct us about what judgments are.

Therefore we should seek another way. In order to verify the conclusions derived from each particular phenomenon based on inner experience we shall apply them to particular judgments. Such a course of action will be conclusive also in those cases where inner experience could be unsatisfactory for us. It may also be the case that many phenomena will open the way to two theories, both of which could be used to explicate

it. It was so in the case of the emission and undulatory theories of light. Then we will concur with the theory which will explain a broader range of phenomena and we will discard the theory which will be contradicted by even one phenomenon or which will be more difficult to support than the other one.

5. The Main Trait of Judgments

All our mental activities which we use to judge are individual phenomena which we strive to explain through theories. Although we do not know much about what these activities are and what their main traits are, we still need a means with the help of which we could distinguish those activities of judging from all other mental activities. If we were not in possession of such means, we could never be absolutely certain if the researched particular mental activities should be included in one of the existing theories of judgment. If we want to examine the essence of judgments with the inductive method, we must first have the ability to distinguish all judgments from all mental activities which are not judgments. Before we can proceed to determine the CONTENT of the concept of judgment, we must determine the RANGE of this concept.

In the early days of professional research into the content of concepts, started by Socrates, words used in everyday speech served as specifications of the scope of concepts. The range of a given concept was interpreted as the whole of presentations covered by the same word whose meaning constituted the concept. When Socrates studied what courage is, he examined all those deeds which were called courageous in accordance with the spirit of language. We must not follow this path now, as we know that *usus linguarum tyrannus* rarely takes into account the requirements of logical precision and that a separate scientific terminology must be developed if the words are to constitute a precise view of images.

Fortunately, in the case of judgments there is a commonly accepted trait which allows us to effortlessly determine in each case whether a given mental activity falls within the range of the concept of judgment, and therefore, whether it is a judgment or not. The trait consists in the fact that each mental activity which contains truth or falsity should be regarded as a judgment; according to Aristotle, ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν καὶ ἢ ψεῦδεσθαι ὑπάρχει. This criterion, which distinguishes judgments and all other mental activities, still requires further description so that it is not misused and does not lose its value.

6. Truth and Falsity

At this point we ought to determine the meaning of the words: “truth” and “falsity,” since these words tend to be used in many meanings and are therefore ambiguous. After all, it is not only judgments, statements and negations that we speak of as true or false. We also say of emotions that they are true, as opposed to pretended emotions; we also say of silver that it is real, as opposed to fake silver; we speak of a friend that he is a true friend, as opposed to a false friend. Since we can say of the emotion of anger that it is true anger, we could apparently also include anger in judgments; yet, no one believes emotions to be judgments. Only those mental activities should be regarded as judgments which are described with the words “true” and “false” in their *PROPER* meaning. Thus, the issue is to find another criterion which helps us realize whether the words “true” and “false” are used in the right meaning or not. There are only two such criteria: an internal one and an external one. The external criterion consists in the ability to replace the words “true” and “false” with synonymous words which are different depending on whether they replace these two words in their proper meaning or not. Speaking of false judgments, we can call them *ERRONEOUS*; speaking of a true emotion, we can call it *GENUINE*. Thus, when the adjective “false” can be replaced with the adjective “erroneous,” then the word “false” is used in its *PROPER* meaning; when the adjective “true” can be replaced with the adjective “genuine,” then the word “true” is used in its *IMPROPER* meaning. Conversely, speaking of true judgments, we can replace the adjective “true” with the expression “consistent with the truth,” and speaking of emotions, metals, or false friends, we also use phrases like: “feigned,” “forged,” or “not worthy to be called a friend.” Therefore, whenever the issue is to determine whether the words “true” and “false” are used in their proper meaning or not, it can be accomplished by selecting those words which can be replaced by these adjectives without changing the meaning of the utterance.

The internal criterion consists in logical classification which divides the adjectives and other expressions replacing them into two categories. According to this division, adjectives and other expressions replacing them are either determining (*attributa determinantia*) or changing the meaning of the word they refer to in the grammatical sense (*attributa modificantia*).

Any adjective or a word replacing it which complements the meaning of the noun it belongs to is determining. *WHITE* paper, an *EQUILATERAL* triangle, an *IMMORTAL* soul, a *GOOD* king, a *SORREL* horse, a *DANGEROUS* disease – in all of these expressions the adjectives signify a true feature of the objects they refer to. The content of the presentations which constitute the meaning of the presentation of a king, a horse or a disease is enriched

through adding the adjectives but is otherwise unchanged, since a good king remains a king, a sorrel horse is still a horse and a dangerous disease – a disease. The nouns retain their meaning after the adjectives have been added, except the expression consisting of an adjective and a noun has a richer meaning than the said noun on its own.

It is different in the case of adding modifying adjectives to nouns. A DEAD king, a PAINTED horse, an IMAGINARY disease could serve as examples here. A dead king is not a king but a corpse; a painted horse is not a horse but a painting of a horse; an imaginary disease is not a disease but an illusion of a disease. By adding words like “dead,” “painted,” or “imaginary” to nouns, we do not complement the content of the relevant presentations, but instead, we replace the content originally and usually attached to these nouns with completely different content, as indicated by the ability to replace these nouns with completely different ones. This is why modifying adjectives are called “meaning-changing.” There is a large number of such modifying words; they do not differ grammatically from determining ones; yet, there is a significant difference between them in terms of logic and psychology.

However, there are also such adjectives which can be used as determining or modifying ones without a change in their grammatical form. The word “false” also belongs to this class of adjectives. For instance, the word “witness” denotes a person who testifies they witnessed something. However, a false witness is not a witness, as he cannot testify about the issue in question; this person is only pretending to testify they witnessed something. Applied in this meaning, the adjective “false” modifies the meaning of the noun “witness,” since a false witness is not a witness, just as an imaginary disease is not a disease. When we want to emphasize that a noun is to be interpreted in its primary rather than modified meaning, we also use adjectives or adjectival phrases. Then we speak of a true witness. Naturally, also in this case the adjective “true” is not a determining [adjective], since it does not complement the meaning of the word “witness” in any way. “A true witness” means exactly the same as “a witness”; similarly, we speak of a true disease when we wish to prevent the word “disease” from being understood in its modified meaning. The same role is performed by the adjective “real” or the expression “in the proper sense.” These words are not *attributa determinantia* as they are in contrast to modifying adjectives. In order to distinguish them from adjectives which change their meaning, they could be called “adjectives which retain the meaning of nouns.”

With the two mentioned criteria, it will always be possible to determine whether the words “true” and “false” are used in their proper sense or not, and as a result of this, whether they refer to judgments or other spiritual phenomena when they are applied to words which signify mental activities.

If any [doubts] arise in this respect, the first question to ask is what adjectives can replace these words. If the words can be replaced with adjectives like “consistent with the truth” (“genuine”) or “incorrect” (“erroneous”), then the adjectives “true” and “false” refer to judgments. Another issue to pay attention to is whether the adjectives “true” and “false” are used to retain or to change the meaning of the noun they belong to in a given case, or if they are defining. If they have the function of adjectives which retain or change the meaning of nouns, then these nouns may represent something other than judgments. However, if these adjectives are defining, they indicate that the nouns they belong to represent judgments.

7. Judgments and Other Mental Phenomena, especially Images

Being in possession of the knowledge of traits which can be used to distinguish judgments from all other spiritual phenomena, we can enumerate all the phenomena which are not judgments. Although it is not presented in the form of scientific classification, this enumeration will still be used to communicate [...] terminology with which we intend to determine spiritual phenomena, which, not being judgments themselves, must often be mentioned in a dissertation on judgments, either as conditions or as consequents of judgments.

Other kinds of mental phenomena besides judgments are: images, emotions and wantings. The case is simple with emotions and wantings as there is no trouble with these words. It is common knowledge that an emotion is either pleasant or unpleasant and that sadness, happiness, love, hate etc., are called “emotions.” Everybody also knows what wanting is. Thus, there will be no difficulty in using these words in this aspect. Let me only note once again that enumerating these mental phenomena does not constitute a final classification. In order to provide one, one would first have to resolve certain issues in dispute concerning the relationship of emotions to will. Thus, for example, some claim that wanting is not a separate mental phenomenon, but rather, that it belongs to a common set of mental phenomena together with emotions. How this issue will be resolved is insignificant for the theory of judgments.

It is different in the case of images, since one cannot judge without knowing the image of the thing one is supposed to judge about. Images are a necessary condition for the existence of judgments, which is why we need to communicate the meaning of the word precisely, as it is indispensable in a discussion about judgments. A comprehensive description of the relationships between presentations and judgments can take place only

after examining judgments, so an agreement as to the meaning of the word “image” will be only temporary and mainly based on examples.

When we think of any thing but only by recalling the object, we carry within us an image of this thing. Whether this thing exists or not is completely indifferent to us. We may imagine the building we live in or we may imagine Jupiter; we may also imagine things of which we are certain do not exist and moreover, cannot exist. Therefore, we may imagine a round triangle. Admittedly, the claim that such images are impracticable is common (*unvollziehbare Vorstellungen*). Yet, this opinion is fallacious. How can we predicate anything on an object which cannot be imagined? Yet, we can issue different statements about a round triangle. Thus, we say that a round triangle does not exist or that it is something which contains contradictory traits etc. It is therefore unquestionable that we have to be able to imagine a given object containing contradictory traits; otherwise it would be impossible to issue any claims about it. The fact that the object does not exist does not prevent us from being able to imagine [it]. After all, any time we read fairy tales, our mind is filled with images of non-existent people and things.

Yet, the arguments of those who claim that such images are “impracticable” are not without reason altogether. The mistake lies in the fact that they speak of images in general where one should speak of images in a narrower sense of the word, that is, of perceptions. Perceptions are such images whose objects are or could be the basis for perceiving, whether sensory or extrasensory. Thus, we have a perception of colors, sounds etc., as well as other objects experienced through the senses, or one which would be experienced through the senses if they existed, provided these objects are of such kind that they are or can be included in one act of perceiving. Perceptive images also exist in the context of our own mental phenomena, emotions, judgments etc., as they fall under inner experience, whereas we do not have any perceptive images of mental phenomena of other individuals which have their own, as only an individual who knows all the innermost thoughts of all thinking individuals could have them.

When we imagine a geometrical figure with a thousand equal angles, this image is not perceptive. Even if this figure was drawn before us, it would be impossible to take it in with one glance, in one act of perceiving, so that we notice the fact that it has a thousand sides. On the other hand, an image of a single triangle can be perceptive; yet, when we imagine a triangle in general, when we have a GENERAL image of a triangle, this image is not perceptive. This fact is the reason for the fallacious opinion that general images do not exist and that we are only in possession of universal words which can be used to determine many objects which are similar to each other in certain respects. In fact, whereas it is true that there are no

general images which would not be perceptive, there are no non-perceptive general images. Perceptive images in the more precise sense can also be called “direct images” (*repraesentatio directa*) and non-perceptive images can be called “indirect images” (*repraesentatio indirecta*). Concepts (*conceptus*) are kinds of indirect images. The issue in dispute of whether concepts are images or not can be resolved according to what we said of images in the following manner. If we interpret the word “image” in a narrower meaning, where it only refers to perceptive presentations, then we have no right to call the concept “an image.” However, when we speak of images in general, we naturally have to include concepts in that group. Yet, the reason why we use a collective name for images in the narrower sense and concepts, thus creating one group of mental phenomena out of them, can only be demonstrated after having examined the essence of judgments.

As for the fundamental difference between indirect and direct images, it consists mainly in the following fact. Imagining any object directly, we manage without images of other objects. Yet, imagining any object indirectly, we always need another object to aid the imagination, with the help of which we reach an indirect image through imagining certain relationships between one and the other object. The auxiliary image must be either perceptive or, if it is not perceptive itself, must occur only through imagining the relationships connecting it to a further perceptive image. This law was expressed by Aristotle as: οὐδέν ἀνευ φαντάσματος νοεῖ ἢ ψυχῇ, where the notion of φαντάσμα is interpreted as an perceptive image and the notion of νοεῖμα is interpreted as an indirect image. A few examples will further explain the meaning of the rule presented above.

When we want to imagine, for instance, a regular figure with a thousand sides, we usually imagine a regular hexagon while thinking that this figure has a thousand sides instead of six. The image of a hexagon is an auxiliary image; by imagining a hexagon, we also imagine the relationship between the number of sides in a hexagon and in a figure with a thousand sides. Yet, because the image of the number: a thousand is also non-perceptive, we resort to the same method when we want to imagine the number. We may imagine the number 5 in an perceptive way. Then we imagine a number twice as big and we obtain an image of the number 10, which is indirect and non-perceptive. With the help of further images of relationships of the said number to the number ten times as big as it and, in turn, that number (100) to one ten times as big, we reach the image of the number 1000.

In fact, we usually make use of a shorter method when we imagine an object indirectly, since it is obvious that with the above method we would have to devote too much time to imagining, if it is indirect. Thus, we use other auxiliary presentations, that is, written or spoken words. We have direct or perceptive images of any word in our native language, as it

either comes under the sense of sight when it is written or under the sense of hearing when it is spoken. A direct presentation of any word is used as an auxiliary image; the relationship we need consists in the relationship between any sign and what it signifies. What is signified by a sign as such is later the object of an indirect image.

This fact is most easily observable with mathematical signs. The image of the number one thousand is indirect. However, a mathematician who calculates with this number will not create an image of this number in the above mentioned manner, [that is,] imagine it with the aid of the image of the number five etc. He understands the number one thousand as the number marked with the sign 1000, and imagining it, he only imagines the number which remains in the relationship of what the sign 1000 means toward the sign. Thus, we may say that when we calculate with numbers, we really calculate with digits. This sort of indirect imagining is called “symbolic imagining” by Leibniz, as the imagining occurs via auxiliary images which are signs (*symbolum*).

This fact puts in the right context the importance of human speech in the face of abstract thinking, which only ever occurs on the basis of indirect images.

Having explained which mental activities should be interpreted as an image going forward in the present dissertation, let us proceed to stating common features of images; familiarity with these features is necessary to conduct research on the essence of judgments.

8. Parts of Images

Speaking of an image, one must distinguish [its] three parts. It is not that each of these parts can exist or did exist on its own and created the whole of an image joining another element. Parts of the images mentioned here are the so-called metaphysical parts. [Let us recall that] this name is used to signify parts which can be distinguished by thought in a given whole, which however cannot actually be divided from or separated from the whole. Thus, upon noticing a piece of paper in front of us, we distinguish its color and shape. We cannot separate the color or the shape from this piece of paper as the paper cannot exist without them, nor they without the paper. The case is different when we divide the piece of paper into four quarters; then we can not only distinguish one quarter from another, but we can actually separate the four quarters from each other, and then every quarter will exist independently from each other (let us recall these are physical parts). Yet, although color and shape cannot exist for themselves only, they are still easy to distinguish from each other so that we

can state something about each of these parts regardless of another part or the whole. We can state that one color is lighter or darker than another or that two colors are similar; we can say of a shape that it is symmetrical or not etc., and the ability to do so is fully justified by the practice derived from Aristotle's metaphysics of calling color, shape etc. "parts," although they can only be distinguished with the aid of abstraction (the so-called *trennende*) rather than separated from each other.

Therefore, also parts of images are those kinds of metaphysical parts, with the reservation that sometimes one of them also becomes a physical part. These elements are: the act of imagining [to oneself], the content of the image and the object of the image (according to Medieval terminology: *conceptus formalis*, *conceptus objectivus*, *ens*).

First, I shall attempt to explain the difference between the act and the content of the image. Wundt and his school claim there is no such difference. Yet, it seems to me that they are mistaken. When I think of any horse, for instance, I imagine it to myself. When I then think of a cow, I imagine it. Further, when I think of a steam engine, or of Venus of Urbino [...], I imagine a steam engine etc. Naturally, we always have in mind here only the very images of mentioned objects. Clearly, the state of our mind remains the same, as long as we do not perform any act but let the images of a horse, a cow etc., go through our minds; what always changes is, so to say, the spiritual picture, which depicts for us a horse or a cow. What constitutes a common feature of all the mental states when we imagine a horse, a cow etc., is called "an act," or "an action of imagining," whereas what distinguishes the two acts so that one of these acts is called "an image of a horse" and the other: "an image of a cow" is the content of an image.

By stating that the content of the above mentioned image is a horse, a cow etc., I did not mean that the content of the images are entities or things which exist outside our minds. It is not a horse pulling a cart or a cow standing in [...][a cowshed] which are the content of the image, but rather what corresponds to them in our minds. This is why content exists in all images without exception, even though what corresponds to the image does not always exist in the outside world. The content of image is what is usually called "a spiritual picture of a given object." The content of a presentation image, just as the act of imagining, is something which completely exists in our minds.

Apart from the act and the content, each image also has its object. The object of an image is what we mean when we imagine something [to ourselves]. When we imagine a horse, the object of the image is this or that horse or a horse in general, but it is always something of which we are certain that it is independent of our minds. The object of an image may exist or not. When we imagine a pen with which we write, we imagine

an existing object, whereas when we imagine a tree 100 meters tall, we imagine an object which does not exist. Perhaps the latter example emphasizes the difference between the content and the object of a image best, as it is evident that an object may not exist, whereas its content always exists any time we imagine something.

9. Image versus Speech

An analysis of the relationship between speech and thought can contribute to a better understanding of the difference between the three metaphysical parts of an image, as long as the relationship concerns presentations.

Symbols of speech which refer to images are nouns and all parts of speech which can be used as nouns or which can replace nouns. In Medieval terminology, they are called “categorematic” and contemporary grammarians call them “names” (*nomina*). Each name has three tasks. If we say “the Sun,” first we make it known that we are thinking of something and that we are imagining the Sun. Thus, the noun informs a listener or reader that there occurs or occurred an act of imagining in the mind of the person uttering or writing the word. Thus, uttering the word “the Sun” stimulates the listener to mental act, and at the same time, it provides for him the content which is supposed to fill the action, since when someone hears the word “the Sun” uttered, he will not imagine just any[thing], but he will imagine what the word denotes; he will imagine the Sun. This is the second function of a name; it fills the listener’s mind with certain content which is the same as the meaning of the word. The content of an image is called “meaning” due to the word which is a sign of an act occurring in the mind. Yet, when we utter the word “the Sun,” we simultaneously direct the listener’s attention to this fiery celestial body, which is the center of our solar system. The word “the Sun” does not only mean something, namely: the content of the image of the Sun, but it also SIGNIFIES an object. Thus, every name expresses a mental act (*exponit actum*), provides the meaning of this activity, that is, its content (*significant*), and signifies the object (*nominat*).

What I have stated in this, perhaps too concise, summary of images is explained in greater detail in a separate small dissertation which I recommend as a source to all those who are dissatisfied with the presented description.* In this small dissertation, I also attempt to refute the objections which can be put forward, seemingly legitimately, against the above claims.

* What is meant here is probably the dissertation [Twardowski 1898] [B&J].

10. Research Matter. Organization of Research

In order to come to the theory of judgments, we must first examine every kind of judgment, and having described all existing or possible kinds of judgment, we must put together all their common features and create a theory. As I mentioned in §2, when attempting such a description one cannot yet be in possession of any classification of judgments, as any classification as such is based on preconceived opinions on the classified objects. If we do not wish to distort the research at the very beginning, we cannot be based in any classification of judgments, as any classification of any phenomena emerges from a competent analysis of these phenomena. Thus, it is evident in all analyses of the essence of judgments which do not value truth that examining judgments according to a preconceived classification means limiting the research to proving and stating the legitimacy of a given classification throughout all categories of judgments. This is also the origin of [the fact that] every scholar who defends his individual theory of judgments does it on the basis of his own separate classification of judgments. The work undertaken with the intention of reconciling various opinions by putting forward a theory which could be accepted by everybody prevents the reaching of a general consensus, as it highlights its distinctness through the very course of research.

Naturally, all research of certain phenomena must begin with a description of the simplest phenomena and reach more complex phenomena in a certain order. Yet, which judgments should be deemed simple and which – more complex is resolved by a theory of judgments adopted by a given researcher. This is why some begin their research with a description of judgments which others believe to be highly complex phenomena and which they only analyze by the end of their research. For instance, Sigwart believes the simplest and most primary judgments are those which give names to an object (*benennende Urteile*), as is the case when we state: “This is white,” “This is a rose”;² Sigwart begins his research with analyzing this kind of judgment. On the other hand, Brentano considers such judgments to be complex and thus, he analyzes them at the very end of a systematic interpretation of the theory of judgments, defended by Brentano and composed by one of his former disciples.³

Since we need to go through every kind of judgment when we research judgments, but we dare not organize or distinguish them according to any

² Cf. [Sigwart 1873], §9: “Das einfachste und elementarste Urteilen ist dasjenige, das sich in den Benennen einzelner Gegenstände der Anschauung vollzieht.”

³ Cf. [Hillebrand 1891], §67.

theory, we are forced to resort to a method which, on the one hand, would let us classify the whole material of judgments to some degree, and on the other hand, would not prejudge the results of the research.

An idea of the manner in which judgments are expressed in speech will serve as a means to this end. It is known that sentences are externalized expressions of judgments. They will serve as the basis for our discussion.

I do not claim that sentences are an accurate and absolutely certain expression of our judgments. On the contrary, the same sentence may be an expression of different judgments. In any case, we learn about what should be understood by it either from the relationship in which the sentence is uttered or from the emphasis put on certain single words which make up sentences. Conversely, the same judgment can be expressed with various sentences. Thus, I cannot agree with the idea presented by Prantl, who claimed that having examined a language thoroughly, we will automatically learn the mental activities which are expressed with the language. In the present argument, grammatical sentences shall serve as a sort of scaffolding which I shall use to build a theory of judgments. When the construction ends, we shall discard the scaffolding and then the shape of the construction will look different from the shape of the scaffolding, that is, the classification of judgments based on their logical properties will be different from the provisional classification constructed by their externalized expression with grammatical sentences.

Therefore, we shall look into judgments by examining in sequence all kinds of sentences. Let us begin with the simplest sentences, consisting of only one word, continue with sentences which consist of several words, and conclude with compound sentences. With each form of sentences, we shall attempt to analyze thoroughly the mental phenomena which are expressed with a given sentence, and having conducted the analysis, we shall organize the results regardless of the grammatical form of the discussed sentences.

A certain kind of sentence must be excluded from the very beginning, namely, all sentences which are not used to express judgments, but rather, which contain either wishes, or requests, or commands, or finally, questions. Since, we cannot say of either a wish, or a request, or a command, or a question, that it is true or false in the proper meaning of these terms, they should not be regarded as judgments.

11. Sentences Consisting of One Word

Undoubtedly, there are cases where one word suffices to utter a judgment. Sometimes this sentence may consist of more parts, for instance, of a verb and a pronoun like in phrasal verbs. Still, these two words are considered as one since, first of all, each of them uttered separately have other meanings, and secondly, they express one thought and make a complete whole when uttered together. This cannot be said about the sentence: "I'm sad," since one of the two words which this sentence consists of is an expression of a judgment, if extended to the form: "I am."

The cases where one word expresses a judgment exhaustively should be distinguished from the so-called elliptical sentences, which are lacking in one or more words necessary to express the thought in a precise manner. Common examples of such elliptical sentences are responses to questions where words included in the questions are omitted. The question "How are you?" is usually answered with one word, "Fine"; yet, it is obvious that what is meant by this word is "I am fine." Similarly, we respond to "Who is here?" with "Me," by which we mean to say "It is me" etc. Both nouns and verbs can be used in this way. ("What's this?" "Fire." "What came?" "A letter.") Moreover, such thoughts can be expressed even without the preceding question. When we say, "Rain," when looking out of the window in the morning, we mean to express the same with this word as with the expression, "It is raining," and when we walk down the street in the evening and see a glowing red light, we may shout, "Fire!" meaning: "There is a fire." We may proceed to the analysis of judgments expressed with such elliptical sentences only at the point when we break down sentences consisting of several words.

[...] In order to analyze judgments which require one word to utter, not only seemingly but also genuinely, we should reach for other examples. Of these there are plenty so there is an abundance of work material; the linguist Miklosich already managed to classify this material.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

ON FORMAL TRUTH*

When words such as “truth,” “true,” or “truthfulness” are used in various expressions, to speak of various kinds of truth, sometimes these words are used *univoce* and sometimes they are used *aequivoce*. Among many meanings of these words we may first distinguish their primary epistemological meaning where truthfulness is inherent only to judgments, namely: those which claim that which exists or negate that which does not exist; second, various derivative epistemological meanings (for instance, “a true saying,” “a true friend” etc.); and finally, various extra-epistemological meanings (for instance, “a transcendent truth” in Wolff’s understanding); whereas the word “truth” in its primary epistemological meaning signifies either the very feature of truthfulness of a judgment or a judgment which possesses this feature. Truth in its primary epistemological meaning can also be called “material truth” and is sometimes contrasted with formal truth; speaking of formal truth, we may also use the word “truth” in the derivative epistemological meaning, both when formal truth is understood as compatibility with the rules of thinking and when it is interpreted as a judgment considered as the consequence of an appropriate reason. A conclusion following from adequate premises, a formal truth, is a judgment, which is characterized by the fact that it fulfills certain conditions of material truthfulness, or truthfulness in the primary epistemological meaning. In fact, calling judgments “formal truths,” considered as consequences of appropriate

* The lecture was delivered during a scientific meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on 11th February, 1922. The author’s abstract appeared in Polish in *Ruch Filozoficzny*, VII (1922-1923), No. 1-3, pp. 37b-38a [B&J].

reasons, suggests another method of formulating formal truth. Namely, if a judgment considered as a consequence of an appropriate reason is interpreted as a formal truth, then the claim that this judgment is a formal truth, or [is] formally true, is contingent upon the claim that it is in fact a consequence of its reason, that is, that there really occurs a relationship of reason to consequence between the mentioned judgment and a certain other judgment (other judgments). Having ascertained that, we also issue another judgment, namely, a judgment on the occurrence of the relationship of reason to consequence between certain judgments. Issuing such a judgment, as well as making judgments whose subject is logical relationships occurring between other judgments in general, is called "reasoning" in the sense of "an action," and the mentioned judgment is called "reasoning" in the sense of "the product." When speaking of correct reasoning, we mean the activity of issuing a judgment which states a logical relationship, in accordance with the rules of logic (for instance, the relationship of reason to consequence), and the product of this activity is a true judgment, which states such a relationship. This sort of true judgment deserves to be called "formally true" or "a formal truth" above others. This is because logic, seeking to create a taxonomy of judgments whose object is the logical relationship between other judgments, and therefore also the relationship of reason to consequence, does not consider all of these other judgments separately, but rather reduces them to certain types, which have long been called forms of judgments, and thus, it presents general rules of reasoning, which at the same time constitute the criteria for the truthfulness of judgments which state logical relationships in general, and thus, also the relationship of reason to consequence between judgments in a certain form, that is, between certain forms of judgments. Thus, it seems right to call "formally true," or "formal truths," those judgments whose truthfulness depends, according to such criteria, on the form of those other judgments between which they state the occurrence of logical relationships, and therefore also the relationship of reason to consequence. Thus we may state in the spirit of Kant that formal truth consists in the compatibility of certain judgments with the rules of thinking, that is, compatibility of judgments which state the occurrence of logical relationships, and thus, also the relationship of reason to consequence, with the principles of reasoning, which are rules of thinking. Admittedly, thusly determined formal truth is not in opposition to material truth any more and ceases to be the truth in the derivative epistemological meaning, and instead, it itself becomes material truth, a truth in the primary epistemological meaning, since the judgment stating that a logical relationship occurs between other judgments, for instance: a relationship of reason to consequence, if it is true, is so in

precisely the same sense in which any materially true judgment is true. Thus, the expression “formal truth” becomes an expressions of the same type as “mathematical truth,” “historical truth” etc., as it denotes true judgments which are the content of logic as a *par excellence* formal science. This is also perfectly consistent with the fact that we can also speak of logical truth and truthfulness instead of formal truth and truthfulness.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

PART III
METAPHYSICS

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY ON THE
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL*

In the Catholic religion, the immortality of the soul is not a subject of dispute, but constitutes the essence of one of the most fundamental article of faith; the conviction of the Church of the immortality of the soul is firmly reflected in the short, final paragraph of The Apostles' Creed, which is based on Christ the Lord's own words and the teachings of the Apostles on the one hand, and on the historical fact of the Lord's Resurrection on the other. Yet, it is not only religion that speaks of the immortality of the soul; additionally, immortality is one of those rare subjects which are of interest both to philosophy and religion. Although contemporary positivists and agnostics deny philosophy the right to deal with the question of the after-life, exclaiming "*ignorabimus*," they will not remodel humanity, nor will they suppress the thirst for knowledge in the human hearts, which is never greater than when one stands over the corpse of a loved one and asks in the presence of the cold, still body: Is this the end?

Still, those who deny the human mind the ability to resolve the mystery of death on its own, as well as those who do not want or cannot be satisfied with quiet resignation in this matter, who refer back to the religious faith, can quote the historical fact in support of their opinion, which has been around for dozens of centuries, so that anyone can ascertain its legitimacy at any given point. This fact is the disagreement about the immortality of the human soul between philosophers. Some claim forcefully

* The paper appeared in Polish as "Filozofia współczesna o nieśmiertelności duszy" in *Przełom* I (1895), No. 14 (24th August), pp. 427-438 [B&J].

that they are in possession of irrefutable evidence which leaves no doubt as to the immortality of the soul, while others claim equally emphatically that this alleged evidence is sophistry, dispelled under irresistible, rigorous reasoning. Therefore, since so many generations, in working and reasoning in so many different conditions, have not yet reached a satisfactory result, so that the dispute over immortality is as heated nowadays as it was at the time of Greek sophists and Socrates, then one should probably admit that this issue is one of those which can never be resolved in the human mind.

There is, however, a ready response to this argument. If one is dealing with a problem which has not ceased to be an problem despite the efforts of the best minds, then the reason presented in our case is not the only one which has to entail such a state of affairs. The problem does not necessarily remain unresolved because it cannot be resolved. There may be other reasons for this state of affairs. It may originate in the fact that secondary research which constitutes a necessary condition for significant progress in the question in dispute has not reached far enough. Another reason could be that a genius who would discover the right method to solve this mystery has not been born yet; a method which would consequently seem so simple that it would leave everyone gaping, as it happened with Columbus' companions when he showed them the trick every child is familiar with nowadays. Finally, the reason could also be that the question has long been resolved but those who believe the solution is inconsistent with their beliefs do not wish to accept it as solved and, on the one hand, refrain from formulating their objections clearly and, on the other hand, complicate it further so that finally even those who have hitherto been standing on firm ground begin to withdraw slowly, forgetting where the point of reference was and telling them: *Hic Rhodus, hic salta!*

Therefore, the reasons presented by positivists in order to explain why the question of immortality has not been resolved yet are not the only possible ones. It might actually be the case that this problem IS in fact resolved but there are still people who would be glad to see it unresolved rather than decide that it has been resolved counter to their expectations and favorite theories. Let us now look more closely into the whole problem, let us take account of all that has been done in the question so far and we shall see which side will emerge from the comparison stronger.

The word "immortality" can be used in a proper on an improper sense. The latter occurs when one speaks of «immortal fame» someone earned etc., whereas the proper sense of "immortality" entails the discussed controversial idea that at the moment of death, that is, at the beginning of decomposition of the human body, the «self», which is distinguished from the body, does not cease to exist but instead continues to exist forever. Yet, even in the proper sense, "immortality" can be interpreted in a twofold

manner, depending on whether it is INDIVIDUAL or PERSONAL. It is individual when it means a simple existence of the human «self» but denies it self-consciousness in the afterlife; it is personal when it denotes such a state in the afterlife that each «self» is conscious of its existence and feels like the same person who used to occupy the body in its earthly life. Analogously, the notion of immortality in the proper sense, as the only one of concern to us here, is also sometimes used in reference to other living creatures, which results in some philosophers wondering whether an animal or even a plant may contain a certain element which would be able to outlive these organisms, as long as their existence can be perceived by our senses.

The more complicated a problem is, the closer attention must be paid to the method used to analyze it. As for the problem of immortality, the question of the method is understandably crucial. After all, the point is that the choice of method greatly influences the spirit in which the answer to the question of whether we are immortal will be received.

The question of immortality has been and is still being attempted to be resolved in three, fundamentally different, ways: the experimental method, the deductive method and the inductive-deductive method. The EXPERIMENTAL method is used by spiritists. They are focused on eliciting such phenomena which would prove immortality by the very fact of their existence in and of themselves, without any theories. Naturally, the experimental method has priority wherever it can be used; however, the issue is precisely whether this method can be applied to the problem of immortality. After all, there is no lack of opinions, some of them significant, where phenomena obtained through spiritist experiences are considered to be illusions. On the other hand, spiritists also have world-famous scientists as their proponents. Therefore, it must be admitted that the ability to make use of the experimental method, that is, spiritist experiments, in order to resolve the question of immortality would be highly desirable, but since it is a contentious problem in itself, it is unsuited for attempts to resolve another problem. It is hard to prove immortality with a fact which is itself often negated.

The DEDUCTIVE method forgoes experience altogether. It does, however, attempt to derive mortality or immortality of the soul, depending on the stand it takes, from certain claims which, when developed consistently, allegedly resolve the problem. Thus, one often comes across the so-called ethical proof of immortality, which consists in the opinion that the desire for constant self-improvement, on the one hand, and the craving for justice on the other, are inherent to the human being. Since these moral needs often go unsatisfied in the earthly life, therefore there must be afterlife, where whatever was denied in mortal life is supplemented. Obviously, this proof is based on the belief in teleological design of the universe, which leads

to the conviction that life must be extended beyond the grave. Thus, it is derived from a premise which has nothing to do with the discussed subject, that is, the soul, and yet, it reaches conclusions concerning the state of the soul after death. A person who does not believe in intelligent design and reaches completely opposite conclusions acts no less deductively. The deductive method is indeed accessible to both spiritists and their opponents, but it is not free from its flaws either. Namely, the premises all deductive proofs, whether ethical or other, are based on, stray too far from the very object of research and, similarly to spiritists' alleged facts, they are questioned by many. Yet, to stick with the previously cited example, intentionality of the universe, as well as immortality itself, are both questions which have been disputed as heatedly in ancient times as they are nowadays. This is why deductive proofs must shift the focus of the question of immortality to another area; they should first convince their opponent of the teleology ruling the universe, and when the opponent is able to defend his opinions deftly, the task of the person persuading becomes extremely difficult, almost more so than the task of a proponent of the experimental method who wants to convince someone of the reality of spiritualist facts.

This is why the most adequate method to address the question of immortality is the one I called "INDUCTIVE-DEDUCTIVE." This is because it is derived from strictly inductive research on the properties of mental life and phenomena connected to them. As everywhere else, also in this case this research allows for stating some general laws if it is advanced enough. These laws are usually stated only through induction, just as, for instance, Kepler's laws on motions of the planets. Thus, when induction fulfills its task by stating certain laws, deduction proceeds to derive conclusions from these laws; conclusions which may be able to rule on the issue in question. Therefore, this method differs from the previous one in that its proofs are based on laws found through induction which refer directly to the main point of the issue: the soul, whereas the conclusions drawn in the deductive method are often based on laws which are not drawn from induction, but rather, they stem from some general philosophical view and either refer to God's attributes, or to the way the universe works, and they only concern the soul in an indirect way.

As for resolving whether a fact which cannot be reconciled with experience takes place or not, the inductive-deductive method is the only scientific method which leads to satisfactory results. It is used in natural sciences whenever they deal with such *quaestio facti*. The problem of whether there are living creatures on the Moon has been resolved in the negative with this very method. Induction indicated general laws governing organic life; these laws determine the conditions governing organic life; these laws also determine the conditions under which organic life

develops. These conditions are not fulfilled on the Moon; therefore, a conclusion can be reached through simple deduction that there are no organic entities on the Moon. The question of immortality is the same kind of *quaestio facti*, whether our «self» ceases to exist after the death of the body or not. There is no other way to resolve the question than the one already indicated above.

Therefore, one ought to commence the research on immortality with a purely descriptive research of mental phenomena and the way they present themselves in our inner experience. Our experience informs us of two highly significant facts: of the UNITY of our consciousness and of the sense of IDENTITY of our «self» which last throughout the time encompassed by our memory.

In psychology, “the unity of the consciousness” is interpreted as a fact that all mental phenomena which we perceive in ourselves at a given moment are referred to the one and only «self». When we look at the letters we write on a piece of paper and hear the rumble of a passing coach, we refer the visual impression and the acoustic impression to one «self», stating that one who sees the letters is the same one who hears the rumble. The same unity of consciousness is also manifested toward mental phenomena which do not belong to one category of phenomena, sensory phenomena, as the sight and the hearing do. When we see a person who we cannot stand and who we hate at the same time, we perceive a sensory impression received from the person standing in front of us through our eyes as well as the feeling of hate toward the same «self», and so we know that we feel hate toward the person upon seeing this person. There is perfect consent in this point among scholars. They also agree with the other mentioned fact, which is that each individual is convinced that they are the same person upon turning thirty as they were at any other point of their lives in the past, at least as far as they can remember. I am convinced that I, the same «I» who is now sitting by the table and writing this, walked in the city center yesterday and went to school many years ago. Thus, these briefly described facts that all presently perceived phenomena are referred to ONE SELF and that mental phenomena presented by our own memory are referred to THE SAME SELF which remembers them is what should be understood under the terms of UNITY and the sense of IDENTITY of our «self».

Then what is the mentioned «self»? Various answers to this question have been presented by various philosophical groups. They can be divided into two categories. The first one, which encompasses a large number of trends, is marked by the conviction that such a «self», usually called “the subject of mental phenomena,” exists and differs from each mental phenomenon and from all mental phenomena as a whole. The second category rejects the existence of the subject of mental phenomena; according to it,

the word “self” may only denote a whole, a collection of a certain amount of mental phenomena which are in a particularly close relationship to each other and thus differ from the mental phenomena of other people.

Naturally, this difference of opinions where some accept and others reject the existence of the subject of our mental activities flows from the difference of opinions on a certain metaphysical problem, namely, the problem whether there is another substance besides the phenomena accessible to our experience; something which is not perceptible but forms a sort of a basis of phenomena which are then called “accidents of the said substance.” The existence of this substance was first questioned, albeit tentatively, by John Locke; David Hume firmly denied their existence; and in contemporary times; G.T. Fechner attempted to develop the whole of his worldview without resorting to the hypothesis that apart from sensory or inner perceptible phenomena some mysterious substances exist. According to Fechner, there is no substance, either corporeal or spiritual; there are only phenomena arranged in certain groups so that they are always perceived together, and the substance is only a frivolous invention supposed to serve the purpose of explaining this close interrelationship of certain phenomena which belong to one such group. What we call our «self» is also such a group of mental phenomena included in the consciousness and memory, and not in the least some subject separate from these phenomena. Such a subject does not exist.

As I mentioned before, the first category of answers to the question what «self» is, may be divided, as I have said, into a number of trends, all of which acknowledge the existence of some sort of a subject of our mental phenomena, but cannot agree as to the nature of this subject. Some say it lies in the brain, or in the nervous system in general, consequently making the subject of sensory phenomena, that is, matter, also the subject of mental phenomena. These are called materialists. The other group denies matter the ability to function as the subject of mental phenomena; however, disinclined to ascribe a separate subject to them, they claim that there is a certain subject common to mental and sensory phenomena. These are called monists. According to them matter is not a subject but an accident, a manifestation of a pre-substance from which emerges matter on the one hand and spirit on the other. Another group accepts separate subjects for sensory and mental phenomena; matter and spirit, which monists perceive only as accessories of common substance, become substances themselves. Those who defend this view are called dualists. Yet another group represents a view contrary to the materialists. Just as the materialists only recognize the existence of one substance, matter, this group reduces both mental and sensory phenomena to one substance, namely: the spirit. These are idealists, or actually: spiritualists. There is finally an intermediary view

between monism and dualism. According to this view, subjects of mental phenomena consist of monads as their ultimate, indivisible elements; these are subjects of mental phenomena, at first unconscious, and then conscious at a higher level of development of a monad. The human soul is therefore a very highly developed monad. The proponents of this view are called monadologists.

Each of these trends contains more small sub-trends and various nuances. For instance, monists either allow the existence of only one of these pre-substances, like Spinoza or Hartmann (pantheists), or they divide this substance into a vast number of subjects, like Haeckel. Dualists either belong to the extreme dualist group of followers of Descartes, or they advocate the opinion of a moderate dualist, Aristotle. On the other hand, monadologists either deny the idea that single monads can affect each other (Leibniz), or believe that monads can affect each other (Bolzano, Teichmüller).

All of these trends can be grouped differently by assuming the relationship between each of them and the issue of immortality as a starting point. Thus, we obtain three groups. The first one encompasses the trends which the conviction of immortality CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH; the second one includes trends from which immortality FLOWS DIRECTLY AS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE; the third one includes trends which DO NOT JUDGE ON IMMORTALITY THEMSELVES.

First of all, the first group should encompass materialism and Haeckel's monism. If, as materialists claim, the brain is the subject of mental life, then all symptoms connected to its life terminate at the moment when it starts to decompose. According to Haeckel's monism, on the other hand, every bit of pre-substance, each atom of the ether (since ether is the said pre-substance), is endowed with physical forces and the ability to feel. A system as complicated as the structure of the brain brings the development of these powers to the greatest complexity; there emerges mental life, which is the result of interrelationship of those germs of consciousness which are the feelings of each of the atoms of ether. When the whole system disintegrates, the conditions of interrelationships which resulted in the emergence of mental life are terminated, and as a result of this, also the said life disappears. This kind of monism is so close to materialism, even though it cannot be confused with the latter due to various other assertions, that it is no wonder that both trends reach the same conclusions regarding immortality.

This same group includes a trend which denies the existence of a subject of mental phenomena, with such representatives as Hume and Fechner. Yet, here we come across the strange phenomenon that Fechner, who does not accept the subject of the symptoms of mental life, believes in

immortality and ardently defends it, which is rare among contemporary naturalists. He is of the opinion that mental activities follow each other after death just as they follow each other in life. Yet, in order to go beyond a mere conjecture that this is the state of affairs and to support his opinion with arguments, Fechner had to betray the premise he started from, claiming that there is no subject of mental phenomena. Although he thus proved to be less precise than Hume, who did not hesitate to deduce all the consequences from his view, Fechner remained original. Not wanting to accept any substance as the subject of mental activity, he made mental phenomena this subject, that is, "psychophysical motions," as he called them.

The second group only contains monadology, as it is the only one which describes the subject of mental phenomena in such a way that the immortality of this subject results from the very description. After all, monads are eternal; they have always existed and always will. The subject of mental phenomena and everyone's soul is such a monad which has already passed through a series of stages of higher and higher development before it organized a human body for itself, in which it gained self-awareness and memory for the first time. This memory reaches back beyond the life which the monad leads as a human soul; but this memory will not be lost after death, when the monad will continue to develop, since the law of development states that all powers obtained on a lower stage of development are often retained in further evolutionary progress. Therefore, also self-awareness and the memory of the human life will be retained forever by the human soul; it is eternal precisely because it is single, not composed of any parts and it is the ultimate, indivisible element. Admittedly, all kinds of systems and collections of monads vanish when they are divided into their elements, and therefore also human body disappears, but the soul does not disappear, as it is one such element itself. Thus, monadology affirms not only individual, but also personal immortality. Yet, monadology has to be clearly distinguished from Haeckel's monism, which it seems to have lot in common with at first glance. In fact, there is a very significant difference between them. Namely, Haeckel claims that the subject of mental actions is a collection of atoms of ether called the brain and so, a whole consisting of an immense number of parts; on the other hand, according to monadology this subject is not compound but single; as a result of this fundamental difference between monadology and Haeckel's monism, both of these directions lead to completely opposite answers to the question of immortality.

The third group contains mainly Spinoza's monism, resumed by Hartmann in a slightly changed form. Spinoza's monism allows for immortality, but only individual. This is because, according to Spinoza, man is a transient manifestation of the one and only substance which is revealed

in the whole universe. Each entity and each part of this world is a property of this substance, and just as it initially emerges from it, itself not in possession of a separate existence, it returns to the substance when it dies. Thus, it ceases to exist as a manifestation of the substance, but it continues to exist as an unrevealed part of this substance, except it loses its temporary, illusory independence. However, since at least one substance is eternal, then each being continues to exist forever after having returned to this substance.

On the other hand, Hartmann claims that the very substance is doomed to be annihilated, and therefore there is no question of immortality, even if only individual.

Another trend which belongs to the third group is spiritualism, also erroneously called "idealism." It takes different stances on immortality. Berkeley's spiritualism comes to the defense of immortality; Fichte's spiritualism essentially refutes it. No conclusions on immortality can be drawn from the spiritualistic stance as such; only some secondary views of individual spiritualists pushed some to defend, and others to deny immortality.

On the other hand, dualism is sometimes considered as a trend which inherently supports immortality, perhaps because it is closely related to Christian philosophy, which is a firm proponent of the immortality of the human soul. Still, let us remember that *cum hoc*, it is not yet *propter hoc*. Naturally, dualism can be fully reconciled with the conviction of immortality; however, whether dualist theory in itself is sufficient to derive the conclusion that the human soul is immortal seems doubtful to me. For instance, Aristotle, who was a dualist through and through, is not necessarily seen by the Fathers of the Church as a defender of immortality. Admittedly, Saint Thomas is of the opinion that Aristotle insisted on the existence of immortality; whereas Saint Augustin claims that Aristotle denied the immortality of the soul. Even among contemporary experts on Aristotle there is no consensus about this question. The reason for this ambiguity lies in the following fact:

Dualism teaches that sensory phenomena and mental phenomena have separate subjects. The subject of the former is matter, and the subject of the latter is soul. When soul and matter of a certain structure merge, a human being emerges. Matter had already existed before it formed the human body, albeit in a different form, as a part of the mother's organism. However, what is the case of the soul? There lies the whole difficulty.

Some dualists believe that the human soul emerges as a result of God's creative act, who endows the embryo of human body with a soul when the embryo is at a certain stage of development. There is no agreement yet as to when this happens. On the other hand, others are of the opinion

that the soul comes into existence without direct participation from God, as a result of the same reasons which cause the emergence of the human body. The former are called "creationists," and the latter are called "traducianists." Naturally, whoever suspects that the soul emerges in time must also admit the possibility that the soul perishes in time, either as a result of each act of God's will, or as a result of the functioning of the laws of nature similar to those which were the basis for bringing the soul of a child to life. In order to defend immortality from the position of creationism or traducianism, one must deploy theological arguments, by means of which it can be demonstrated that the destruction of directly created souls, or ones which emerged based on the laws of nature, cannot be reconciled with either God's wisdom or His mercy. Yet, this argumentation is purely deductive and may take place if the problem is seen from the theological point of view, but it is not suitable for philosophical research. A philosopher will always say that whatever has a beginning can also have an ending (although it does not have to), which is why he will not reach a conclusion in the issue of immortality with dualism in this interpretation.

There is only one instance where dualism fends for itself and, while remaining faithful to its fundamental assertions, is able to resolve the issue of immortality on philosophical ground; namely, when it follows Plato in recognizing the soul's preexistence. If the soul is as eternal as matter, then its worldly fusion with the human body does not deprive it of this feature; having said that, one must remember that eternity of matter and souls does not at all stand in opposition to the idea that they were created by God as long as the words "eternity" and "creation" are interpreted properly. Therefore, the fact that dualism allows immortality of souls is no worse than monadology as to proofs of immortality. Still, I placed it in the third group, because the decisive factor, preexistence of souls, is not at all a crucial element of dualism, but rather a view which can be easily reconciled with it; only together with this view does dualism stand in favor of immortality.

Having reviewed all the answers given to the question of what our «self» is, and having noted the relationship between each of these answers and the question of the immortality of this «self», let us return again to our starting point and see if the facts of unity of consciousness and the sense of identity can lead to conclusions which would enable us to choose from among the existing views on the essence of our «self» in philosophy.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

METAPHYSICS OF THE SOUL^{*†}

Out of all the theories concerning the human soul, invariably the most peculiar ones are those which do not recognize the existence of the soul altogether. If “soul” is understood as a non-material subject, a non-corporeal substance of mental phenomena, then not only must Fechner’s view, where the existence of any substances is not accepted, be included in this category of theories, but also materialism with its claim that the subject of mental phenomena is something material and corporeal. Materialists and parallelists (as Fechner’s proponents are called nowadays, even though he himself called his theory “synecology”) are not familiar with the concept of the soul, and even if they use it, they do so in order to determine a certain homogenous whole of mental phenomena, those which everyone considers as their own.

Just as a vote on various conclusions usually begins with the most far-fetched, also in the case of assessments of philosophical theories about the subject of mental phenomena, or our «self», it is best to start with the most radical view. Therefore, is the idea that the subject of our spiritual manifestations does not exist legitimate? Can we go without the substance whose accidents are all the phenomena of which our mental life is composed? Can we support Hume and Fechner in claiming that our mental life consists of a mere succession of phenomena, put together by our self-awareness and memory? Fechner defends this view exceptionally aptly, and if it turned

* The paper appeared in Polish as “Metafizyka duszy” in *Przełom* I (1895), No. 15 (31st August), pp. 467-480 [B&J].

† This is a continuation of the text posted above, “Contemporary Philosophy on the Immortality of the Soul” [B&J].

out to be right, it would entail a great simplification of numerous metaphysical theories. Yet, it seems to me that Fechner's arguments do not lead to the intended goal.

According to Fechner, the mental world consists of nothing but states of consciousness which follow each other, sometimes continuously and sometimes with shorter or longer interruptions caused by sleep etc. Each of those states usually consists of several phenomena; for instance, a sensory impression and an emotion connected to it (the sight of a person and the feeling of hate toward that person). By rejecting the subject of these phenomena, Fechner attempts to explain how we are led to believe in the UNITY of all such states of consciousness and in the IDENTITY of a certain (imaginary, according to Fechner) «self», which remains constant despite the succession of states of consciousness.

Fechner's relevant arguments are quite accurate and no objection can be raised against them. Still, they miss their point. After all, Fechner forgets that he should NOT address the question of how we reach the CONVICTION of the unity and identity of our «self», but rather, whether this conviction is right or wrong. CLAIMING that it is wrong, but DEMONSTRATING ITS ORIGIN, Fechner believes that he has PROVED it is wrong.

Yet, there is a possibility that Fechner is right, even though he did not prove his claim. After all, it is often the case that one scholar puts forward a hypothesis without having supported it with a proof, and yet another scholar provides the proof. The lack of proof should not be taken as a sign of falsity. How is it in our case then? What stand to take on the question of whether there is a subject of mental phenomena, whether our «self» is something more than a whole of certain mental phenomena, something lasting among the changing manifestations of spiritual life?

I respond: such a «self» exists; still, I admit I am unable to provide any proof of its existence. In my view, the existence of my «self» is one of those immediately obvious truths. Such truths cannot be proven but on the other hand, they do not need to be proven. Nobody demands to see the proof that a square circle does not exist, since it is immediately obvious that such an entity cannot exist. The conviction of one's own being is as immediately obvious. This is not a new claim. St. Augustine, and later also Descartes, expressed this view as well, and the latter formulated this truth in the following sentence: "I think therefore I am." There later appeared some super smart individuals who said: To be exact, only the existence of my THINKING is immediately obvious, but apart from that thinking, the fact that there is also some sort of a SUBJECT of that THINKING, some sort of «self» which thinks, is arbitrary. According to them, we should not actually be allowed to say "I think" (*Ich denke*), but only

“It is thinking” (*Es denkt*) just as we say “It is thundering” (*Es donnert*), not prejudging the problem of what is thinking and whether there exists something which is thinking but is not the act of thinking itself. Here I may respond: “*Habeant sibi!*” If someone denies his own existence, then I see little point in convincing someone who does not exist. And if that non-existent individual tells me that although «he» does not exist, there exists a certain group of impressions, thoughts, feelings etc., which wishes to lead a philosophical discussion with me, then a hitherto unprecedented dialogue may arise. This group of impressions etc., claims that what people call their «self» is only another group of mental phenomena, just like itself. Therefore, if he wants to be precise, he does not dare to use the first person pronoun, but can only speak of himself as a group of mental phenomena. Then, our dialogue may be something like the following:

ME: Pray tell me, group of mental phenomena, how does the group know that a certain mental phenomenon belongs TO IT and is not a part of some OTHER group of mental phenomena?

GROUP of mental phenomena: Each group of mental phenomena knows about it because it perceives its own mental phenomena directly, with the help of its inner experience; whereas it learns about other mental phenomena, ones which do not belong to it, only through reasoning.

ME: I agree completely; but pray, group of mental phenomena, kindly instruct me what is the mentioned inner perception to which each group owes its share of crucial information?

GROUP of mental phenomena: Each inner perception is also only one of many mental phenomena which a group, usually called the «self» by most people, consists in.

ME: Beautiful. But how does a group know that the inner perception also belongs to the same group of mental phenomena that I have the honor of conducting this highly instructive conversation with?

GROUP of mental phenomena: It is simply known because this inner perception is also an object of inner perception for it.

ME: Are these two inner perceptions one or two perceptions?

GROUP of mental phenomena: Naturally, two, since the first of them teaches the group of the phenomena belonging to this except for this very one which teaches it of this fact; on the other hand, thanks to the second inner perception, the group obtains information that also the first perception belongs to the same group.

ME: I see. Still, how does the group learn that also the second perception belongs to the same group of mental phenomena which the first one belongs to?

GROUP of mental phenomena: Obviously, from a third perception, similar to the first two.

ME: Thus, I could go on asking like that. I thank the group for the readiness to provide the above explanations. Now I know that this way no group will ever know which phenomena belong to it, as in order to gain this knowledge, a group would have to make an infinite number of consecutive inner perceptions, and that would take an infinite amount of time.

GROUP of mental phenomena: I see now that the way presented by me does not lead to good results. Therefore, I put forward the hypothesis that as already the first inner perception informs the group which phenomena belong to it, it also informs the group of its own affiliation to this group.

ME: I agree to this evasion, which the group graciously called "a hypothesis." Still, there remains one more doubt, which I cannot still grasp in my limited mind. The group claims that it learns something with the help of inner perception. Yet, the group is not something with an independent existence alongside the phenomena it consists of, but is only a smaller or greater amount of phenomena. Therefore, to be precise, one would have to say that a certain amount of phenomena learn from one of the phenomena, namely: inner perception, that it consists of a certain amount of phenomena.

GROUP of mental phenomena: I see you are a very apt student.

ME: I thank the group for the compliment. I regret I cannot say anything of the sort about the group. After all, amount is nothing other than an abstract notion?

GROUP of mental phenomena: That is right.

ME: Then, we are still not precise enough when we say that a certain amount of mental phenomena knows about something; we should say instead that phenomena in the number of ten, for instance, which make one group, learn about something.

GROUP of mental phenomena: Right.

ME: Then, when phenomena which the group I am talking to is composed of understand what I am talking about, does the understanding take place once only or as many times as there are phenomena, let us say: ten times?

GROUP of mental phenomena: Naturally, only once, and this is done in such a way that one part of this understanding falls on each of the ten phenomena, and all of these parts put together make one, full understanding.

ME: Cheers for that! Such understanding of the issue explains a lot. It also explains why I cannot fully understand the claims of those who believe they do not exist and that *THEY* are only groups of mental phenomena.

Apparently, I lack a certain mental phenomenon in which there lies a part of understanding necessary to make it complete. Yet, pray forgive me for asking one more question, honorable group, for I still do not comprehend how mental phenomena in the number of ten know that those parts of understanding, distributed among the ten phenomena, belong to each other and make one whole, one full understanding. After all, this knowledge is only one and itself is made of ten parts, distributed evenly in each of the phenomena.

GROUP of mental phenomena: Certainly.

ME: But then we are in need of another knowledge which informs these mental phenomena of the fact that these parts of the first knowledge residing in each of them make one whole; the same can be said of the second knowledge etc., *in dulce infinitum*! Therefore, mental phenomena, which the present group talking to me consists of, never know anything, although each of them is in possession of a part of the knowledge, as there is nothing which would put these parts together into a greater whole. For that, an infinite number of acts of knowledge would be necessary, rather than an infinite amount of time. The conclusion is that although I spoke to mental phenomena in the number of ten, let us say, these phenomena did not understand me, since the condition of understanding is the knowledge of affiliation of respective parts of understanding to one another, and this knowledge can never be achieved. What follows is that these phenomena cannot know about anything at all; this is why I may unscrupulously end this conversation with them, not saying goodbye and not thanking them, since these phenomena know nothing about anything; they do not know whether I am still talking to them or not, or whether I am saying goodbye or not.

The end of conversation.

This is more or less how one can reduce *ad absurdum* all those who claim that their «self» is nothing else than a collection or a group of mental phenomena. You need only to corner them and make sure they express themselves in a way which is a straight consequence of their assumptions, and then it is possible to deal with them. Fechner, followed by Wundt, use the word “soul” in their arguments with which they intend to prove that the soul as a subject of mental phenomena does not exist. Although they claim that they use the word to denote solely a group of mental phenomena, a certain whole, nothing more, they still suggest the original meaning to the word in spite of themselves and thus, they remove for themselves insurmountable difficulties which arise when one insists on understanding the soul, the «self», as merely a certain number of consecutive or simultaneous mental phenomena. If one is not deceived with empty words but attempts to penetrate thoroughly this somewhat delicate question, he cannot

seriously claim that his «self» is nothing more than a common name for certain mental phenomena.¹

Ergo sum. I am, I exist, not as a group of mental phenomena, but as a subject from which those phenomena arise. The conviction of unity and identity of our «self» does not lie in stating that the mental phenomena perceived by us refer to the one and only «self» which lasts among the ever changing and new manifestations of spiritual life. Yet, one contradicts himself if he disagrees with those who claim that they know such a subject does not exist, since the consequence of his alleged knowledge is that he cannot possess any knowledge at all.

* * *

Having learned that mental phenomena have a subject which they belong to as accidents belong to substance, we must ask further what kind of subject that is. Inner experience does not reveal the subject to us; we only perceive phenomena; but perhaps the kind of these phenomena together with the fact of unity of our consciousness and the identity of our subject will let us judge on the properties of this subject through reasoning. Therefore, instead of investigating, respectively, whether materialists, or monists, or others are right in recommending their definition of subject as the only correct one, we shall simply attempt to discover such features of the subject which would allow us to determine *eo ipso* whether our «self» should be understood according to this or that school of philosophy.

Again, we should take as the point of departure an unquestionable fact, well known from our inner experience. It is often the case that two objects are compared with each other; for instance, when we realize that we hear and see something at the same time, this conviction is based on the comparison of the time of the occurrence of the visual impression and the time of the occurrence of the auditory impression. Thus, we compare one impression with the other with regard to the time when they take place and

¹ It would be wise to quote Victor Cousin's words on this question: "*Dira-t-on, que le moi, c'est la pensée même, c'est-à-dire la sensation, le jugement etc. réunis dans une unité collective, qu'on appelle moi? Mais je sens et je sais, CERTISSIMA SCIENTIA ET CLAMAUTE CONSCIENTIA, que, quoique la pensée, le souvenir, la sensation ne soient pas sans le moi, le moi n'est pas seulement un lien logique et verbal, inventé pour exprimer leur union, mais quelque tant, qu'il est dans chacune d'elles identique au milieu de leur diversité... Je sais, qu'il n'est pas vrai, que la sensation ou le souvenir ou le désir, dans un certain degré de vivacité, deviennent moi, mais que c'est moi, qui constitue la sensation ou le désir, en m'ajoutant à un certain mouvement, à des certaines affections sensibles, qui ne s'intellectualisent ou quelque sorte et ne deviennent pour moi sensation ou désir qu'autant que j'en prends connaissance*" ([Cousin 1826], pp. 216-217).

decide that the time for both of these impressions is the same. In this way, we get four separate mental phenomena: (1) the image of color and shape (visual impression); (2) the image of the sound (auditory impression); (3) the act of comparison; (4) the judgment that the two images [are] simultaneous. We shall confine ourselves to the discussion of the first three phenomena.

The very fact that we compare mental phenomena with each other, namely: visual impressions and auditory impressions in our case, lets us claim firmly that the subject of these phenomena is single and does not consist of parts; this claim can be proven with irreproachable reasoning. If we assume that a subject consists of parts and we place each phenomenon in one of these parts, comparing phenomena proves impossible. This great truth can be proven in the following manner. Let the mental phenomenon marked with the number (1) be placed in part *A* of the subject; let the mental phenomenon marked with the number (2) be placed in part *B* of the subject. Then where should the phenomenon marked with the number (3), the very act of comparing, be placed? If it is placed in part *A*, only phenomenon (1), the visual impression, will be accessible to it, but phenomenon (2), which phenomenon (1) is to be compared with will not be accessible to it. On the other hand, if it is placed in part *B*, only phenomenon (2), the auditory impression, will be accessible to it, with the exclusion of phenomenon (1), and therefore the second phenomenon, necessary for comparison, will be lacking. There remain two other possibilities: either we can place phenomenon (3), that is comparing, in both parts, *A* and *B*, or we can place it in some other part *C*. In the first case, comparison is impossible again, as each of the comparisons which are supposed to occur would only be in the presence of one impression; yet, in order to be able to compare, one needs two objects. Also in the second case comparison cannot take place; as it belongs to a different part of the subject than the impressions which are to be compared, it cannot be in possession of any knowledge about these impressions. In the case of any doubts as to the above, one should consider the fact that by dividing the phenomena which are to be compared, as well as the very phenomenon of comparing, into three parts, we obtain three partial subjects, where part *A* sees, part *B* hears, and part *C* compares what *A* sees with what *B* hears, which however part *C* neither sees nor hears. Therefore *C*, without having seen any color, which only *A* sees, and without having heard any sound, which only *B* sees, is supposed to rule solely on the basis of its own, inner experience whether the impressions of the color and the sound are simultaneous. In the same vein, one might demand from someone that he compare with the help of his inner experience the thoughts of two people sitting on either side of him. In order for this comparison to be successful, it is necessary for THE SAME part of the subject

which is supposed to compare to also possess the phenomena which are to be compared with each other. *C* can only compare an auditory impression with a visual impression if *C* itself receives these two impressions and if they are ITS own impressions. This is to say that the subject of phenomena compared with one another must be identical with the subject of the comparison; the comparison cannot be placed in a different partial subject than the entity which is compared. Since we can at least compare each of our mental phenomena with another with regard to the time they occur in, all of our mental phenomena must necessarily be in the same subject. Even if we allow that our «self» consists of numerous parts, we would still have to ascribe all our mental phenomena to only one, indivisible part, since at the moment when we place the phenomena in different parts, the comparison between them becomes impossible for the reasons quoted above. Then, the mentioned part of that complex subject becomes the adequate subject, the adequate 'self', since what they occur in is the subject of our mental phenomena. Therefore, there is no doubt that what is seen, heard, compared, judged etc., the subject of those spiritual activities, our «self», is single and does not consist of any parts.

Based on the conclusion we reached that the subject of mental phenomena is indivisible, it may be stated that each current in philosophy which accepts a subject which consists of parts should be discarded as false and inconsistent with the conclusions drawn from obvious facts. Therefore, materialism is incorrect, as well as Haeckel's monism, since both of them claim that the brain, which consists of an infinite number of atoms, is the subject of mental phenomena. I am at a loss as to why some inflict so much work on themselves in order to refute one materialist or Haeckel's argument after another with great precision. It is quite sufficient to indicate the indisputable fact that we compare mental phenomena with each other, which results in the subject of these phenomena being indivisible, in order to force Büchner and Haeckel to retreat. Let them deal with this fact without having to betray their theories. Yet, they are unable to face it. HERE I WISH TO ASCERTAIN FORCIBLY A VERY SIGNIFICANT FACT that no work which defended Haeckel's materialism or monism attempted to reconcile these theories with the fact which we used to form the conviction of the singularity of our «self». They avoided this problem like the plague, and even if they did not earn the charge of ill will on their part, they at least exhibited great lack of diligence. As long as they avoid raising this very problem, they cannot have a claim to be considered respectable scholars whose only aim is to discover the truth.

Thus, forced to reject the opinion of those who deny the existence of the subject as well as those who seek it in the human brain, we obtained a surplus in favor of immortality. After all, the whole group of views on the

essence of the subject, WHICH CANNOT BE RECONCILED with the immortality of the soul, proved to be wrong. There remained only those trends which either directly support it, like monadology, or at least do not oppose it, or are even a par with monadology as to belief in immortality, when supplemented with pre-existence.

This surplus, albeit not very substantial for the time being, gains greater importance when we consider the fact that also monism in the meaning presented by Spinoza or Hartmann cannot be reconciled with facts. According to these philosophers, there is only one subject for all mental phenomena of all people. May we then inquire why all these phenomena with only the one subject are not combined into one great whole, thus creating only one person with very many mental phenomena? Even if we obtain a satisfactory response to this question, there arises another, greater difficulty; in fact, so great that monism disintegrates. This difficulty is the fact that often one person denies what another person claims. For instance, one person claims, "The soul is immortal," while another person claims, "The soul is mortal." Since according to Spinoza and Hartmann those two people, although they differ in their views to such an extent, have one common subject, and thus the subject called "God" by Spinoza and "Nescient" by Hartmann would view the same issue in two opposite ways. And so, God, or the Nescient Absolute, would CLAIM and DENY the idea that the soul is immortal at the same time, through his two manifestations in human shape! That would be utterly ridiculous!

Therefore, there remain monadology, spiritualism and dualism; where the last two can be supplemented with pre-existence or professed without it. If there was a way to prove that it is monadology which should be selected and spiritualism or dualism discarded, the issue of immortality would be resolved. Spiritualism could probably be dealt with, but this still does not resolve anything if we cannot resolve the dispute in favor of monadology, as there always remains the choice between monadology and dualism, and dualism does not rule on immortality in itself. Moreover, I know of no arguments which would force us to accept monadology and reject dualism, just as I know nothing of any arguments in favor of dualism and against monadology. In my opinion, there is no reason to support monadology, having rejected dualism, and to state from this point of view, which clearly supports immortality, that the soul is immortal.

Therefore it seems we have no choice. Indeed, we obtained a surplus in favor of immortality, having demonstrated that all philosophical trends which immortality RESULTS from are wrong. Yet, since we cannot demonstrate the fallacy of dualism as well, since both mortality and immortality of the soul can be RECONCILED with it, the obtain surplus seems too small to clearly change the balance in favor of immortality.

Yet, this is not the case. Although we lack arguments to definitely support monadology or dualism, we can make one more, and decisively at that, step toward the resolution of the question of immortality. This can be done in the following way:

Through irrefutable reasoning, based on unquestionable facts, we managed to prove that the subject of mental phenomena, our «self», is indivisible. Thus, it is an ultimate element in the world of mental phenomena just as atoms are ultimate elements in the world of sensory phenomena. This is where scientific analysis ends, which is able to demonstrate how objects emerge from the combination of indivisible elements and how they disappear by disassembling into elements again, and yet, it is unable to explain either the emergence or the disappearance of these indivisible elements and as a result, it seems to be forced to claim that these elements are eternal; that they have always existed and will always exist. According to science, matter is eternal. The same reasoning which leads to the conviction that material elements are eternal, also leads to the conviction that there is no natural explanation, that is: based on natural forces acting in the universe, for the emergence of mental elements or souls. Therefore, traducianism, which assumes the above explanation for the emergence of souls, is inconsistent from the scientific point of view.

By claiming that indivisible elements of existence are eternal, science does not really clarify anything. It only acknowledges that nothing can be judged as to the origin of these elements. Yet, the human mind will never be satisfied with such state of affairs, as it must seem strange that these elements would continue to exist in and of themselves, on their own, without a cause. The human mind only manages to believe that God may exist without a cause; everything else which exists must have a cause, and if the cause of something is not in natural forces, then it is in God. This is the only way to attain a view on the whole of existence which will satisfy the mind. Therefore we say that indivisible elements, atoms and souls, did not emerge as a result of the activity of chemical, mechanical, organic or mental forces, as these forces cannot exist *BEFORE* these elements, but that they owe their existence to God, who created them.

One might impute that I contradict myself by claiming that atoms and souls are created by God, since I claimed before that they are eternal. Yet, this is only apparently a contradiction, and it dissolves when the notion of creation is strictly defined. We call “created” all that which does not come into existence as a result of natural forces, but owes its existence directly to God. Only then can something be created and at the same time eternal in the regular meaning of the word. After all, it is possible for something which owes its existence to something else not to be subsequent to it. Just as the light, which has its beginning in the flame and which owes its

existence to the flame, does not come into existence later than the flame, but instead it exists in every moment the flame itself exists, also elements which owe their existence to God can exist for as long as God exists, and thus, *ETERNALLY* in the common meaning of the word. Thus, by conceding that atoms and elements exist eternally we do not automatically negate the idea that they were created by God.

Still, eternity is not an infinitely long time, but rather the absence of time. Just as colorlessness is not some undetermined color, but the lack of any color, or silence is not a certain tone but the lack of any sound, also eternity is not some unlimited time, but a complete lack of time. Speaking of God that He has always existed and will always exist, we are imprecise, since God does not at all exist in time, just as He does not exist in space, nor does He possess a shape or a color. Time, like color, is something which is established in our minds because this is how the brain is organized. The human brain creates for us the notion of time although it was not created in time. Time only exists in our minds, and wherever there is no brain which exists in given conditions, there is no time either. Since God does not exist in time, also His actions do not exist in time; God does not do anything in this or that moment, but instead, He does everything eternally, that is, His actions, just as His existence, cannot be defined solely with the differences in time.

From this understanding of eternity, the only comprehensible one, it results that there is only an apparent contradiction between creationism and the study of pre-existence. When creationism claims that God creates every soul at the moment when a given embryo of human body attains the appropriate stage of development, then it describes God's creative acts as if the discussed issue was human actions taking place in time, earlier or later. Creationism transfers the property of the *CREATED OBJECT*, the soul, which falls into the category of time together with the body, to the *ACT OF CREATION*. Similarly, we say of an artist that he recreated a certain group in a *VIVID MANNER*. Yet, vividness is not in fact a property of the *ACT OF RECREATION* but of the *RECREATED OBJECT*. Thus, we ought to say that the artist recreated a vivid group. Similarly, we should also say that God created the soul, which begins to act and manifest itself in a way that can be described in time, at the moment when the embryo of body attained a certain stage of development. We cannot say anything about *WHEN* the soul was created, and rightly so, since the creation of the soul as an act of creation conducted by God does not take place in this or that moment but takes place in eternity, that is, in a way which cannot be determined with temporal determinations.

On the other hand, the study of pre-existence claims nothing else. First of all, by stating that souls exist eternally, it recognizes the view that the emergence of souls cannot be explained with natural forces. Creationism

also agrees with this claim. The difference between these two trends consists solely in that the theory of pre-existence is satisfied with this purely negative knowledge, whereas creationism supplements it with a positive claim, stating that human souls cannot emerge as a result of action of natural forces and, like matter, they owe their existence to a supernatural force, that is, God's creative act. Therefore, there is no contradiction between creationism and the theory of pre-existence; the contradiction arises only when creationism begins to apply the same measure to the creative act of God as to human actions and begins to inquire as to when God creates souls. To pose such questions is to deny God his eternity.

We are approaching our objective. We have demonstrated that out of numerous theories on the human soul only those can remain which, first of all, do not deny its existence as the subject of our mental phenomena and, secondly, do not claim that the subject consists of parts. There is nothing more philosophy can add in this matter. Thus, it is also unclear whether we are to follow spiritualism, monadology or dualism. However, it is quite clear that the subject, our «self», since it is single, cannot constitute the result of the operation of natural forces, and that it cannot EMERGE in the same conditions under which products of chemical, mechanical, biological etc. actions emerge, and therefore, it is eternal just as the indivisible particles of the corporeal world. The difference between the theory of pre-existence and creationism interpreted properly does not influence this conviction. What is eternal does not have either a beginning in time or an end in time. The SOUL, itself being eternal, is IMMORTAL.

* * *

Therefore, the statement that the problem of immortality has long been resolved is not entirely invalid. Plato resolved it, and everything which has been done in this matter since then may have contributed to a more precise formulation of certain parts of the proof but it did not alter the main line of reasoning. Countless objections were raised against immortality; admittedly, I did not take into account any of them in the present paper. Yet, there is no obligation to defend oneself from objections which were raised against the RESULT of some research instead of the research itself, which remains intact. Let the opponents of immortality demonstrate the error in REASONING, in the WAY which lead to the conviction of immortality, instead of professing that the soul must be mortal for certain reasons. Scientific criticism should not evaluate the RESULTS of research, but rather the WAY which led to the results. Since in our case the way is obvious and since the conclusions emerge strictly logically from indubitable facts, all those inconvenienced by the idea of immortality cry out that the soul [is] mortal or that there is

no soul. As long as they only provide imaginary proofs for the mortality of the soul, and as long as they do not provide a proof that the error lies in the PROOF of immortality, we will have the right to pay no attention to them. Until someone convinces us that we chose the wrong path, we shall believe that we are not lost and we have not missed our objective.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

WHAT DOES “EXPERIENTIAL” MEAN?^{*†}

Because of the fact that expressions like “experimental physics,” “experiential psychology,” “experiential sciences,” “experiential research,” “experiential methods” etc. are widely accepted and applied, any objections concerning them are likely to be ineffective. However, objections have to be raised, in the hope that valid arguments will eventually convince opponents. All the more so because the question concerns a term which is usually applied by the people of science, and not by the crowd and thoughtless people. What raises objections is the fact that a word “experiential” [Pol. “*doświadczalny*”], when used in complex expressions like

^{*} The paper appeared in Polish as “Co znaczy „doświadczalny”?” in *Ruch Filozoficzny* II (1912), No. 4, pp. 57-60 [B&J].

[†] Twardowski elaborates in this article on a Polish word “*doświadczalny*” (“experiential”). In order to indicate the Polish word discussed, I introduce the following pattern: I write the English word plus “*” (thus “*doświadczalny*” = “experiential*”). In his argument, Twardowski refers to the semantic and morphological features of this word, as well as to complex expressions in which this term is used. A semantic feature is characteristic of the whole group of adjectives to which “experiential*” belongs; this group consists of adjectives which indicate potential actions that the objects, which are described by these adjectives, may be subjected to. This feature has its morphological representation in the form of the Polish suffix “-alny.” In English, there is a similar group of adjectives which indicate potential actions; they have characteristic suffixes as well, namely “-able” or “-ible.” Moreover, a number of Polish complex expressions consisting of “-alny”-adjectives are equal – in terms of meaning – to English expressions consisting of “-able/-ible”-adjectives. In this article, Twardowski enumerates Polish expressions which have their equal, directly translated English counterparts (for instance, “*zauważalny*” and “noticeable”). Yet there are some exceptions. To start with, some Polish adjectives share a semantic feature of potentiality with their English counterparts, although it is not marked by suffixes [C].

those listed above, violates both the spirit of the Polish language and one of the principal rules of scientific terminology.*

In order to justify the first objection, one should understand what meaning Polish adjectives ending with “-alny” [Eng. “-ible/-able”] have. There are a number of adjectives of this kind, such as: “touchable” (Pol. “*namacalny*,” “*dotykalny*”), “visible” (“*widzialny*”), “audible” ([“*słyszalny*”], “*dosłyszalny*”), “noticeable” (“*spostrzegalny*”), “measurable” (“*obliczalny*”), “reversible” (“*odwracalny*”), “destructible” (“*zniszczalny*”) etc. The meaning of adjectives ending with such suffixes is clear. The adjectives express a property that these objects are «open» to the activities which were indicated by the relevant verbs. In other words, these adjectives state that the objects which the adjectives refer to may be subjected to relevant actions. Therefore, anything which may be touched is described as “touchable,” anything which may be noticed – as “noticeable”... anything which may be reversed is “reversible.” The same is consequently applied to negative expressions. Therefore, anything that can be experienced is “experiential” and “unexperiential” refers to anything which cannot be experienced. Then, as things which can, or could, be experienced are described as GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE, one may claim that anything that is experiential is, or could be, GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE.

However, when one refers to “experimental physics” or the “experiential method” they do not mean Physics or a method which can be experienced or which is GIVEN IN EXPERIENCE. By using these expressions,

Above all, it concerns the word “experiential*” which is discussed in this paper. It is hard to find an English translated form which would have (a) the same meaning and (b) a relevant suffix. Let us consider two words which seem to be the most suitable. On the one hand, the word “testable” is proper in terms of morphology but its meaning differs from the meaning of “experiential*.” On the other hand, the word “experiential” is excellent in terms of meaning but is devoid of the “-able”/“-ible” ending. The most suitable word would be a new term “experiantable,” which would convey the idea of potentiality (“-able”) and would visibly show what verb this adjective is derived from. For the sake of clarity, I decided to choose the word “experiential.” Yet in consequence, some of Twardowski’s remarks may not be clear as he often refers to a morphological feature of adjectives normally indicated by a suffix “-able/-ible” which “experiential” does not have [C].

* In English, the science which Twardowski refers to is called “experimental physics” so there is no problem with a misleading use of the adjective. In a direct translation from Polish, this branch of physics would be called “experiential physics.” One should bear in mind that Twardowski, who referred to Polish terminology, raised doubts concerning the phenomenon of, let us say, “experiential Physics.” I decided to keep the original collocation “experimental Physics” but I made the text slightly confusing in some places. Whenever it was possible I tried to modify Twardowski’s examples so that the expression “experimental Physics” did not occur; such changes are indicated in the footnotes [C].

a speaker means physics or a method which IS BASED ON experience. Therefore, in these cases the adjective “experiential” has an altered meaning; although it essentially [i.e. normally] describes something which IS AN OBJECT OF EXPERIENCE or which is experienced, [in its altered meaning] it describes something which is a subject of experience or [something] which experiences [something else].*

The objection explained above justifies sufficiently why expressions like “experimental physics” (“*fizyka doświadczalna*”), “experiential psychology” (“*psychologia doświadczalna*”) etc. should be rejected. However, one may still be resistant to the spiritual prescriptions given by language. They may argue: “Admittedly, the word «experiential» in expressions such as “EXPERIENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY” etc. may be used not in its ORIGINAL and proper meaning. However, the terms of scientific terminology often have altered meanings which differ from original ones. Therefore, the change in meaning of «experiential» is allowed, all the more as it is clear what this adjective means in these complex expressions.” However, this argument overlooks one matter. Putting its grammatical correctness aside, this adjective does not fulfill one principal condition that every scientific term has to fulfill: the condition of UNIVOCALITY. Therefore, the adjective “experiential” must not be a scientific term.

Moreover, the noun from which the adjective “experiential” is derived is ambiguous itself. The Polish word “experience*”† covers nowadays the meanings of other foreign words, such as the Latin “*experientia*” and “*experimentum*,” the German “*Erfrahrung*” and “*Versuch*” and the English “experience” and “experiment.” In all these cases, the meanings of two separate foreign words are equal to one Polish word with its meaning. There is no misunderstanding when the Polish word is used in the plural; by choosing a plural form [indicated in Polish in this case by suffix “-a” – “doświadczenia”] one clearly refers to experiments, and not to experiences. However when used in singular form, it is clearly ambiguous. For example, when one is told that Galileo Galilei has established his law of falling bodies thanks to experience [Pol. “*doświadczenie*”], it may not really be suggested that he conducted experiments in order to

* The English term “experiential” (and its Polish equivalent “*doświadczeniowy*”) probably expresses these intuitions well [C].

† As it is shown below, Twardowski refers to foreign words which are equivalent to “*doświadczenie*”; English terms, namely “experience,” are mentioned by him as well. In order to make the text more intelligible for non-Polish speakers, I chose the following pattern: in most cases, when Twardowski applies the Polish term “*doświadczenie*,” I mark it by the form “experience*” [C].

state this law. Moreover, it is not clear what a speaker uttering such a sentence has in mind: whether they intended to contrast Galileo's conception with a priori statements on nature, or to highlight the experimental character of Galileo's research.

The ambiguity of the Polish noun "experience*" causes the adjective to be ambiguous as well when one considers its meaning as "making use of experience or based on experience." The plural form which helps to indicate the proper meaning of the noun – namely, its connection to experiment – is not helpful here. Therefore, such expressions like "experiential psychology," "experiential science" or "experiential method" are classical examples of ambiguous terms. Due to this ambiguity, they lack any scientific value: it is not clear whether "experiential" in the expressions listed above describes psychology, science and method which are based on experience (and therefore are not of an a priori character), or which use experimental methods of research.

In order to make the way of speaking precise, one ambiguous term should be replaced with two unambiguous ones. The Polish language has two excellent words that fulfill this requirement: "empirical" and "experimental"; their equivalents are present in English, French, German and Italian as well. The former is derived from the Greek word "ἐμπειρία" (which is equal to the [Latin] "*experientia*") and it describes the knowledge, science, methods etc. which are based on experience and therefore are not of an a priori character. The latter describes knowledge that is gained as a result of experiments, or science that uses experimental methods of research.

Some people would argue that there is no need to differentiate between the two meanings of "experiential*" because if science is experimental, then it is always empirical. Admittedly, this implication is true. Yet it is not a work around: empirical science may be experiential but it does not have to be. This statement is of grave importance from a methodological point of view and it justifies why one should distinguish between the adjectives ["experiential," "experimental" and "empirical"]. Otherwise, the conditional statement is not clearly stated. One could not express then, [for example], that both astronomy and history are empirical sciences but are not experiential ones; or that within [originally homogenous] psychology, two branches emerged over time: rational psychology and empirical, and that empirical psychology became an experiential science [*scil.* using experiments] in its later phase of development.

The examples listed above give us clear evidence that there is not only a theoretical but also a practical need to distinguish separate notions by ascribing separate terms to them. Then one can replace the expression

“experiential method” with a relevant term “empirical method” or “experimental method,”* depending on the context.

However, the word “experiential*” should not be eliminated [from scientific terminology]. It may be used with its original meaning – which can, or could, be given in experience – and would not violate the spirit of the Polish language. For example, [there will be] an experiential world contrasted with an unexperiential (transcendent) one, experiential phenomena contrasted with phenomena which cannot be experienced, such as alleged unconscious mental phenomena. Yet this unambiguous way of using “experiential*” cannot be achieved unless one redefines this word and limits its meaning to the original one which is equal to Latin “experiential.” And in order to avoid [misleading associations with] Latin “*experimentum*,” I suggest explicitly using the word “experiment.”

As a result, one would have three separate terms at their disposal – “experiential,” “empirical” and “experimental” – and all of them would have their own meaning. Meanwhile, when this change is not implemented, as is the case nowadays, two notions are used interchangeably and the last one, which is original and the most accurate, is overlooked entirely. One may argue that foreign terms should not displace indigenous ones, especially as the latter ones are available in a given language. However, linguistic purism is never strict and definite to such an extent that scientific language was unclear and ambiguous. The univocality of terms is the most principal requirement of scientific language. Moreover, “empirical” and “experimental” have already been introduced to Polish terminology and whoever is guided by purist tendencies and prefers to use an expression like “experiential psychology” (Pol. “*doświadczalny*”) instead of “experimental psychology” (Pol. “*eksperymentalny*”) seems to forget that “physics” and “psychology” are also foreign words.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

* Twardowski mentioned physics here as well [C].

WHAT DOES “PHYSICAL” MEAN?^{*†}

In schedules and other documents published by our universities and secondary schools, expressions such as “physical society”[‡] often appear. One easily understands its meaning. It concerns an organization which focuses on particular problems connected with physics. By analogy, terms like “mathematical society” are coined. Therefore, such expressions do not seem to be peculiar or raise any doubts.

However, in the same schedules and other documents published by our universities and secondary schools, expressions like “physical chemistry” and “physical geography” are used. When one compares these expressions with the one listed above [i.e. “physical society”], they will immediately notice that “physical”¹ has a different meaning when used with “chemistry” and “geography.” “Physical chemistry” means “a branch of chemistry (its research) which is close related to physics.” On the contrary, in “physical

^{*} The paper appeared in Polish as “Co znaczy „fizyczny”?” in *Ruch Filozoficzny* V (1919-1920), No. 7-8, pp. 121-126 [B&J].

[†] In order to indicate that Polish words are being discussed, I introduce the following pattern: I write the English word plus “*” (thus “fizyczny” = “physical*”). If there are pairs of words with similar meanings in Polish but they are not differentiated in English, I add numbers at the end (“muzyczny” = “musical*1” and “muzykalny” = “musical*2”) [C].

[‡] Twardowski gave here more examples. The problem is that in this list of Polish words, the word “physical*1” appeared in complex expressions. Therefore they raised doubts. Yet doubts are hard to be raised in English, as in English equivalents for the words given by Twardowski, the word “physical” is not used. For example, “gabinet fizyczny” or “pracownia fizyczna” are translated to English as “physics lab” and “instytut fizyczny” is translated as “institute of physics.” In order to show the ambiguity, one should refer to “physical room” and “physical institute,” which is incorrect. That is why I chose another expression, in which the word “physical” is somehow ambiguous [C].

geography” the word “physical*¹” does not have the same meaning; it does not refer to research [within geography] which would be related to physics, like research [within chemistry] was. Apparently, the meaning of “physical*¹” in “physical chemistry” differs from the use in “physical geography.” Moreover, what gives us evidence that this word is even more meaningful is the expression “physical exercises.” This phrase can be interpreted twofold*; obviously, “physical exercises” refers to actions which people undertake in order to be healthy. In contrast to “physical Chemistry” or “physical society,” “physical exercises” does not concern physics at all.

Thus, the first meaning of a word “physical*¹” concerns a relation between some actions, places, organizations etc. and physics, that is a science. The adjective “physical*¹” when interpreted in this way comes from the noun “physics,” just like “botanical” and “mathematical” are derived from, respectively, “botany” and “mathematics.” The second meaning of the word “physical*¹” neither concerns relation to physics [i.e. problems of physics], nor comes from a noun “physics.” The adjective “physical” interpreted in this way is just a translation of a Greek adjective “φυσικός” which is derived from the noun “φύσις.” “Φύσις” means ‘nature.’¹

In order to realize what “physical*¹” understood in the second way means, one has to consider what the original noun “φύσις” (nature) means.² Originally, “φύσις” meant all that exists, or the whole world, or the universe; titles of various physical works on such topics which contain the phrase “περί φύσεως” refer to that meaning. Greek philosophers understood the word “φύσις” in the same way when they mentioned “physiologists,” or people who studied the universe. As words like “φύσις” and “nature” suggest that the universe has been self-created, the adjectives “physical*¹” and “natural” respectively concern [phenomena] which have also been created by themselves, or which exist by nature, and have not appeared in an artificial way. Therefore, there is the word a “natural person”[†]

* This ambiguity occurs in Polish, but not in English [C].

¹ As it is widely known, “physics” as the name of a science is also derived from the adjective “φυσικός” which comes from the noun “φύσις,” while its origin is seen in “η φυσική θεωρία” or “τα φυσικά.” Therefore, “physics,” the name of a science, and “physical” understood in the way which does not concern physics (science), have a common source of origin, that is the noun “φύσις.”

² I mention the meanings of only those words listed above which are important for this discussion.

[†] Twardowski refers to the Polish language in which the word “physical₁” is used in this expression. The direct English translation of the Polish phrase would be a “physical person,” although English has the collocation “natural person.” Besides, it is interesting how many Polish words and expressions are translated into English with the use of a word “nature,”

as opposed to a legal person; while the former one refers to a “real” human being, the latter one is created by law.

However, “physical*¹” does not always mean “natural.” It is because the meanings of the words “φύσις” and “nature” have been changed over the time and their original meaning – ‘concerning all that exist, or the whole world, or the universe’ – has been limited to just a part of total universe. The shift started when one began to distinguish and oppose spiritual or mental elements of the world to physical ones. It was then when “φύσις” and “nature” were given the narrower meaning which refers to the material (Pol. “cielesny”) aspects of the universe solely.* Yet, the original and broader meaning has been kept in some contexts. For example, Spinoza’s statement *Deus sive natura* should be understood as “God, or the universe” and not “God, or nature₂”[†], because the second translation darkens the fact that he has a spiritual as well as a physical side of the universe in mind. Whenever one says “law of nature,” they also use the word “nature” in its broader sense. The expression “laws of nature” includes, apart from the notion of the laws which influence the physical world, the notion of the laws that determine mental phenomena; at the same time, this phrase suggests that the laws are settled by nature and are opposed to norms and other regulations settled by people.

Anyway, the original and broader meaning of the word “φύσις” and “nature” has been displaced by its narrower meaning.[‡] Therefore, the adjective “physical₁” seldom means ‘natural’. It is used rather in connection with the body and senses, as opposed to in connection with the spirit, mind, thoughts, or “moral.” That is why such phrases as “physical-moral order” (by Hugo Kołłątaj), “physical pain” and “physical coercion” (as opposed to “moral”), “physical delight” (as opposed to “spiritual”), “physical necessity” (or “physical impossibility”) (as opposed to “logical”) etc.³ In the

“natural” etc. See the next footnote and further Twardowski’s remarks about English in the given area [C].

* In this place, there was a sentence which was intentionally skipped in translation. In Polish, there are two terms (“*natura*” and “*przyroda*”) which have one English equivalent (“nature”). Let us call them, for the sake of this explication, “nature*¹” and “nature*²,” respectively. “Nature*²” has a biological connotation and means as much as “the whole of living beings” (fauna and flora). “Nature*¹” is ambiguous and therefore has a broader meaning than “nature₂.” It may be synonymous with “nature*²” but it has some characteristic aspects as well. For example, only “nature*¹” is equivalent to “essence,” and the sum of “essential features of a given object” is “nature₁,” and not “nature*²” [C].

† See footnote * on p. 218 [C].

‡ The rest of the sentence has been skipped. Twardowski explained here that “nature*²” refers to physical aspects of the universe [C].

³ It is possible that the notion of physical necessity (or physical impossibility) (as opposed to logical) includes the meaning of the word “physical” which was discussed above, namely,

past, the phrase “physical sciences” (Pol. “nauki fizyczne”) was used and it meant the same as “natural sciences” nowadays.⁴ In these cases, the adjective “physical” was contrasted with “humanistic,” in the same way that the purely physical world is contrasted with a human being understood as spiritual and physical entity. By analogy, physical geography is contrasted with political geography; physical anthropology is contrasted with psychological anthropology etc.

To sum up, the meanings of the word “physical” is divided into two groups. The first one concerns the meaning of the word “physical” which is derived from “physics” and means “contributing to physics,” “concerning physics,” “characteristic of physics” etc. The second one concerns the meaning of the word “physical” which is a translated form of the word “φυσικός” and means “natural / given by nature,” “connected with the body,” “material,” “entailing from laws of nature” etc.

These two groups differ from each other significantly, although originally, at the dawn of science, they had some common core of meaning. When natural sciences were homogenous, the word “physics” meant “the study of the world” (Pol. “badanie przyrody”). Therefore, the same word referred both to the field of research of a science and to a science that dealt with this field. Yet new sciences soon began emerging from the original homogenous physics and the common core of two groups of the meaning disappeared; nowadays it belongs to the history of science. “Physical” which means “concerning physics” and “physical” which means “concerning material aspects of the world” are different. But one word is used to describe two [separate] phenomena!

However, it is not inevitable. In some languages, there are two separate adjectives which describe two separate phenomena. For example, “*fisico*” and “*fisicale*”⁵ in Italian, “*physisch*” and “*physikalisch*” in German, “*phisico*” and “*physical*” in Portuguese, “*physisk*” and “*phiskalsk*” in Danish. Admittedly, in some languages only one word exists like “physical” in

“concerning the universe understood as something given by nature.” Physical necessity (or impossibility) is based on the laws of nature where “nature” is understood in its original and broader sense. Moreover, it occurs both in the physical world and the mental (within psychological facts).

⁴ The phrase “physical sciences” appears mentioned, for example, in the set of regulations of Vilna University of 1803 (article 4). In this paper, among other departments of the University, “the department of physical and mathematical sciences” is mentioned. As “physical sciences” includes physics, chemistry, natural history, botany etc., one may state that physics is a physical science. It immediately makes us realize that the word “physical” in the expressions listed above is not derived from the word “physics.” When used in these phrases, “physical” is a translated form of a Greek word “φυσικός” which, in turn, comes from the word “φύσις.”

⁵ The adjective “physicalis” exists in later Latin where it means the same as “medical.”

English, “physique” in French, “*físico*” in Spanish. In Polish, like in Italian, German and other languages, there are two words, “*fizyczny*” (“physical*¹”) and “*fizyczny*” (“physical*²”).* Yet “physical*²” is becoming used less frequently, both in scientific and in colloquial language. Schedules and documents, which were mentioned at the beginning of this paper, contribute to this tendency by referring to “physical” [i.e. “physical*¹”] research, “physical” problems, “physical” methods, “physical societies etc. However, it is the word “physical*²” that should be used in such expressions. It is hard to find any arguments against such solution, as the word “physical*²” is derived from “physics,” the name of a science, and refers to anything that is connected with this science, i.e. what is in the field of interest of physics, what serves an auxiliary role to physics etc. But there is a convincing argument for including this word [to scientific terminology]. It consists in one of the principal rules of scientific terminology which states that two notions should have two separate terms. That is why such terms like Italian “*fisicale*” or German “*physikalisch*” etc. were coined. Therefore, if the adjective “physical*²” did not exist in Polish (yet!), there would be the need to coin it, in the manner of the terminology of other languages. [It is advisable to] follow tendencies leading to more precise terminology and therefore avoid inadequacies of less perfect tendencies (like in English, French and Spanish). Would anyone think about discarding the word “*muzykalny*” (“musical*²”) from the Polish language, just because there is also the word “*muzyczny*” (“musical*¹”)?† Both the first and the second words are needed because they express separate notions, do they not? Admittedly, the case of “musical₁” and “musical₂” is, in a sense, an internal problem of musical terminology. “Physical*¹” and “physical*²” face other sort of difficulties. When the term “physical*²” is being replaced by “physical*¹” which has a different meaning, then a scientific, or physical, term is being applied [outside scientific/philosophical terminology]. Therefore, it is not a problem of physical₂ terminology (some of our physicists would say “physical*¹ terminology” – “*terminologia fizyczna*”).

Advocates of using the word “physical₁” instead of “physical*²” may argue as follows: If an adjective derived from a word “Physics” should be “physical*²,” and not the other one, then the pattern should be applied

* Unsurprisingly, there is no English equivalent for this Polish word. As Twardowski’s study reveals, the meaning of “physical-PL-2” is close to the meaning of “physical*¹,” although there are slight differences. “Physical*²” appears, for example, in a phrase “*badanie fizyczne*” that is translated into English as “physical examination” [C].

† This pair of words has only one English equivalent, a word “musical.” “Musical*¹” means “related to or connected with music” (“musical instrument”), and “musical*²” means “having a skill in or passion to music” (“musical people”) [C].

to other sciences as well, for example “*logikalny*” (from “*logika*” [“logic”]), “*etykalny*” (from “*etyka*” [“ethics”]), “*estetykalny*” (from “*estetyka*” [“aesthetics”]).* Undoubtedly, it is true. Moreover, the lack of such terms [in Polish] leads to numerous equivocations. For example, [let us consider the term] “logical theory.” It refers to a theory which is “logical” because it belongs to logic. Yet it may mean as well that a “logical theory” is the one constructed according to logical rules etc. But does the fact that [undesirable] equivocations exist within philosophical sciences justify introducing new fallacies of this kind? And especially when it requires deleting a previously accepted term which, moreover, helps to avoid such equivocations? By replacing “*physical₂*” with “*physical^{*1}*,” physicists face some difficulties which should make them realize their mistake. Problems occur when one tries to give a name to courses [in Physics], as in plans of lectures at universities. In these documents, expressions like “to perform exercises for reviewing knowledge of Physics” or “to perform exercises in Physics lab” are used instead of the phrase “physical exercises.” The last expression is ambiguous as it also means any exercises conducted to keep fit, as opposed to *exercitia spiritualia*, as it was mentioned at the beginning of this paper.[†] Therefore, as physicists tacitly admit, exercises which concern Physics cannot be called “*physical₁*” ones. Then, why would one call research and methods which concern Physics “*physical₁*” as well, and claim that they remain consequent?

It is very likely that my argument, which is not surprising for philosophers, will not convince physicists. Argumentation concerning the faulty use of the word “experiential” was not appealing either to physicists or to other researchers dealing with natural science, nor even to some psychologists.[‡] It seems that the “exactness” declared by some representatives of exact sciences does not concern names and the names of the sciences and methods they deal with. Therefore, philosophers whose mission it is to oversee the preciseness of terminology, both within Philosophy and in other sciences, should pay attention to the problems [sketched above]. Specialists who deal with SPECIFIC SCIENCES are not interested.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

* Examples which are given by Twardowski cannot be translated into English as there are no suitable equivalents. English does not register such pairs of words. There are no such words in Polish either and Twardowski suggests they could be coined. That is why no dictionary definitions can be given [C].

[†] Let me remind the reader that this ambiguity occurs in Polish but not in English [C].

[‡] Cf. [Twardowski 1912a]. [See also this volume, p. 211-217, B&J.]

PART IV

ETHICS AND AESTHETICS

ETHICS AND THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION*

The theory of evolution is older than Charles Darwin. Cuvier's opinion that all species and types of organic beings which live on the Earth are «constant» and do not change nor transform one into another was questioned by some researchers in the last century. One of them was the grandfather of Charles Darwin, Erasmus, who introduced the whole system of the origins of species in his book *Zoonomia, or the Laws of Organic Life* (1794-98). The ideas of Erasmus Darwin influenced Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck, which may be observed in his work *Zoologie philosophique* (1809). However, none of them were to be found popular even in the field of life sciences. Their ideas were not sufficiently justified and therefore they were underestimated. Charles Darwin was more successful. Yet he should be given credit not for suggesting the origin of species, but for stating hypotheses which enabled the formulation of the theory of the origin of species. Like all other theories, Darwin's theory may then be discussed, although it may turn out – besides, some claim that it actually did turn out – to be too weak to support the theory of evolution; in that case, some other hypotheses about the origin of species would need to be formulated.

Darwin's findings caused at any rate the theory of evolution to be definitely successful in the field of natural sciences. Researchers who do not agree with Darwin, such as Weismann, do not deny evolution, but they claim that Darwin's justification for evolution is insufficient.

The influence of the theory of evolution exceeded the mere natural sciences. It was Darwin himself who applied it to the area of mental

* The paper appeared in Polish as "Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji" in *Przełom* I (1895), No. 18 (21st August), pp. 551-563 [B&J].

events. After that, Herbert Spencer was the first philosopher to comment on the symptoms of mental life from the evolutionary standpoint. This new [i.e. evolutionary] approach is present in, above all, psychology; as far as branches of philosophy are concerned, ethics is influenced to the greatest degree by evolutionary tendencies.

Admittedly, it has been previously claimed that moral rules are empty conventional or that they result from a social system. Sophists and skeptics in Greek were staunch advocates of such a viewpoint. They argue that people formulate various ethical statements and that people's ethical opinions change. Moreover, they pointed out that there is also a general change of ethical opinions in time. However, it had not been before Darwin that this opinion was given a theoretical form. In Darwinism, some facts, which ancient thinkers had been familiar with, were organized according to general laws. The main assumption was that the facts are just symptoms, or instantiations, of a general law of evolution.

Unsurprisingly, attempts to apply the concept of evolution to the field of morality were not warmly welcomed and caused some concerns. Opponents disagreed that the change of judgments about good and bad things was necessary, and that the difference between moral and immoral conduct is – and would be – relative. Ethics would be ruined then, they argued, there would be no norms of conduct and, eventually, no one would know what they should or should not do!

As a result, a new disagreement in philosophy occurred. Some philosophers still support the opinion that the feeling of obligation, the ability to differentiate between the good and the bad and the drives of moral nature are given to mankind as *a priori* elements of people's mental constitution. Meanwhile, others agree with the new theory which states that conscience, altruistic feelings and ethical convictions result from sexual selection and other evolutionary factors, as particular animal classifications do. Therefore, advocates of the second viewpoint claim that a given action is moral when it conduces toward sustaining the life of an individual or the whole of mankind and at the same time it does not allow that these interests of particular individuals are contentious.

Each stage of development at which a given group of beings is in a given time has its relevant ethics. For tribes of wild people live in different conditions than civilized people and therefore they have to behave in a different way in order to preserve their individual and tribal nature. Our nation, in turn, is a proud owner of the most dignified ethics, that is, Christ's ethics, and we consider it to be a true ethics only for the reason that it is the most suitable to our life. Soon the time will come – or has already come, as some claim – to exchange Christ's ethics for a new one which will be more relevant to our future conditions of life than the norms of the Gospel, and

this new ethics is what the world and mankind strive toward. Apostles of this new ethics are among us and Nietzsche is their leader.

Undoubtedly, the main argument which is given by supporters of new, RELATIVE OR PROGRESSIVE, ethics is strong: particular nations have various ethical convictions which differ from each other; moreover, it occurs even within one nation that their ethical convictions are subject to change. In some nations, it is accepted to kill old and disabled people or nobody feels remorse for theft or slavery. Ethnology and anthropology provide us with plausible evidence in this field, yet one does not need to study deeply nor travel to understand this problem. It is enough to look around: an anarchist who believes in anarchic ideas has no qualms about detonating a bomb in a meeting of the government; moreover, he is convinced that future generations will be proud of him and grateful for his act. There are Europeans who have no doubts of whether to take advantage of people who are in a terrible predicament; they make a fortune at the expense of the work of their subordinates who become disabled because of such extensive expectations – and eventually the latter are forced to live in poverty and die from hunger. There are DECENT people, who cause families to be bereaved when a father or husband cannot pay off his gambling debts, just because their honor makes them do so, and they feel no remorse. How deep is the gap between those people and the ones who are so strong morally as to forgive somebody for abusing or besmirching them, or to share profits with the people who have contributed to the profits, or to let themselves be hurt rather than hurt someone else? Admittedly, we as a group are internally morally differentiated to the same extent, or even more so, than in comparison with an English man, prayerfully celebrating on Sundays and a black cannibal. Therefore, there are no common and widely accepted ethical norms, and no moral law to follow. There is nothing more than individual preferences and social rules of behavior sanctified by either national or caste customs and traditions, which cannot be broken without punishment and which are, therefore, followed.

As evolutionists claim, the list above enumerates the consequences which follow from an application of an evolutionist theory to social life. I agree that they are indeed significant, not only because of their theoretical importance, but also for practical reasons. In fact, they mean nothing more than ethical anarchy. If people do not appreciate the moral rules which comprise their moral education, they may be faultily convinced that by accepting new moral rules they become apostles of [new] ethics of the future. They will not feel like criminals, but rather like geniuses, and they will have a sufficient number of supporters and theories to avoid any remorse. Scenarios of this kind occur very often.

Therefore, there seems to be an inevitable dilemma: either to admit that a theory of evolution is faulty and reject it, or reject the existence of an ethics which is valid for the whole mankind as a prejudice and superstition.

* * *

The Spartans were absolutely sure that killing weak children was morally GOOD. On the contrary, we think that consciously causing a child's death is BAD, which is a pure fact and not a result of any reasoning. And what should be entailed from this fact? The answer should be given with great care. Nothing follows from the mere given fact: a general statement may be formulated only when some facts are collected; one act may be interpreted twofold, either as a bad one, or good one. However, even a general statement of such a kind cannot be the basis for formulating subsequent statements. For statements like "ethical opinions are changeable" or that "there is no common agreement "as far as ethical problems are concerned, express the same thing [i.e. the same fact], though they do that by means of different words. And the very fact gives us no more information than that various people make judgments on various actions based on some intellectual skill called conscience or moral feeling, and that they call these actions "good" or "bad," and that their judgments are not consistent with each other.

We deal with analogous situations in other areas of our mental life. According to the Chinese aesthetic sense and feeling of beauty, loud sounds produced by drums and kettle-drums are beautiful while these sounds are horrible to Europeans' ears. They would rather consider the works of Bach or Beethoven, Mascagni or Wagner, Rossini or Mozart as the most beautiful musical masterpieces. Besides, Europeans themselves have also different opinions in this matter. Nevertheless, an analogy between aesthetical facts and ethical ones is clear. Not only when they speak about morality and wickedness, but also about beauty and ugliness; people form opinions based on some intellectual skill and call this skill, feeling of beauty, aesthetics, sense or taste the same thing may be called "beautiful" by a Chinese person and "ugly" by a European.

An analogy between ethical and aesthetical judgments is so clear that it was already noticed a long time ago; moreover, the analogy was also observed in one more field. Apart from the oppositions of good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, there is also an opposition of truth and falsehood, and the analogy is complete. Spartan people considered killing children good, while we consider it bad. Chinese people consider their music beautiful, while we consider it ugly. Ptolemy considered his theory of the revolutions of the heavenly spheres to be true, while we stigmatize it as faulty. In the

last case, there is also some intellectual ability involved, namely the reason [or intellect], and there is also something which people consider differently, either as true, or as false.

Our discussion still concerns facts, and we have already differentiated three analogous types of them. Firstly, we make ethical judgments on things, on the basis of our conscience. Secondly, we make aesthetical judgments on the basis of our taste, our feeling of beauty. Thirdly, we make logical judgments on the basis of reason [intellect]. And all of these types of evaluations concern two opposite qualities: good opposed to bad, beautiful opposed to ugly and true opposed to false.

Not surprisingly, the three pairs of particular oppositions listed above exemplify one general opposition, i.e. the opposition of something that is RIGHT and something that is WRONG. When someone says that two times two is four, we admit that they are right. When some people enjoy a beautiful painting, we admit that their preference is right. In the same way, some people behave right when they offer their help to others in need. In the first case, we make such a judgment on the basis of our reason [intellect], in the second one we base our judgment on our aesthetic taste, and in the third case we refer to our conscience.

Having the mere naked facts presented, we are going to turn to the conclusions which are drawn by evolutionists.

* * *

Supporters of evolutionary ethics, i.e. ethics in which principles are being changed as progress is proceeding and in which no widely-accepted laws are valid, argue in the following way: almost every nation considers its own and specific rules of behavior to be right; this is undeniable fact. And if there were general norms of behavior which were binding for everyone, everyone would accept them as they were. Therefore, there are no such norms, or moral rules, which should be binding for everyone.

This line of argumentation is faulty, which can be easily revealed by referring to an analogy between our ethical and logical evaluations, or between oppositions of good and bad and truth and falsehood, which was discussed above. Naturally, logic provides us with rules of thinking which are valid, or have a binding force, for everyone. In other words, anyone who breaks logical rules makes a mistake. However, the history of logic provides evidence that there was no common agreement about the norms of thinking, nor there is such thing nowadays. For example, as far as inductive reasoning is concerned, John Stuart Mill did not agree with Francis Bacon. Nevertheless, it does not prove that there are no norms of logical thinking which should be valid for everyone, and by no

means would anybody draw such a conclusion. On the contrary, this fact, which is very close to the problem of changeable ethical principles, was explained in the following way: the human mind has not yet discovered and formulated in a clear and convincing way the norms according to which people behave (provided that they think logically). However, apart from inductive logic, there are also other areas in which it is claimed that rules of thinking are changeable. For example, there exists now a tendency according to which rules of inference or the whole syllogistic system elaborated by Aristotle is faulty; according to this tendency, the Aristotelian system should be replaced by a different mood of demonstrating [proving]. Thus, we have in this case a disagreement concerning principal rules of thinking. It means that there is no common agreement about logical rules which would be widely accepted, but it does not mean that there are no such logical rules at all. Admittedly, in the face of rules which are not accepted by everyone, some people think that they should be justified in a better way, and others claim that there is a need to discover or formulate, true and right rules. However, none of them doubt that such rules do exist.

Once upon a time, people did know logic. The rules of thinking are not mentioned in *Iliad* or *Odyssey* yet the heroes of Homer's works were actually thinking, they made mistakes and they were right as well. Yet a nineteenth-century peasant and even the seven-year-old child of the most talented modern philosopher knows logic to the same extent as a son of Hector, or even Hector himself, did. But all of them: the peasant, the philosopher's child and Hector were thinking and are thinking, and they are not always mistaken in their thinking. Truly, they are not able to explain why some of their thoughts are adequate and true, while others are false and inadequate. We still know that when Hector, a peasant or a child draws correct conclusions, they do have to think according to logical norms, according to generally binding rules of logic, rule, but they think according to these norms unconsciously, and do not even know them. For a reasonably small group of people have obtained a logical education. It does not mean, however, that there are no rules which should determine our thinking if we wish to know the truth.

Therefore, neither lack of knowledge of general rules, nor lack of agreement about such rules gives evidence that such rules do not exist. If people disagree whether a given norm is right or wrong, it means that a given branch of human knowledge which deals with identifying and formulating these norms is still not fully developed, and that is why some of its components are not widely justified nor finely completed. It concerns both logic and ethics. For in order to understand why some rules of behavior are not accepted by everyone, one should turn to an analogous problem in the field

of logic, on the grounds of the analogy between logic and ethics which was explained above. As we have also already discussed, a lack of widely accepted rules of thinking is not caused by the lack of such rules at all but rather by the insufficient development of a science dealing with rules of thinking, that is, logic. The reason why there are no widely accepted moral rules is the same: a science dealing with moral rules, that is, ethics, is not developed sufficiently to give a completed set of such rules.

Therefore, the evolutionist consequences of the fact that people's ethical judgments vary and change are faulty. They cannot be true; otherwise, they could be applied to logical thinking as well, which would lead to a skeptical conclusion: people are not able to differentiate between things which are actually true and things which are actually false. Admittedly, some advocates of the theory of evolution do apply an evolutionist approach not to ethical problems only but to other theories as well; it results in claims about *RELATIVE* truth. Yet they are out of their depth. If every truth is relative, then the same concerns the very statement: "Every truth is relative" is a relative truth as well. But then it is not convincing to argue that truth is relative. Relativists have then two solutions: either they accept that truth is absolute, or they lose the right to utter any statement. What would it mean that "2 times 2 is 4" is a relative truth? Is it possible that once in a while people come to the conclusion that this statement is not absolutely true? Is it possible that there are [strange] beings who believe that 2 times 2 is 5? And if they actually existed, would we not say that their belief was faulty? It is really challenging to understand what *RELATIVE* truths would be.

Evolutionists have not proven so far that there are no widely accepted moral rules. The facts which evolutionists refer to mean nothing more than that academic ethics has not yet been able to settle moral rules in an undoubted way.

However, the evolutionists will not back down. As their argument concerning the changeability and variety of moral norms is weak, they propose another argument, which is stronger and therefore has some supporters. It is as follows: among theoretical convictions, there are so-called axioms, or sentences, which are accepted by everyone who knows them. An example of an axiom is a statement that a part is smaller than the whole. According to the evolutionists, there are no moral axioms in ethics. Even uncivilized people believe that a part is smaller than the whole. There is common agreement about such axioms, which does not depend on anything, like time or the people engaged in it. On the contrary, it is not commonly accepted that one should love their neighbor as they love themselves, or that people should not do things which they would not personally like. Such [moral] rules are much less convincing than axioms.

This argument is strong enough to be taken seriously. It is formulated on the basis which is similar to the basis of the first argument, i.e. that there is no common agreement about moral rules. The second argument shows that there is no common agreement about the principal ethical statements, and juxtaposes such statements with theoretical axioms. It has serious consequences: it results, firstly, that absolute ethics is not possible, and, secondly, that there is no analogy between logic and ethics and this analogy causes us to reject the first argument against evolutionists. Meanwhile, I dismantled the first [evolutionist] argument by using this analogy. What should we do now?

At the very beginning, we should analyze and properly reconstruct the evolutionists' statements, like we did with the first argument. Evolutionists refer to the fact that everyone accepts some statements, like the one about part and whole, as true. However, this fact has not been accurately reconstructed. When I inform a black man from middle Africa or a child, in language which they are familiar with, that a part is smaller than the whole, neither a black man, nor a child are going to understand me for they are not used to thinking in an abstract way. If we want them to understand our words, we firstly have to remove the obstacles which cause their minds not to comprehend what is told them. In the case of an adult black man, the task is not difficult. It suffices to give him some examples of a part, and some examples of the whole; the black man will then construct relevant notions and soon will agree with me and believe that a part is actually smaller than the whole. In the case of a child, say a 5-year-old, the task is more challenging. It is unlikely that it has acquired the nature of abstract notions. Perhaps we will undertake some attempts and see their failure, and give up, claiming that a child will accept an axiom as true when they grow up and become sufficiently mentally developed. In other words: it is hardly possible that children accept that a part is smaller than the whole.

And it means that the fact, which is the basis for the second evolutionist argument, is not true when properly reconstructed: it is not true that everyone accepts truths such as axioms; in fact, they are accepted by these people only, who do not have mental obstacles which make accepting certain statements impossible. Hence not everyone accepts that a part is smaller than the whole but only these people who are sufficiently mentally developed. It may seem that adding such a stipulation is not of profound importance, and that by mentioning an additional condition under which people accept axioms as true, we deal with scholastic pedantry.

However, it is pure philosophy that pedantry is not only permitted but also recommended, for *minimus error in principio, maximus in fine*.¹

Once we add an additional condition under which people accept axioms as true, then the second evolutionist argument becomes weak. It becomes clear that its power consisted in concealing details: some facts are presented as minor ones, while they are actually crucial. And if one realizes that, then a complete analogy between theoretical judgments and moral ones is valid again, while it seemed to be invalid in evolutionist reasoning. As we see, it was caused just by improper reconstruction of the fact which evolutionists refer to. Obviously, people accept ethical axioms when the mental obstacles which would enable them to accept them are removed. What was an obstacle in the field of differentiating truth from falsehood, was a lack of relevant abstract notions. By analogy, an obstacle in the field of differentiating between good and bad things is a lack of relevant feelings. Making somebody have some feelings which they do not have is significantly more difficult than making somebody think in an abstract way. That is why it is more difficult to accept ethical axioms than theoretical ones. Only people who are sufficiently mentally mature can accept principal ethical demands. Immature people, such as uneducated ones or children, accept some statements although they do not understand them; they do that because of the authority of someone uttering such statements. Moral rules have to be based on authority as well, until people are mature enough to accept given moral axioms as right, judging by their own feelings and drives. The education of reason [*scil.* intellect], is focused on acquiring concepts which are needed to accept some principal truths, as well as on teaching skills to understand how some new and unknown truths follow from principal truths. In turn, moral education, or the practice of character, is focused on evoking feelings in ourselves, which are needed to accept moral principles and to understand how particular rules of behavior, i.e. rules which apply to particular situations, follow from moral principles. Education of character is much more complicated than the education of reason [*scil.* intellect]. That is why people are more likely to accept theoretical principles than ethical ones. It also explains why there are more wise people than moral ones, and, unfortunately, why erudition is more appreciated than honesty!

The way in which children develop, or grow up, makes it evident that accepting ethical principles is actually more complicated than accepting axioms. Needless to say, children become familiar with abstract notions much earlier than they evoke particular feelings in themselves, which then

¹ A minor mistake made at the beginning may lead to serious problems in the future.

enable them to accept moral principles. It is enough to realize that the process of developing in somebody a feeling of gratitude is time-consuming, and some people are not able to have this feeling at all. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, that such people do not accept the most obvious ethical principles. For according to the natural sciences, the development of individuals reflects the development of the whole species which individuals belong to, it becomes clear why the whole mankind, though intellectually developed, is insufficiently morally developed. It is inevitable, as human intellectual development precedes ethical development.

* * *

To sum up, advocates of the theory of evolution maintain that there are no common and widely accepted ethical rules. They refer to two kinds of facts to support their standpoint. Firstly, they point out that there is no common agreement about ethical rules and regulations and that every nation has their own set of ethical principles. However, as I have shown, the lack of agreement about any answer to any question does not prove that THERE IS NO answer; it means nothing more than we just DO NOT KNOW a true answer, or that we are not able to convince someone else that such-and-such answer is true. When scientists are asked about the number of stars in the sky or where Aryan people were primarily living, they may give various answers. However, their answers vary not because of the fact that the number of stars is indefinite and that that the seat of our primogenitors was nowhere. It is because science is still not fully developed, and by no means may a conclusive answer be given. There is one and only one true and conclusive answer but we do not know that yet. Therefore, the lack of common agreement about moral truths does not prove at all that there are no moral truths.

Secondly, ethical evolutionists argue that there are no ethical axioms which would be widely accepted and which would be the basis for particular ethical rules. However, as we have seen, even theoretical axioms are not accepted unconditionally: they may be accepted provided that some obstacles are removed. In the field of theoretical axioms, the lack of abstract notions, i.e. insufficient intellectual development, was a factor which precluded accepting the axioms. In the field of ethical axioms, such a precluding factor was the lack of some feelings, that is, insufficiently developed conscience. For it is more complicated to learn some feelings than to learn some abstract notions and intellectual development is more time-consuming than moral development, one should have no doubts why there are a smaller number of ethical axioms than theoretical ones and why less people accept ethical axioms than theoretical ones.

The conclusion is that the problem of the theory of evolution and absolute ethics is ultimately solved. Nobody has an inborn set of ethical rules nor a system of logic from the very beginning. However, everybody has the nuclei of reason (*scil.* intellect) and conscience.

And the actual development in these fields depends on various factors, or the surroundings in which people grow up. The further human development proceeds, the more truths, both moral and theoretical, people accept.

Therefore, the theory of evolution is not contradictory to absolute ethics. On the contrary, it perfectly explains why absolute ethics, since it does exist, is not always and widely accepted. The main mistake of evolutionary ethics consists in the claim that moral TRUTHS are changeable, which is absurd. For every truth remains the same and it is neither changing nor developing. If it is true that Mickiewicz was born in 1798 and that you should love your neighbor as you love yourself and that symphonies of Beethoven are beautiful, then it will always and everywhere be true. It is not TRUTHS that are at various stages of development and in consequence what is true today could transform into another truth but it is rather humankind which is transformed. People develop in terms of their reason and conscience and aesthetic taste and, as a consequence, get rid of more and more mistakes and come closer to the discovery of more, new, eternal truths which previously have not been known to them. Sciences change likewise: new scientific truths are being discovered, formulated and justified. Admittedly, there are evolutionary laws which underlie both mankind and human artifacts. Yet it does not concern things which do not depend on mankind: the theory of evolution must not be applied to such things. For even if there were no single human being anywhere, it would still be true two times two is four or that one should love one's neighbor. The only difference is that in the latter case, the truths would not be formulated and practically applied.

The whole of evolutionary ethics makes one more thing evident: natural scientists deal with philosophy in a careless way. The arguments which I have presented in this article may provide additional support for a claim that philosophy is significant in spite of the rapid growth of the life sciences; it is not true that the life sciences may replace philosophy. I do not propose to neglect natural sciences which indeed are important and serious. However, they need philosophy not to forget about an old statement: *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

ON ETHICAL SKEPTICISM^{*†}

[1. The Notion of Skepticism and Its Varieties]

Ethical skepticism – the lectures which are presented here [are a complement and continuation of the lectures delivered during the winter[‡] term] [but] at the same time there are a separate set of lectures. The lectures which I am going to deliver in this term differ from those delivered during the winter term: they are neither reporting nor historical; on the contrary, they deal with a complex problem: is it justified to apply skepticism in ethics (as science)? And if yes, under which conditions may this be performed? In other words, we are going to discuss whether ethics is possible as a science. During the winter term, numerous schools of scientific ethics were presented, which might have raised some skeptical doubts. Plato – Hobbes, [intellect]ualism – emot[ionalism]. We have seen that the number of attempts, trials and views were great, but no conclusive statements were made. For there are a number of various skepticisms: religious, metaphysical, epistemological, it is not surprising that there is an ethical skepticism as well.

* The lectures were delivered at the Lvov University in 1923-1924. They were prepared for print by Izydora Dąmbska and published as “O sceptycyzmie etycznym” in *Etyka* IX (1971), 171-222 [B&J].

† These lectures were delivered a few times so there are a number of versions of them. While Dąmbska was preparing subsequent parts of the lectures for publication, she included the versions of the best quality. That is why there is a lack of chronology in the whole paper [B&J].

‡ This lecture was entitled “Main Directions of Scientific Ethics.” Its subject was: 1. Systematization of ethical notion and approaches; 2. Their historical illustration [D].

The word “skepticism” derives from [the Greek word] “σκέπτομαι” (with epsilon, ‘ε’) which literally means “look at something” or “investigate something carefully”; metaphorically, it means “to consider,” “to hesitate,” “to question,” “to doubt.” It must not be confused with the word “σκηπτω” (with eta, η, instead of epsilon), which means “to support or buttress something,” nor with “σκηπτομαι” – “to lean on something” (thus “σκηπτρον” means “scepter”). Therefore, skepticism [is] a philosophical orientation or a standpoint which is characterized by DISBELIEVING and QUESTIONING, which results in refraining from categorical statements.

Proper skepticism should not be confused with methodological skepticism. The latter is sometimes considered a research tool or a means of gaining knowledge. Meanwhile, the fact that knowledge may be somehow gained is not questioned. Both Saint Augustine and Descartes applied methodological skepticism. They wished to separate what may be known from what may be doubted so that our knowledge would be based on a certain basis; thus they strived for determining the elements of our knowledge which could be taken for granted and which could not raise any doubts; yet this mere idea may be doubted as well. They both [Saint Augustine and Descartes] agreed that everything may be questioned except for our own questioning, our own thinking and existence. *Cogito, ergo sum*. Yet they drew further non-skeptical consequences. Therefore, methodological skepticism is just a provisional stage.

According to what is subjected to doubt, we may differentiate the following varieties of skepticism. We are interested in the following kinds:

(I) GENERAL SKEPTICISM (philosophical or epistemological). [It consists in] questioning our cognitive forces or abilities and doubting whether the truth may be known.

(1) Radical skepticism (or philosophical nihilism). Epistemological agnosticism. This is a view according to which we are not able to know anything. Knowledge does not exist. Absolutely doubting our cognitive abilities [is recommended]. This kind of skepticism is usually traced back to Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily (483-375 BC). We are familiar with his ideas thanks to Sextus Empiricus (about 200 AD) who paraphrased them: οὐδὲν ἐστίν (“nothing exists”); εἰ καὶ ἐστίν, ἀκατάληπτων ἀνθρώπῳ (“if anything did exist, we could not know it”); εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἄλλα τοῖ γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας (“if we could know that something existed, we would not be able to communicate it to anyone else”).

Naturally, radical skepticism, or philosophical nihilism, is burdened with internal contradiction: if we cannot know anything, we cannot know the fact that we cannot know anything as well. Therefore, by claiming that we cannot know anything, we make a contradictory statement. Even the principle *εποχή*, supported by some radical skeptics, demanding to refrain

from making any judgments, does not help here. For, it implicitly assumes that we cannot know anything. For if it were not assumed, one would not need a mere *εποχή*. Apart from radical skepticism, there is one more kind of this approach, namely, substantial epistemological skepticism which may well be labeled “moderate skepticism.”

(2) Moderate skepticism. According to this, the possibility of knowing some kind of truth is not rejected. People can know relative truth, although they cannot know absolute truth. By truth we mean a true judgment; thus absolute truth means an absolutely true judgment, or a judgment which is unconditionally true, or a judgment whose truthfulness does not depend on any changing conditions. Thus a true judgment cannot turn into a false one and vice versa. A true judgment which is unconditionally true is called absolute truth and a true judgment which is conditionally true is called relative truth. That is why this kind of skepticism is called “RELATIVISM.” “*Relatio*” means “relation”; the question of whether a judgment is true or false, according to this view, depends on its relations to certain conditions. Thus a given judgment is truth *AS REGARDS* these or those conditions, circumstances.

For example, a judgment: “On May 5, this year, elderberries are still not in bloom” is relatively true: it is true when made here but it is false when made in some tropical country. Similarly, a judgment: “Cancer is a fatal disease” is true nowadays but may be false in the future. According to the relativists, all truths are relative and no truth is absolutely or unconditionally true. There is also a kind of relativism called “SUBJECTIVISM.” According to subjectivism, truthfulness or falsity of a judgment depends on the subject who makes a judgment. This orientation is traced back to the sophist Protagoras (481-411). [He said:] Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος (Man is the measure of all things). This claim has two interpretations: “generic” and “individualistic” according to two senses of the word “man,” for the word “man” may be understood either as [(1)] human beings as such, or people as such, or [(2)] any human being.

According to the first interpretation, it is claimed that the fact that two times two is four or that one of a pair of contradictory judgments is true – is accepted as true by people as such. Due to our psychical and physical organization, we necessarily accept it. However, there might be other entities which would have a different organization than we have, and thus they might accept as truths that two times two is five. According to the second interpretation, it is argued that the statement “The scent of the flower is pleasant” is accepted as true by people who like this smell, but may be rejected as false by those people who do not like it. Therefore, both judgments: “The scent of the flower is pleasant” and “The scent of the flower is unpleasant” are equally valid, and the whole problem consists in the

strength of persuasion. Analogically, one may claim: "Happiness depends on conducting scientific research" and another one maintains "Happiness depends on moderate physical delight." Different things are accepted by them as true.

Relativism and subjectivism are not only philosophical doctrines based on certain pure theoretical considerations but they are often the result of life practice i.e. our thoughts about life and our character which is impassive and easy-going. Well-educated people with wide horizons, educated by travel and association with various people and nations are likely to appreciate other people's viewpoints in any field and not to reject them beforehand. They try to avoid biased thinking and they are willing to accept other people's convictions as true, just like they accept their own convictions. For they know that their own convictions depend on the conditions, or environment in which they were brought up, and they do not insist that their convictions are comprehensive or absolutely true. So-called socialites, in a good sense of the word, such as Michel Montaigne or, among Polish authors, Bishop Ignacy Krasicki, as far as the clerical duties of the latter let him act, are skeptical in this sense. In literature, such a skeptic appears in Weysenhoff's novel *Pan Podfilipski* [*Mr Podfilipski*]. In the field of morality, in addition to habits and customs, both this kind of skepticism and theoretical relativism and subjectivism play crucial roles.

(II) PARTICULAR SKEPTICISMS, SPECIAL SKEPTICISM. Apart from a general (philosophical or epistemological) skepticism, there are also a number of particular skepticisms. While the general skepticism questions the object of human knowledge and the object of the human desire for knowledge, particular, or limited, skepticism either doubts some sources of knowledge and treats knowledge based on them as uncertain (for instance, an empiricist questions rational knowledge, and a rationalist the sensory) or doubts some objects or branches of knowledge. Religious [and] metaphysical skepticisms belong to particular skepticisms. As far as religious skepticism is concerned, what should be highlighted is that this term has two meanings. In the FIRST meaning, religious skepticism does not support religion; on the contrary, it questions the whole content of religion and it doubts anything which is said to be given by revelation. Colloquially speaking, it is labeled DISBELIEF, or lack of [religious] faith. It may be called RATIONALISM as well, i.e. accepting things which result from reasoning only. Rejection of any supernatural sources of knowledge. In the SECOND meaning, religious skepticism does support religion. Namely, it is claimed that rational knowledge is impossible and, therefore, we have to rest on revelation to know anything. Religious skepticism includes, on the one hand, the theory of double truth established in 1200 and the ideas of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) on the other. Metaphysical skepticism, which

is also called positivism or moderate agnosticism, consists in questioning any knowledge which goes beyond experience, [for example,] that which deals with the beginning and the essence of the world or the immortality of the soul etc. Thus any consequent and radical EMPIRICISTS, like the sophists, Socrates and, above all, Hume in the 18th century, may be called metaphysical skeptics. It includes any POSITIVISTS as well, who one may find as early as in the ancient times. For instance, Socrates [was] such an anti-metaphysician. In turn, this direction is complemented by tendency to question sensory and experiential knowledge and relies on rational knowledge; it is called “RATIONALISM” but one should differentiate between this rationalism and the one which has been discussed before. It [i.e. the latter] is represented by, among others, Parmenides or Leibniz and Kantian criticism aimed at reconciling two varieties of skepticism. His criticism was indeed anti-metaphysical but it still might be reconciled with [religious] faith; thus it turned into religious skepticism which both supports religion and does not do so at the same time.

[2. The Notion and Varieties of Ethical Skepticism]

What is ethical skepticism? By now, we know that it is an attitude which doubts the scientific character of ethical knowledge (it may be related to religious dogmatism). For answering [the question] posed at the beginning of this part, we have to consider what ethics is; there are a variety of notions of ethics.

[Let us begin with] descriptive ethics, or ethicology. This is a science which collects and explains any ethical or moral facts and stipulates its origin. For example, human conduct is an ethical fact which is evaluated by us in various ways; we call it “good” or “bad,” we appreciate or depreciate it. Other examples are: [facts that] people feel remorse; people feel obliged to some things; people have various standpoints on good and bad things; some prohibitions and orders may be based on various sources: by God’s will, social utility or any ethical ideals. All of these facts are partly historical and partly available to us in everyday experience. The same concerns the fact that the ethical views of a given society and its institutions are mutually related. In his paper “On methods in ethics” published in the 9th volume of *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, Ochorowicz presented an insightful program of descriptive ethics. What should be highlighted is that ethical skepticism does not concern descriptive ethics; for descriptive ethics is a science of a historical, psychological and social character, and only epistemological skepticism could concern it (at the most).

Thus, let us remember, ethical skepticism does not doubt descriptive ethics. Yet it questions scientific normative ethics. In general, normative ethics [is] a science which deals with vital values. Its presupposition and core is a claim that there are vital values and that we are able to make statements about them in a scientific way. It results in another assumption: vital values are general, universal. The main theses of scientific ethics are as follow. [Let us assume] that the objects *A*, *B* and *C* have a positive value, and [the objects] *X*, *Y* and *Z* have a negative value, and there is also a difference between the degree of the values; for example, the positive value of an object *A* is bigger than the positive value of an object *B*. The thesis may be paraphrased in the following way: an object which has a feature *M*, has a positive value; in the case of our consideration, it may be said that the object has a positive moralistic value.*

Thus one has to identify what is ethically good and what is ethically bad. There are various degrees of good and bad. One may mention here: Meinong's scale of evaluation; greater or lesser ethical values, more or less important duties, greater or lesser misdeeds.

According to Meinong,[†] things like ethical values, obligations and human behavior may be subjected to ethical evaluation; therefore, he would accept judgments such as "*M* is a higher obligation than *N*" or "[*M*] has more positive ethical value [than *N*]," and, respectively, similar judgments on negative values. Ethical skepticism questions the difference between ethically positive and ethically negative things, as well as judgments made on them.

For our scientific and practical reasons, we may put the main theses of ethical skepticism in three points, by analogy with Gorgias's theses: (1) there is no difference between good and bad; (2) if there were such a difference, we could not know it and grasp it in an objective and absolutely

* Remark in brackets after these words: "I have not dealt with the problem of a criterion before. In my [previous] investigation, I assumed that there were a variety of vital values, both subjective and objective, and that just ethics indicates study and puts them into a hierarchy." In his lecture delivered during 1927-1928 [academic] year, Twardowski changed the passage on normative ethics: "Normative ethics concerns free evaluation of our acts, intentions, resolutions and dispositions (characters). Its core and the most essential content are declarative judgments like "Object *X* is good" or "An object which has the feature alpha is good, (or respectively, "Object *Y* is bad" or "An object which has the feature beta is bad"), according to whether somebody accepts the need of criterion or does not (Moore is an example here) [D].

[†] Meinong (1853-1920), who was much admired by Twardowski, presented his theory of values primarily in the following papers: [Meinong 1894] (second edition was published in 1923 after Meinong's death; it was edited by E. Mally; a number of Meinong's remarks on the content of the book were included, and the title was changed according to Meinong's idea) and [Meinong 1917] [D].

valuable way; (3) if it existed, we could know it and grasp it objectively, it would have no practical significance for such knowledge would not convince anyone to behave in a proper way. *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*; Ovid[ius], *Met[amorphoses]* VII].*

Ethical skepticism consists in the three theses listed above, and no varieties of ethical skepticism add anything new. Yet for the sake of discussion, we may label these varieties: [Firstly,] there is “ethical NIHILISM” which is related to ethical nominalism. [Secondly,] there is “ethical AGNOSTICISM” and, thirdly, we have “PRACTICAL ETHICAL SKEPTICISM” or “ethical pessimism.” It is easy to notice that supporters of ethical agnosticism are not concerned with whether there is an [objective] difference between good and bad for the existence of this difference is neutral for them, they could neither know nor grasp it anyway. Similarly, blind people do not care about the difference between black and white. Therefore, we may treat both nihilism and agnosticism as “THEORETICAL ETHICAL SKEPTICISM.” In consequence, there is (1) THEORETICAL eth[ical] sc[epticism] which states that the difference between good and bad cannot be objectively stated[†]; and (2) PRACTICAL ethical skepticism (ethical pessimism) which states that this difference can be known but such a knowledge does not have any practical significance for it does not influence our behavior.

Theoretical ethical skepticism questions the possibility of identifying differences between good and bad in a direct way or by means of ethical criterion. According to agnosticism: No basic ethical assumption may be scientifically justified, either when formulated as the judgment “A is a good object,” or as “An object which has feature A is good.” In the second case, an ethical criterion is used in a narrow sense for there is a feature which makes two objects different. Meanwhile, when an ethical criterion is used in a broad sense, there is a judgment which affirms that some feature is characteristic of some individual objects or some kinds of objects. According to [theoretical] ethical skepticism, there is no commonly binding ethical criterion; it is admitted that people adopt various criteria but they are considered relative and subjective, either due to the lack of essential difference between good and bad, or because this difference cannot be known and scientifically proven; for we must remember that ethical skepticism questions the existence and knowledge of absolute and COMMONLY

* Theses of ethical skepticism formulated in the manner of Gorgias’s theses are reconstructed partly on the basis of the lectures delivered in 1923-1924 and partly on the lectures of 1905-1906 and 1927-1928 [D].

[†] In the version of the lecture delivered in 1927-1928, Twardowski noted in the margin: “Agnosticism questions the possibility of knowledge but may accept the feeling of good and bad” [D].

BINDING ethical criterion. As long as someone establishes their OWN PRIVATE criterion, which recommends or forbids some acts but it is applied to them only, no skeptical doubts are raised. However, skeptics strongly disagree with applying the criterion to the whole universe and formulating general rules that one SHOULD act in such and such a way. For the use of the word “should” assumes that some behavior is an obligation, and that EVERYBODY is obliged, or should, act in such and such a way and that such a criterion is binding not only to individuals but to everybody. Therefore, ethical skepticism does not question the norms created by people for, let us say, their own use but it questions norms which are said to be commonly binding.

I intentionally used the word “norm” instead of the word “criterion.” It is clear that they are both closely related to each other in terms of logical, aesthetical, ethical and any other practical criteria. For example, in architecture there are criteria which differentiate between weak and strong ceiling. Of course, the following norm directly follows from it: if one wants a ceiling to be strong, one should build ceilings that fulfill these criteria. The same is applied to ethics. Let us assume that *X* is a feature of good behavior; if one wants to behave well, that person’s behavior should have the feature *X*. This problem will be discussed later on. What needs to be STATED now is that theoretical skepticism questions the possibility of identifying the difference between good and bad either in a direct way, or by means of commonly binding ethical criterion. According to this attitude, human nature is not able to make people act ethically. That is all about the meaning of the words “ethical skepticism.”

During these lectures, I would like to investigate whether ethical skepticism is right and JUSTIFIED, and to criticize its arguments. In other words, I would like to answer the question: Is scientific ethics, that is, ethics which is commonly binding, possible?

This is a special kind of epistemological skepticism where the problem of the rightness of skepticism is connected to the problem of whether objective knowledge, one for everybody, is possible. However, practical problems appear here as well: [is] pessimism justified? Practical skepticism questions the thesis that even if delivering scientifically justified ethical criterion was possible, it would not provide any benefit for people’s behavior. It doubts that such a criterion would contribute to the foundations of ethics, or that it would be a motivation for behaving in accordance with this criterion. Moreover, it questions if there is any ethical foundation in a precise sense, or any motivation for behaving in an ethically positive way for no other reason than such behavior itself. For example, when anyone acts with apparent ethical motivation, it eventually always turns out that it is purely a self-beneficial motivation broadly understood that underlies their behavior. There are many more delusive

elements, or even worse things, in both ethical pessimism and agnosticism. Undoubtedly, nowadays there is no one ethics which would be commonly accepted. This fact is often exploited by the ethical skeptics who support their view by pointing out a variety of standpoints on an ethical criterion, as well as the large number of ethical systems and the fact that they evolve. It is not surprising, then, that the idea of a commonly valid ethics which would have scientifically justified criteria is often rejected. Advocates of such a standpoint might well argue that any discussion about the possibility of a scientific ethics is a waste of time for it has no point and makes no sense. The question of whether scientific ethics is possible or not should be left open: if it is possible, it will be made in future. However, in spite of such skeptical critique, the attempts to establish scientific ethics are being made all the time. Why are they made? And why do chemists try to build a balloon which could be navigated in any direction? Why do biologists try to find out what was the beginning of organic life? Chemists and biologists try to solve these problems and we will see in the future whether their work would be effective. Ethicists should be given the same opportunity. Either our or the next generation will see whether their findings were conclusive.

However, such a standpoint is wrong for three reasons. *Primo*, it is not effective, because science should not waste time trying to solve the problems which cannot be solved. Such aimless problems are, among others, squaring the circle or *perpetuum mobile*. If ethical skeptics were right that no criterion is possible to be indicated, indeed it would be pointless to try to establish it. Meanwhile, they support their claims with strong arguments and it seems to be true that an ethics which would be commonly binding has not been formed yet. *Secundo*, commonly binding ethics is not only of theoretical but also of practical significance (to the highest degree). Ethics is the signpost in our life. It is a guide for our behavior. If there is no scientific ethics, i.e. an ethics which would be commonly binding, we will have to find other principles to underlie our actions, for example, religion, and give up searching for apparent moral principles etc. In turn, if a scientific, commonly binding ethics is in principle possible, we should strive for establishing it for a scientific ethics is much more valuable than one based on religion. *Tertio*, perhaps, by considering arguments we will discover the proper face of scientific ethics – the only possible shape of it. Our enemies may teach us a lot. Thus, supporters of scientific ethics may be taught by its opponents. We might leave the question of the possibility of scientific ethics open for the future only if this question could not be solved in a theoretical way; only in such a situation would we be entitled to do so because we would be under the pressure of necessity. However, that such a risk is not serious we will understand soon.

Yet we face a greater difficulty. It is not clear what we should begin with in order to dismantle the arguments proposed by the supporters of [theoretical] scientific skepticism. According to nihilism, the existence of the essential difference between good and bad is questioned. According to agnosticism, the possibility of knowing this difference is questioned. Therefore, what should be discussed first: the possibility of KNOWING the difference or the EXISTENCE of the difference? If we cannot know it, we cannot state whether it exists or not. But if we do not know whether it exists, we cannot consider whether it can be grasped or known to us. Thus it seems that the question of whether one can know the difference assumes that the difference does exist – and that the question of whether the difference exists assumes that it may be known to us. It is a vicious circle! Fortunately, we may escape from the trap. We should consider: (1) Is there any essential difference between good and bad? And (2) Can we know this difference? These problems may be approached separately. However, if it turned out that the second statement “We cannot know the difference between good and bad” was NOT JUSTIFIED, we would try to know it and state that difference. Therefore, it is recommended to approach both problems at the same time. If we are able to know the difference, it is obvious that the difference does exist. Let us compare this with the situation: I do not know whether Paul is behind the door, or not, but I do not have any idea how to check it. Naturally, it makes no sense to think about the first question until the second one will have been answered. However, I may answer two questions at the same time as well; namely, I may open the door and see – that is, know and state – whether Paul is there, or not. Before making such an attempt, we have to prepare for it, that is, remove any obstacles: we have to open the door and look behind it. We have to study the arguments proposed by the skeptics, especially the arguments offered by ethical agnosticism which is given in the second problem.*

* A part of this fragment, starting with the words “We should consider,” was eventually changed in 1924 in comparison with previous versions of the lecture (1906 and 1910). Previous versions are presented below. (1) “Fortunately, we may escape from the trap by referring to the difference between φύσις and προς ὑμᾶς πρότερον. According to agnosticism, one cannot know the difference between good and bad. However, such a claim requires accepting some notions of good and bad beforehand for it assumes that some people admit that differentiating between good and bad is possible, while skepticism rejects that possibility. Therefore, we may ask whether agnostic arguments against a possible differentiation between good and bad are actually strong and adequate. If they were strong, it would be unnecessary to wonder whether there is a difference between good and bad: even if it exists, we still will not know it. If the arguments were not strong, we might say: to know the difference between... (the text stops here). (2) We should consider: (1) Is there any essential difference between good and bad? Or is this difference just verbal, nominal and conventional, like the difference between

[3. Criticism of Epistemological Relativism]

Analysis of ethical agnosticism: This posits that one cannot demonstrate nor justify a judgment which would be absolutely true and which would establish the difference between good and bad, either in a direct way or by means of a commonly binding ethical criterion. Why does it state so? Above all, this thesis is supported by epistemological relativism. Namely, if the ethical criterion is commonly binding, the judgment which expresses the criterion should be commonly accepted, i.e. should be absolutely true (for example “A given act is good when it is motivated by sympathy” or analogically in aesthetics “An object [is] beautiful when it synthesizes some varieties in the whole”). However, some people say that absolutely true judgments do not exist. Truth is always relative. Thus a judgment which states an ethical criterion is necessarily relatively true. For example, the statement that good acts are always motivated by sympathy is relatively true as well: it may be true or false; for example, when somebody steals money because of their sympathy for an ill child. This is epistemological relativism. Therefore, we should now grapple with relativism.

There is no absolute ethics* for there is no absolute truth. The thesis is: every truth, every true judgment, [is] relatively true, and its truthfulness depends on circumstances of time, place etc. Such a standpoint results from confusing sayings and judgments as well as from the fact that our sayings are sometimes elliptical, that they are sometimes formulated in an exhaustive way and that they contain ambiguous words; for these reasons

[the words] “beautiful” and “ugly” discussed by some aestheticians (fashion!), or just subjective, like a difference between “tasty” and “tasteless”? (2) Can we know the difference between good and bad? Obviously, if one can know the difference, it exists; if it did not exist, it could not be established, known, stated or even described. One knows the difference when they know what the difference consist in, and this means that the difference must exist. Therefore, by confirming the second question we confirm the first one. However, a negative answer given to the second question does not entail any answer to the first question: even if we cannot know or state anything about the difference between good and bad, it does not mean that the difference does not exist. Yet one cannot approach the problem by beginning with the first question for a statement that there is, or that there is not, a difference does presuppose that we know what the difference is. Therefore, it is clear that we should start with ethical agnosticism [D].

* In the lectures delivered in 1905-1906, 1913-1914, 1919-1920 and 1923-1924, Twardowski presented detailed argumentation which was then included in his paper [Twardowski 1900]. In the lectures of 1928, he just sketched this argumentation and made reference to the paper. [...] The paper [Twardowski 1900] has been reprinted in Twardowski 1965; in this edition of Twardowski's lectures I follow Twardowski's suggestion and present a shorter version of his argument against epistemological relativism and subjectivism, like he did in his lectures of 1928 [D].

they are ambiguous themselves. It becomes evident when we investigate relativist examples of judgments which seem to be relatively true, i.e. judgments which would be true in some circumstances and would become false when the circumstances change. "My castle was attacked" is an elliptical and ambiguous sentence [for a "castle" may refer to a building or to a chess figure]. "It is not cold today" was not true three months ago or in the North Pole; thus "It is not cold today" is elliptical and as a consequence ambiguous as well and it should be completed as "On the day..., it is not cold in Lvov." This is absolutely true. It is similar with the "On the day..., it is not cold at the North Pole" which is absolutely false.

Similarly, relativists maintain that "Physical exercise is healthy" seems to be false when it refers to someone who has a serious heart disease or when exercise is too hard. The same saying expresses either a true or false judgment, and that is why it is SAYINGS that may be called "relatively true" or "[relatively] false." It does not concern JUDGMENTS. The same concerns [the statement] "Cancer is a fatal disease," which is either true or false. It is hard to judge. In order to express some truth, one has to make a precise statement: "Cancer is probably a fatal disease" or even "According to the contemporary knowledge, that is, in 1928, we suppose that cancer is a fatal disease" [see footnote * on p. 247]. Having spoken in this way, one has an absolutely true judgment. Meanwhile, "Cancer is a fatal disease" is an elliptical saying and, therefore, it is relatively true; it depends on our interpretation. To conclude, epistemological relativism is [an] overall wrong [theory] so it is wrong as regards ethical judgments as well. Provided that it was an epistemological relativism, and not some other kind of relativism, in question. If we may achieve true judgments in ethics, they are absolutely true.

[4. Subjectivism and Its Criticism]

The concept of subjectivism needs to be clarified as well; I have elaborated on it in detail in my paper. It assumes that the same judgment may be true when made by *X* and false when made by *Y*. *X* and *Y* may be either two human beings, any man or other beings such as Martians, or two groups of people (for example a primitive tribe and a civilized community), or any individual people. In the first case, it is labelled "anthropological subjectivism," and in the third one, "individualistic subjectivism." Such judgments as "This meal is tasty" (– which is equal to "I like this meal") are not proper examples for they express in fact two different judgments when stated by *X* or *Y*. Meanwhile, we need to indicate a situation in which *X* and *Y* make identical or almost identical judgments but the judgment made

by *X* is true and (almost) the same judgment made by *Y* is false. However, such a judgment could not be indicated by anybody, since such a judgment would have to be both true and false, [at the same time], true and untrue, which violates the principle of non-contradiction. However, subjectivists respond that their reasoning does not necessarily lead to contradiction. They claim that two judgments would be contradictory if they were absolutely true. They admit that accepting “The Sun goes around the Earth” and “inversely” results in contradiction, just like accepting “Sport brings about such and such moral values” and “It does not.” According to subjectivism, absolute truth cannot be known; WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THINGS REALLY ARE; AT LEAST, WE KNOW HOW THINGS ARE PRESENTED TO US. It is likely that a given object is presented to *X* in one (true) way, i.e. as it actually is, and to *Y* in another (false) way, i.e. as it seems to be. It is likely as well that a given object is wrongly presented both to *X* and *Y*. We still do not know what the things actually are; absolute truth is beyond our knowledge. Truly, it is often claimed that “I would rather not state anything, I would prefer to express my PERSONAL, SUBJECTIVE CONVICTION,” and “subjective conviction” is not claimed to be objective. However, the same restriction applies to subjectivism: people have to agree that they do not know whether it is true that they do not know anything and that they do not know what things “really” are for the only thing that they know is how things are presented. In other words: the claim that every truth is subjective is subjective itself as well. What are the consequences? As a result, subjectivism may not be consequently sustained because it leads to *regressus in infinitum* or to internal contradictions. If we agree that we do not know whether it is true that we do not know anything and what things really are and that we can only know the presentations of things, then on the ground of subjectivism, it turns out that we do not know again whether it is true that we do not know anything and what things really are... and so on ad infinitum. In order to avoid *regressus in infinitum*, subjectivists may do nothing but accept that [(1)] their presentations of reality inform them about the way of presenting reality only and [(2)] they can know only the presentations of reality and not reality itself. But then there would not be subjective truth any more but rather objective and absolute truth only. If absolute truth is accepted once [in subjectivist reasoning], it may be accepted in other cases as well. Naturally, it does not follow that we may always know how things really are; on the contrary, we often do not know anything but presentations, like in an example of cancer’s treatment; in this case, people may have various presentations of the problem. Nevertheless, some truths are absolute; for instance, the fact that people have various presentations [of things], a claim that two things which are identical with a third thing are also identical with each other, or a claim that I exist etc.

It is clear now that epistemological subjectivism is actually absurd. But why was it formulated? What [is its] source? In general, relativism is caused by confusing sayings with judgments and by the ambiguity of sayings. And what is the situation here? As far as epistemological subjectivism is concerned, judgments on real things are confused with judgments on presentations of things. People tend to believe in their presentations and they wrongly assume that reality corresponds to their images and concepts of reality. This is a symptom of the tendency to objectivization. Doubts are raised after some time. Different people have various presentations of reality, but still people tend to believe that their presentations of reality correspond with reality itself. So if people have different presentations of reality, reality itself must be different in two cases as well. Such reasoning reveals our tendency to objectivizations. In consequence, judgments of reality are true for some people and false for others. The problem is, firstly, that subjectivists fail to notice that the expression "true for some people" is obscure unless it means "accepted by someone as true." However, a judgment which is "accepted by someone as true" does not mean "true" although it may happen that someone accepts as truth a judgment which actually is true. Secondly, subjectivists extend the scope of some state of affairs which correspond to judgments on external experience to any kind of judgments; the state of affairs in question is the fact that judgments we made depend on our psychophysical. Meanwhile, such a thing is not justified: one has to differentiate between judgments on our experience and judgments on reality. This state of affairs may not be reasonably generalized in order to make it applicable to judgments other than judgments on external experience.

[5. Judgments on Future and Epistemological Relativism]

In order to complete our analysis, I would like to pay attention to one more question which is raised here. [There is a problem of] a relation between absolute truth and determinism broadly understood. Determinism in a broad sense assumes that anything that has happened, is happening or will happen is by inevitable necessity as an effect of given causes. Things go like this.

We have agreed that a true judgment, once true is always true. Or that truth is eternal. But what are the meanings of "truth," "true judgment"? A number of definitions are given: correspondence between thinking and reality or correspondence between [an act of] judging, or a judgment, and reality. In short, every judgment consists in affirming or rejecting the existence of some object. "God exists," "Ghosts do not exist," "It is

thundering,” “Two times two is four,” “I do not look like my brother.” It is always a matter of reality, existence. Thus a true judgment [is] affirmative when it refers to an existing object, and it is negative when it refers to a non-existing object. This is what correspondence between a judgment and reality consists in. How then should the following judgments be qualified: “Pericles existed” or “It is going to be beautiful weather tomorrow”? According to our conception, qualifiers which are manifested by the forms of the verbs belong to an object of a judgment. For we may say “*X* owns something” or “*X* is the former owner of something”; “This man will be my father-in-law” or “This man is my future father-in-law”; other examples are: “yesterday’s snow,” “tomorrow’s dinner,” “future life,” “eternal [life]” and so on. Therefore, judgments which state something about the past or future may be true as well. “All people will die” is true because it affirms the existence of our future death. “It is going to be beautiful weather tomorrow” may be true or false; it is true if tomorrow’s beautiful weather exists; if it does not, it is false. Thus everything which may be stated in a true judgment or everything which is rightly stated exists; it may exist either now, in the past or in the future. As a true judgment is always true, everything which a true judgment refers to always exists: either now, in the past or in the future; or, in other words, there exists a past, present or future thing. It seems to be paradoxical. Yet it may well be reformulated in a less paradoxical way: Every object of a rightly made affirmative judgment has an objective value in the present, in the past, in the future. The objective value is what we mean by saying that events from the past cannot be changed. Does it apply to the future as well? Is it true that what is going to happen must happen as well? This problem was dealt with by Dr. Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his dissertation [Kotarbiński 1913a]. See also Hans Pichler [1914].

The answer is as follow: some future objects exist in the same sense as present and past objects exist. But there are a few future objects such that we cannot say the same about them; they do not exist; we may not make a true judgment of the following form: “These future things are there.” From this, the following consequences may be drawn:

“Every truth is eternal but only some truths are both eternal and sempiternal”¹ ([Kotarbiński 1913b], p. 124). It means that every judgment which is true will always remain true but not every true judgment has always been true. Not every judgment which is true now also was true

¹ If something exists at the moment t_1 , then it is eternal, if and only if it exists also in every moment t_k which is after t_1 . If something exists at the moment t_1 , then it is sempiternal if and only if it exists also at every moment t_i which is before t_1 .

yesterday. "There are judgments which just turn out to be true, which gain truthfulness at a given moment; there are judgments which become true, or judgments whose truthfulness is created" (*ibid.*, p. 125). Not surprisingly, one may have in mind here judgments which are made on the objects which do not exist now and whose existence cannot be stated now, in the present. We are always entitled to affirm the existence of real objects which existed in the past.

Let us focus now on the difference between two groups of future objects. The first group consists of objects whose existence may be rightly stated in the present; "from the practical point of view, [they] are more similar to objects from the past than to other future objects" (*ibid.*, p. 126). They are, for example, currents, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, movements of celestial bodies and our own death. What these things have in common is that they are irreversible both in the future and in the past: we may not annihilate them either if they already happened or if they are to happen in future. So the eruption of Mount Etna in the future exists in the same sense as our death exists. Judgments on future events are as true as a judgment on the eruption of Mount Vesuvius which destroyed Pompeii or a judgment on Julius Caesar's death. Such judgments are true and were true and will always be true. They are both eternal and *SEMPITERNAL*. Is it true about the following judgments as well: "I will take the right fork, not the left," "One day I will promise something" or "I am going for a walk tomorrow"? Professor Kotarbiński denies that and argues that future actions in question are *INDECISIVE*, are "not ready," they depend on our decisions. We may undertake some action but we may not do that as well. I may go for a walk tomorrow or I may not go. We are absolutely free to create – or not to create – such future objects as future promise, future walk and so on. Therefore, a judgment on my tomorrow's walk is neither true nor false: it is impossible that it is true that my future walk exists [now] if I am to make it in future. On the other hand, it is not false as well: I cannot deny that my future walk exists if I may make it ([Kotarbiński 1913b], pp. 127-128). Therefore, a judgment on my future walk begins to be true when I go for a walk tomorrow, whereas it begins to be false when I do not go; from this moment onward, it is always true or false. Such judgments are *ETERNALLY* – but not *SEMPITERNALLY* – true or false for their truthfulness or falsity begins to exist at a particular moment. There is one way to avoid this consequence. Namely, one has to agree that people are not free to decide whether they will do or not do something in the future; it would mean that I am not free to decide whether I will go for a walk tomorrow or not but I just do not know whether I will go or not. When we accept the view of ignorance, the fact whether I will go tomorrow for a walk or not is as inevitable, necessary, just as my death is. Having adopted such assumptions only,

one may claim that judgments on their tomorrow's walk are true or false today. In other words, a judgment "There is my tomorrow's walk" is true today if and only if my tomorrow's walk will necessarily happen, or must happen, tomorrow. Therefore, sempiternality of truth presupposes that the objects which [sempiternally true] judgments refer to have to be necessary or, respectively, impossible. And judgments are sempiternally true if and only if all the objects of the judgments are necessary or impossible. In turn, if there are objects which are possible or not necessary, that is, IF THERE IS A FIELD OF FREE CREATIVITY, JUDGMENTS ON SUCH OBJECTS ARE ETERNAL BUT THEY ARE NOT SEMPITERNAL. These are the main statements of Kotarbiński's conception; besides, it has grave consequences as regards the principle of excluded middle. Kotarbiński's idea was subjected to criticism. Among others, Dr. Stanisław Leśniewski responded to it in his paper [Leśniewski 1913]. Leśniewski claims that the Kotarbiński's conception of judgments which are eternal but not sempiternal is contradictory. I am not going to reconstruct Leśniewski's argumentation but I just wish to point out some DOUBT concerning Kotarbiński's arguments. The core of Kotarbiński's conception consists in a statement that truthfulness of a judgment which states the existence of a future event is related to necessity of this future event. As Pichler observes [1914], it may be twofold interpreted: either that necessity of a future object is a truthfulness condition of a judgment which states the existence of a future event, or that necessity of a future object follows from truthfulness of a judgment which states the existence of a future event. The first means that one may make a true judgment on the future existence of a future event if and only if a future event must happen, i.e. if it is not possible that it would not happen, and so in the present, I may make a true judgment on its future existence. The second means that if a judgment which is made in the presence on the reality of a future event is true, the future event *MUST* happen, i.e. it is not possible that it would not happen; otherwise, the judgment would not be true. My doubts are as follow: as far as the first interpretation, [is concerned], why not assume that a sufficient condition of the truthfulness of today's judgment, which is predicated on the existence of a future event, is the fact that the event will take place in the future? Is it necessary that it must happen? Kotarbiński would defend this view by claiming that if a judgment is true today, the event must happen. Yet is it an event that depends on a judgment or rather a judgment that depends on an event? In the first interpretation, a judgment depends on an event: it suffices that an event happens and a judgments which states it is already true. As long as we do not prove that such an assumption [i.e. that a sufficient condition of truthfulness of a judgment is the fact that an event will happen in the future] is wrong, the necessity of a future event will not be considered as a condition of the truthfulness of

a judgment which is based on the reality of a future event. Meanwhile, it is not obvious that this assumption is wrong. As far as the second interpretation is concerned, we must admit that if a judgment on the existence of a future event is true, the event *MUST* happen. However, “must” in question does not mean that a future event is causally determined. Similarly, in this case it also suffices to say that if a judgment on the existence of a future event is true, the event will happen. This “must” concerns logical necessity, i.e. the fact of whether a judgment “An event will take place” is true, or not, depends on whether the judgment “There is a future event” is true or not. This mistake results from confusing two things: on the one hand, the possibility judging in the present whether given judgments are true or false with, on the other, the actual truthfulness or falsity of the judgments.*

[6. Ethical Relativism and Its Criticism]

Obviously, everything that has been said before concerns all judgments, including ethical judgments. However, ethical relativism has not been dismantled yet. We have to continue our analysis so that it is clear that ethical relativism is not justified at all; perhaps it has some other justification.[†] Ethical relativists support their conception with three main arguments; accordingly, they formulate three main theses with arguments against scientific ethics; if they are right, it will turn out that an absolutely true ethics is not possible.

6.1. No ethical norms are absolutely valid, and the number of exceptions is high. There is no ethical criterion which would be absolutely valid and true, because every ethical principle is right and valid under certain conditions only.[‡] For example, one must not lie, that is, say untrue things consciously in order to confuse somebody. However, who would tell a dying mother who is asking about her child that the child has just died? Or if someone would keep a secret, which he solemnly promised not to reveal, thanks to a minor, simple lie? Or another example one cannot take anything which belongs to someone else. However, if I know that some boy saved money

* The whole polemical fragment which begins with the words: “In order to complete our analysis...” [point number 5] was included in the lectures of 1913-1914 only (pp. 23-30). I decided to add it because it sheds light on Twardowski’s viewpoint on relativism [D].

[†] Remark in the margin: “It is possible that the general version of the thesis of relativism and subjectivism [is] false, and that relativism and subjectivism are right as regards ethical judgments” [D].

[‡] Remark in the margin: “It is important for practical application; so-called practical rigor” [D].

and bought a gun, not only may I but also I have to take this gun for it is likely to harm the boy. Therefore, there are relative ethical principles which should be applied in certain situations only. Some ethical principles are not absolutely true. Now we may explain this problem. If it is possible that one may fairly consciously confuse someone else or if it is possible that taking someone else's property is permissible, it means that ethical principle are NOT PRECISELY FORMULATED: THEY SEEM TO BE GENERAL JUDGMENTS, BUT ACTUALLY THEY ARE NOT. Thus they should have the following forms: "One usually must not lie," "One usually must not take someone else's property" [...].* For if principles and judgments are actually general, they have to be paraphrased so that they include exceptions. Thus: "One must not confuse anyone else unless it is so-and-so" or more general "...unless telling truth is less harmful than telling untruth." It is not a new idea. For example, Hugo Grotius in his *De iure belli et pacis* differentiated between *falsiloquium* and *mendacium* and attempted to enumerate the situations when the former appears. Every *mendacium*, he concluded, is *falsiloquium* but not the other way round. *Falsiloquium* may become *mendacium*, i.e. it may become ethically negative, when it violates someone else's right to make free judgments, or their ability to *libertas iudicandi*. For everyone has a right to make judgments on a given problem by themselves, they may demand not to be confused; meanwhile, when we offer him facts which conflict with reality, their right is constrained. However, in certain situations people are deprived of their right to make free judgments and then *falsiloquium* is no longer *mendacium*. It may happen (I) as a result of volitional agreement: for example, when someone listens to a fairy tell, fantastic story etc. (II) when the right to make one's own judgments is waived by some superior law; it happens in five types of situations mainly: (1) children and people who are mentally handicapped; neither are they able, nor entitled to make free judgments; (2) somebody who has overheard something which was not uttered to him. We may talk to somebody in such a way that the witness of our talk may interpret our words as unclear, dark and mysterious and for that reason this third person may become confused; (3) when people who we lie to could find it beneficial rather than harmful for themselves; that is, when we suppose that our *falsiloquium* will not be considered as a wrong act; (4) when somebody disposes all the rights and entitlements of a given person, including *iudicandi*, they may tell [their charges] untruths; (5) when lying is the only way to save someone else's life or any other

* The following sentence was skipped: "It is similar to a judgment 'A cold bath is healthy' (see the example II)." There should be "is usually" instead of "is" for analogous example mentioned here was not included in accepted version of the lectures. See footnote * on p. 247 [D].

valuable thing. To conclude, in all examples it is imprecise speech which results in apparent relative truthfulness, or in a claim that ethical prohibitions and orders are relatively right.

6.2. The second argument against absolute ethical truths, which was presented already by the sophists, and then by many other thinkers, concerns the variety, changeability and mutual inconsistency of ethical standpoints. The following examples were given to support this argument: cannibalism, killing and eating one's own parents, a variety of views on sexual relationships, the fact that Spartans felt obliged to exterminate their own children if they were frail, while we consider such practices as barbaric; other examples: slavery, a father's entitlement to kill his own children. In general, advocates of this argument point out that the ethical principles which are valid in a certain period of time, or at certain level of the development of the mankind, or in certain societies are absolutely rejected and considered wrong or immoral in other periods of time and in other societies. As a result, [ethical principles] are said to be "binding" for one people and "not binding" for other ones.

(A) If some principle is followed in certain societies or at certain levels of development of mankind, it means that it IS or it WAS REGARDED as right and true in certain societies or at certain levels and it does not mean that it IS RIGHT. Similarly, if someone treats asthma with badger fat, it does mean that such treatment IS correct; it means that it IS REGARDED as correct. Naturally, it may turn out to have been incorrect. Meanwhile, the existence of false principles which are regarded as right does not support a claim that ethical principles are relative. In the same way, the fact that some false judgments were considered as true in certain periods of time or in certain nations – for example, a judgment that the Sun moves around the Earth – does not support a claim that truth is relative.

(B) However, it is possible, though nobody expects it, that both principles – to exterminate frail children and not to exterminate frail children – which we accept, are right. *Mutantur tempora et mores. Andere Zeiten, andere Sitten!* Moreover, it may turn out that the practice of killing and eating one's own parents, which is said to be popular among some primitive tribes, may or might result from a right rule of behavior, although nowadays we would accept such rule as wrong. And we may be right. Similarly, both rules may be right: "People suffering from cancer should be operated on" and "People suffering from cancer should not be operated on (at given stage of the disease)." The question is: how may one SUCCEED IN EXPLAINING SUCH PHENOMENA and, at the same time, argue that ethical truths are absolute and not relative? The answer is fairly simple. The principle "Frail children have to be exterminated" is as rough as a judgment

as “The scent of flowers is pleasant” or “Children should be obedient to their parents.” The problem is that several elements of the principle were SKIPPED BUT IMPLICITLY ASSUMED, just like in the judgments above; for example, the judgment “The scent of flowers is pleasant” actually does not express a thought that IT IS ME who finds the scent of flowers pleasant. Every order has its addressee; orders may be addressed either to all people, or some groups of people, or some individuals. They are binding for their addressees thanks to certain conditions which are binding for addressees. Meanwhile, such elements as addressees or conditions are normally not explicitly indicated in orders; they are usually skipped. That is why specific orders look like general ones and in order to correctly express a general order, the statement has to be reformulated. Every ethical principle and every norm implicitly assumes certain conditions and addressees, i.e. the people who are to follow the principles and norms. Similarly, the judgment “The scent of flowers is pleasant” implicitly assumes conditions, or a situation, in which [this judgment] is made; for example, that there is someone who is smelling a flower, that they are able to feel a smell; the same concerns skipped but implicitly assumed elements of the following judgments: “The sun is shining” or “A bus driver must not talk.” Therefore, the rules such as “[Frail] children have to be exterminated,” “[Impaired] parents have to be exterminated” are elliptical; when one completes them, they are “Any nation who lives under the same conditions as we do has to exterminate frail people” and “Any tribe who lives under the same as we do have to exterminate frail and impaired parents.” Obviously, all the conditions of completed sentences have to be precisely defined; thus “Such and such nation who lives under such and such conditions” or symbolically, “A nation which has the features *a, b, c, d* has to exterminate children which have the features *m, n, o, p*.” And it may be said that the principles are fairly right; moreover, they are right always and everywhere, and not in certain periods of time or in certain situations. But they are still principles, which differ from each other. Why do we not apply them? It is clear: they are not binding for us. They refer to precisely defined objects, like a nation or a tribe which has the features *a, b, c, d*; and we are not such a thing. Therefore, these rules have not ceased to be true nowadays: they are not false but they are just not binding and not applicable any more. It often happens in other fields as well. Let us consider the following example: “One should not contact with people suffering from contagious diseases unless one is obliged to that.” Let us assume that this principle is true. All right. However, is it impossible that one day in the future medicine will reach such a high level of development that there will be no contagious diseases in the world? Or is it impossible that there is such a place in the Earth where there are no contagious diseases? It is possible. And what happens then to

the principle in question? Is it untrue? Absolutely not. Even in a situation sketched above, it will be true that one should not contact [with people suffered from contagious diseases unless one obliged to that]. The only difference is that it will be not needed any more, or not applicable. Nobody will apply it because it will not be possible. Because this principle implicitly assumes that there are contagious disease or, in a conditional form, “if there are any contagious diseases at all.” Therefore, this principle will not cease to be true or right. It will just cease to be applicable.

6.3. The third argument is based on the fact that principal ethical concepts, like “good” and “bad,” are relative. What does it mean that concepts are “relative”? [It means] that these words change their meanings as regards various times and places. It is argued, then, that the notions which correspond to them are changed as well. And as a result, a given act cannot be evaluated as absolutely good or absolutely bad. It may be considered either as good or bad, according to our understanding of “good.” Similarly, it is hard to judge whether a given dress is modest or not. The concept of modesty [is] relative; what was considered as immodest before the war is considered modest nowadays, and is likely to be considered immodest again in the future. Let us think about it. Admittedly, the world “good” and “bad” are defined in many ways. For example: what enlarges the happiness of people, or what enhances the harmony of the soul, what enables individuals to be well-developed. And that is why one and the same act is considered by some people as good and by other people as bad, which depends on the concept of “good” which is accepted by them, or what they understand or feel as good. The same concerns the modesty of a dress in given circumstances. However, it does entail that our JUDGMENTS on good and bad [things] are relative. If we reformulate the statements, we will see that judgments in which we accept something as good are always and everywhere true – provided that they are true at all. For a judgment is: “Act *X* is good when “good” means “enlarging the happiness of people.” In other words: act *X* enlarges the happiness of mankind. And “Act *X* is not good when “good” means “enabling an individual to be well-developed.” In other words: act [*X*] does not enable an individual to be well-developed. Either it is, or it is not. It is the same as with “The Sun is shining here and now.” “Here” and “now” are also “relative” concepts, for it may be understood as either as “Lvov” or as “Vilna” etc.

Again, it is only SAYING that [is] “relatively true.” Therefore, in this case judgments are once true and then false but there are various judgments expressed in one and the same statement. “Wearing short trousers which denude the knees is not modest.” The judgment has not changed and it has not turned out to be false. It is not true that the judgment:

“Wearing [short trousers which denude the knees] is modest” has become true. The problem is that there are in fact two judgments, for “modest” has different meanings in two cases. But even if it had the same meaning, it would prove nothing else than the fact that it is the viewpoint that changes, and it would not support a claim that ethical truths are relative. Therefore, the so-called relativity of ethical concepts does not conflict with the possibility of the absolute truthfulness of ethical judgments. It would be better to approach this problem by observing that words may be understood in various ways, and that concepts are the meaning of words. By “relative ethical concepts” one should not mean that ethical judgments are relative for we know that it is what is said – and not a judgment – that is relatively true. To sum up, none of the three arguments is actually dangerous.

[7. How the Predicates “Good” and “Bad” are Used]

While [the third] argument which we have dismantled does not hamper our attempts to establish scientific ethics, there is another danger which is related to this argument. This difficulty may eventually become a source of domestic ethical skepticism. We have mentioned that the words “good” and “bad” may be understood in many ways, whereas we are not concerned with things which people consider as good but rather with things which ARE ACTUALLY GOOD. Therefore, we have to consider whether it is actually easy to classify some acts as good and some as bad. There [are] a number of possible situations which we are going to discuss by means of analogous examples. We have to deal with this problem for it is of grave importance and actuality. Let us try to present it as easily and somehow visually as possible.

Firstly, let us wonder what the people who are gathered in this room may be called: who is a student and who is an unenrolled student. Both of these terms are defined; a student is someone who attends lectures at university and who has been matriculated, whereas an unenrolled student is a student who has not been matriculated. Thus the meaning of the words is well known, precisely defined; and we see immediately what a criterion is: this is a state of being matriculated. Thanks to that, dividing the whole audience into students and unenrolled students does not pose any difficulty. No problem. Now let us imagine the second situation: we are to divide the whole audience into group of students who will successfully complete their study and the group of students who will not complete it.

The concept of a student who has successfully completed their study may be explained as a student who has defended their thesis or passed

a teacher exam. In this situation, the words are PRECISELY DEFINED. However, it is difficult to make a classification. Because we DO NOT HAVE A CRITERION which would enable us to judge to which individuals, that is, to whom, [this] concept is subordinated. The third example: we are to divide people who are gathered in this room into two groups: healthy people and ill, i.e. unhealthy, ones. Yet “healthy man,” “health” and “healthiness” are HARDLY DEFINABLE. Let us try: a healthy man is a man whose psychical and physical features are normal. Yet what does “normal” mean? Or: a man is healthy when he does not suffer from any diseases. Such a definition would be constrained to physical health only; moreover, it is invalid as some serious diseases, like tuberculosis, do not manifest any symptoms at the beginning. Therefore, it is difficult to give a definition. What is more, establishing a GENERAL CRITERION IS NOT EASY as well. Appearance? Effectiveness of work? To sum up: the definition of a healthy man is hardly clear. However, we know a number of features which may help us to judge that somebody is ill, or unhealthy. If someone does not have these features, we may consider them healthy. And in this way, we may make a rough division into healthy and unhealthy people on the basis of a detailed medical examination. Fourth example: we are to divide people [in this room] into gifted and not gifted ones. What does it mean? These concepts are so highly vague that they do not have precise meanings; neither may we give any characteristic feature. Fifth situation: the people gathered in this room are to be divided into people who have dark hair and people who have light hair. On the one hand, there is no criterion either. On the other hand, we perfectly know what “dark” and “light” hair means. Additionally, let us consider modified variants of the first and third examples. Let us imagine that even though there is a criterion, we cannot divide people into two groups because we cannot use this criterion: a student cannot prove that they have been matriculated for they have lost a document which is proof of that act. They claim that they have been matriculated but we cannot accept it provided that we do not take it at their word; a doctor is not sure whether a given patient has symptoms of some illness, or not. Therefore, we have the following possibilities.

- (I) We have both a definition and a criterion. Either we may or may not judge whether the objects which are to be divided satisfy the criterion, or not.
- (II) We have a definition but we do not have a criterion.
- (III) We do not have a definition but we have a criterion. Moreover, either we may or may not judge whether the objects which are to be divided satisfy the criterion, or not.

- (IV) We have neither a definition nor a criterion. A division cannot be made.
- (V) We do not have a definition or we have a definition but we do not have a criterion, or a division may be intuitively made.

[Schematically]

Legend: Y = yes, there is (something); N = no, there is not (something)

A	{	1.	Definition: Y; criterion: Y	rational classification
		2.	Definition: Y; criterion: N	
		3.	Definition: N; criterion: Y	rational classification
		4.	Definition: N; criterion: N	
B		5.	Definition: Y or N; criterion: N	intuitive classification

Let us apply it to our problem. Now we are to make an ultimate classification of behavior, or intentions, plans or fine characters into good and bad in their ethical meaning. How does it work as regards the words “good” and “bad” which name the categories which we are to classify? *THEORETICAL ETHICAL SKEPTICISM* corresponds with case number *FOUR*. “Good” and “bad” are hardly definable. Moreover, they seem to be vague, not easy to identify. Therefore, our ethical judgments have neither cognitive nor scientific value. The opponents of agnosticism, that is, *ETHICAL DOGMATISM*, may be related to either case (1), (2) or (3). In turn, radical intuitionism corresponds with the *FIFTH* case: intuitionists indirectly experience and know intuitively what is good and what is bad. Making a classification poses no difficulty to them. The fifth case is often ascribed to a common view [on ethics], as well as to other ethical theories, for example to a conception of G.E. Moore, a contemporary English philosopher. “If I am asked, what is good?” – he says – “my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked How is *GOOD* to be defined? My answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it. (...) My point is that *GOOD* is a simple notion, just as *YELLOW* is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it, what *YELLOW* is, so you cannot explain what *GOOD* is. Definitions (...) are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. (...) But *YELLOW* and *GOOD*, we say, are not complex: they are notions of that simple kind, out of which definitions are composed and with which the power of further defining ceases.”² The clear and firm viewpoint taken

² G.E. Moore [1903], chapter 1, §§ 6, 7.

by Moore is also adopted by our [philosopher], Dr. Tatarkiewicz [1919]. However, one doubt may be raised here. There is an agreement concerning the classification of things into yellow and not yellow. Is there the same agreement concerning division of things into good and bad?

Or to divide people into these who have dark hair and these who have light hair, which appeared in our example given above? There would be no problem if there were doubtful cases. There may be some things which are transitions between good and bad. However, a core of not-doubtful cases is necessary. Some people try to prove that such a core exists; they argue that just as MANKIND believes in God or some supernatural powers, it also agrees to appreciate certain things, such as devotion, and to depreciate some others, like betrayal. It is a difficult factual problem. Provided that there actually is a core of widely accepted ethical evaluations, it does not suffice to reject intuitionism for there is no core in the field of theoretical judgments either. *Primo*, even the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle were rejected. *Secundo*, certain theoretical judgments may be accepted if relevant concepts have been familiarized before. The same applies to ethical evaluations: some of them may be questioned. One may wonder whether such questions are fair, or not, but the same problem of fairness concerns the law of contradiction. In order to judge it, we need some criteria, namely some feelings. A certain level of development needs to be achieved. So would not it be sufficient if a group of people who achieved a certain ethical level agreed about ethical evaluations? This [solution] is quite problematic but a question of the obviousness of judgments is problematic as well; and in spite of that, we have to base all our knowledge on this obviousness. Coming back to our example: perhaps our classification of people into dark-haired and light-haired will be questioned and rejected but we will defend our standpoint, arguing that people who question this classification have a sight defect. Meanwhile, we have good sight and we are able to notice a difference between the hair colors of individual people. The difference is firmly obvious to us, so we are right and our opponents are wrong. Just in case, we have to be aware that by touching the problem in this way, we are likely to analyze the pair “good” – “bad” in the manner of the pair “beautiful” – “ugly” rather than “true” – “false.”* Such a line of argumentation is impossible.

Which standpoint is then recommended? In my opinion, this question may be answered as regards the scope and aims of scientific ethics only. And this means that – as far as the positive part of our study is concerned

* Twardowski's remark in pen over this sentence: “Or not, provided that we take into account the direct obviousness of judgments which are certain” [D].

– we may know at least what the words “good” and “bad” mean and what a criterion of [dividing objects into] good and bad ones is; what is important – we have to begin with accepting the first, (I), case, and not the fifth, (V), or third, (III), ones.*

[8. Criticism of Hedonism]

Before we present the positive part of our study, we have to dismantle the ethical pessimism which could deprive our analyses of any practical

* There are some Twardowski's remarks on the meaning of the adjectives “good” and “evil” [or “bad”], which were made during his lecture of 1919-1920 but then skipped in a lecture of 1923-1924. It is worth adding them here. Twardowski observed: “We have to ask a fundamental question: are the words “good” and “evil” appropriate for scientific discussion? Should one not exclude them from ethics and establish new a ethics «without the good and the evil»? It sounds paradoxical but these words are incredibly ambiguous. For example: «good» and «evil» are some features. However, “the good” and “the evil,” i.e. the nouns derived from the adjectives, stand for either the features, or, even more often, the objects which have these features. The following examples illustrate the first meaning: “The good of his act is extraordinary” – “The evil of his intentions is evident.” The second sense is illustrated by the following contexts: “A clear conscience is a great good,” “It is a great evil to be overcome by one's passions”; another sense: a “good man” refers to someone who is warm-hearted, and a “evil (bad) man” means someone who is wicked. We say about “good will” and a “good word,” but also about “good pocket knife” or “bad pocket knife,” “good water” or “good (useful) rifle” where “good” means “useful for some aim.” Or “Would you be so good (kind) to give me a glass of water?,” “What a good story” etc. So let us limit our investigations to the word “good” with the ethical meaning. But it causes several new problems. What does it mean? Is this feature relative or absolute? We may try to substitute [a pair “good” – “bad”] with the expressions: “ordered behavior” and “prohibited behavior,” and maybe “recommended” and “permitted” as well. Then “the good” would refer to anything which leads to recommended and ordered behavior, and “the bad” to anything which results in prohibited and permitted behavior. Yet new difficulties may appear. Who prohibited or ordered it? Is it prohibited or ordered absolutely or relatively? In such a situation, the field of morality is constrained to the law and deprived of its essential feature. Perhaps it is conscience that orders? A solution to these problems [could be] as follow: ethics deals with orders and prohibitions which are equally binding for all people of any condition, any class, age, profession, sex etc. Prohibitions and orders do not result from any special relationships between people but from the very fact that people have any relationships, or that they live with each other. Nobody has settled these dictates and prohibitions, i.e. they have not been established as decrees, codes, agreements etc. That is why it seems better to refer to duties and moral obligations instead of orders and prohibitions. And this is the scope, or object, of scientific ethics: it deals with these prohibitions and orders, or moral duties. The fact that they are codified by no authority may be called their NATURAL FEATURE. Therefore, there are obligations which are binding for everyone (although for a group of people they are not applicable any more) and natural obligations. Yet do such prohibitions, orders and obligations present any practical value? Practical ethical skepticism deals with it [D].

or theoretical significance. I am going to discuss two main principles of ethical pessimism: hedonism and determinism.

“PSYCHOLOGICAL hedonism” is a view which assumes that human behavior is motivated by one kind of incentives only, namely by ipsistic or egoistic incentives. According to this theory, people necessarily strive for their own pleasure, in everything which they both do and forego. ETHICAL hedonism claims that people should always take into account their own pleasure and that there should always be egoistic incentives behind their actions. However, if people are always motivated by egoistic incentives, ethics – or in general any regulations which would involve other motivations of behavior – is useless; moreover, there is no point in settling regulations of mere ethical hedonism either. Such reasoning is fairly appropriate. But the problem is whether the premise is adequate. At first glance, psychological hedonism, which accepts only egoistic premises of human behavior, seems to be contradictory to a number of widely known and commonly accepted concepts: we still say about work for others, devotion, abnegation and altruism. What would they mean if people were naturally and necessarily egoistic? La Rochefoucauld (*Réflexions ou sentences et maximes morales*, 1665) and his supporters, both former and contemporary ones, know the ready answer. They maintain that it poses no difficulty to reveal that our work for other people and devotion, and any other phenomenon which seems to be non-egoistic are in fact motivated by egoistic incentives; what should be done is simply to consider why someone is devoted to something or why they work for other people. They do that because they find it pleasant; if they forgo these things, they will be filled with remorse, anxiety and any other kinds of moral torment. In order to avoid these unpleasant feelings, they devote themselves to others, which not only makes them free from displeasure, but also contributes to their true and permanent pleasure. Would a mother take care of her ill child if she did not find it deeply pleasant or if she did not predict that negligence of her child could harm her? Would somebody take a great risk trying to save a life of a sinking man if they did not find this act decently pleasant and if they knew that a passive observation of this situation could be painful? In other, in similar situations it works in the same way; people always strive for their own pleasure and avoid displeasure. In consequence, it is clear that egoism is a salient motivation of any human behavior.

Such an argumentation may actually be convincing, and in fact a number of people follow La Rochefoucauld and do not believe in «true» devotion etc.; they perceive it as a hidden egoism, or “one’s best interest.” However, the theory is nowadays not supported by any psychologists or ethicists, that is, people who are highly competent in this field. When we look deeper in [hedonism], we will see that there are two principal

mistakes underlying this theory: a verbal and factual one. For a psychological hedonism not only changes the sense of the word “egoism” but also misinterprets factual state of affairs. Is it true that everybody who strives for their own pleasure or tries to avoid their own displeasure should be called “egoist”? Is somebody who wishes to kill a toothache or who smokes a good cigar just for pleasure an egoist? We are pretty convinced that such actions are not egoistic at all for an egoistic action should have some additional feature. There is nothing egoistic in striving for one’s own pleasure or displeasure; we use egoism when our own pleasure or displeasure is connected to the pleasure or displeasure of someone else. An egoist is someone who strives for their pleasure and does not care whether their actions lead to the displeasure of someone else. People who aim at pleasing themselves and ignore that the displeasure of other people is a condition for their pleasure are egoists. It results from a definition of egoism which is nothing else than ignoring, or adopting a neutral standpoint on the pleasure and displeasure of other people. Ignoring the way in which our pursuit of pleasure affects our surrounding is a characteristic feature of egoism.* Therefore, people who are devoted to some actions because of pleasure which devotion may bring about are not egoistic; they strive for their own pleasure but at the same time they do not harm anyone nor make anyone feel unpleasant or be deprived of pleasure. That is all what I wished to say about the verbal aspect [of the problem of hedonism].

Let us suppose that the supporters of psychological hedonism are right and that their use of the word “egoism” is proper. Let us agree with them that any behavior is egoistic when it is motivated by a pursuit to achieve and maximize one’s own pleasure or to avoid or decrease one’s own displeasure without any regards to the harm of those surrounding. Does it not mean that people always act ipsistically? If so, La Rochefoucauld’s theory is hard to defend for it is contradicted to several certain psychological facts.

What do we mean by saying that someone strives for their pleasure or tries to avoid their displeasure? It means that the *AIM* of someone’s behavior is to achieve pleasure or avoid displeasure. And in order to establish the aim of our behavior, we have to think about the way in which we are going to behave at the very moment when we resolve to do so. Something which I am not aware of and which I am not thinking about cannot be the aim of

* Remark in the margin in this place: “Ipsism to be differentiated.” In Twardowski’s terminology, “ipsism” was a superior notion to “egoism,” namely it was “a drive to please oneself and avoid one’s harms, which is not necessary related to ignoring pleasure or harm of other people” [D].

my behavior: I cannot pay attention to it when I begin behaving in certain way. But one may ask whether someone who is saving someone else's life or a mother who is resolving to take care of a child instead of going to a party, are aware of or concerned with their own pleasure at the very moment of making a resolution. It may happen. But does it always happen? It is clear that it is not necessary, and our everyday experience gives us evidence for that. For example, while we are buying a gift for someone who is important to us, are we thinking about our own pleasure which we are likely to enjoy when this person will receive a gift and be happy? And if we are not thinking about our own pleasure, it may not be our aim in buying the gift. On the contrary, in such cases our aim is to please someone else; similarly, in previous examples we aimed at saving someone else's life or, like in the case of a mother, preventing a child from suffering. And these are our motivations for certain actions, like jumping into water to save someone who is sinking or resolving to take care of a child. In presented cases, our own pleasure is not our aim, and that is why our behavior cannot be called "egoistic," even if one accepts a broad, and therefore faulty, understanding of egoism proposed by psychological hedonism. That is why La Rochefoucauld's idea is refuted by the facts which are experientially stated. It is simply false to say that the only aim of human behavior is to increase one's own pleasure or to decrease one's own displeasure. [Firstly,] people establish for themselves other aims as well. [Secondly,] even when we actually strive for increasing our own pleasure or we try to decrease our own displeasure, we do not always behave in an egoistic way. It may be surprising, then, that the theory of La Rochefoucauld has gained numerous supporters in the past and that he has many followers nowadays as well. But it is not strange in fact. Paradoxical views are always attractive and their paradoxical nature prevails over sober criticism of them. The more paradoxical theories are, the more "convincing" they seem to be; and psychological hedonism is supported by really misleading apparent proofs. The first one consists in the fact that really non-egoistic behavior is fairly rare; we personally must admit that people whom we consider to be noble or at least altruistic often turn out to be egoists. We personally know that it is wrong to make generalizations and to infer a general statement on people's behavior from just a few facts. But there is also the second reason why psychological hedonism is popular, and it is true that the analysis of the mental factors, which are concerned with our resolutions and behavior, is shallow. Because of that, one treats something which normally co-occurs with our behavior as the main or the only impulse of our behavior. The problem may be explained in the following way.

When we aim at something and achieve it, that is, fulfill the aim, we have a feeling of pleasure; and when we fail to achieve it, we have a feeling

of displeasure. It is not only a fact but a fact which we are aware of. So we know that if we achieve our aim, we will enjoy pleasure. It results from the very essence of the aims of our behavior for we aim at something toward which we are never neutral. Nobody has a desire that something which they do not care about be accomplished; if people do not pay attention to whether such a thing exists or not, they are neutral toward it. Therefore, fulfilling our aims is always connected with enjoying pleasure, whereas failing to fulfill our aims is connected with experiencing displeasure. However, the pleasure which is enjoyed when we achieve our aim and which appears when our aims have been fulfilled is not our aim; it is just a phenomenon which appears when we have achieved our aim. Somebody who has saved someone else's life will actually be happy when their action is accomplished; if they did not care whether a man who was sinking would die or not, they would not have wished to help him. However, their happiness, or pleasure, is not the aim of their action; they rather focus on the phenomena which necessarily co-occur with their behavior, or with achieving the aim of their behavior. When someone follows a psychological hedonist in claiming that this phenomenon, which necessarily co-occurs with certain actions, is the aim [of the actions], they seem to agree with the following statement as well: "I meet some man who always uses a walking stick. He hobbles so that, but for the walking stick, he would not be able to walk at all. Therefore, he walks in order to use his walking stick." Naturally, such reasoning is ridiculous. However, it does not differ significantly from the theses of psychological hedonism. The use of a walking stick is a necessary condition of the walk but it is not the aim of the walk. The same concerns pleasure: the pleasure which one enjoys when one has achieved an aim is a necessary condition of any action but it is not the aim of the action. Yet it is still possible that there is someone who aims at enjoying pleasure; there may also be people who go for a walk just in order to present publicly their new walking stick. This is the main source of a belief that the theory of common egoism is right; yet it just seems to be right, as we have said. In fact, psychological hedonism is nothing more than clever sophistry.*

One could avoid the consequences of psychological hedonism by claiming that even though all people strive for and aim at their own pleasure, [they accomplish it in various ways:] some people find one thing pleasant, some another, and some would enjoy a situation when thanks to them,

* Almost the whole part of the text, except for one phrase, which begins with the words: "At first glance psychological hedonism, which accepts only egoistic premises..." (see above, p. 264), that is, argumentation against hedonism, has previously been published in [Twardowski 1899a]. I included the fragment of the text republished in [Twardowski 1927], pp. 362 and ff. [D].

other people have pleasure or have less displeasure than they would have otherwise. The last group may be called "altruists" and the former ones "egoists" or "ipsists." Psychological hedonism would be then somehow defended, although it would not reject any more that practical ethics is possible. It would be concerned with a way in which people could enjoy pleasure by pleasing other people, or by bringing the good to other people.

[9. Determinism and Ethics]

Let us go to the second argument of practical et[hical] skepticism, [i.e.] ethical pessimism. This argument [concerns] determinism and its consequences. In order to understand the problem, one has to consider the very notion of determinism. According to determinism, "Will is not free." The problem is: "what is will?" and "what is free?" (Schopenhauer). Will can be considered as a disposition and may have a broad and narrow meaning. Will [can also be considered] as a psychical fact (then "I want" means "I resolve," or "I decide to do something"; "someone's last will"; "Are you truly willing to...?"). Resolutions. This is precisely what determinism and indeterminism deal with, whereas they are not concerned with will [understood as a disposition]. But what does "free" mean? It may mean many things for the word "free" is ambiguous. This word and notion is relative and means "free from (something)". ["Free" may refer to] something which is relatively free ("free from something"), we say about "free seat," "free time," "free translation," "free nation," "free people," "free bird," "are you free this evening"; "free" is somehow synonymous with "not controlled," "not occupied."

In a sense, the problem of whether the will is free or not is not a serious problem to deal with. "I have free will because I may do whatever I want. I make resolutions on things which I desire," which means that I have no difficulties in accomplishing my resolutions. If so, it is not a resolution but rather the accomplishment of a resolution, or an act which follows the resolution, that is free. It means that "If I have resolved that I want something, it will be accomplished" (implicitly: "But for I had not resolved it, it would have not been accomplished"). I may stand up if I have resolved to stand up, I may sit down, I may leave etc. I may even kill someone if I have resolved to do so. I may do anything provided there is no external difficulty. Then I may do anything which I resolve to do. Free will which consists in the LACK OF DIFFICULTIES TO ACCOMPLISH ONE'S RESOLUTION, or in possibility to do anything which one has resolved to do, is called by some people "PHYSICAL FREEDOM." It is "physical" for, according to Schopenhauer, it consists in the lack

of physical difficulties. Some people, like Höfler, call it *PSYCHOLOGICAL* freedom for it is psychological experience which lets us believe that we may accomplish our resolution. The following conviction is present here: (1) I resolve something; (2) I accomplish my resolution, i.e. the things which I have made my resolutions on are accomplished; (3) the things are accomplished because I have made resolutions about them. The first judgment is based on internal experience, the second one is based either on internal or external experience, and the third one has the same basis that other judgments of cause-effect character do. We are not going to deal with physical freedom. Apart from physical freedom, Schopenhauer suggests that there is intellectual freedom as well; intellectual freedom of will, or of resolutions, consists in the fact that one is free from intellectual difficulties or imperfections. To be explained. Examples*: In fact, [intellectual freedom] is not concerned with the freedom of resolutions either but rather the freedom of intellectual states which are the basis for willing and resolutions; this means [freedom] from imperfections and mistakes. One may be deprived of intellectual freedom when one suffers from mental illnesses; their intellectual freedom may be weakened as well; it happens when one is drunk or strongly affected by emotions. But it [i.e. intellectual freedom] may not work in normal situations when we make inevitable mistakes; for example, we are convinced that we give somebody a medicine but in fact we give them a poison because our servant has put poison in a container with the name of a medicine. This freedom of will (i.e. resolutions which are free from our cognitive mistakes) are subjected to the interest of lawyers etc. We are not going to deal with it for it does not pose any difficulties for ethics at least. It is clear and not arguable.

We are interested in another meaning of the freedom of will; we actually are to deal with the freedom of resolutions. What are these resolutions free from? [They are free] from their causes. [Our problem is whether] resolutions are caused by something, which would mean that they are effects, or whether they are not caused by anything, which would mean that

* An analogous passage which was attached to the written version of lectures of 1906 is: "Intellectual freedom (Schopenhauer). Freedom from obstacles of an intellectual character, that is, [freedom from] the lack of judgments or from mistaken judgments. The former may be when I am not aware of the consequences which are entailed by accomplishing my resolution; if I knew them, I would not accomplish my resolution. I flicked my friend as a joke but I could not know that I would frighten him so much that he would lose consciousness. Or I shot my servant who came into my bedroom for I confused him with a burglar." Schopenhauer discussed the distinction into physical and intellectual freedom in the first chapter of his [1839]. Psychological freedom of will is analyzed by Höfler in his [1897], p. 556 [D].

they are not causes. [We shall begin with] explaining the notion of cause conditions and final cause.

[The following problems should be analyzed.] Total and partial cause; its relatively constant and relatively temporal parts. Necessity or inevitability, as regards both the existence and an «appearance» of an effect. Determination of effects. F Conditionalism. Functionalism. “Necessity” is discussed again in “functional dependence.” Examples: A stone which is thrown, an explosion, an outburst of anger when I am fed up with someone. Are resolutions really free from this inevitability, are they free from causes? Determinism and indeterminism. The teleological source of our problem. *Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*. *Necessitare* and *inclinare*.*

Does it apply to everyday situations? Is it as adequate as it is regarding physical and intellectual freedom? Undoubtedly, we explain our resolutions by referring to their sources or causes. We anticipate and predict. Sometimes we are not able to explain someone else’s action or behavior. However, if we knew what they were really thinking, if we were able to look into their soul, we would be able to understand their acts and behavior. Moreover, we are convinced that we may influence someone else’s resolution. Pedagogy. The causes which are assumed by us in everyday life may be divided into two groups.

Firstly, there are incentives or motives. For example, Peter let his debt or not return his money and he was motivated by a desire to help his debtor. However, if Peter were ABLE to have such a thirst and to make a relevant resolution, his incentive would neither exist nor work. So apart from desire, we must consider as well some ability to have certain feelings and make certain resolutions. Therefore, there are INCENTIVES and DISPOSITIONS concerning feelings, desires, resolutions; all [such dispositions] are called someone’s “character.” The relation between will and character. In turn, INCENTIVES are any facts or psychical phenomena which explain, together with character, why a given resolution has been made. They are presentations, judgments, feelings, desires. [So there are] factual and dispositional partial causes. We use them to explain resolutions and behavior. For example: someone has committed suicide. Why? Because they were accused of a dishonorable act. [They must have been] ambitious and persistent and deeply hurt by the accusation; but for this ambition and certain mental facts they would not have resolved to commit suicide.† It seems that we

* The whole analysis of the notion of causality which may be [partially] found in ALL lectures has a form of dispositions, which were collected by me in one place [D].


† Here is a reference to a scheme which presents the problems in question:

all accept determinism, like we do in everyday life. However, on the other hand we are reluctant to agree with determinism for we are full of pride concerning our «internal» freedom. We have a «clear» «feeling» that we are able to make any resolution and that we are able to act in any way we like. However, according to Schopenhauer, this is an illusion, or rather a proper meaning [of our conviction]. We waver between determinism and indeterminism; supporters of both [orientations] point out the negative consequences of their opponents' standpoint. We have already discussed objections which are stated by indeterminists against determinism. And determinists response that according to indeterminism, anything in the domain of resolutions becomes accidental and unpredictable and influence on anyone is impossible, and so on. That is a problem!

We are not going to solve it. We are not interested in the question of whether determinism actually poses such a danger to ethics as it is claimed. Some attempts were made to find a compromise solution (Kant, Schopenhauer). Yet we are not dealing with the essence of this problem but with a question of whether it is true that determinist theses have dangerous consequences for ethics, which is maintained by its opponents. The whole thing is highly obscure. Yet some problems could be solved without a deep analysis of its psychological aspects. Namely:


(I) Determinism is not opposed to a claim that there are ethical incentives and that they really work. Ethical incentives work like any other ones, compare e.g. a feeling of obligation, a fear of remorse, a willing to realize some ideal, like love for neighbor, and so on.

(II) Determinism is not opposed to ethical evaluation, because: (a) nowadays it is commonly accepted that the proper OBJECT of ethical evaluation, or of calling something "good" or "bad," is precisely our character; incentives and resolutions in an indirect way only, for we are interested in their influence on the character; the same concerns behavior; we find it important as it is an external manifestation of our character. No matter whether our resolutions necessarily result from character



Remark below the scheme: "three meanings of the word "character" [D].

and incentives or not, the character may be evaluated. By analogy, (b), we ourselves may be evaluated aesthetically and logically, no matter whether our appearance and our judgments are necessarily caused by our organism or our reason. Someone said something which is absolutely wrong. The same analogically concerns the actions. Making a resolution is analogous to making judgments. Arguments and rationales are analogous to incentives, and reason is analogous to character. If our behavior were not motivated by incentives, there would not be these analogies. [It is presented in the scheme below.]



For we all accept that if one has given reason and rationales, they inevitably have to make given resolutions. But we may still evaluate their convictions or what they say as appropriate or wrong, and their reason as wise, great or poor (wise – stupid). And then: even if some phenomenon is necessary, it never poses any difficulties to evaluate it; that is why physical impairment may be aesthetically evaluated. Why would it not work in this case? One may respond that such an evaluation has no significance, no value, whereas it should have one. For if someone makes faulty judgments because they are stupid, we do not consider him responsible for the judgments; if we do not like someone because they are ugly, we also do not consider him responsible for it. Similarly, we do not praise anyone for their talents or wisdom, or beauty.

If we consider somebody responsible for these facts, we do it only when this person has contributed to them by his behavior.

There is something special about human behavior; it is **BURDENING SOMEONE WITH RESPONSIBILITY** and recognizing one's guilt and merit, which is not normally made in other cases. How could it work if our acts and resolutions are a necessary condition of our character and incentives, like beauty or ugliness [are a necessary condition of] physiological conditions which do not depend on us. This is the main problem. In order to solve it, we have to look deeper into it.

What may we say about one's responsibility, guilt and merit? Above all, we have to consider the notion of recognizing an act and its relation to the notion of responsibility. So there is recognizing an act, a maker of an act, limited recognition*, and sanity. Moral obligation. We recognize an act, that is, we state that a given act results from a resolution and this resolution [is] in accordance with character.

If it is not so, then moral obligation, or sanity is limited, or there is nothing like sanity at all; and if there is, then we are dealing with the so-called moral freedom from temporal constraining caprices etc. Meanwhile, responsibility is a social concept. We recognize an act as related to a resolution, and a resolution as related to character; therefore, we recognize an act as related to character, and as character contributes to one's personality, we recognize an act as related to a given person. There is no recognizing an act – although we recognize as acts things which follow from foregoing an act as well – if there is no act or no resolution. The recognition of an act and the sanity of a person are limited, or there is no recognition and no sanity, when an act does not correspond to a resolution or when a resolution does not correspond to character, or there are no such correspondences at all.

The recognition [of an act] and the sanity [of a person]. Why in recognizing a certain act we do not go beyond the maker [of this act]?

The notion of moral freedom†, and then the notion of responsibility, guilt and merit. Criteria of recognizing something as one's guilt or merit. We not only recognize some acts and burden people with responsibility for them but we also recognize certain things as merit or guilt (which Höfler calls "emotional" recognition).‡ We also say that [something] "is

* By using both the terms "recognition" and "sanity," Twardowski might have intended to differentiate between two relevant notions; see below, footnote * on p. 278 [B&J]

† Twardowski elaborates on the notion of moral freedom in his work "O pojęciu poczytalności karnej w świetle psychologii" ["On the notion of criminal sanity in light of psychology"]: "If a given act completely results from someone's character, then the maker of the act is, as we said, morally free while they are acting. [...] Moral freedom is then a condition of recognizing an act." Cf. [Twardowski 1899b], p. 447 [D].

‡ Höfler puts the problem of moral recognition of an act (*emotionales Zurechnen*) in his [1897], p. 581, in this way: "Offenbar ist das Zurechnen zunächst ein Urteilen; nämlich das Urteil, dass A wirklich der Thäter des Geschehenen sei, [...] Hiermit ist die intellektuelle Seite des in Z sich rollziehenden Vorganges, die intellektuelle Zurechnung beschrieben. Indem wir nun aber insbesondere von moralischer [...]. Zurechnung sprechen, ist schon gesagt, dass mit dem intellektuellen Zurechnen zusammen auch ein emotionales Zurechnen stattfindet. Das Wissen um die That und um den Willen des A macht nämlich beides zum Gegenstand einer im Z sich vollziehenden sittlichen Werthaltung; und diese ist, wie jedes Werthalten, ein Gefühl" [D].

not my fault," "*nicht meine Schuld*," "*pas ma faute*." Examples. In all the cases, the question is whether I am the maker of an act or a state of affairs, or an event; besides, the act or its consequences may be positively or negatively evaluated. The first meaning. Thus some act or its further consequences are merit or guilt if it may be recognized as positive or negative and, at the same time, it has a positive or negative value. Examples. It is my merit that I have passed an exam. It is my guilt that someone got cold, or drew the wrong picture, or was harmed etc. In the situations presented above, I am a maker and the things which I have done are negative. This [is] the first meaning. The second one: a feature which the maker of such acts or states of affairs begins to have: "I do not find him guilty," "Who is without guilty feelings" etc. "This is a man of numerous merits." Perhaps the adjectives are clearer: "faulty"/"guilty" and "honored." It is fairly obvious. Any possible meanings of the word "guilt" and "merit" may be reduced to the two meanings explained above, provided that we are going to differentiate between them. However, one must remember that these two words convey the nuance of meaning of RESPONSIBILITY: "merit" suggests that the maker of a given act should be rewarded for that act, and "guilt" presupposes that the maker should be punished. But not necessarily. We should also remember one more thing: we may recognize something as one's merit or guilt, or not, provided that: (1) the thing that is to be recognized has to result from an act, (2) the act has to result from a resolution, and (3) the resolution has to correspond with a character. Therefore when we say that something is not someone's merit or guilt, we may mean many things, according to our reason for not considering someone as a maker of an act. [It may happen when] (1) either because something does not result from our act; for example, it is not my merit that my patient has recovered; or it is not my fault that my patient has died during an operation; in the first case, my patient's recovery is not a result of my acts because I considered his illness incurable and refused to treat him; I just pretended that I treated him; in the second case, [my patient's death] is not a result of my acts as well, because he died of a stroke. Or (2) there was no resolution at all, so my acts could not have resulted from any resolution. For example, we do not recognize an outburst of anger as merit when it happens to phlegmatic people for they cannot resolve [to become angry]; yet we may recognize it as a merit when it happens to impulsive people. As far as guilt is concerned, we do not recognize it as guilt that somebody is nervous and very timid because of a shock which they experienced in their youth or childhood; in consequence, [we do not recognize it as a fault] when such a man as a soldier has been dictated to watch a mortuary but he becomes frightened of some rustle and runs away. We do not [recognize his act in this way] for he has not made any resolution; he escaped under provocation, as

it is said. Or finally (3), there is no guilt nor merit if one has made a resolution, and there is a causal connection between the resolution and an act and perhaps between an act and its further effects, but the resolution does not correspond to one's character. For example, [this concerns] a soldier who is not courageous but decides not to leave his post and actually stays there. However, if he was threatened to do so, if he was threatened to be shot if he left his post, this was moral coercion, and there is no merit. There is also no guilt when someone is morally coerced to do something. One should always consider these three types of situations when there is no guilt and merit; otherwise, they may be misled by the following facts. Examples presented in (2), the phlegmatic person and the soldier leaving his post at the mortuary, show that what these people did corresponded with their character. However, we still do not recognize [their acts as guilt or merit] for there was no resolution. As far as situations shown in (3) are concerned, we do not recognize [their acts as guilt or merit] because people's resolutions do not correspond with their character. Like it was before, examples in (3) suggest that there is a state of affairs which makes recognizing acts difficult. This is what I wanted to discuss the notions of merit and guilt and recognizing [given acts] as meritorious or guilt-worthy. We understand it simply as recognizing something which is evaluated both as positive and negative, which is sometimes related to a factor of rewarding or compensation. Someone deserves our honor, or gratitude, and someone else is responsible for someone's death. In the second case, if there is some guilt concerned, it is a matter of RESPONSIBILITY provided that there is someone who has a right to demand COMPENSATION.

Let us go back to determinism and indeterminism, precisely to the question whether one may reconcile determinism with the essential features of ethical evaluation which are conveyed by the notion of merit and guilt; and if so, may one reconcile determinism with responsibility? In my opinion the very recognizing of something as guilt or merit is not contradictory to determinism and does not pose any serious difficulties, for to recognize something as merit or guilt is [to state] that a given man has done an act and that the act has some value. Admittedly, ethical evaluation differs from logical and aesthetical evaluations. We prefer things which we like to things which we do not like, and we prefer truth to falsehood; meanwhile, as far as ethical evaluation is concerned, we may prefer better things to worse ones but things make [irrelevant] resolutions. That is why we need SOCIAL coercion, and a means of this coercion is simply burdening people with responsibility. But here is a question: is there any responsibility if we accept determinism or indeterminism? Things seem to be different in this case. Indeterminists claim: "We are responsible for the acts of which we are the maker, because we could have been makers of

them.” Determinists say: We could not have not been the makers of these acts – we are not responsible for them.” Or more precisely, indeterminists say: “Having a certain character and being influenced by certain incentives, I could have made another resolution,” and determinists: “Having a certain character and being influenced by certain incentives, I could not have made another resolution.” Therefore, ethical skeptics would argue by referring to determinist claims that nobody can be responsible for their acts or burdened with responsibility, because their resolutions were necessary, inescapable and inevitable. And our feeling of responsibility, our repentance, our pity and our remorse are all prejudices! In fact, it is a problem, and numerous philosophical systems have tried to solve it in many ways. Kant and Schopenhauer differentiated between the intelligible and empirical character and Vaihinger introduced the notion of a useful fiction; but their results were not satisfactory. So what is a better solution? It seems that it is fairly simple. Let us consider this question again. Indeterminists point out that despite having made some resolution, they WERE ABLE TO MAKE a different one that they actually did.

Determinists argue that despite having made some resolution, they WOULD HAVE MADE a different one IF THEY HAD BEEN influenced by some other (different) incentives or if they had had another (different) character, or if both conditions had been fulfilled. Let us investigate the example: a man who is really poor asks me for money. I do not trust him and I suspect that he is going to cheat me. After short consideration, I decide to refuse him for I am not so sympathetic and I am fairly stingy as well. Perhaps I would make a different resolution if the man asking for money was more convincing, or if I noticed some benefits of a loan, or if I was more sympathetic or less stingy. According to indeterminism, in spite of my character, I could have made a different resolution. And according to determinism, I would have resolved in a different way if only I had had a different character or if I had been motivated by different incentives. We are not going to judge which standpoint is right; we are interested in the issue of whether our feeling of responsibility or repentance, burdening us with responsibility and feeling remorse, may be understood and explained on the ground of determinism. Let us skip now the problem of burdening someone with responsibility. Let us focus on a MERE RESOLVING SUBJECT and this subject's feeling of responsibility, repentance, pity and remorse. From one point of view, all of them have no value, and this would be accepted both by determinists and indeterminists; resolutions which have already been made. Namely, I cannot cancel a resolution [which I have already made]. What is done is done. Let us imagine that people may make only one resolution in their life; once they have made this only resolution, they have a feeling of responsibility (they distressed the man who was asking), they show

repentance, they feel pity and remorse. But it means nothing for them and for anyone else. It is completely pointless and has no value. It's done. (I ignore situations when a second person seems to be needed, someone who would forgive if we show repentance and would not forgive otherwise. As we are going to see, it actually does not affect our reasoning). If someone finds it difficult to imagine a situation where people are able to make only one resolution in their life, they may think about another example: somebody is dying and they feel pity and show repentance for whole their previous life; assuming that there is no afterlife, what is the point of pity and repentance? Does it have any value? Perhaps a purely theoretical one and nothing else. Even the most radical indeterminists would admit that in such circumstances, people cannot resolve to live in another way. It's done. That is why even though pity, repentance and remorse concern and result from resolutions which have already been made, they are actually important for future resolutions. Thus, the problem of whether or not someone could have made a different resolution is neutral for these feelings. However, the crucial point is whether someone IS ABLE TO MAKE A DIFFERENT RESOLUTION IN THE FUTURE. Repentance, pity and remorse which somebody once felt or experienced leave a mark on somebody's soul.

It may be manifested in the future in two ways: (1) as a disposition to experience a similar feeling or to make an existing disposition more intense; or (2) as a recollection of past repentance etc.; such a recollection appears when we are to make a similar resolution in the future ([for example,] I felt sad when I refused to lend money and I would feel responsible if the man who asked me for money felt despair and committed suicide; that is why if someone else asks me for money in the future, I will not refuse). Then a recollection becomes a new incentive.

From a psychological point of view, people never act in the same way for our past experience strongly influences our life; so even the situations which seem to be the same as the ones which already took place are in fact different from them. Everything stays in the soul forever. Even determinists must agree that the feelings are important; they are facts which are recollected and which contribute to new incentives of our future behavior; that is why one may make [new and] different resolutions in spite of the fact that external circumstances remain totally the same (partly because we have changed, partly because new incentives have appeared). In other words, we react emotionally to any sensations, including our resolutions.

For example, we like some faces and some figures in an aesthetic dimension and some other we dislike in this sense. Some smells cause us pleasure, others are abominations to us. We react in one way when our body and mind are relaxed and in another way when we are weary and ponderous. Any sensory reactions are of grave life (biological) importance.

They attract us or warn us. They play such a role *pro futuro*, of course, for what we experienced is experienced and we cannot cancel it. Yet it is a guideline for the future: we will avoid some things and strive for others. Naturally, we are not going to strive for looking at beautiful faces and avoiding ugly ones, and we are not going to strive for experiencing pleasant smells and avoiding unpleasant ones; what we are interested in making certain resolutions and to forego making different ones. That is why pity, repentance and remorse are founded not on the fact that I could have made a different resolution but on the fact that I will be able to make a different resolution in the future. So it does not play any role whether I could have or could not have made a different resolution [that I actually did]. [Let us compare it with an] analogous situation: I enter an airless room and I feel it is stifling. My feeling of disgust is caused by a sensation of an unpleasant smell; yet it is biologically important for it warns us to avoid such unpleasant smells in the future. I am supposed to recognize a given resolution as unpleasant in order not to make similar resolutions in the future.

The same concerns our FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY. Besides, this term is ambiguous. ["I feel responsible for something"] may mean "I accept myself as a maker of this act," "I recognize this act as mine." And then [one may say] "I do not feel responsible for this thing" because that person is not the maker [of an act]; this may be caused by any reason out of three which result in the lack of recognizing an act. It works in a similar way to when one says "I shoulder full responsibility [for a thing]" and "I do not shoulder full responsibility [for that]." However, in the latter examples, a speaker assumes that they may, or may not [respectively], be burdened with responsibility.* And again: a right to burden with responsibility the authors [of given acts] is not founded in the fact that someone could have made a different resolution in the past but in the fact that it inclines both them and other people to make different resolutions in the future. It is related to theories of punishments. [There is] a theory which is based on the primordial need of revenge, retaliation for injustice or moral disorder.

* In the lecture delivered on 13th June 1928, Twardowski puts it in this way: "The word 'responsibility' [has] two meanings. The word in the first meaning appears in the expression 'burden with responsibility,' and the second one in the sentences 'I feel responsible [for something]' and 'I shoulder responsibility [for something].'" In the second meaning, it refers to a condition when it is possible to burden someone with responsibility, that is, when it is possible to do a thing which is suggested in the first meaning. "To burden someone with responsibility" means to make someone aware, and to prove to them, that they have done something improper and to draw negative effects (punishment). And what about the second meaning of "responsibility"? What does this condition consists in? It consists in recognition of an act [and] in the sanity of the maker of an act" [D].

[Then] a theory of prevention, a theory of improvement. Only a theory of reward, which has been established on the basis of a theory of revenge, is hard to reconcile [with determinism]. A theory of improvement and a theory of prevention are easy to be reconciled. And then punishment, and in consequence burdening someone with responsibility as well, is an external means which serves the same role as pity, repentance and remorse which are internal and involuntary. Therefore, a determinist claim that someone could have not made a different resolution than they actually made does not exclude the fact that they still may be punished; for the point is not to make the same resolution in the future. People who are sufficiently developed are affected by internal incentives as well, namely by moral feelings which appear as reactions to their own resolutions. Children are not influenced by such incentives; they only have dispositions to them, but incentives themselves are not active. Children act like small animals: they are afraid of punishment. When they grow up, they become afraid of annoying their parents etc. We support such a feeling of fear in children for it is beneficial for resolutions that children will make in the future. We are going to come back to this problem later on. Now we should notice that there are two parallel factors: internal and external. They are of the same biological importance: they have to discourage people from making some resolutions and encourage them to make other ones. And it is neutral whether passed resolutions were necessary or voluntary, to use determinist and, respectively, indeterminist terminology.

One could raise objections to this by claiming that the whole argument may explain at least the biological and sociological *RAISON D'ÊTRE* of these moral feelings, as well as burdening someone with responsibility, and adjusting them to the determinist framework. Admittedly, these feelings may still be important even if resolutions are not free, i.e. when one does not have to accept that a resolution could have been different that it actually was.

However, is it necessary that we have a conviction that we could have made a different resolution to feel repentance, pity or remorse? In other words, the freedom of will is not necessarily needed in order to justify theoretically that moral feelings and burdening someone with responsibility have a *raison d'être*. Yet is not a *BELIEF IN THE FREEDOM OF WILL* needed for us to have moral feelings? Let us compare this with an analogous example: I will enjoy compliments even if they are not sincere; it is enough that I *BELIEVE* that they are sincere. Objective states of affairs are indifferent but my conviction about an objective state of affairs is not.

Therefore, determinists may agree that there is theoretically no contradiction between these moral feelings and the necessity of resolutions. However, if [they were to accept that] one may have these feelings if and

only if one is convinced that resolutions are not necessary, determinists would never have any moral feelings; by promulgating their ideas, they will make their supporters reject the freedom of will and ability to feel these moral feelings.* So it seems that ethics should maintain a fiction of the freedom of will, almost an illusion of it, to its own benefit.

And then: is it not true that this fiction, or illusion, is necessary for one did not lose one's faith that one may develop morally and morally improve oneself? If one is convinced that one's own resolutions are necessary and inevitable and, thus, that person might not have different resolutions than they have at a given moment, they will infer that their resolutions will always result from their character and incentives; and it would mean that whether they would resolve to expel some of their disadvantages or to gain some advantages, or not, it does not depend on them. Actually, it is in fact a dangerous consequence for morality. This consequence is not an argument against determinism but it may become and in fact does become a weapon of ethical skeptics. So how is that? Above all, we have to answer the question of whether one needs to be convinced that the will is free in order to show repentance etc. If by the conviction in question we understand adopting the theoretical standpoint of indeterminism, then the answer is: no. For if one needed to have such a conviction, only those people who believe in the freedom of will be able to show repentance etc. Meanwhile, in order to believe in the freedom of will, one has to know what the notion of the freedom of will consist in. In order to grasp this notion, one has to be familiar with the notion of causality and with relevant psychical facts which are related to our resolutions, and only then one may be convinced that the will is or is not free. Yet it requires having a quite trained ability to think about some abstract notions and about one's own psychical life. And uneducated people do not have it. But they still show repentance etc. When we ask them whether their will is free, they will not understand us; it is hard to explain to them that by asking this question, we want to know whether their resolutions are necessary. It is hard to explain that we want to know whether a general law of causality underlies their resolutions. But

* In a plan of his lectures from 1923-1924, there is a remark next to a lecture delivered on 23 June 1924: "Apart from that, the problem of substituting primitive moral feelings with rationalized ones, and a feeling of obligation above all, was discussed. Some demagogy which was characteristic of a fight with determinism was illustrated; it resulted from the human resistance to any ethical bounds, superficiality, clichés and confusing [ethics] with a theological standpoint. Such a demagogic cliché is the way of understanding the word «people» which has a distributive and collective meaning. [Another example is] temporal fashion or advertisement in science, like the present [popularity of] Einstein. One has to be calm and formulate strong arguments; nothing should be able to discompose them" [D].

we do not mean such a theoretical standpoint. One's conviction that one's will is free, which is apparently or really necessary to show repentance etc., may be expressed just as a conviction that one could have resolved in a different way than that person actually did. So we should change the question and ask whether it is necessary for one to be convinced that they could have resolved in a different way than they actually did to show repentance; (or more simply whether one could not have done something which that person actually did). It is really hard to give an answer to this question for it is *quaestio facti* (and the previous question about the deterministic view on the *raison d'être* of repentance was *quaestio iuris*.) But what we ask about is a problem of whether some psychical facts are a necessary condition of other psychical facts. In order to positively answer this question, i.e. to say that this conviction is necessary to raise the a feeling of repentance etc. it should be shown that when there is a feeling of repentance etc., then also this conviction occurs, and when there is not this conviction, then these feelings do not occur either. It is impossible to make an *a priori* statement that one's conviction that one could have made a different resolution than what was actually made is a necessary condition to show repentance etc.; yet also the opposite statement cannot be accepted *a priori*. May our research explain this problem? It is hard to predict. Let us consider both situations, i.e. the consequences of POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE answers to the last question. If it turned out that our conviction that one's will is free or that one "could have done something else than was actually done" IS NOT a necessary condition of repentance, then determinist objections against the practical significance of ethics were *eo ipso* no longer valid. Then one could be a determinist and still could be able not only to JUSTIFY the *raison d'être* of remorse etc., but also to actually HAVE them. If it turned out that our conviction is necessary then determinism would actually be harmful to] remorse etc.; *nota bene* under the condition that it would be able to remove this conviction. For it is possible that we are instinctively convinced that we "could have done something other than we actually did," and it would mean that even if some sophisticated theory, like determinism, rejects such an instinctive conviction, we will still have it. Examples of instinctive convictions are as follow: naïve realism which assumes that there are colors, sounds, heat and cold; the Sun moves around the Earth. According to determinism, in such cases we would be affected by illusions and thus have instinctive convictions; moreover, they would be perfectly sufficient to have remorse etc. and no free will would be necessary. These illusions embodied in instinctive convictions would be one of the means which perform some biological, especially social and ethical, function. [It may be understood as an analogy with] our instinctive conviction that there are colors etc., which [is] also a means to live in the

world. However, it could be applied provided that deterministic convictions would not be able to cancel this conviction [that free will exists]. Once more, this is *quaestio facti*. [In order to check it,] we would need to survey all determinists who strongly support their thesis. So we face a problem which cannot be solved. If determinism were able to cancel this conviction, and if it turned out that this conviction were necessary for one to have some moral feelings, declared determinists would not be able to have moral feelings.

But perhaps there is a way to avoid this alternative. Maybe the problem should have been formulated in a different way and the question is not: does one have to be convinced that one could have done something other than what was done in order to be able to have moral feelings? Perhaps the question is: does one have to be convinced that one could not have done anything other than what was actually done in order to have been able to have [moral] feelings. It would mean that we do not need to be convinced about the freedom [of will]; the lack of the conviction that will is not free is sufficient here. And one is not convinced that will is not free when one has no convictions as regards the possibility or impossibility, of doing something in a different way than it was actually done. This seems to be the most appropriate view on the actual course of psychical life. Does a person, who has negative moral feelings because of a resolution, have to realize first that “that person could have done something other than what was actually done”? (See the example given above about a resolution not to lend money to somebody.) Is it not enough for this person to realize that nothing could have been done any differently than it actually was? By analogy, we have already seen that in order to make any resolutions, one does need to be convinced that one may perform [a relevant] act; it is enough for this person not to be convinced that the act cannot be performed. We may support this claim, i.e. that it is enough for one not to realize that one could not have done anything else than what was actually done, by pointing out that moral feelings appear in a direct way. They are somehow automatic reactions to some resolutions. If they are anticipated by some deliberation, what is being deliberated is not whether one could or could have done something in a different way than it was actually done, but rather whether one’s incentives were right or not and what consequences one may expect. But it seems that people do not deliberate in such situations whether they could have done something in a different way than they actually did. And if all [what has been stated] is true, it does not matter whether someone is determinist in theory or not; their theoretical views do not affect the appearance of their moral feelings for it is not true that they are convinced that they could have made a different resolution than they

actually did. For we assume that there is no such conviction which would be made after a resolution was made.

However, some problems still remain. Namely, it is possible that someone who is a determinist, that is, who assumes that they could not have made a different resolution than they actually did, dissuades themselves *ex post* that they did not have some moral feelings even though they actually had them. They may argue: there is no point in having any remorse for it was not possible for me to make a different resolution than I actually did. By applying such an argument several times, they may eventually have no remorse at all. Perhaps it is possible and perhaps it happens in the world. However, does it actually mean that practical ethics has been sentenced to death? Does it actually mean that practical skepticism has won over ethics? Does pessimism win? We may defeat our standpoint in two ways: (1) we may admit that one does have to be convinced that one could have done something other than what was actually done and one still may feel repentance etc. for it is enough for one to be convinced that one *MIGHT* have done something else, and it would be accepted by determinism. Everything would be all right then. Apart from the fact that is once more a *quaestio facti*; it is difficult to decide this question, it is hard to convince somebody at our stage of research. (2) Even though we draw a conclusion that one's conviction that one could have done something other than what was actually done is not sufficient for one to show repentance etc., and even though determinists actually would not have such moral feelings, it does not mean that practical ethics is sentenced to death. What it means is that we have to admit that one does not have moral feelings which would result from the resolutions which are evaluated as negative by this person. However, do we have to admit as well that ethical practical skepticism is right and that theoretical ethics, the most beautiful one, has no practical significance? No. The only implication for theoretical ethics is that its practical application should not be based on remorse, or in general, not on any moral feelings. We need to establish other motives which make people avoid negative resolutions. By analogy, it is also applied to our second problem, that is, to the possibility of making resolutions about one's self-improvement. We say that it is the very belief in the necessity of some resolutions that lets us believe that we would make different resolutions provided that there were favorable conditions. And the only thing which is needed is that people [who make resolutions] would care that these conditions were present.

Therefore, the whole problem consists in people's willingness to make resolutions which have a positive value. If people do not care about it, neither indeterminists nor determinists will pay attention to ethics. Admittedly, indeterminists will voluntarily make this or that resolution, and determinists will make resolutions which they find necessary. But these

acts of resolutions will have the same consequences. The problem may be put in the following way; moral feelings perform an important biological function: they create the motives which shape one's future resolutions in an (ethically) desirable way. According to indeterminism, it actually works in this way provided that one does not accept determinist claims; when one is determinist, they have to be substituted with some other feelings, namely with the feelings of values, i.e. that some resolutions have a positive value and some others have a negative value. The latter feelings are not contradictory to a determinist standpoint because they co-occur with other necessary things (such as an illness). The feelings of values may determine the direction one's future resolutions as well. Just like we resolve to avoid an illness, we may resolve to avoid [making] negative resolutions, or resolutions which are evaluated negatively. (The same concerns a situation when one regards someone else's behavior as outrageous; it is recommended at a primitive stage, when we try to prevent some behavior which is [ethically] negative; however, it is not advisable for a educator or teacher to regard students' behavior as outrageous every time it happens; anger and outrage are bad counselors.)* (Another analogy: pity or sympathy is a good motivation of one's behavior but one may achieve the same results when one is motivated by a feeling of obligation; even doctors should not be motivated by excessive sympathy – but rather by obligation – when they treat their patients.) To conclude: by claiming that people are not able to feel remorse, one does not kill practical ethics, nor does it mean that the statements of practical ethics have no sense, nor does it dismantle a feeling of responsibility and burdening someone with responsibility. Determinism does not pose any danger to the practical application of scientific ethics. On the contrary, it may even help us to understand how scientific ethics may be practically applied.† In fact, indeterminism is sometimes in conflict with our everyday experience.

* A remark in this place: "The more mentally developed people are, the more religious incentives are substituted with others; for example, a peasant does not drink [alcohol] because of the fear of Hell, and someone else is motivated by the hygienic aspect [of drinking alcohol]" [D].

† It seems that a note to the lectures of 1923-1924 concerns this paragraph: "Yesterday: some feelings [were] regarded as unnecessary although they [were] regarded as very valuable and necessary as well. This is rather a common problem. Yesterday we talked about outrage. We talked about some religious feelings. [But] other examples may be given as well. A doctor, officially appointed as someone who takes care of the poor. So we may wonder whether teachers should not aim to develop other feelings. Undoubtedly, these feelings result in an unpleasant experience. Is it not advisable to avoid it and to establish a new aim, or a new feeling to aim at? This means that someone should not visit a dentist when they have a toothache because they should not have a toothache at all: they should have a regular check-up, which

Undoubtedly, we normally assume that there is some regularity in the way people behave and, in consequence, that their resolutions are somehow regular as well. We are convinced that we may predict how someone, who we know well, will behave in this or that situation. We often try to influence other people and their resolutions and we use relevant incentives (like rewards or punishments; requests or threats; encouragement or discouragement, to achieve our aim). And this is based on determinist assumptions. We face a strange paradox: both indeterminism and determinism seem to be equally necessary. Perhaps something was wrongly recognized through the whole analysis but we are not going to deal with it. What we wanted to show and justify is that determinist arguments against practical ethical skepticism are in fact not important. They just seem to pose a difficulty to it. Even if we accept assumptions which provide the weakest support [for practical ethics], which is not necessary, the practical application of ethics is still possible. Determinism may be regarded as somehow ethically serious.

[10. Practical Difficulties of Applying Ethics]

We have to consider one more argument against the practical applicability of ethics, that is, some difficulties concerning its formal and practical nature.

Some people claim that the application of scientific ethics, or any ethics in general, requires a great number of regulations which would control all possible cases and situations; it is particularly important in the light of the absolute nature of ethical truths [and] the disambiguity of numerous norms and regulations. This objection [is] not strong for any other kind of norms or regulations; for example, engineering, or technical, norms cannot list and take into account every possible form of the ground where the buildings are to be erected; pedagogical norms cannot predict every individual feature of students etc. The norms which were mentioned consist in general rules which are applied by people: engineers or teachers or, in the case of ethical norms, by everyone. Pedagogical norms are applied not only by professionals, but also by non-professionals, that is, parents. Therefore, just as pedagogical knowledge needs to be popularized, ethical knowledge, or ethical culture, should be popularized as well.

would let them to have a tooth healed early and to avoid a toothache. In short: the rationalization of emotional life. A feeling of obligation plays an incredibly important role" [D].

Every objection against ethics which has already been discussed has one feature in common: they were general; they did not consider the various systems of scientific ethics but rather began with the very notion of ethics and tried to prove that (1) it is impossible that this notion will ever make sense and (2) even if it makes sense, it would not have any practical significance. My aim was to show that such arguments are weak; that is why I focused on the analysis of various types of skepticism and then on psychological hedonism; later I dealt with the problem of free will and, eventually, with an objection that it is impossible to impose one ethical regulations which would be applied to any situation and which would be justified beforehand.

I have not presented so far the most important argument against the last objection. I have not done it for it belongs to the positive part of scientific ethics which will be discussed later. The second part of the lecture is called “positive” in order to differentiate it from the critical part. The aim of the positive part of the lecture is to establish scientific ethics. What we know about it is that its existence is not impossible.

Translated by Alicja Chybińska

ETHICS, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL*

Introduction

From the title of the lectures beginning today it may be understood that it is not my intention to discuss the problem of free will as such; I am not concerned with the theoretical problem in itself. I wish to consider the STANDPOINT which ethics and criminal law assume toward this problem and, if this standpoint is not correct in all its aspects, I wish to show what standpoint ethics and criminal law should assume toward this problem. To specify the issue more: the problem of the freedom of will can be resolved, in the *a priori* approach, in three ways. One may claim that will is free, or deny it, or seek middle ground by assuming relative and limited freedom of will. A question arises as to whether the manner in which the problem of the freedom of will is resolved matters for ethics and criminal law. There are different opinions in this matter. It is often said that denying the existence of freedom will abolishes any differences between good and evil, or between virtue and vice; it is said that denying the existence of freedom will renders punishment and reward unwarranted. Yet, there is also an opposite opinion, that is, that punishment and reward cannot have any meaning if one assumes that will is free. On the other hand, it is said that by denying the existence of free will, one loses the right to hold someone responsible etc. It is evident from these claims that, according to widespread opinion, it does matter for ethics and criminal law whether

* The lectures were delivered at the Lvov University in 1904-1905. They were prepared for print by Izydora Dąmbska and published as "Etyka i prawo karne wobec zagadnienia wolności woli" in *Etyka* XX (1983), 123-159 [B&J].

one accepts the existence of the freedom of will or denies it. Therefore, the question is whether this view is valid and whether the way of resolving the problem of free will indeed can, or even must, influence ethics and criminal law.

This influence is undoubted in another field, that is, in the field of religion. The relationship of man toward God seems completely different when we attribute free will to man than when we deny it to him. (a) If a man who possesses free will commits a sin, and if God punishes him for this sin, everything is in order. (b) However, if a man who is denied free will commits a sin, the problem gets complicated. As Hume claims (§56), then

there is a continued chain of necessary causes, preordained and predetermined, reaching from the Original Cause of all, to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all beings in that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he employed be long or short; so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, either finite or infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author of all the rest, and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong to them.¹

Hence, various directions of religious faith are directly connected with accepting or rejecting free will. (a) When someone says that human will lost the ability to make a free choice between good and evil as a result of the original sin, and that he must choose evil, unless God in his grace comes to his aid, then he obviously denies the existence of freedom of will and must more or less accept predestination, which states that the redemption or condemnation of man does not depend on his will, as will cannot choose between that which brings salvation and that which results in condemnation. (b) If one wants to avoid the necessity of accepting predestination, he must abide by the freedom of will, just as for example the Catholic Church did, which accepted the freedom of will as a dogma of the faith during the Council of Trent. Therefore a question arises of whether, just as in the case of religious ethics, also in scientific ethics one of its courses is closely connected with the acceptance or rejection of the freedom of will, and moreover, if also criminal law is dependent in its various

¹ Cf. [Hume 1748], p. 116.

claims and notions on the manner in which this problem is discussed. The issue under discussion is the CONSEQUENCES of one or another solution for ethics and criminal law.

One might call this perspective false and inquire as to why we should consider what consequences for ethics and criminal law denying freedom of will entails, and what consequences a compromise brings. Instead of considering this problem, it would be better to consider directly the issue of free will and, having resolved it, to draw appropriate conclusions for ethics and criminal law. This is certainly quite a reasonable point, and not only with respect to the issue of the freedom of will, but it is also quite redundant, as it has already been satisfied. I am of the opinion that the problem of the freedom of will has already been resolved, provided this problem can be resolved at all; moreover, I believe that it has been resolved in the negative direction, by denying the existence of free will.

As is well known, the view which denies the existence of free will is called "determinism," the opposing view is called "indeterminism," and the intermediate view is called "moderate indeterminism." Therefore, I am of the opinion that determinism is the most probable solution of all the solutions of the problem of the freedom of will. I say "the most probable," as such issues cannot be resolved with absolute certainty, just as in the case of, e.g., the problem of the age of the Earth, the problem of the primitive social system or the problem of whether the atomistic view or the energetic view is valid. They are all more or less likely. However, just as science manages to resolve those questions as long as the resolution is presented with a sufficient degree of probability, also in the question of freedom of will we have no right to demand certainty, but rather we must and can settle for a probable resolution.

Only at this point can we pose more rightfully the question of why we should discuss the consequences of the indeterminist view, since the determinist view is more probable. The response is simple. By drawing consequences for ethics and criminal law from determinism, we shall see that determinism does not jeopardize the existence of either; it only entails a certain change in formulating certain fundamental notions; whereas when we draw relevant consequences from indeterminism, we shall see that certain difficulties in reconciling these consequences with the very foundations of ethics and criminal law will occur. This is exactly why it is very instructive to draw mutual consequences and find out that they favor determinism over indeterminism.

The advantage of this comparison of the consequences of both views is apparent. If it is indeed demonstrated that determinism can be reconciled with the assumptions of ethics and criminal law, and if it is demonstrated that reconciling indeterminism with them is more difficult, we shall

remove one of the main reasons which impedes reconciliation with determinism and which generally impedes objective and reasonable analysis of arguments in favor of determinism. Thus, we contribute to spreading the view which is scientifically more probable, and at the same time, we demonstrate that, as is always the case, an erroneous view is more harmful than a supportable view.

According to the above, the outline of these lectures will be more or less as follows:

I. First we shall learn the proper meaning of the notion of the freedom of will and its opposite. We shall explain the standpoints of determinism and indeterminism. This will be conducted in a series of descriptions, as well as psychological and logical analyses.

II. Then we shall familiarize ourselves with the main arguments presented in favor of both of the views and we shall see why determinism should be considered as the more probable view.

III. Subsequently, we shall analyze such notions as good and evil, responsibility, attributing,* fault, merit, punishment, reward etc. from both the determinist and the indeterminist point of view.

We shall accomplish all of the above purely empirically.

IV. Following that, we shall discuss the consequences of determinism and indeterminism in two directions, more loosely related to ethics, namely, in the direction of practical ethics (practical life), and in the direction of ethics based on religious views.

Therefore, as you can see, the present lectures aim to gather issues from various branches of philosophy: from psychology, from ethics, from the philosophy of law, from the philosophy of religion, and if we have to tackle the question of causality, also from metaphysics. The problems which are the subject of these lectures indicate to what degree these diverse fields of philosophy are linked with each other in all important problems. At the same time, this proves that the relationship between the philosophical sciences and life in all its various aspects is closer than it seems at first glance.

* Twardowski used the term "ascribing," which I. Dąmbska replaced with the term "attributing," used here in this case [B&J].

CHAPTER I. THE NOTION OF THE FREEDOM OF WILL

1. Introductory Terminological Definitions

“Will” and “free.” I begin with the word “will.” The meaning [of this word] is very diversified, the broadest being where “will” signifies the source of all desires, wantings, and even emotions. This is will in the meaning where it was contrasted with intellect as *voluntas*, for instance, in medieval philosophy, following Aristotle. In this meaning, will is the capacity for all psychical phenomena which form the emotional side of life. Juxtaposition: head and heart. *Voluntas sive affectus*. Among contemporary philosophers, Schopenhauer assumes the aforementioned broadest meaning of the word “will” and sees will in this meaning as the essence of all things.

A slightly narrowed, but still very broad, meaning of the word “will” means the capability for desires, drives and wantings only, so basically as before with the exception of emotions. Thus, will in this meaning includes all impulses, all inclinations, is the source of all acts, actions and behaviors as long as it is not purely mechanical, purely physiological, instinctive, automatic. The relationship to human behavior and actions is even clearer in this meaning than in the previous one, where the inclusion of emotions obscured the relationship slightly. In both of these meanings, will is ascribed to animals as well as to man, since will is noticeable in the impulses and instincts, in dispositions of animals as a sort of less developed human will, as a beginning, budding will of their own. Schneider may have written his well known books, *Der thierische Wille* and *Der menschliche Wille** with this meaning in mind. Also Bain uses the word “will” in this meaning in his work *The emotions and the will*.†

The third, narrower meaning of “will” is understood exclusively as the capability for making resolutions. This ability to resolutions, to make resolutions, is also included in the previous meanings; here, it is the only content of the term. Each resolution is countered with desires, wantings, striving, inclinations, impulses etc. We assume that resolution is a feature exclusive to human beings, as it requires consideration, it requires reflection, it requires the appreciation of what prompts us to make a resolution, its consequences etc. This does not counter the view that resolutions are in some measure, some sort of higher degree of the development of desires,

* G.H. Schneider [1880] and [1882] [D].

† A. Bain [1859], p. 156 [D].

striving, and impulses; this question is of no concern to us now; we are only concerned with the distinction between the different meanings of the word "will."

The three meanings discussed so far can be compared in the following manner:

A. Will is the ability to:

- I. experience emotions, harbor desires and resolutions;
- II. harbor desires and resolutions only;

III. harbor resolutions only.

I hasten to note that none of these meanings mention the question of freedom of will. This question concerns another meaning. The meanings discussed so far concerned ability. Therefore, in these meanings the word "will" is comparable to such expressions as "memory," "imagination," "sense," "mind," "the sense of beauty," or "attention," as all of these words signify abilities. "Memory," the ability to recreate past images and notions; "imagination," the ability to create new ones; "sense," the ability to experience sensory impressions (and in the broader meaning, the sense of perception, the combinatory sense etc.); "attention," a higher degree, a temporary heightening of the ability to issue perceptive judgments; "mind," the ability to issue accurate judgments; "the sense of beauty," or "the aesthetic taste," the ability to experience certain pleasures and displeasures etc. The most general psychological term for ability is "disposition," "adaptation." Specific phenomena and mental acts correspond to each ability disposition, predisposition. The relationship of the disposition to act can be compared to the relationship of force in the physical sense to actions and phenomena. Magnetism and magnetic phenomena. Also, imagination and creating images. Similarly, acts such as experiencing emotions, harboring desires and wantings and making resolutions (or the last two, or just the last one) correspond to will in the sense of ability, disposition or predisposition.

The word "will" is often used to signify acts of ability, not only the ability itself but also its acts. "Will" often denotes desires, wishes, or resolutions. For instance, in the prayer "Thy will be done," let "Thy will" be fulfilled means Your wish, whatever You want, Your resolution. Another example, "write up one's last will." Or, "he did not express his will clearly," which means, he did not pronounce his wish, or his resolution [clearly]. Or, "fire at will," meaning as much as one wishes or desires. This active meaning of the word "will" can be opposed to the first three meanings as predisposed meanings. Yet, this active meaning can again be broader or narrower. Either it includes the acts in meanings I and II of the predisposed meaning, or only in the third one; either wishes, desires, wantings and resolutions, or only resolutions.

This is how it can all be compiled:

B.

I. Will is equivalent to desire, wish, wanting, fancy, resolution.

II. Will is equivalent to resolution only.

Here we get the meaning where the problem of free will is mentioned: meaning B-II. The narrow active meaning. The problem is whether our resolutions and our decisions are free. (Let me hasten to add that the above compilation of meanings only concerns the psychological meaning of the word. In the ethical meaning, there is also good and bad will, strong and weak will etc. These meanings are different. Will which is described as "good" signifies a certain direction, certain moral characteristics of resolutions or desires and wishes. "A man of good will," or, "there is no good will in his behavior." We are not concerned with this presently since we shall only discuss the psychological aspect of the problem.)

This ambiguity of the word "will" is regrettable from the theoretical point of view, since in ideal scientific terminology a separate name should correspond to each notion. Still, it is also a warning to be cautious with the problem of the freedom of will. Since the very word "will" is so ambiguous, there is concern that also other words may prove ambiguous in the discussion of the question. Thus, we should be wary. This is a good warning.

Therefore, we know that the problem of the freedom of will concerns resolutions. Still, this is not enough to determine the problem. We are not only concerned with will but also with its freedom. Which meaning of "free" is assumed then when we inquire whether will is free?

We should state at the very beginning that the word "free" is a relative word in the logical sense. Relative words and notions are those which can only be determined in view of another notion. For instance, the notion of distance – always "from something"; the notion of talent – always "for something"; or the notion of function in mathematics. Similarly, freedom is always the "freedom from something." Often when using such relative words we do not add the complimentary word or notion; this is the case when the complimentary word is self-explanatory. For instance: I do not know why you are sending this boy to college; after all, he has no talent at all – naturally, for academic subjects to the extent required at college. Similarly, we omit the complimentary word with the word "free." For instance: Is this seat free? Free pass. There are very few free apartments in Lvov. Freedom of speech. He gets a salary and free lodging. Free fall of objects. Free fire. Sometimes we add: letter free of charge. All these examples demonstrate to us that when speaking of the freedom of will, we must inquire what the will is or is supposed to be free from. Since we know that "will" signifies resolution here, we may inquire what our resolutions are or are supposed to be free from. We shall discuss this in the next paragraph.

“Freedom” applied to will can be understood and used in different ways. The important thing is to be aware of what will is supposed to be free from or can be free from. The following cases can be suggested.

2. Freedom of Will in the Physical Sense

Will is free in the first (colloquial) sense if nothing precludes its execution. This is freedom from external pressure, *libertas a coactione*. In this meaning a person may say: I am free, that is, if I want to leave now, I can leave; if I prefer going for a walk to going to a café, I can do it. On the other hand, when a person is in prison, he is not free. When he is in a boarding school and is told to go for a walk, he is not free, and the moment he turned toward a café, the supervisor would grab his arm and not let him go in, and therefore he is not free in this meaning. In this meaning someone may say of himself that he is free as a bird, that is, just like a flying bird does not have obstacles in the air, the person may also go here and there, do this or that, and not come across any obstacles. Therefore, when someone calls himself free in this meaning, he ascribes freedom in the first meaning to his will. Thus, this freedom concerns actions or behaviors which come out of our will and includes the following moments in its concept: 1. “If I want, I can do this or that.” 2. “If I did not want to, I would not do it.” Examples: “If I want, I will extend my arm,” “If I did not want to extend my arm, I would not do it.” The opposite case, that is the lack of freedom, occurs in the first example when one is bound with a rope, and in the second example, when someone stronger than the speaker, and against his will, extends his arm, which he attempted to keep close to his body. Thus, we can see that freedom in this meaning, freedom from obstacles and external pressure can also be described in a positive way, as Schopenhauer proves. The ability to do whatever one wants and to not do whatever one does not want. Thus, acting according to one’s will. Similarly, we say that somebody is “free to do something.” I do not have to do something, and I do not have to not do; there is no obligation either way, but instead, only the ability to act according to my own will. Do it if you want and nobody will mind; do not do it if you do not want to and nobody will force you. “You are not free to do it,” that is, there exists a prohibition, an obstacle in the form of a punishment etc.

Schopenhauer calls freedom in this meaning “freedom in the PHYSICAL SENSE,” as it denotes freedom from pressure and from physical obstacles.* At the same time, we can see that freedom in this meaning exists; it is not

* Cf. [Schopenhauer 1839] [D].

a question or a problem. This does not mean that physical freedom exists for everyone and always and is limitless. On the contrary, even if obstacles and obligations created by other people did not exist, for instance, there is no freedom from the obstacles for our muscles caused by the weight of our body or paralysis, or tiredness etc. Yet, this freedom exists in certain conditions. It is always desired, and its lack is experienced as unpleasant. Therefore, there is no problem here. Clearly, this is not our problem to consider, since when we speak of free will in this meaning we use the word “will” in the meaning which, as I mentioned before, is not in the least connected to our question. Here will is interpreted in the first, more general, active meaning. If freedom consists in acting according to one’s will, then will may not only signify a resolution, but also a desire, a wanting, wish, thirst. Thus, we say that we can do what we please; we can do what our hearts desire; we can act as we wish. We can also say that nobody will order us around – that we will do as we choose, i.e. according to «our» will. It is clear in this positive formulation that “freedom” is used in the meaning we have in mind when we speak of it colloquially. Let me add that it is also freedom in the POLITICAL sense. Just as a person who organizes his life the way he pleases is free, also a nation which lives the way it wants, rather than the way someone else bids, is free. This freedom takes the form of not only the most general political and civil freedom, but also specific, particular political freedoms or liberties. For instance, freedom of speech consists in the fact that there is no obstacle in uttering whatever one wants; freedom of the press, freedom of assembly etc. The notion of ACADEMIC FREEDOM, the essence of which is freedom of learning and teaching, also belongs in this group. The teacher is not bound by textbooks or regulations; the student is not bound by any specific outline of study. Both can organize their tasks “as they please”; moreover, the notion of academic freedom is connected with the lack of many constraints and pressures which do exist in many other schools in the aspect of discipline. Therefore, political freedom, just as academic freedom, belongs to freedom in the first meaning. This again confirms that there is no issue here for psychology. After all, freedom of will in the first meaning is the ability to act according to one’s will. Before we proceed to other meanings of the phrase “freedom of will,” let us note that some describe this first meaning as “psychological,” as it only expresses a psychological fact.* As a matter of fact, this is not very accurate, as there are also physical facts. In order to be precise, one must bear in mind that the issue is freedom of action and behavior. Before we proceed to other meanings of “freedom of will,” we must deal with certain concepts.

* For instance, A. Höfler does so in [1897], p. 556 [D].

3. Character and Incentive (Motive)

We speak of incentives of actions and of character in everyday life. Here we are mainly concerned with the ethical aspect. Purity or baseness of incentives, egoistic incentives, ulterior ones, etc. Noble character, vile character, unsteady or steady character, sophisticated or unsophisticated character, or even villainous character. We use these words with great ease and certainty, but what do they mean? We can state in advance that character and incentives are factors which are assumed to influence our behavior. We make this claim because we explain man's behavior with his incentives and his character. For instance, a faithful, solid friend has done something disappointing such as thwarting our plans. Surprised, we ask what incentives could have prompted him to do such a thing. Have we not been mistaken about him? We believed he was a person of character, whereas he proved not to be. Another example: someone whose life seemed happy commits suicide. Again, we seek incentives. Or: a habitual thief steals again. Well, it is in his blood, it lies in his character. Or: someone asks us if he can trust another person, and we respond that he should not, as the other has an unreliable character. Even these few examples of the colloquial use of these words allow us to draw the following conclusions: character is not something which is given in external or inner experience. Character can only be 'demonstrated', and it is demonstrated in a series of mental states which are characterized as belonging to the emotional and volitional group (heart) and they influence behavior. A person's character is demonstrated in what emotions he experiences (cruel character), what wishes and desires he harbors (vindictive or impulsive character) or what resolutions he makes (adamant character). Thus, we discover a very well-known thing in character. This is simply a set of dispositions, capacity for emotions, desires, and resolutions inherent to every person. (In other words, "will" in the meaning A-I.) In this meaning we speak of an unsteady or steady character, depending on whether abilities and dispositions for emotions, desires and resolutions are the same for a prolonged time for an individual or if they vary within certain limits. There are also two other meanings besides the most general one; namely, we use "character" in the second, narrower meaning for dispositions for emotions, desires and resolutions, and thus, all dispositions within the meaning A-I of the word "will," as long as they are not something transient, accidental, changeable. We say in this meaning that character must be formed, or that character is revealed in given behavior. We speak of features of strong character. For instance, a boy who takes care to be considered brave and courage, will not scream even when he is in great physical pain, but may instead only grit his teeth etc. This is how we ascertain character, or steady disposition toward desires,

since even in these difficult conditions he does not primarily want to avoid pain, but he wants to prove himself brave instead. Additionally, at issue here is not a positive or negative ethical value. An ethically very negative person may also have character in this meaning. For instance, someone whose aim is to destroy the present social system by the cruelest possible methods, by murdering those who are in positions of power within this system, who does not care about his own safety and his own good and who exposes himself to the penalty of imprisonment or death etc., has character in the second meaning, which everyone will admit, both those who condemn him and those who, as believers in the same doctrine, praise him. Except the latter, will ascribe character to him also in the third meaning, where character signifies good, ethically positive character. This is the very meaning used in "This is a man with character," or "This is a man without character." It results from these distinctions that the boundary between character in meanings I and II is not fully decisive. The entirety of dispositions toward emotions, desires, and resolutions and the entirety of *CONSTANT* dispositions [toward emotions, desires, and resolutions] are not always able to be distinguished, since this constancy is not an entirely accurate notion. Yet, these transitional forms do not interfere with this important difference. Some decide to include in the notion of character only completely permanent dispositions which never change throughout one's life and then of course they are able to state that character is unchangeable. Yet, even in the second meaning character may undergo certain changes, although they are quantitative rather than qualitative. For instance, someone of a very quick-tempered, impulsive, disposition may settle down and curb his passion with time. A gentle person may become less so as a result of irritability progressing with age. Yet, it is exceptionally rare that an impulsive person ceases to be impulsive. (The case is similar with laziness, impressionability, the sense of duty, compassion etc.) Besides, we shall return to this question later in a different relationship. At this point we are only concerned with the distinction between the meanings. Let us also attempt to explain the relationship of the concept of character to the concept of will in the first dispositional meaning. Are character and will in meaning I identical concepts? It seems so, since both mention unstable will, stable will, and good will. Still, there is a slight difference. Will is a more specific concept whereas character is a more general concept. Human will is manifested even in single actions, in single emotions, desires and resolutions, and will is understood as the ability and predisposition to experience such emotions etc. Yet, all of these abilities altogether create character. It is similar with memory, mind, brightness, combinatory sense which altogether make "intelligence." This exhausts the subjects of character for now; let us return to the notion of incentive.

Incentive. To incite, to stir. What shall be incited or stirred? And to do what? It is character which is supposed to be incited, or strictly speaking a certain ability included in character. This seems self-explanatory. The ability is a disposition toward certain acts, activities, phenomena. For instance: memory. The corresponding act is remembering. Yet, in order for remembering to occur on the basis of memory, there must be something which will induce this remembering. For instance, a perception is created in the mind and the perception makes one remember a certain reproductive image, that is, a remembrance. An example from another domain: knowledge, information that is, the ability to issue an accurate judgment about a certain object. This knowledge lies dormant within us. Something must incite it in order for it to be activated and give rise to an act. This may be a question, for instance, When did Descartes die? It is the same with will. We have the capability for desire, for instance, the ability to desire music. Another person does not have this ability, and is uninterested in music. Yet, something else is necessary for a person who has this ability to actually desire it. He must think about music, or he will not desire it. There is one other thing: he must be in the right disposition. When he is sleepy, tired etc., he will not desire music. Despite the thought of music, the desire will not occur. Another example: someone has a capability for altruistic resolutions. He resolves to set up a hospital, or he resolves to give a certain sum of money to charity. Yet, in order for such a resolution to occur, something must stimulate to action his ability to resolve. It is like with magnetism, which is the ability to attract iron; in order for it to work, something which stimulates magnetism to action and gives it an opportunity to occur must find itself within its reach. In the above example, this something is the thought of poverty, the desire to help, the conviction that we should give from our excess to the needy etc. Naturally, we must adopt yet another set of conditions: there must be no obstacle in the form of the thought of one's own family which needs support, or on the contrary, bearing a grudge against one's family and neglecting them as a result. These examples will already allow us to formulate a provisional definition of an incentive, motive. An incentive, a motive is what incites a person's will. Still, this definition requires some explanation in one area. In everyday life, we speak of incentives for behavior, from which there would result that incentives incite to action. Yet, we have stated that they stimulate will, and therefore, encourage the performance of acts which correspond to will in the dispositional meaning; actions are not such acts, but certain mental phenomena, like desires or resolutions, are of this kind. Still, it will not mislead us if we realize that behavior is the result of desires and resolutions and, therefore, an incentive which incites desires and resolutions thus *INDIRECTLY* stimulates behavior. This is the short way of expressing things in everyday

life, which takes into consideration the initial and final link in a chain of phenomena, as these two links are the most important for it, and moreover, these two links are the easiest to perceive. Only in this case we obviously do not think about what exactly is incited, that is, human will, but rather, we tend to think of a man as such, a man as a whole. What incited and what stimulated this person to behave in such a way? is how we ask, instead of asking what incited, stimulated his will. Let us explain this one thing. The restriction concerning the meaning of "will" assumed here; Is it the first, the second or the third? An incentive for desires, wishes, craving, striving? It seems so, since it is often said that something stimulated someone to strive for something (the motive for the striving was ambition, or the desire to right the wrong). Yet, we are not discussing incentives, motives of wishes, desires, or repulsion (cf. below, p. 302) This would indicate that also in the previous cases we use the word "incentive," "motive" with reference to "tendency," since "tendency" does not include a psychical act, but rather all actions resulting from certain desires, strivings etc. We speak of desires themselves that something awakens them, but we do not say that something incites them. Therefore, also in the second meaning will is not the background for incentives; it is only the case in the third meaning: WILL AS THE ABILITY TO RESOLVE. In order for a resolution to occur, something must stimulate our will. This something is the incentive of our resolution.

The question at hand is what the incentive of resolutions is. What incites our will in the same way that iron stimulates magnetic force, or chemical affinity stimulates a rise in temperature, or irritating a nerve ending the capability for reflexes? Knowing that an incentive influences the ability to resolve, we ask what exactly influences this ability. There are VARIOUS OPINIONS in this matter. For instance, Schopenhauer calls "a motive" the kind of object whose realization stimulates will to action, and which this act of will concerns as well, and therefore, which the will reacts to by aiming to introduce a certain change in it. On the other hand, this definition is too narrow, if only for the reason that simply becoming aware of an object is never sufficient to induce an act of will, or a resolution, if the object is neutral and one does not care about either its existence or its change. This is why the notion of motive is regarded in a broader context, with the inclusion of all those conscious factors which stimulate the will to action and which induce a resolution. For instance, Sergi (Eisler, *Motiv*)* calls motives "les stimulants à la volition, quand ils sont passés dans la conscience de l'agent sous une forme physique." Höfler expressed the

* G. Sergi [1888], p. 419; R. Eisler [1899], p. 696 and subs. This quotation does not appear in the fourth edition of this dictionary [D].

same opinion. The stress put on the “realization” of motives is derived from the fact that in order for will to be stimulated, or a resolution to be made, a chain of other factors which are not realized is necessary, for instance, a certain state of will itself, or the lack of certain obstacles etc. Thus we obtain a definition of an incentive. We call an incentive all those states of activities or all those psychical phenomena which condition will to make certain resolutions. This also includes what Schopenhauer calls “a motive,” that is, a realized object. Instead, we can also say: realizing an object, that is, a presentation of an object, and it works fine. Except that this motive in itself is never enough to stimulate will to action. Something more is necessary. What is needed is the existence of certain emotions and thirsts; the fancy to achieve something; a set of judgments on the relationship of the aim to us, on what it is like, since we are to achieve it and so on. It is therefore clear that we are dealing with two kinds of motives: on the one hand, there are motives of an intellectual and cognitive nature; on the other hand, there are motives of an emotional-wishing nature. An example: the incentive when we resolve to give money to the poor (Höfler, p. 558).^{*} A wish to help the poor also results from the fact that we feel sorry for them, and thus, we also feel compassion. Yet, in order for compassion and a wanting to help to emerge, we must see a poor person, then have the conviction that he is in fact poor, and then have the conviction that we are in possession of a coin. Another example: someone sets someone else’s house on fire. Incentives: the desire to cause harm to him. This could result from, for instance, the wanting for revenge, and this wanting for revenge may result from remembering some injustice which the other person has committed; there is also the conviction that one will actually cause distress, instead of doing something that actually harms this person, since he has good insurance. In order to distinguish the two groups of motives, intellectual ones and emotional ones, some, including Kreibig, suggest that emotional motives be called “impulses,” and intellectual motives be called “motives” in the narrower sense of the word.[†]

At this point we are able to understand the roles and motives, as well as their relationship to character. If character is the entirety of dispositions toward emotions, desires and resolutions, then incentives are what influences dispositions toward resolutions in such a way that there occurs a resolution. Therefore, in order for a resolution to occur, the ability to do it is needed, and moreover, something which encourages this ability. The

^{*} Höfler quotes this example and the next, about arson, from Sigwart [1879], in the note on the page from [1897] mentioned by Twardowski [D].

[†] J.C. Kreibig [1902] [D].

former is character and the latter is a motive. We can now examine the relationship between motives and will as well as resolutions more closely, namely, to analyze the relationship between individual motives and acts of the will, as well as whether they are all on the same level or not.

4. The Relationship of Incentives and Resolutions

Common experience instructs us in this matter. It allows us to formulate certain rules. The following are the most significant:

(1) A necessary condition for a resolution to occur is a presentation of what one resolves, that is, the thought of it, realizing it. One cannot resolve whatever he did not conceive of it. This results from a general rule of psychological life. It's a special case of it.

(2) A necessary condition for a resolution to occur is the conviction that what one is to resolve is within his power, or at least, the lack of the opposite conviction that it is not within his power. This means that if one is convinced that something is not within his power, he cannot resolve it. Yet, sometimes one resolves without a clear conviction that something is within one's power, and it is only in the course of executing the resolution that one either clearly ascertains that it is within his power or that it is not, in which case he ceases to execute the resolution. For instance, someone may see a beautiful object in the shop window, he wonders if he has enough money to last until the end of the month, he calculates that he has enough, and so he enters the shop in order to buy the object. However, upon reaching into his pocket, he discovers that he has no money on him. Therefore he abandons the idea of the purchase. He would not have resolved to enter the shop and buy the object if he had known from the beginning that he had no money on him. Similarly, no one will resolve to jump 10 meters and touch the roof, or to turn iron into gold, or to write a long novel in one night etc. The above rule includes several special cases like the following: one cannot resolve something which would occur anyway without his contribution, or to be more precise, about which he is convinced that it would occur anyway without his contribution. Let us take two situations as examples: one resolves to die (not indicating the time of death) or one resolves to fall down after being lifted up and left without any support.

The two presented rules differ in that the first one is significant for will in the broadest sense, and the second one, only for will in the third sense. Presentation of an object is also a condition for emotions and desires to occur; but it is not the condition for the occurrence of the emotions and desires not to be convinced of the impossibility of realizing that which evokes emotions and desires in one. One may want not to die, or to jump

as high as the ceiling etc. This is an important difference. When it allows us to ascertain differences between desires and resolutions, it concerns the following law to an even greater degree:

(3) A necessary condition for a resolution to occur is for the object of that resolution to also be the object of desire. In other words, one does not resolve what one does not want. This is an extremely significant law. It can also be expressed in the following words: whatever has neutral value to us cannot be the object of resolution. We can only desire something which is of some value to us (according to our conviction and feeling, either imaginary or real); thus, the value of an object is a condition for desire, and the desire is in turn a condition for resolution. For instance, if passing an exam does not have any value for someone, then he does not desire it, as he is indifferent toward it. Since this is the case, then he does not make a resolution. Or: if someone does not care whether it is warm or cold in the room, he will not want it to be warm, and will not resolve anything so that warmth is produced. Admittedly, we sometimes say that we resolve things which are in fact of neutral value to us. Still, this thing, which is neutral out of context, ceases to be neutral in view of its relationship to other things. (For instance, money, or means to an end in general, indifference toward an exam but not toward the father's distress.) We must also take into consideration the fact that the desire which is a condition for a resolution can often be replaced with rudimentary forms, and sometimes the mere conviction that the thing is desired by us may suffice, and the desire may not occur in full. This is especially the case when we consider *COOLLY* whether we should resolve this or that, for instance, join a given faculty, or choose a given group of subjects. Then we review in our minds the expected effects of this or that resolution, we wonder what advantage this or that may bring, but at the core of all this there is always the question of what is more desired by us and what is less desired, that is, what has greater or lesser value, what we want more or less, what we care about more or less. Thus, the general law remains in effect.

This sheds some light on the question of what incentives incite. Do they only stimulate desires or only resolutions (cf. p. 299). We can see that desire alone is a motive for resolutions, since it stimulates the capability for resolution. The reasons and sources of desires and the incentives for resolutions are not on the same level then, since desire can be the condition for a resolution. Yet, this of course does not prevent us from using the word "incentive" in a slightly broader sense and applying it to desires as well. Indeed, we can also say that the incentives of a given wish are quite clear, or that they are not plain to us. Here we shall always use this word in the narrower sense, concerning that which incites will in the third dispositional meaning to resolutions.

5. The Freedom of Will in the Philosophical Sense

Having established what character is and what incentives are, we can now proceed to the second meaning of “freedom of will,” which is precisely the meaning which constitutes a hard problem. This meaning is named differently by different people. Some (Schopenhauer) call it “freedom in the moral sense,” some (Höfler) call it “freedom in the metaphysical sense,” some call it “freedom in the psychological sense,” which Höfler actually reserves for “freedom in the colloquial sense” (or “physical,” according to Schopenhauer). I shall use the word “philosophical” to contrast it with “the colloquial sense.” The colloquial sense occurs in everyday life; on the other hand, this constitutes a philosophical, or to be more precise, metaphysical, problem. What is the issue here then? The issue is the relationship between the influence of incentives on the character, which causes a resolution, and the law of causality. The law of causality is well known. It states that nothing happens without a cause. Everything has its cause. Every phenomenon is a result of other phenomena. The question of determinism and indeterminism is all about whether the psychical phenomenon known as a resolution also falls under this law, and therefore, whether every resolution has its cause. This question, seemingly very innocent, reveals its great significance when we consider what is included in the claims of determinists and indeterminists. Let us shortly analyze the notion of cause. In order to settle the matter quickly, let me remind you that a causal relationship does not occur when one simply follows the other. *Post hoc* and *propter hoc* have long been distinguished. The moment after signing a letter, a spark jumps out of the furnace or a friend enters the room. This is *post hoc* rather than *propter hoc*. It is also insufficient for ascertaining a causal relationship that phenomena always dependably follow each other, for instance, day follows night, spring follows winter etc. Cause and effect are where one phenomenon INDUCES another. Yet, this “induces” is a metaphor, an anthropomorphism. Science has attempted to establish the causes for this notion more precisely, and this is more or less how it is done nowadays: Phenomenon *X* is called “the cause of phenomenon *Y*” and phenomenon *Y* is called “the effect of phenomenon *X*” if phenomenon *X* is necessary, and at the same time sufficient, for phenomenon *Y* to occur. If any of these features, either sufficiency or indispensability, is lacking, then *X* is not the cause of *Y*. For instance, we are convinced that signing a document is not necessary or sufficient for a spark to jump out of the furnace or for a friend to enter the room. It would have happened anyway. Or it could not have happened with those factors present. Similarly, it is not necessary for the occurrence of day that it is preceded by night. After all,

day may last constantly on the hemisphere of the Earth (in the state of the Moon) which faces the Sun.* It is similar in the case of spring. On the other hand, if one has a loaded gun, everything works well and the bullet explodes as a result, then all of this was necessary, but at the same time sufficient, for the bullet to shoot out of the barrel. And if it does not leave the barrel, then we are convinced that something which was necessary for it did not occur. Another example: we have an object which is heavier than air; we are holding it in our hand, it falls when we let it go. Letting it go was necessary but also sufficient for the object to fall. Another example: in order to light a candle, there must be oxygen, as well as a [appropriate] increase in the temperature of the wick; if this occurs, nothing else is necessary for the candle to burn. As is evident from these examples, this indispensability requires further clarification. For instance, if we pierce someone's heart with a dagger, death follows. Was piercing with a dagger necessary even though it was sufficient? No, since a bullet would have also done the job. Therefore, is it sufficient but not necessary? This flows from inaccuracy of expression. The effect is expressed inaccurately. Namely, what kind of death is it? There are various kinds of death. Here we are concerned with quite a definite phenomenon of death in a given time. It was sufficient in order for this particular death to occur. Still, someone might say that this person could have had a heart attack at precisely the same time. Yet, there is also a response to that; saying that death was the result of the heart attack, or piercing the heart with a dagger, or a bullet shot through the heart, we actually only specify the *ULTIMATE EFFECT* and a more remote cause. This means that in fact we do not know what the cause of death was. If we knew this, we would also know why, for instance, damaging certain parts of the brain causes death, whereas damaging other parts of the brain does not. Whatever we state in this topic is only an approximation. Besides, all doubts cease when we put the matter in the following way: in order for life to exist, certain factors must exist; they are necessary. When we remove any of them, life stops. This termination is called "death." This and other examples lead us to establishing closer and farther causes, and thus, to a more precise definition of the relationship between cause and effect, when it is evident from the above examples that one single phenomenon is never sufficient for another to occur. The most basic example: an object falling. It is not sufficient to let the object fall;

* This brief formulation should be interpreted as follows: if the Earth behaved toward the Sun as the Moon behaves toward the Earth, that is, if it always faced the Sun with the same side, then it would always be day on one hemisphere, and there would always be night on the other hemisphere [B&J].

there must be gravity, i.e. attraction of the Earth; the object must also be heavier than air, or put generally, heavier than the medium in which it is falling. Letting it go is not sufficient, since for example a balloon filled with helium will not fall. Therefore, there are a relative number of necessary factors. They are not identical. Some of them are certain properties of the objects under discussion. Others are certain relationships of these objects to each other and to the environment. Other still are certain phenomena which occur in the background of these objects, their properties and relationships; for instance, the weights of certain bodies, a certain relationship with the Earth, as well as the phenomenon of letting the body fall and depriving it of its foundation. Gravity and the weight of the body itself, which is lighter than air are called "necessary conditions" (wherein "necessary" is a pleonasm here), whereas depriving it of its foundation is called "the cause."* The case is similar with the shotgun, as well as with death as a result of piercing the heart. The condition is that the body is alive, otherwise death does not occur. We can collate it so that there occurs an effect, that is, a phenomenon in the role of effect; given conditions must have occurred. As long as there are only conditions, there is no effect. Yet, if any other phenomenon occurs, that together with the conditions causes another phenomenon to occur. For instance, the formation of iron sulphide in a test-tube. We should distinguish conditions from the cause. Otherwise, we can call all conditions, including the cause, "total cause," and the cause in the previous meaning, "final cause." The following set of statements falls within this definition. If a set of conditions lacks one, there is no effect, since all of them are indispensable. If all conditions together with the final cause are provided, the effect must occur. The phrase "must occur" means that it cannot not occur, and that it is necessary for the effect to occur. Let us now apply it to our problem.

If the issue is whether a resolution falls under the law of causality, then the issue is whether a resolution occurs necessarily if the given conditions and final cause are provided. Therefore, the condition is the ability to make a resolution. As we already know, it is also something else: a presentation of what is supposed to be resolved. There is also a certain negative condition, namely: the lack of conviction that something does not lie within our power. There is also a positive condition: we must care about the object, the objective or our will, it must be valuable. These are all necessary conditions. Yet, we know that it does not result from the presence of these necessary conditions that they are sufficient conditions. It is very often the case that these conditions are fulfilled and there is no resolution. For

* There is a note on the margin at this point: "Afterwards, character is called "necessity" [D].

instance, an office worker, who is tired, weary and unwell, and therefore craves rest, wonders if he should apply for time off immediately. The application for time off is the object of the supposed resolution, and he cares about it indirectly. Other conditions are also fulfilled. Still, the resolution may never come to pass. We can say it is because certain other factors influenced it, for instance, the office worker was afraid he might vex the boss or he supposed that obtaining time off is not very probable. He may also be aware that his colleague is planning to go on holiday and that the colleague needs time off more than him. Yet, there may come a time when a doctor tells him that he necessarily must take time off immediately if he does not want to run the risk of falling seriously ill. Then he hesitates no further, decides to submit the application and applies for time off. As we can see from this example and ones similar to it, the conditions were not sufficient at the beginning. They became sufficient when the value of the object of his resolution attained a certain level. That was the final cause; concern about health, fear of damaging his health etc. Because of this, the object of the resolution also acquired greater indirect value and the resolution was made. We can draw a perfect comparison between this example and the one with iron sulphide. It begins to form only when the temperature attains a certain level.

The presentation of the above issues is deterministic, as it starts from the assumption that when the conditions are given; meaning: the thought of filing an application, the conviction about the feasibility and value of the filing, and the ability to resolve; and when the value attains a certain degree, the resolution occurs just as inevitably as when iron sulphide is produced. This means that the conditions together with the final cause were necessary, and at the same time sufficient, to induce the resolution. It had to be made in the given conditions, and it could not have not been made. On the other hand, indeterminists state: we accept that all conditions are necessary. There is no resolution without them. Yet, we deny that they are sufficient. A resolution does not have to be made even if they are present. There is no necessity. The will considers and resolves or not. After all, it has *liberum arbitrium*, free choice. Therefore, a resolution is not a necessary consequence of these data, but instead, it is a free act of will which needs the mentioned data. To return to our comparison: indeterminists state that the case is similar to the example of a stone which does not have to fall when it is dropped. Its weight and the lack of support are necessary conditions for its falling. Yet, this is not enough for the stone to fall; there must also be some good will on the part of the stone, since it will not fall if it does not want to. This is how this problem can be formulated in short. Is the person's character together with his motives a necessary and sufficient cause of resolutions, or is it only a necessary condition?

At this point, we realize the level of significance ascribed to this issue. According to determinists, every act of will and every resolution are a necessary consequence of given conditions, given character and given motives. If the application for time off assumes sufficient value for the office worker, he cannot act otherwise than to resolve that he will submit the application. Another example: if someone has a desire for revenge, together with other conditions, and the desire is strong enough, he cannot [resolve] otherwise than to burn down his neighbor's house. This is necessary, inevitable, unavoidable. He cannot not commit this crime, (a) therefore, how can we demand otherwise from him? And if we cannot demand it from him that he not burn his neighbor's house, what right do we have to forbid him to burn it, and what right do we have to punish him for burning it? Yet, similarly: (b) how can God punish him, since he necessarily had to resolve this way? Also, (c) why should we feel remorse if we harm someone in anger? After all, the resolution of harming him was only an inevitable consequence of our character, our anger, and our grudges. Also, (d) how can one require someone to work on self-improvement, that is, on not doing certain things and doing others, since what he does is the consequence of his resolutions, and these resolutions inevitably result from his character and his motives? Also, (e) why should we feel responsible for what we resolve and do, since IT DOES NOT depend on us, but on what character we have, which is thanks to our ancestors, the circumstances of our upbringing, and the motives which influence us at a given time? Therefore, where is the boundary and what is the difference between fault and merit, sin and virtue, good and evil? All of this terminates. A person becomes an automaton which works with the same necessity as, for instance, an automobile. As long as everything is in order, and we turn the right crank, it will start moving. Man is similar, except he is more complicated. Since the character is so and so, the motives are such and such, he will do so and so. This is how determinists present the case, as indeterminists say, and they themselves state: all of these difficulties cease when we assume that a resolution is not an inevitable consequence of character and motives, since one can resolve either way even if the conditions are given. Then we can say to the arsonist: Well, too bad, you have to be punished since you resolved to set fire. After all, you did not have to resolve to do it, despite your need for revenge and your motive for it, you could have decided not to take revenge and to forgive. This was your will. This is also why you are bothered with pangs of conscience and you feel responsible for it, because you know you could have refrained from doing it, but you did not. Therefore, this is a significant issue, as all of ethics depends on it.

CHAPTER II. THE QUESTION OF DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM

1. Indeterminists' Arguments

Naturally, I shall only discuss the most important arguments on both sides.

I. FIRSTLY, indeterminists REFER TO INDIRECT CONSCIOUSNESS, or indirect sense. Descartes [...]: "*Quod autem sit in nostra voluntate libertas et multis ad arbitrium vel assentiri vel non assentiri possimus, adeo manifestum est, ut inter primas et maxime communes notiones, quae nobis sunt innatae sit recensendum.*"* This is what indeterminists continue to repeat in various configurations. It is not true that I have to resolve the way I have resolved, as I can resolve otherwise. Everyone will agree with this statement. Let me note that I use the form: I can resolve so and so, instead of: I can do so and so, since I am concerned with freedom of resolution from the causal necessity. The issue is not whether I can do what I want, but whether I can resolve what I want. At this point, the very form used: I can resolve what I want, is an opportunity to note a few problems. What does "I want" mean? This expression is as ambiguous as "will." After all, a psychical act corresponding to a disposition known as will is not only determined in colloquial speech by the word "will," but also with the word "wanting." Therefore, "I want" means "I like it." This is often the case with children. Another meaning is: "I want" as "I desire," or "I do not want" as "I do not desire," "I feel revulsion." Do you want to go for a walk? Do you wish it? Or conversely: I do not want it. I do not feel like it, or I feel hungry. The third meaning: I want, I resolve. All you need is to want to be able to do it! Or: Make up your mind whether you want it or not. A related meaning, for example: Do not be angry, I did not want to offend you. I did not intend to. It was not my wish, neither was it my resolution. When someone says that he can resolve whatever he wants, it is evident that everyone can resolve whatever corresponds to his feeling and desire. This is quite possible and, moreover, we can resolve only that which we want, that is, only something which presents a certain value to us and consequently, which we desire, can be the object of a resolution. This much we can accept. Still, what about the third

* "The existence of freedom in our will, and our power in many cases to assent or dissent at our pleasure, is so clear that it must be counted among the first and most axiomatic [...] of out innate notions." Cf. [Descartes 1664], p. 188.

meaning? Can I resolve what I resolve? This may mean: (A) Is it possible that I resolve what I am resolving now, but then it is a tautology, since of course *ab esse ad posse valet consequentia*. Since I resolve, then such a resolution must be possible. Or (B) Is it possible for me to resolve what I have resolved to resolve? We can also say this is possible. I resolve today that tomorrow I will resolve, for example, to refrain from smoking and from food all day. I may also make a general resolution today, which will split into a series of particular resolutions tomorrow, for instance, I resolve that from tomorrow I shall improve this or that and so on. This also does not present any difficulties, since one resolution can be the object of another resolution (just like a judgment may be the object of another judgment and an emotion may be the object of another emotion and a desire may be the object of another desire etc.) Thus, the claim that I can resolve whatever I want does not bring any value into our problem. In order for it to express some indeterminist argument, it would have to be reformulated, namely: when faced with different resolutions, I cannot just as well resolve one or the other. This is opposite to causal necessity. After all, we believe that in the physical world whatever happens must happen the way it happens, and thus, if we take a cross-section of events at a given moment, then whatever will happen in the next moment is already a completely and clearly defined state of affairs at the present moment. For instance, yesterday before the storm; or the height to which the grass will grow in the botanic garden this year. Indeterminists say that our sense informs us differently about our resolutions. I can resolve this or that in given conditions; I am independent, autonomous; it is irrelevant what the configuration of conditions and data is. Hence the name *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*. Indifference toward motives, and thus, free choice, dependent only on my will. (The phrase “dependent only on my will” is also interesting, since in order for it to make sense, we cannot understand it as other than the ability to resolve; then it means that incentives do not decide, that they do not compel us to make a resolution, but instead, the ability of the will itself issues whatever resolutions it wants. Yet, this is only a side note.) Let us deal with this argument from indeterminists. Can I indeed resolve either way? Schopenhauer deals with this matter very evocatively [...].

Let us think of a man in the street who says to himself: “It is six o’clock; the day’s work is over. I can now go for a walk, or go to the club; I can also climb the tower to see the sun set; I can also go to the theater; I can also visit this or that friend; in fact I can also run out by the city gate into the wide world and never come back. All that

is entirely up to me; I have complete freedom; however, I do none of them, but just as voluntarily go home to my wife”*

(naturally, this is a shortened form used instead of: I can RESOLVE this or that or the third thing, as we are not dealing with freedom in the colloquial sense). “This is just,” Schopenhauer states further on,

as if water were to say: “I can form high waves (as in a storm at a sea), I can rush down a hill (as in the bed of a torrent): I can dash down foaming and splashing (as in the waterfall); I can rise freely as a jet into the air (as in a fountain); finally, I can even boil away and disappear (as at Réaumur[†]); however, I do none of these things now, but voluntarily remain calm and clear in the mirroring pond.” Just as water can do all those things only when the determining cause enter for one or the other, so is the condition just the same for that man with respect to what he imagines he can do. Until the causes enter, it is impossible for him to do anything; but then he must do it, just as water must act as soon as it is placed in the respective circumstance.”‡

Thus, Schopenhauer formulates an objection against the indeterminist argument: *nihil probat, qui nimium probat*. What you say about a man and his resolutions can also be applied to phenomena and objects which you yourself state fall under the law of causality. This is altogether legitimate. “Be able to” means exactly that. The content of the notion of feasibility is the lack of necessity of an opposite. Can water freeze? It can. Can water boil? It can. “It can freeze” means that it does not have to not freeze; “it can boil” means that it does not have to not boil. Yet, can water ALWAYS boil? Can it always freeze? No, it is the case only when the appropriate conditions are met. Yet, when the conditions and the final cause are provided, can it not boil? No, then it must boil. It is similar when we resolve. I can resolve this, or I can resolve that; this does not mean that I ALWAYS can. For instance, I cannot resolve to stand behind the podium, as I am already standing here. However, I can resolve it when the [appropriate] conditions are given. When the conditions, the final cause, certain character and motives are present, then I have to resolve. Therefore, when indeterminists refer to the fact that I can just as well resolve this or that, they are right as long as they add that this is true provided the appropriate conditions are given. Only when the conditions for one resolution are provided must this one occur; when the conditions for the other one are provided, then the other one must occur. Therefore, both one and the other resolution are indeed possible in this meaning, just as the water in the bowl can boil or freeze when I heat it or cool it. Thus, the whole line of argument of indeterminists is based on the fact that they omit the hypothetical character of our “be

* Cf. [Schopenhauer 1839], pp. 36-37 [B&J].

† 80° in Réaumur’s scale corresponds to 100° in Celsius scale [B&J].

‡ Cf. [Schopenhauer 1839], p. 37 [B&J].

able to,” that is, they omit it that “be able to” means: if the conditions are appropriate. Therefore, this argument is not convincing.

II. THE SECOND ARGUMENT [BY INDETERMINISTS] IS BASED ON THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. What is that? Let us listen to the proponent of indeterminism, a theologian, Kneib, and quote his work entitled *Die Willensfreiheit und die innere Verantwortlichkeit*,* where he justifies indeterminism with the sense of responsibility in a case when someone does not follow his sense of obligation although he had it, but instead, he resolved otherwise out of convenience or laziness (e.g. I should file my friend’s application for scholarship, but I do not feel like it, there are certain inconveniences, and finally, I say to myself, Well, I am not going to file it as he would not get the scholarship anyway; afterwards, I learn that he would actually have gotten the scholarship if the application had been filed.) What is then included in this sense of responsibility which then bothers me when I reproach myself? According to Kneib,

(1) [The sense of responsibility includes] an objection which we make to ourselves, namely, that we did not make a resolution, as we were obliged to. This objection is practicable only when we are convinced that we could have made a resolution in spite of our laziness and convenience, and according to our sense of duty.

(2) We ascribe an inner negative value to ourselves, which results from our own fault. This negative value, together with a side notion of one’s own fault, may only result from the fact that the resolution was our own creation, rather than something necessary, inevitable.

(3) [Finally,] the sense of responsibility also includes the conviction that in another case, but in the same conditions, a resolution according to the obligation should occur, or at least that such a resolution may occur. This is the sense of responsibility.

The line of argument derived from this is apparently very powerful, since it convinces Schopenhauer† himself, who practically negates the whole of his determinism because of this argument. He states at the end of his dissertation that having demonstrated that determinism is absolutely right, he has reached a point where we can understand true freedom. At this point he points out the sense of responsibility (*Verantwortlichkeit*) for what we do, which consists in the conviction that we alone are the authors of our actions. According to this notion, nobody, even the most hardened determinist, excuses himself with the necessity of their resolutions or blames

* Ph. Kneib [1898] [D].

† Twardowski added a note in parentheses above these words, “Kant: “*Du kannst, den du sollst*” [D].

motives. After all, anyone can see that he cannot act otherwise in given conditions, but at the same time, he is aware that out of these conditions one is of a subjective character, namely, his character. He resolved so because he had to resolve so, considering his character. Yet, character is the entirety of dispositions of our will, and will is the essence of all things according to Schopenhauer, a thing in itself, which such as it is, does not fall under causality. Therefore, as long as resolutions result from character as a thing in itself, and they in fact do result from it, they are not dependent on the law of necessity, and this is why one may feel responsible. Thus, Schopenhauer required this line of reasoning in order to explain the fact of the sense of responsibility and reconcile it with his determinism. Let us see if all of this is necessary.

We shall return later to the analysis of the notion of responsibility; let us keep to the meaning of the word which indeterminists use. Let us see what Kneib has to say about it. As for points (2) and (3), it is easy to deal with them. The sense of our negative value is independent of whether we accept indeterminism or determinism. After all, just as we can have a sense of negative ethical value, we can also have a sense of negative aesthetic or intellectual value, even though it does not depend on us whether we are beautiful or ugly, wise or stupid, whether we are making a mistake or not. Point (3) is also compatible, since the conviction expressed in this point only states that what we resolved was wrong. It is stated in point three that in another case we could act differently from how we acted, but it amounts to the same as point one. Namely, we feel remorse about having resolved in a given way which makes sense only when it was feasible for us to make another resolution, as Kneib states. Let us consider the following example. Was it feasible for me to resolve that I will submit my friend's application? Moreover, what does it mean that it was feasible? It was feasible, that is, had I had the conviction that not submitting the application could result in so much harm to my friend, I would have submitted it. Yet, was it feasible to have this conviction; could this motive have influenced me? Absolutely, if I had had adequate information about the prospects of success in the case of the application. However, could I have resolved to obtain information about the prospects of success of the application? Absolutely, if I had thought of it. Could I have thought of it? Absolutely, but I did not. Why did I not? Perhaps I was not interested enough in the matter, and in that case, the problem lies in the fact that I lacked certain dispositions toward emotions, and after all, it does not depend on me that I do not have these dispositions or did not have them at that time. Ultimately, the issue is reduced to the idea that if I had had different dispositions, I would have been able to resolve otherwise. Let us now discuss the matter from the opposite perspective. We assume that the conditions

were different, that there was interest, and that as a result I complied with my friend's request and went to find out about the prospects of the application and learned that he would get the scholarship if I submitted the application. Could I have resolved that I would not submit the application then? Everybody will probably say I could not; and if someone resolved not to submit the application, we would say that he must have had motives which counteracted the other ones. Yet, since I was keenly interested in my friend's affairs and knew about the prospects of the application, I could not have resolved that I would not submit it; and similarly, my lack of interest and lack of the information about the prospects would result in the impossibility of resolving to submit it. The result of the analysis for the issue of pangs of conscience proves, as it was repeatedly raised, that our pangs of conscience are directed against our disposition, and that it is the culprit which raises negative ethical evaluations. Therefore, the regret and the remorse which we feel toward ourselves is not at all conditioned by the idea that resolutions are made out of necessity, but rather, by the fact that they result from our character. Let us reverse the matter again: What do we gain toward the explanation of pangs of conscience if we accept indeterminism? According to indeterminism, I could have resolved that I would submit the application despite my lack of interest and consequently, despite the lack of information about the prospects of the application. I did not do it. What are the pangs of conscience directed against then? Against my resolution. This resolution was not a necessary consequence of character and incentives, but rather, it was something completely independent from them. Once the resolution has been made, I feel remorse that it was resolved in this way and not any other. The remorse is directed against something which is completely independent from me, from my essence and my character, since otherwise the resolution would not have been free. The question is in what ways is such an independent resolution different from my character when it comes to the issue of independence from me. I did not give myself my character. I also did not guide my resolution. After all, "I" denotes my character, my whole personality, and if this is what guides my resolution, it is not free in the meaning professed by indeterminists. Thus, pangs of conscience turn against something which is independent from me, both in the first and in the second case. Sometimes this independent thing is my character, and sometimes it is my resolution. Thus, indeterminism does not change the state of affairs, and the above analysis demonstrates that the essence of pangs of conscience, together with the conviction that I could have resolved otherwise, is nothing else but dissatisfaction with my own character, paired with the conviction that I could have resolved otherwise had I had different character. Yet, this line of reasoning faces one objection.

III. [THE THIRD] ARGUMENT OF INDETERMINISTS [is as follows]. If resolutions are not free in the indeterminists' meaning, then how do resolutions made under normal conditions differ from resolutions made under physical coercion, or under internal coercion? We are not discussing external coercion, since it may force us to perform or abandon something contrary to our resolution. We mean internal coercion, like in the case of embezzlement where someone's wife is under risk of dying; she must be operated on immediately, but the doctor said the operation must be performed at a hospital which is far away, and there is no money for the train ticket. Another example is torture; if you do not say who did it, you will be tormented etc. The tortured person reveals the secret because of great pain. Indeterminists state that if apparently certain incentives force the will to make given resolutions, and if we accept extenuating circumstances as a result of this, since these resolutions are not made willingly, but under coercion, then according to the determinist view all resolutions would have to have the same right to extenuating circumstances. In that case, we never have any right to blame anyone. Thus, all responsibility ceases to exist. The response to that is that the essence of internal coercion consists in the idea that certain incentives, which do not usually stimulate a given individual's will to make resolutions, stimulate this will in a direction which does not correspond to the character, as a result of their exceptional power. If the embezzlement was caused by a less strong incentive, we would have to assume a disposition toward embezzlement and the inability to respect someone else's property etc. This is similar in the case of revealing the secret without torture. Since such strong incentives were necessary, and since succumbing was preceded by a fight,* as can almost always be ascertained, it can be assumed that the resolutions which have been made do not correspond to the character of the given individual. Therefore, internal coercion does not consist in the idea that a resolution becomes necessary, not being necessary otherwise, but rather, it consists in the idea that the resolution is made counter to the character, as a result of a great force of the incentives. This then is why such a person may still feel *CLEAN* (*cf.* p. 313).† What is more, indeterminists unwittingly present us with a very strong argument against them, as they admit that in certain cases resolutions are made out of necessity, that is, in cases of inner coercion. Yet, this does not stand in opposition

* A note on the margin, "This fight should be analyzed from the psychological point of view" [D].

† A note in brackets following this passage, "Explain then that these abilities must also be present in the character, albeit very weakly" [D].

to their own theory. After all, if will is free, and if resolutions are exempt from the law of causality, how can they sometimes fall under it? Since indeterminists state that resolutions fall under this law only when the incentives are strong enough, this is an evasion, since certain motives are always strong enough to induce a resolution for a given character. Even if they say that this inner coercion was not absolute, as even in these cases absolute will was strong enough to be able to withstand the temptation, we should respond that this “will which is strong enough” actually denotes counteraction of strong opposite motives, for instance, the desire to be unblemished, ethical rules which are so strong that one may even sacrifice his life for them etc. Thus, indeterminists cannot withstand critique in any direction. Their arguments may cause passing difficulties for determinists, but they lead the indeterminists themselves into far greater trouble. Let me just note here as an aside that the above discussion deals with the question of moderate indeterminism at the same time (they oppose the rule of contradiction, *aut-aut* etc.). *Inclinant, sed non necessitant*. What shall this inclination consist in if motives do not have a decisive role? It is sufficient to strengthen, and they will be *necessitantes*.

2. Determinists' Arguments

Due to lack of time, I do not intend to present the very question of determinism and indeterminism in this lecture. What I am after is to demonstrate that determinism does not at all have the consequences inconsistent with ethics etc., which indeterminists suggest. In that case, instead of discussing all of the determinists' arguments extensively, I shall only mention some of them and highlight their value. After all, they have also often been at fault, failing to note that some arguments are very fragile.

1. An example of such a fragile argument is referring to the fact that a RESOLUTION MUST ALWAYS MOVE TOWARD A STRONGER MOTIVE. This argument would only be convincing if we always knew precisely which motive is the strongest. Yet, we usually judge it *ex post*, that is, we call “stronger” and consider as stronger that motive which was followed by a resolution. For instance, should I or should I not give money to a poor person? For some the motive may be pity, that is, the feeling together with the conviction that this person truly needs the help. For others, it would be the desire to counteract the problem of begging, or doubts as to whether the beggar is indeed poor or perhaps only lazy etc. Which motives are stronger? We can state it only when the decision is made. Therefore, this argument is worthless here. Only when we accept determinism for other reasons do we

have the right to say that will follows a stronger motive, as only then is this statement deduced from the principle of determinism.

II. Another argument which is not very convincing either is the one known under the rather amusing name of “Buridan’s ass.” Buridan was a scholastic philosopher of the 14th century. He was French, his name was Jean, he was a disciple of William of Ockham and a nominalist. He is credited with this argument which is, however, not present in his work and dates back even further. Namely: if an ass is put between two bunches of hay, equally big, fragrant, and far from it, the ass will starve, as nothing will induce it to move toward one instead of the other bunch. An idea: because of the lack of a motive which balances will toward one side or the other, there can be no resolution, and so a resolution demands a cause. Exactly the same idea appears in Dante’s work, and even earlier, Aristotle’s, except with a person instead of an ass.* Yet, this argument is not sound, as it is fictional; still, it may serve the purpose of creating a clearer image of the whole issue as well as indicating difficulties which the indeterminist view may face. After all, the idea at issue is that there are no obstacles from our point of view, because will resolves on its own, despite the lack of a predominant motive on either side. Still, in that case, it is very apparent that a resolution is made without a cause, and therefore there is also no question of inclining will toward this or that resolution, and the facts are incompatible with it.

III. THE UNIVERSAL NATURE OF THE LAW OF CAUSALITY. If someone believes that this is an a priori law, he has obviously already resolved the issue of will. The matter is more difficult for those who believe the law of causality to be based on experience. Experience does not provide absolute certainty. It may be that it has been ascertained that everything has its cause in every field beyond the phenomena of will. Admittedly, it is very probable that resolutions also have their cause, but this is by no means certain. It must be ascertained separately through research that this law has no exception and that resolutions are not an exception. Still, we can say that, based on experience beyond the sphere of will, it is highly improbable that resolutions do not have their cause. After all, this is the case everywhere, even in the field of all other psychological phenomena. Nobody would even think to deny this. This is why this argument matters, as it provides us with a great, truly great probability, which is enough in empirical questions, especially as long as there is no *instantiae contrariae*. Still, there is no clear indication of an

* Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, vol. I, ch. 13, 295b; Dante, *The Divine Comedy*, canto four, V, 1-7. Schopenhauer noted that these authors were precursors. See [Höfler 1897], p. 257, note I, on the same topic [D].

instance of *contrariae* in the form of a fact which would be observable at least once, and which would consist in a resolution being made without a cause, since in that case, determinists would not be able to ignore it. The mentioned indirect *instantiae contrariae*, which consists in the alleged consequences of determinism, have proven to be unfounded.

IV. The best argument would be AN UNQUESTIONABLE FACT STATING THAT RESOLUTIONS HAVE A CAUSE.* Do such facts exist? They do. This is exactly the factor which settles the whole controversy.† After all, it is a fact that we can almost always indicate our own motives which become the cause of a resolution, and we can also often indicate them for other people. In the moment, we are unable to discover these motives for others, but we know, based on experience, that in the end we will manage to discover these motives as long as we become acquainted with others' character and circumstances. Even in a case where a resolution is utterly incomprehensible to us, this incomprehension consists in not knowing the motives or knowing that the motives exist. If motives were not the cause of resolutions, every resolution would be incomprehensible in the same degree.

These arguments can be developed more widely. I shall go no further than these remarks, and I shall now proceed to notions and questions belonging to the scope of ethics and criminal law, which are allegedly at risk from determinism. These are primarily the notions of responsibility and sanity, and the related notions of punishment and correction, improvement and justice etc.

CHAPTER III. THE ANALYSIS OF NOTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY ETC.

I shall begin the series of notions with the analysis of those which are of greatest importance, both to ethics and to criminal law, that is, sanity, responsibility and punishment. Indeterminists' arguments turn against the possibility of using these notions from the point of view of determinism. I have mentioned responsibility before, yet, without a more detailed analysis of this notion, which I intend to present now. Let me note immediately that such a presentation of the issue and such argumentation, which is the indeterminists' favorite, as they tend to favor these three notions, is somewhat one-sided, as it only notes the negative ethical aspect. The very word "sanity" testifies to this fact, as it can be connected both with the notion of

* This phrase is not highlighted in the original version [B&J].

† The manuscript says, "a decisive factor" [D].

guilt and with the notion of merit. Speaking of responsibility and punishment, the issue is instantly presented on the basis of a negative aspect of ethical and legal scale. Still, let us adhere to the simplest possible presentation of the question as far as the law is concerned, and we can always also apply it to the positive side in the ethical meaning throughout our analysis.

1. Ascribing. Sanity

I shall begin with this notion for reasons which should soon reveal themselves, and at the same time, because it is not one-sided in its use and is not limited only to good or bad things. We can ascribe guilt, or a sin to someone as well as ascribe merit or virtue to someone; thus, we are primarily concerned with what the object of ascribing is, that is, what is or can be ascribed, and consequently, to whom it is or can be ascribed. Thus, we have two variables. Actually, there is also a third one, namely, what does “ascribe” actually mean? Let us analyze a simple example: a fight; someone has stabbed someone else with a knife. Who? The investigation revealed that it was *X*. He admits that he consciously and with clear will stabbed the other; he states that he wanted to stab the other, as the other had grabbed him by his throat and ruthlessly strangled him. Faced with this confession and the presented state of affairs, we do not hesitate to ascribe the ACTION to the said *X*. Still, what does “the said *X*” mean? This *X* is also a very complicated entity; we do not ascribe the action to his eyes, or his legs, or even to the arm which performed it, or his mind, or anything else for that matter, except his will, and moreover, [his will] in two meanings. Will or an act; a resolution or a disposition, and the entirety of these dispositions is the same as character. Since this *X* admits that he wanted to stab his opponent in order to free himself in the fight, we naturally ASCRIBE this action to his will in the meaning of wanting, or a resolution. What about the other meaning, disposition or character? This is another question to resolve. After all, *X* could have acted and resolved under the influence of pain, suffering, or fear of his own death. Otherwise, *X* is a calm person, very sensitive and affectionate etc. Or: *X* could have acted completely in cold blood, and sought an opportunity to stab the other person deliberately etc. In the second case, we can say that the resolution and the action flowed from person *X*’s character, but not in the first case. Then, in the second case, the action will be ascribed to will in the meaning of disposition, character, but not in the first one, or at least to a much lesser degree. Naturally, ascribing would cease completely if it proved that *X* did not at all want to stab his opponent, but that someone accidentally took hold of the hand he was holding the knife in and pushed it so that *X* stabbed his opponent.

This popular example lets us understand that we actually ascribe an action to will, that is, resolution, and then, to character. Admittedly, a resolution can also be ascribed to someone. Yet, in that case the resolution takes the place of the action, since we know that one may resolve a resolution just as one may perform an action. Moreover, ascribing a resolution can be explained with the fact that it fulfills the same task as an action for will in the dispositional meaning and for character, that is, it reveals character and results from it. Similarly to actions, we say of someone's resolution that it is like him or unlike him to make it. Negligence is a similar case. Naturally, we do not ascribe to all individuals all the negligence they are guilty of at any point in time in full; we only do so with individuals who fall under the evaluation of the ethical or criminal code of law. Yet, even then these instances of negligence result from character or resolutions to a greater or lesser extent. For instance, a nanny neglects taking care of children because she is irresponsible etc. ([negligence] can also be ethically positive: someone neglects revenge because he is a noble person; if someone neglected revenge because he was unable to take revenge, we will ascribe this negligence to him to a lesser extent, or not at all, as this negligence resulted from his will in the second meaning). All of this allows us to realize what it means when we ascribe guilt or merit to someone. Namely, this is ascribing combined with an ethical evaluation of the action which we are ascribing. Ascribing without such an evaluation is also technically possible. Yet, these are probably exceptional cases, for instance, it may be the case in the course of judicial practice that a judge must punish someone for an ethically neutral action which is prohibited by criminal law (carrying a gun without a firearms license). Then guilt is not ascribed ethically, but only from the point of view of criminal law. But, in principle, even that is not necessary for the act of ascribing; it is enough to state that the action results from a resolution, and further, from the character of the person performing the action.

At this point we can respond to our third variable of what it means "to ascribe." It means to issue a judgment that a certain action results from the character of a given individual, and therefore, that the individual is the author of the action. Ascribing action *C* to individual *X*, we thus issue a judgment which may read: It was *X* who did it and none other. *X* did it according to his character, and therefore action *C* results from this character. Action *C* corresponds to [*X*'s] character; it is like him to do it. Such ascribing, such issuing of a judgment, is called "intellectual ascribing." There is also emotional ascribing, when describing the state of affairs is connected with an ethical evaluation of the ascribed action based on a feeling. This is precisely the source of ascribing guilt or merit. Having determined ascribable actions and the sanity of the author, we can also determine the conditions

of reduced or eliminated responsibility for those actions. Responsibility is eliminated either when there was no action or when there was no will, or if this will was only seemingly present. Ascribing is reduced when:

- (1) the action did not correspond to the resolution: I wanted to hurt him (or I did not want to do anything), but instead, I killed him;
- (2) the resolution did not correspond to the character;
- (3) both of the above [occur].

“The author’s responsibility” (actually, he should not be called “the author”) is a phrase used for the reduced or eliminated responsibility for an action because of reason (2), that is, if a resolution is the result of circumstances other than his character; responsibility decreases as it departs from character. This is connected with the notion of the freedom of will in the moral sense. The predominance of internal, personal conditions over external, random conditions (Höfler, p. 572).

At this point, Twardowski’s text breaks off. Yet, because certain theses connected with his views on the notions of ascribing were formulated in the lecture delivered during a session of the Lawyers Association in Lvov on 25 March 1899 [...],² as they summarize certain vital idea of the present article.*

(1) Ascribing in the meaning used in criminal law is a special case of ascribing taken in its broadest sense, that is, moral ascribing.

(2) Moral ascribing includes an ethical evaluation of the ascribed action, qualifying it as forbidden or permitted, or proper, or commendable.

(3) An ethical evaluation is a psychical action which consists of certain ethical feelings and of a judgment which is the expression of these feelings.

(4) Apart from an ethical evaluation, ascribing also contains a judgment which states that a certain individual is the author of a given action.

(5) Criminal ascribing differs from moral responsibility in two respects: (A) Resolutions of criminal law take the place of ethical feelings in criminal responsibility. (B) Criminal responsibility is limited to actions qualified as forbidden.

(6) The objects of ascribing are human actions. Yet, one cannot describe an action as such a manifestation of the existence of a given individual which is the work of his will. In that case, it would be impossible to ascribe unintentional guilt to anyone.

² Cf. [Twardowski 1899b].

* This passage was written by I. Dąmbska [B&J].

(7) The following term is free from this objection: An action is any human activity which falls under ethical or criminal evaluation, in itself or due to its consequences.

(8) When we call someone "the author of a given action," that is, when we ascribe this action to him, we express the conviction that character is also among the conditions of a given action as is the resolution of the person to whom we ascribe the action, as long as unintentional guilt is not under discussion.

(9) Therefore, if a given action does not result from character or a resolution of a given individual, it cannot be ascribed to him. Yet, punishment may still take place in such cases, for pedagogical and social purposes.

(10) Responsibility is reduced when the contribution of character, or respectively, also a resolution, in a given action is limited.

(11) If a given action results entirely from the character of the author, then the author finds himself in the state of so-called moral freedom when performing the action.

(12) Moral freedom is therefore a condition of ascribing actions, whereas the freedom of will (in the meaning which constitutes the subject of dispute between determinists and indeterminists) is not a condition of ascribing.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

DOES MAN ALWAYS BEHAVE EGOISTICALLY?*

Both in everyday conversation and in more or less serious books, one often encounters the opinion that the only motive of human actions is egoism, and therefore, that whatever man does, he does it out of egoism. This statement was uttered by i.a. La Rochefoucauld [1665], among others. He argues that even such actions which seem to be the extreme opposite of egoism are in fact the result of it, as man simply cannot act on other than egoistic motives. This view, claiming that the aim of human actions is necessarily one's own satisfaction is known as psychological hedonism, as opposed to ethical hedonism, i.e. a doctrine which claims that the aim of human actions *SHOULD* be one's own satisfaction.

Psychological hedonism does not accept any motives other than egoistic ones, and at first glance seems inconsistent with a number of stock and almost universally accepted ideas. After all, we speak of working for the sake of other people and sacrifice, of abnegation and altruism! What do all these words mean if man is and must be inherently egoistic in all matters? La Rochefoucauld, as well as his past and present proponents, have a ready response to this. They claim that working for the sake of other people, sacrifice, and other such seemingly non-egoistical phenomena can be easily reduced to egoistic motives as long as we carefully consider why someone is sacrificing himself or working for the sake of other people. This is because he finds satisfaction in it. If he acted otherwise, he would experience pangs of conscience, unrest and moral distress; in order to avoid these

* The paper appeared in Polish as "Czy człowiek zawsze postępuje egoistycznie" in *Iris* V (1899), No. 2, 211-215 [B&J].

unpleasant feelings, he devotes himself to others, which does not only free him from distress but also gives him true and lasting satisfaction.

Would a mother watch over a sick child if she did not find some deep satisfaction in it or if she did not predict that she would concoct unrest for herself if she neglected the child? Would someone attempt to save a drowning man from certain death, thus risking his own life, if it did not give him noble satisfaction and if he did not realize that the part of an indifferent onlooker would be utterly agonizing in such a moment? The case is similar with any such example, and thus, man seeks his own satisfaction in everything and avoids distress; therefore, there is no doubt that egoism is an essential foundation of all human action.

Indeed, this argument convinces many; thus the great number of those who, following La Rochefoucauld, do not believe in *TRUE* sacrifice etc. They only see hidden egoism in it. Still, nowadays this theory does not have any proponents at all among psychologists and ethicists, that is among those who are the most competent in the matter. This is because a closer inspection reveals plainly that it is based on a double error: one of them is verbal and the other substantial. Psychological hedonism does not only arbitrarily alter the meaning of the word egoism, but also presents a false picture of the actual state of affairs.

Is it true that everybody who seeks his own satisfaction or avoids his own suffering deserves to be called an egoist? Can we call a person who wishes to be free from a toothache or one who lights a cigar exclusively for his own pleasure an egoist? We know very well that such behavior lacks the characteristics of egoism; more is needed in order to brand certain behavior as egoistic. After all, we do not speak of egoism in the context of someone's own exclusive pleasure or distress, but only where one's own pleasure or distress is connected to someone else's pleasure or distress. We call the kind of person who seeks satisfaction for himself, regardless of whether this personal satisfaction is at the expense of another person's distress or not, an egoist; someone who seeks his own satisfaction but disregards the fact that someone else's displeasure is the condition for achieving his own satisfaction is an egoist. It results from the very definition of egoism, which is none other than indifference to other people's pleasure and, especially, distress. A fundamental characteristic of egoism lies in this indifference to how the pursuit of one's own satisfaction affects one's environment.

Even if people in fact made sacrifices because of the pleasure this sacrifice brings, we would not be able to call their behavior egoistic, since they do not harm anybody while seeking their own satisfaction, they do not deprive anybody of satisfaction, and they do not cause any distress to anybody. So much for the verbal aspect of the question.

However, let us suppose that the proponents of psychological hedonism are right in using the word egoism the way they do. Let us make this concession for now and call, as they do, any behavior which aims to achieve or increase one's own pleasure or to remove or decrease one's own distress, regardless of whether it does or does not result in harm to the environment, egoistic. In that case, even La Rochefoucauld's theory is untenable, as firm psychological data stand against it.

What does it mean when we say that someone strives to achieve his own satisfaction or to remove his own dissatisfaction? It means that the aim of his behavior is to increase his satisfaction or to remove his dissatisfaction. In order for something to become the aim of our behavior, we must think about it at the moment when we resolve to act in a certain way. After all, something which we do not realize, which we do not think about, cannot be the aim of our behavior, since we cannot keep it in mind when we begin to act in a certain way. Let us now ask whether a person who saves another from death, or a mother who resolves to watch over a child instead of going to a party, are actually aware of their own satisfaction and think about it at the moment of making a decision. This may be so in some cases, but is it always so? Anyone will admit that it need not be so, and anyone is able to support this view with examples from life experience. For instance, when we buy a gift for a dear friend, do we think then of the pleasure we will experience when we please that person with our gift? And since we do not think of our own pleasure in this case, it cannot be the objective we have in mind when buying a gift for someone. Our aim in this and other similar cases is to please someone, whereas in the examples presented above our aim is to save someone's life or (in the case of the mother), to protect someone from harm etc. After all, these are the ideas in mind when one jumps into water to save a drowning man, or when one resolves to watch over a child. Since our aim is not our own satisfaction, then behavior of this kind cannot be called egoistic, even if we take the erroneous (since it is too broad) definition of egoism assumed by psychological hedonism.

La Rochefoucauld's view cannot then withstand the facts which are observable through experience. It is clearly untrue that supposedly the only aim of human behavior is to increase one's own satisfaction or decrease one's dissatisfaction. There are numerous other aims of human behavior, and even when we aim to increase our satisfaction or decrease our dissatisfaction, we do not necessarily behave egoistically.

Therefore, we could wonder how La Rochefoucauld's theory could and still can win over so many proponents. In fact, there is nothing strange about it. Paradoxical views are liked in themselves, and they drown out sensible criticism with their paradoxical nature. This is done all the more

easily the more strongly appearances seem to support it, and in fact, very delusive appearances support psychological hedonism.

The first one of them consists in the fact that truly non-egoistic behavior is really very rare. So often do we find out that people who we had taken for high-minded, or at least average, altruists, are in fact egoists, that it becomes easy to succumb to the temptation of hasty generalization, and to stretch an opinion formed in certain cases to all human behavior without exception.

Yet, there is another, much more important reason which explains the prevalence of psychological hedonism. This reason is the superficiality in the analysis of those psychical factors which are connected to our resolutions and our behavior. This superficiality results in mistaking something which always accompanies our behavior for its main or only motive as demonstrated in the following example.

In striving to achieve any aim, we experience a pleasant feeling when we manage to realize this objective, and we experience displeasure whenever our attempts do not achieve their aim. This is true, but also, we are aware of the fact that this is true. Therefore, we know that we will feel pleasure when we achieve a given aim. This results from the very nature of the aims of our behavior, since only something which we are not totally indifferent toward can be our aim. After all, nobody wishes to realize an aim which leaves him cold and whose existence or absence arouses no emotions in him. Thus, satisfaction always accompanies the realization of our objectives and distress accompanies the lack of it. However, this satisfaction which is aroused in us whenever we achieve a certain aim, and which we know will occur as soon as the aim is realized, is not an aim in itself, but only a phenomenon whose occurrence is simultaneous with achieving the aim. One who saves another person's life will experience deep satisfaction when his attempts are ultimately successful; if the matter of the drowning person's survival were indifferent to him, he would not want to save him, but the satisfaction is not the aim of his action, but rather, a phenomenon which necessarily accompanies his action or the realization of the aim of his action. If one makes the aim of the action out of the accompanying phenomenon, which is necessary for every striving—just as psychological hedonism professes, one reasons in the same way as if one said, "I sometimes see a man who always uses a cane when he goes for a walk. Using his cane is necessary for him, since his limp is so bad that he cannot walk without a cane. Therefore he goes for a walk in order to use his cane." Anyone can see how ridiculous this statement is. Yet, this is exactly what psychological hedonism claims. Just as using a cane is a necessary condition for this man to make his walk possible, but is not the aim of his walk, so the satisfaction experienced as a result of realizing a certain

aim is a necessary condition for any striving, but is not in itself the aim of that striving. The above does not preclude the existence of a case wherein someone in fact strives for his own satisfaction in the course of his actions; just as there is no shortage of people who go for a walk only to show off their new cane.

This is the main source of the seeming legitimacy of the theory of general egoism; although, as we saw before, these are only appearances. In fact, psychological hedonism is merely a deftly woven sophistry, which is all the more treacherous in that it negates the possibility of selfless actions, and thus discourages people of weak character from any attempts in this direction.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM*

Much has been said recently about pessimism. Optimism is discussed less frequently. Pessimism seems to belong to the property of our times. The works of modernist poets are usually tuned to a pessimistic note, and even without the poetry, there is enough of pessimism in today's world already. The rapid increase in the number of suicides in recent years is most often attributed to the spread of pessimism and sometimes people express their complaints that even the young have been infected with pessimism – after all, formerly, their quality was passionate optimism.

However, despite the fact that pessimism is widely discussed, hardly anybody would give a concise and clear answer to the question of what pessimism actually is. It is quite common that those who utter certain set, widely-held watchwords the loudest and the most often, rarely know their precise meaning. This ambiguity of thought is even more probable when a certain word has multiple related but, simultaneously, different meanings as in case of pessimism.

The words “pessimism” and “optimism” have two meanings: we distinguish these two meanings when we talk about theoretical and practical pessimism, and, similarly, when we talk about theoretical and practical optimism. Theoretical pessimism is understood as a conviction that there is more evil than good in this world, more suffering than happiness, more trouble than pleasure. According to theoretical optimism it is exactly the other way round: there is more good than evil in this world, more happiness than suffering, more pleasure than trouble.

* The paper appeared in Polish as “Pesymizm i optymizm” in *Przyjaciel Młodzieży* I (1899), No. 8-9 (1st September), 122-124 [B&J].

And who is right here? The pessimists or the optimists? The former and the latter defend their opinions with the same stubbornness. Pessimists emphasize the great deal of suffering each human being experiences in the journey from the cradle to the grave. They remind us of the numerous efforts and pains that must be made by a human being to make a living, they mention that we must reject numerous pleasures at our every turn, and this also often concerns things supporting our good health and better development of a spiritual life. And after listing a number of the troubles and failures to which a human being is constantly exposed, they conclude that it would be best for human beings if they had never been born. And if they have been already born, it would be the best for them to descend to the dark gates of Hades. After all, the pleasures that human beings can experience throughout their life are so small and insignificant, and usually so hard-fought, that there is no point in fighting for them, and there is no way they can make up for human suffering.

Theoretical optimists defend their perspective with equal determination. Life itself, they say, is a great pleasure. Admittedly, there is much suffering and many unsatisfied desires; however, where there is light, there must be shadow; where there are pleasant things, there must be unpleasant things too. We should not be sad about this fact, especially as the pleasures of life are so numerous and so great! We should not forget about the great amount of joy given to us by the beauty of nature! About the countless moments of pure delight we can experience thanks to art! Still, apart from beauty, there are many, very many things that give us unadulterated pleasures. Friendship and love, working for our nation and humanity, and even forgetting about our own pleasures for the sake of lofty ideals, and working hard to put these ideals into practice: aren't these the sources of all long-lasting joys? In relation to them, mere temporary troubles seem to be of very small significance; especially as they teach us patience. The world is beautiful indeed and it is worth living in.

In this way, and in many similar ways, theoretical pessimists and optimists have been arguing for thousands of years, and this dispute has not been settled yet. This is no wonder as this dispute cannot really be settled; the question of whether theoretical pessimism or optimism is right is completely pointless and it is not difficult to prove it.

Since pleasures and troubles only exist as personal experiences, in order to settle the dispute between theoretical pessimism and optimism, one investigate what is experienced more often by people: pleasures or troubles? And in order to learn whether people experience more pleasure or more trouble, one should first examine every particular human being. Unfortunately, as everybody knows, this is just impossible. Let us omit both the exceptional cases of extremely happy people and those who are always

miserable, and ask ourselves a question: Have there been more pleasant or unpleasant moments in my life? However, it is not only the matter of the NUMBER of pleasant or unpleasant moments, but also it is about their SCALE: what have been greater, the troubles or the pleasures that I have experienced so far? In short, one would be expected to calculate detailed statistics of pleasant and unpleasant moments, taking the level of pleasure and distress into consideration.

This just cannot be done. And even if we assume that we could count the pleasant and unpleasant moments that we have experienced (although it is simply impossible; for instance, with regard to our early childhood), we would never be able to decide whether the experienced pleasures or troubles were greater. There is no yardstick we can use here. Nor is anyone able to decide whether the distress caused by a brother's death is greater than the pleasure derived from information that he is not dead; that the report of his death was false? Therefore, it is just impossible to settle the dispute between theoretical pessimism and optimism, so if one claims that there are more displeasures than pleasures in the world, and another expresses the opposite opinion, they both offer groundless statements and are not able to justify their view convincingly.

However, there is another type of pessimism and optimism, and it is called "practical." To show what practical pessimism and practical optimism are, one can use the common saying that pessimists always paint a gloomy picture of reality and optimists see everything through rose-colored spectacles. It means that practical pessimism is inclined to perceive almost solely negative sides and features in everything, to overestimate these negative sides and overlook positive sides. Pessimists, in the practical sense, consider people as rather evil than good; they do not believe that their dreams could ever come true, they lack self-confidence and only expect failures and obstacles. On the other hand, practical optimists perceive people as angels, they believe they can realize their plans; they are self-confident and strongly convinced that everything will go according to their plans. Pessimists can be snappish or distrustful, and optimists are always happy and trustful.

This is the characterization of practical pessimists and optimists and again one can ask the question of which one of them is right. And answering this question is also impossible; still, for different reasons than in the case of theoretical pessimism and optimism. Both practical pessimism and optimism are partly the result of one's temperament and partly the result of personal experiences. A human being, whose life has brought him many disappointments and whose gullibility has been taken advantage of, will easily turn into a practical pessimist; especially, if his temperament is rather sullen and more inclined to bitterness than delight. On the other hand,

a man who has been always successful, who has only encountered honest people, will be declared a practical optimist; especially, when nature has given him good health and a light-hearted temperament. Still, a pessimist can experience things which undermine his pessimistic theories and, similarly, an optimist can find himself in a situation which is in opposition to his optimistic views on world and people. After all, one who claims that all people are bad and that a human being cannot be successful is wrong to the same extent as one who says that all people are perfect and success accompanies them permanently. As usual, the truth lies somewhere in between. One cannot be distrustful toward everybody; still, it is hard to trust all people unless one wants to be taken advantage of and ridiculed. One must judge every human being separately according to his deeds instead of condemning or praising people to the skies out of some presumption. And if one has a temperament that inclines him to one of these extremities, he should fight with it, trying to stamp out its instigations, and be clear-headed in relation to the perception of the world and people, forgetting about his temperament. Admittedly, one will be neither an optimist, nor a pessimist, but a rational being who sees the world and people just the way they really are.

Therefore, the watchwords of pessimism and optimism are of no use in life; they can only blur the sound judgment of things and people, and following them can result in unfortunate confusion. It is always better to be guided by rational consideration than by catchy watchwords.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

TRUTHFULNESS AS ETHICAL OBLIGATION*

The speaker has presented an important and intractable problem by raising the question of whether man is obliged to always tell the truth. Many philosophers comment casually on this question. For instance, Plato mentions in *The Republic* that one may refrain from telling the truth if vital public issues are at stake; Quintilianus has a similar idea, as well as Saint Augustine, although the latter is in unconditional opposition to lying, as one of few besides Kant, as he calls the problem of lying “*quaestio magna, latebrosa nimis*.”

Still, it seems that the first attempt of a systematic description of this complicated problem is presented by Hugo Grotius in the third volume of his work entitled *De iure belli et pacis*. Grotius distinguishes “telling untruth,” *falsiloquium*, from “lying,” *mendacium*. According to him, the relationship of these two concepts is the following: every *mendacium* is *falsiloquium*, but not every *falsiloquium* is *mendacium*. Namely, not telling a truth, *falsiloquium*, becomes a lie, *mendacium*, something ethically wrong, only when the person telling untruth breaks the law of “free judgment” (*libertas iudicandi*) of the person he is speaking to. This is because, according to Grotius, every person has the right to consider freely any problem in order to form his own opinion of it, and as a result, he may demand that no one intentionally hinders him from exercising this right through false presentation of the facts. Still, there are cases where one loses the right to judge freely, and therefore, *falsiloquium* is not *mendacium*.

* The lecture was delivered during a scientific meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov on the 13th December, 1905. The summary appeared in Polish as “Prawdomówność jako obowiązek etyczny” in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* IX (1906), No. 1, 84-85 [B&J].

According to Grotius, the loss of this right may occur (a) as a result of an agreement (e.g. when someone tells someone else he is going to tell him a fairy tale and the other one agrees), or (b) when a higher law abolishes the right to judge freely. The following five cases can be interpreted as belonging to (b): (1) One may say anything in the presence of children and the mentally disabled, as they lack the ability, and thus the right, to pass judgments freely. (2) *A* may speak to *B* in a covert and obscure manner, so that *C*, present during the conversation, does not understand what the matter is. When *C* misunderstands the meaning of the conversation, there is no lie on the part of *A*, since *A* did not speak directly to *C*, and therefore, *C* cannot demand that *A* respects his right to judge freely in this case. (3) One may tell someone an untruth when the interlocutor benefits from it rather than be harmed by it, and when the speaker may assume that the interlocutor does not later hold the lie against him. (4) When someone possesses all the legal rights of a given person, including his right to judge freely, and therefore, may not tell the person the truth. (5) One may say an untruth when it is otherwise impossible to save innocent life or another, equally valuable good. In all these cases, as Grotius claims, some higher law abolishes the right to judge freely and *falsiloquium* is not *mendacium*.

Although, as the speaker claims, these interesting remarks and arguments made by Grotius may still require many supplements and corrections, it seems unquestionable that an absolute prohibition of lying is untenable. Even those philosophers (for instance, Cathrein SI), who absolutely condemn lying, as being “*malum per se*,” admit after all that in some cases (e.g. with children), one may speak in an unclear manner without committing an ethically wrong deed. According to the speaker, a more profound analysis of the cases in which the prohibition of lying should not stand, would not only provide plenty of material for building a “bottom up” ethics, but it would perhaps also lessen the great discrepancy between theory and practice in the question of lying.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

ON EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS*

1. Though the problems of aesthetics were already discussed in ancient times, it has been considered a separate field of study only since the middle of the 18th century. Its main task is to formulate an answer to the question of WHAT IS BEAUTY. Therefore, the primary aim of aesthetics is to accurately determine the conditions that must be complied with by certain creatures of nature and works of art in order to be deservedly called “beautiful.” These requirements are based on particular properties of objects that arouse aesthetic sentiments in spectators or listeners. In this way, the main issue of aesthetics can be reduced to the question of WHAT PROPERTIES OBJECTS (PERSONS, THINGS, MELODIES ETC.) MUST HAVE IN ORDER TO BE ACTUALLY BEAUTIFUL.[†]

2. With regard to the answers given by aestheticians to the aforementioned question, they can be divided into two groups. There are the ones who attempt to define the conditions of beauty by taking into consideration only those properties of objects that can be subject to sensory perception; in other words, only those that are actually perceived by a spectator or a listener. If we call the whole of these properties of a certain object its “form,” we can say that the aestheticians of this category search for requirements of beauty in the form of objects itself. These are the followers

* The lecture was delivered in the Reading Room for Women in Lvov on 18th February, 1899. It was prepared for print by Jacek Jadacki and published in Polish as “O estetyce eksperymentalnej” in Kazimierz Twardowski, *Filozofia i muzyka* (Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warsaw 2005), pp. 25-33 [B&J].

[†] In the manuscript, this sentence reads as follows: “what properties an object must have (a person, a thing, a melody etc.) to be actually beautiful” [JJ].

of the so-called *FORMALISTIC AESTHETICS*. According to them, the beauty of objects consists in certain quantitative and qualitative ratios of parts to each other and to the whole; therefore the beauty depends on the size of an object and its parts, on proportion, on harmony etc. The second group of aestheticians considers the form of objects as a factor of a secondary significance in relation to aesthetics. According to them, the beauty of an object is not defined by its form but by what this form expresses, and by the method used to express [it]. And when we call this expressed thing content, we can say that aestheticians of the second category search for the conditions of beauty in the content of objects. And this trend of aesthetics is known as *AESTHETICS OF CONTENT*. According to it, the beauty of objects consists in perfect expression of a certain thought, idea – they are, in a way, pictorial presentation of an ideal.¹

3. Apart from these diametrically opposed trends of aesthetics, there is also an intermediate trend that attempts to reconcile both the aforementioned views on the requirements of beauty. Among the representatives of this intermediate trend, Gustav Theodor Fechner (died in 1866*) is the key figure. His perception of the relation between form and content is based on an accurate psychological analysis; and by gaining wide recognition, he considerably contributed to toning down the controversy, which, especially formerly, concerned the followers of the aesthetics of content and the followers of the formalistic aesthetics.[†]

4. Fechner does not use the words “content” and “form,” but instead, he writes of direct and associated conditions; that is, factors of beauty and aesthetic preferences. He explains the meaning of these direct and associated factors in the following example. “An orange,” he says

is probably the most beautiful or – if one considers use of the word “beautiful” an exaggeration – the most charming fruit to the eye... Where does this charm come from? Obviously, everyone first thinks about its beautiful and clear golden color and shape – curve. These are unfailingly important factors and many would agree that they constitute a sufficient explanation for our preference of the sight of an orange... Still, let us consider whether the whole charm of this fruit actually lies only in its beautiful golden color and its rounded shape. In my opinion, it does not. Otherwise, a wooden ball painted yellow would appeal to us the same as an orange does... It cannot be explained only by the aesthetic superiority of the shape and color of an orange since these properties are similar for both objects; and a wooden ball could be even ahead of an orange in this scope. The superiority of an orange may consist in the fact that we see it exactly as an orange, not as a wooden ball; the whole meaning of an orange

¹ Cf. [Kölpe 1895], § 9.

* This is a mistake; Gustav Theodor Fechner was born in 1801 and died in 1887 [JJ].

† In the manuscript, there is no content of the note [JJ].

is attached to its color and shape. This meaning unfailingly lies partly in its color and its shape; but it is not all – it also lies in what an orange is and what it represents, especially, in relation to us. Our senses only perceive the shape and the color; however, our memory adds many other things to this picture that are joined in a certain overall impression and combined with sensory perception, enriching and flavoring it; it could be called a “spiritual nuance” joined with a sensory nuance, or an ASSOCIATED IMPRESSION which is joined with the original, that is, direct impression. And this is the reason why we like an orange better than a yellow wooden ball. Is it really possible for anyone to perceive an orange only as a rounded and yellow object? It is possible using only the sense of sight, but in one’s mind eye, one can see an object that has a pleasant smell, refreshing taste, that grows on a beautiful tree in a beautiful country under the sunny sky. It can be said that one can see Italy in this object; the country we all wistfully long for. All these memories make up this spiritual nuance that intensifies and beautifies a sensory nuance. And one who sees a yellow wooden ball, perceives only a piece of wood, shaped by a turner and varnished by a painter. In both cases, the impression coming from the memory is so directly* associated with the perception, they merge so profoundly, and the impression influences the perception so strongly that it seems the former is included in the latter. Therefore, we are inclined to see in this associated impression something that really lies in sensory perception, and only thanks to comparisons, as in that referenced above, are we able to notice it is not true.²

[5.] Let me quote another example from Fechner’s work here, where he mentions, among others, Polish women.

Why do we like ruddy-faced young people more than pale-faced ones? Is it because a ruddy color itself is beautiful and has a certain charm? It is partly true. A fresh ruddy color is undoubtedly more pleasing to the eye than a grey color. Still, one might ask the question of why the same color is not so pretty when we see it on a nose or on hands instead of a face. After all, red noses or hands are definitely unattractive. Some unpleasant factor must suppress the positive impression usually associated with the color red; how to explain that? The answer is quite simple. A ruddy face indicates youthfulness, health, joy, excitement; on the other hand, a red nose is associated with drunkenness and the resulting diseases; a red hand reminds us of doing laundry and other chores; these are the things we have or do unwillingly; and we do not want anything to remind us of them. And if it was just the opposite – a red nose and a pale face were signs of health and abstinence, and a pale nose and a ruddy face were clear indications of a lack of these qualities, the direction of our preference would be unfailingly opposite. The female residents of North America and Polish women actually prefer pale faces to ruddy faces, and try, even at the expense of their health, to get pale skin by drinking vinegar or using other methods. Do they do it because they like paleness more than ruddy cheeks? Not at all; they have only become accustomed to perceiving a pale face as a sign of elegance, higher education and social status, and a ruddy face as a sign of health associated with peasants.³

* In the manuscript, the word “strictly” is added above this word [JJ].

² [Fechner 1876], pp. 87-89.

³ Ibid., pp. 89-90.

[6.] Using this, and many other examples, Fechner explains the difference between a direct and an associated factor of impression; subsequently, showing its relation in the principle, which he called “the aesthetic principle of association” (*ästhetisches Assoziationsprinzip*). This principle goes as follows:

Depending on our preference or aversion toward a memory evoked at the sight of a certain object, the memory can have a positive or negative influence on the aesthetic impression that this object makes on us; this mnemonic (associated) factor can be consistent or inconsistent with other mnemonic factors or with a direct impression of objects.⁴

[7.] I have mentioned this principle and the explanatory examples in detail, since the method Fechner uses to formulate it is rather typical of his aesthetic research. Fechner does not deduce aesthetic principles from certain general metaphysical or ethical rules, as was done before, but instead he compares numerous examples related to aesthetic preference and aversion, analyses them, and, on the basis of this psychological analysis of facts delivered by experience, he formulates general principles to which these facts are subject. However, he is fully aware that he has chosen the opposite path of research in comparison to those taken by his predecessors. He even emphasizes this opposition, calling his research study “bottom-up aesthetics” (*Asthetik von unten*), while former aesthetics is considered by him as “top-down aesthetics” (*Asthetik von oben*). He understands bottom-up aesthetics as aesthetics based on a wide empirical ground, formulating its theses through induction from an analysis of facts and, in this way, reaching more and more general laws and principles. On the other hand, top-down aesthetics is any aesthetics that presupposes certain general principles and uses them to formulate detailed aesthetic laws and rules.⁵ In short, bottom-up aesthetics is an inductive and empirical science, based on experience, while top-down aesthetics is a deductive and speculative science, based on abstract relations of sometimes questionable meaning.

Nevertheless, empirical fields of study are usually not only about gathering and analyzing perceptions, but they also attempt to widen the scope of facts as much as possible by means of experiments. Not all empirical fields of study are fortunate enough to experiment within. For instance, astronomy is doomed to the passive observation of phenomena, which can be neither artificially induced, nor freely modified. On the other hand, physics or chemistry use experiments at almost every turn, freely inducing and modifying phenomena that are to be observed. And Fechner not only

⁴ Ibid, p. 94.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

created EMPIRICAL AESTHETICS but also set it on the path of experimentation, thus founding EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS.

[8.] The application of the experimental method in aesthetic research offered by Fechner can be understood easily when we get to know the problem he wanted to solve by means of experiment.

These problems concern certain group of direct factors of aesthetic preference, which are jointly referred to as PROPORTIONALITY. Proportionality is understood here as a certain quantitative relationship between the parts of an object or between an object and its parts. For instance, we sometimes mention a disproportionately large head when the size of a head is too large in relation to other body parts; we can have a disproportionately long rectangle when its horizontal dimensions are too large in relation to its vertical dimensions; there can be a disproportionately big wardrobe if we consider it as a part of a room and notice that its dimensions are too considerable in relation to other pieces of furniture, the whole room etc. Proportionality was previously discussed in ancient times by architects, painters and sculptors; they were all interested in finding the perfect harmony between the dimensions of parts and the whole of their works.

Therefore, they tried to define the best aesthetic proportions of width, length and height of temples, the diameter and height of columns, the size of trunk, head, neck, legs, hands and their particular parts. In this way, numerous CANONS OF BEAUTY emerged. These were formulated not only by ancient artists but also by architects, painters and sculptors of the Renaissance and modern history. Apart from the artists, aestheticians also defined canons, and everyone considered his canon as the perfect expression of real beauty.

[9.] The list of numerous ancient and modern canons offered by Adolf Zeising (died in 1876*)⁶ is very enlightening in this scope. Still, Zeising was not satisfied with listing the canons of others; he also attempted to formulate his own canon of beauty, and he claimed that this canon was not only applicable to the proportions of the human body, but also to all works of the art and creatures of nature which we find rightly beautiful. And since this canon led Fechner to use the experimental method in aesthetics in order to verify relevant theses of Zeising, we should get acquainted with it now.

[10]. Zeising derives his canon by deduction and abstract reasoning from the very notion of proportionality. The aforementioned aesthetician

* Adolf Zeising was born in 1810 and he died in 1876 [JJ].

⁶ Cf. [Zeising 1854], pp. 11-130.

claimed that proportionality was always understood as: “the consistency of relationships between a certain whole and its parts.” Still, this vague definition of proportionality is of no significance since it is of no practical utility. Therefore, one must search for some more precise formulation. Since proportionality is only mentioned when a certain whole is divided into unequal parts, then the simplest examples of proportionality will be those cases where a whole splits into two unequal parts. And even then, the number of various possible relations between smaller and a bigger part is infinite; and since not all of these relations appeal to us, we should ask ourselves which appeals to us the most. And the relations that occur as the result of the division of a whole into two unequal parts are threefold: (a) the relation of a smaller part to a bigger part, (b) the relation of a bigger part to a whole, (c) the relation of a smaller part to a whole. According to the definition adopted by Zeising, proportionality consists in the consistency of relations between a whole and its parts; still it is evident that relations indicated in (b) and (c) cannot be consistent since the relation of a bigger part to a whole must be naturally different than the relation of a smaller part to a whole. Therefore, if there is a consistency of relations between a whole and its parts, it can only apply to relations indicated in (a) and (b). And this consistency will be complete if these relations are equal; that is, if the relation of a smaller part to a bigger part is equal to the relation of a bigger part to a whole. This is the exact formulation of “consistency of relations between a whole and its parts”; and this also includes the canon of substantial proportionality and the most aesthetically adequate section. This canon goes as follows:

If a certain whole that splits into two unequal parts is to be perceived as beautiful in relation to its form, then the relation of a smaller part to a bigger part must be the same as the relation of a bigger part to a whole.⁷

[11.] The fact that we can indeed divide a whole into two unequal parts so that the relation of a smaller part to a bigger part is the same as the relation of a bigger part to a whole was already known by the ancient mathematicians, who called it the “golden” ratio (*sectio aurea*) probably due to the interesting mathematical properties of relationships resulting from this ratio.⁸ In order to grasp the golden ratio, it can easily be exemplified with; e.g., a straight line.

⁷ Cf. [Zeising 1854], pp. 156-159, Cf. the author’s [1855], pp. 179-181.

⁸ Zeising wrote a separate dissertation on these mathematical properties, which was issued after his death [...]; see [Zeising 1884]. Let us mention here that the algebraic expression of the proportion resulting from the golden ratio is as follows: [*illegible*], if a is a whole, x is a

In order to divide line AB of any length into two equal parts that will be consistent with the proportion of the golden ratio, that is, the so-called continuous proportion, we draw line BC perpendicular to it, which will constitute half of line AB 's length, in one of its ends, let it be B . Then we draw a circle around C with radius CB and we join center C with end A of the original line. The line joining A and C and the circumference of the circle intersect at point D . The distance AD is equal to the bigger part of AB divided according to the continuous proportion; thus we measure a segment equal to AD on line AB and we obtain the golden ratio of line AB , so that:

If we want to divide line AE according to the same proportion, we measure segment DF on it, and parts AF and EF created in this way meet the requirements of the golden ratio. Therefore, it turns out we can divide a certain whole in different ways, into very numerous unequal parts whose dimensions are always consistent with the principles of the continuous proportion.

[12.] Zeising considers this continuous proportion as the basic aesthetic principle to which direct; or as he calls them, formal factors of any beauty are subject. Every object is more beautiful, the more evident the golden ratio is in it. By means of very extensive research materials, Zeising attempts to show that works of art and creatures of nature which bring us the greatest aesthetic satisfaction are consistent with the continuous proportion. In order to achieve that, he took precise measurements of the most beautiful monuments and paintings; he compared the dimensions of historic edifices, he measured crystal etc.; and all those measurements confirmed him in his belief that he had actually managed to discover the fundamental condition of a beautiful form.

For instance, when related to the human body, the whole concept can be described as follows: Taking the whole length (height) of a human body under consideration, and dividing it according to the continuous proportion so that a smaller part is placed higher and a bigger part is below it, we will obtain the section of this human body into upper and lower parts which adjoin at the level of the navel. The ratio of an upper part of the body (from the top of the head to the navel) to a lower part (from the navel to a foot) is the same as the ratio of this lower part to the whole length of the body. The upper and lower parts of the body are also clearly divided into another two parts; the section of an upper part is marked with a neck, the marker of the lower part is the knees. These

bigger part, and $a-x$ is a smaller part. When assuming a unit as a whole, we obtain, by solving proportion [*illegible*].

sections correspond to the golden ratio in the classical sculptures to the same extent as the first main section of the whole height. The ratio of the part from the top of the head to the middle of a neck to the part from the middle of neck to the navel is similar to the ratio of the latter part to the whole upper part of the body; and the ratio of the distance between a foot and the knees to a part from a knee to the navel is the same as the ratio of the latter part to the whole lower part of the body, etc.⁹

[13.] Zeising's argument concerning the golden ratio became a spur for Fechner to using experiments in aesthetic research.¹⁰ Two facts struck him. First, he found it rather odd that no one had noticed the aesthetic significance of the golden ratio before; especially, as that ratio has been known for a long time. According to Zeising, it is dominant in all works of art and creatures of nature pleasing to the eye. Second, Fechner was perfectly aware of the fact that other authors saw the fundamental law of formal beauty in other proportions, and that they were convinced that their canons were visible in works of art. Therefore, Fechner decided to examine this matter carefully and search for a definite answer to the following question: What are the proportions of the particular dimensions of objects that we find the most beautiful? Obviously, he was not able to measure the very intensity of preference or* aversion, so he found another way and his reasoning was as follows: If a certain relation of a part to a whole is the first requirement of formal beauty, then the object which show this relation will be not only the most beautiful to every person but also will be beautiful to the largest number of people. On the other hand, the ratios which are considered the least beautiful by every person will be also considered beautiful by the smallest number of people. Therefore, one should find, among different possible relations, those relations that are considered beautiful by the highest, or the lowest number of people; these relations will be then viewed as those which are the most or the least beautiful, which are the most or the least pleasing to the eye.

⁹ Cf. [Zeising 1884], p. 174 and the following pages.

¹⁰ His view on the essence of the task of experimental aesthetics, Fechner presented in his dissertation [1871] and in the already mentioned work [1876], chapter XIV.

* There is the following text overleaf: "...aversion, so he found another way which can be called a statistical one. His reasoning was as follows, if one presents a greater number of people with a number of objects with different relations of their dimensions, and when one marks the objects which appeal to each person the most and the least, then a number of votes for the particular objects can be a yardstick for measuring their positive or negative aesthetic significance. Thanks to the proper selection of people, and widening this statistical method" [JJ].

[14.] Obviously, one should take only relations into account here, excluding any associated factors of preference or aversion. Therefore, in order to conduct the research concerning the above-mentioned matter, one should use the simplest, so to say, schematic presentation of relations; for instance, by means of rectangles of different heights and widths cut out of cardboard, drawn with two perpendicular crossing lines of different length etc. And three following methods are applicable here: method of selection, method of preparation and method of application.

(a) METHOD OF SELECTION: A number of objects of the same forms but different quantitative proportions (e.g. a number of rectangles of different lengths and widths) are presented to as many people as possible and all persons are asked to indicate the object they like the most and the object they like the least.

(b) METHOD OF PREPARATION: Instead of CHOOSING the most beautiful relations from among many samples, one asks as many people as possible to prepare an object with the most pleasing proportions. Obviously, this concerns the simplest objects. For instance, each person is asked to cut “the most beautiful possible” rectangle out of a piece of paper or to write a dot over a letter in a way that seems the most appropriate etc.

(c) METHOD OF APPLICATION: One investigates the quantitative relations of the simplest objects for everyday use; still, the investigation should be limited to only those objects for which quantitative proportions stem solely from aesthetic considerations, and do not result from the purpose of the particular object. Therefore, one can measure here visiting cards, format of books, stationery etc.

[15.] Thanks to conducting research according to the aforementioned methods, one obtains data which enable the determination of the relations that arouse the most considerable aesthetic sentiments. Since Fechner was mainly interested in verifying Zeising’s statement*, his attempts were focused on finding out whether the golden ratio is actually the most beautiful. Fechner uses the following example to explain his method of research.

A great number of people were presented with ten rectangles made of white cardboard of an equal area (80 mm^2) but of different widths and heights. One of those rectangles was a square, another had the relation of height to width which corresponded to the golden ratio (that is, the ratio of a shorter side of a rectangle to its longer side was the same as the ratio of

* There is the following text overleaf: ...aversion, so he found an intermediate way, investigating what quantitative proportions visible on the simplest objects possible will appeal to the most people. One can assume that the relations, which have the most votes, meet the requirements of aesthetic preference the best. Similarly, one can investigate...” [JJ].

the longer side to the sum of its both sides). Each person was asked which rectangle was the most beautiful and which was the least beautiful. The answers were presented in the following table where S stands for the relation of width to height of the particular rectangles, A is the answers (m – of men, k – of women) that indicate rectangles that appeal to people the most, and B is the answers (of men and women) that indicate rectangles that appeal to people the least. % stands for a number of answers corresponding to the particular rectangles. (The fractions in columns A and B appeared because undecided answers, given by a person that could not decide between two or three rectangles, were marked twice as 0,5 or three times as 0,33 at corresponding rectangles, so that; eventually, each person gave one whole answer in column A and in column B .)

Even a cursory reading reveals that, actually, the more the relation of width to height of the rectangles is similar to the golden ratio, the more the rectangles appealed to respondents, and that the less similar the relation of the rectangles was to the golden ratio, the less the rectangles appealed to respondents. The relation of the sides of rectangle 34:21 corresponds to the golden ratio, and this particular rectangle appealed to people the most; no one claimed that this rectangle was the least beautiful. Therefore, one may conclude that the rectangle whose dimensions correspond to the continuous proportion indeed has got the most considerable aesthetic value in comparison to other rectangles.*

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

* In the manuscript there is “triangles” instead of “rectangles” but it is a matter of simple mistake [JJ].

FROM THE AESTHETICS OF MUSIC*

Dr Kazimierz Twardowski, a professor of the local university, gave a talk on the above topic in the Town Hall, where he used the psychological method to analyze a fundamental problem within the scope of the theory of music, which is how musical pieces manage to evoke emotions in a listener, and what kind of emotions these are. The auditorium, mostly comprised of ladies, listened intently to these deliberations, despite the fact that they were scientific, their mood was dry and they lacked the atmosphere which usually characterizes dissertations on music, such as the dissertation about the music of Chopin which is fresh in the memory of Lvov inhabitants, presented by Mr. Przybyszewski. Yet, this time the issue in question is entirely different; it is not about enchanting the listener, but rather, a precise analysis of the elements which can constitute a musical experience, a sort of meticulous research of what is commonly known from collective and general experience.

The line of reasoning of the lecture was the following: From time immemorial, the task of music was seen as recreating and inducing feelings of sadness or happiness in a listener, soothing his soul etc. This is how the Greeks understood music; this is also how a great number of dilettantes and performers understood it, as well as a considerable number of theoreticians of music. Meanwhile, Edward Hanslick's book [1854], outright contradicts this view. It is stated in the book that the proper task of music is not to elicit specific states of the soul, but only to create an aesthetically

* The lecture was delivered in the the Lvovian Town Hall in Lvov on 19th October, 1899. It was published in Polish as "Z estetyki muzyki" in *Przegląd Polityczny, Społeczny i Literacki* XVI (1899), No. 243 (24th October), 1-2 [B&J].

beautiful thing; the listener should merely track the combinations of tones and draw pleasure from their sound, nothing more. Whoever listens to music only in order to get an impression of sadness and happiness, or what is more, even some unspecified feelings, he abuses music, just as a composer who composes in order to elicit these feelings abuses music. This book met with strong resistance, as the author was accused of attempting to deprive music of the very aspect which is the only reason why the general public consumes it, it seeming now to be a tendency to make it into a purely formal and somehow mathematical thing, and to deprive it of its depth etc. However, Hanslick supported his claim with detailed argumentation, so that these ideas are not easy to eradicate.

The speaker did not intend to resolve this question once and for all in his lecture, but instead, he merely posed the question of how music can evoke emotions in a listener at all, as well as what kinds of emotions it evokes.

As the speaker argued, first of all, listening to music, just like performing any action, whether physical or mental, which does not contain any difficulty, is pleasurable for us, although in this case the pleasure is small, since we become indifferent to it through frequent repetition of the action of listening. Secondly, we experience pleasure while listening to music because its material consists of tones, not some other murmurs, and we call "a tone" the kind of sound which is pleasant to our ears, just as colors are pleasing to the eye, each one on its own, regardless of their combinations, or as certain smells are pleasurable, or certain tastes. In psychology, this is called sensory feeling, which is indubitably one of the important factors of the pleasure derived from listening to a musical piece.

The fact that we are not indifferent to what kind of instrument is involved, for instance, the piano or the violin or the flute, or the quality of the instrument a musical piece is performed on, proves the great influence of this purely sensual feeling on aesthetic appreciation of musical pieces. A third factor of pleasure we experience when listening to music is a purely aesthetic feeling, which the speaker formulated generally as both the feeling of the diversity and homogeneity of a certain number of impressions. For instance, in the area of visual impressions, if we assume that, let us say, a wall is painted only one color, even if it was the most pleasing to the eye, the impression drawn from looking at this wall cannot be called "aesthetic." Only when there are several harmonized colors, as well as many lines which create a whole which is easily perceived, can this impression be called "aesthetic." Similarly, the same repeated tone, or a great number of different tones which are randomly put together will not create an aesthetic impression. We can experience it only when different tones are linked in such a way that a certain coherent whole, a certain coherence

becomes apparent in it. This whole is made up of melody, that is, a series of tones of various pitches and lengths, occurring one after another; as well as of chords, that is, several tones which are sounded together; and bars, that is, tones grouped into certain equivalent series. According to Hanslick, tracking various transformations in these combinations of tones constitutes the very pleasure music provides, and a listener should confine himself to it. That is because Hanslick does not deny that music can also evoke other feelings; he merely tells us to avoid them as something secondary, which interferes with the main objective of music.

The issue in question is to state how music evokes feelings, and what kind. Two points should be considered in this analysis. First of all, we must separate an impression created when listening to e.g. a performed song from the impression made by the text of this song, as it was evoked by the text rather than the music. The case is similar with an opera, an operetta, an oratory etc. Similarly, one must set aside the impression created by titles of musical pieces or programs often distributed among the audience before playing the works of such composers as Berlioz or Richard Strauss. For instance, the text, "Funeral March" may remind us of a certain funeral, and thus evoke a melancholy or somber mood. Conversely, a waltz may remind us of a ballroom, a dancer etc., which may evoke certain feelings, but these will not be feelings which the music itself evokes through its means.

Another circumstance to take into consideration is the fact that emotions always have some foundation, which is either an impression, a presentation or a notion. A common statement that we are sometimes happy or sad, in a good or a bad mood, without a reason, just because, rather than as a result of some occurrence, is seemingly in opposition to the above. It would seem that a feeling occurs in us which has no foundation. Yet in fact what we mean by it is simply that we are *PRONE* to feel sad or happy, and that any occurrence may induce these feelings, but these feelings will in fact occur only when they are induced by some impression, presentation, or notion.

Having raised these two questions, the speaker proceeded to discuss how music can evoke in us emotions other than the aesthetic. The presented example was the second part of "The Funeral March" by Chopin, considering only the melody, without the accompaniment, for simplicity's sake. In this melody, tones follow each other at a slow pace rather than quickly, and they are quiet, subdued and played *piano*. This feature of peacefulness and gentleness may remind us of various presentations which we had stored in our minds, which also possessed this feature. We may have observed the placid surface of a lake at some point, or walked in a forest on a hot day, and experienced bliss because of the peacefulness of the place. This notion of peacefulness and gentleness created in our minds as a result of listening

to the melody may remind us of such a moment in time, and by virtue of a psychological rule, it will also promptly remind us of the emotion we experienced at that time, and there is only a small step from the memory of an emotion to the emotion itself. Thus, even the simplest features of a melody can indirectly evoke certain emotions. Another feature of musical phrases is a varied pitch of tones. In this respect, it has to be taken into consideration that also in colloquial speech our voice changes in the pitch of its tone and it requires a lot of effort to attempt to say something in a way that keeps the tone unchanged. In sentences which contain a statement the intonation falls by the end, whereas in questions the intonation rises for the last few words. This is why certain fixed forms which represent questions, answers or vocatives etc. are used in recitatives. Since a question is usually linked with an emotion of anticipation or uncertainty, and an answer is linked with a sense of satisfaction etc., thus a musical phrase can indirectly evoke certain feelings thanks to the variety of tones. Moreover, there are the so-called skipping melodies, where tones follow each other directly, divided by conspicuous intervals. This jumping up and down and the other way around may remind us of glancing here and there whenever we are looking for something. And thus, such melodies may evoke in us the feeling of tension and impatience which usually accompanies looking for some lost object. It is also sometimes said that certain musical fragments are in a way rolling, and indeed, alternating higher and lower tones bear a certain resemblance to sea waves; thus, together with the presentation of those waves there may occur the feeling which we experience upon seeing the waves themselves.

The case is similar with chords. When we speak of full and empty chords, it is more than a play on words, as there is indeed some similarity between chords in which there are many intermediate tones and something which is filled, saturated. Therefore, by inducing an image of such full things, a full chord may evoke in us an emotion of a certain satisfaction, a certain assurance and stability. Also the third element of music, that is, rhythm, may induce a feeling indirectly, through creating the so-called ideomotor effect. This is a phenomenon which has such a strong effect on us that we are unwittingly stimulated to perform certain movements. For instance, when someone is talking about a fight, he might have such a strong image of stabbing someone that he will unwittingly perform the movement with his hand. Also rhythm may evoke such an ideomotor image, and consequently, also corresponding emotions.

It is often the case that musical pieces evoke certain feelings in a much simpler way. For instance, in the opera by Verdi entitled *Othello*, there is a passage when Desdemona sings the prayer "Ave Maria" in one tone; this repetition of the same tone bores us, therefore we await with impatience

the end of it, and we experience a pleasant feeling of relief when something else follows. A similar thing happens at the end of intermezzo in the opera *Cavalleria Rusticana* by Mascagni, where the violins repeat the same high tone several times. This is also used on a greater scale in the famous first part of the 5th symphony by Beethoven. As a rule, we say that this piece creates an impression of something great approaching; as we know, the composer himself stated about this piece, "*So pocht das Schicksal an die Pforte.*" The impression is created by the constant repetition of the main motive, which consists only of four tones, four quick *G* tones and the following long *E-flat*.

Having thus enumerated the means with which music can evoke feelings, and having analyzed them based on the rules of psychology, the speaker nevertheless admitted that one thing is very hard to explain in this manner, that is, the difference between major and minor chords. This issue was called by the speaker "one of the most difficult questions in the history of music." Admittedly, what is said about major and minor chords is not entirely true: that the former create a cheerful impression whereas the latter create a gloomy impression, demonstrated by the very melancholy and mournful pieces written in minor key and cheerful ones written in major key. Yet, there is a grain of truth in this statement. Still, psychology has hitherto been unable to account for this phenomenon.

It results from the following presentation of the issue that evoking emotions under the influence of music through associating musical images is highly dependent on the individual conditions of the listener. Nevertheless, according to the speaker, these emotions should not be altogether ignored, as Hanslick and his proponents suggest. After all, architecture is also burdened with the main task of evoking feelings, and yet, the sight of a construction built in the simple Doric style, or one in the rich ROCOCO or BAROQUE style may evoke a certain characteristic mood and emotion, and certainly no one can claim that anyone who surrenders himself to these feelings abuses architecture. Thus, Hanslick is not right in proposing listening to music exclusively as a kind of flowing, audible arabesque. His radical opponents are similarly wrong in claiming that the purely aesthetic way of listening to music leads to a reduction of music to a purely rational, dry and formal art. According to the speaker, the truth lies in the middle in this question, just as in many other significant issues in dispute.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

PART V
CORYPHEI

SOCRATES*

Socrates, the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus and the midwife Phaenarete, born in 469 B.C. in Athens, which he left only when his military duty called him to leave the city, was in many ways similar to the Sophists who he often encountered, just as were other representatives of the contemporary intellectual movement. Similarly to the Sophists, he devoted his life to teaching youth as well as adults, although he omitted the problem of the essence of the universe in his teachings just as the Sophists did, as he believed that resolving this problem was not within the power of the human mind. Just like the Sophists, he wished his students to become courageous in the conviction that as long as they were courageous, they would feel good. Yet, he did not demand payment for his teaching, as he believed himself to be a teacher according to God's will and by the grace of God. His teachings differed greatly from those of the Sophists. He did not wander from town to town as they did, but instead, he walked around the streets and squares of Athens, probably to his wife Xanthippe's displeasure, went to stadiums, visited friends and whenever an opportunity to talk presented itself, which he usually created himself, he began a conversation. Socrates taught through conversations or dialogues, rather than giving lectures and beautiful speeches to a crowd of listeners, like the Sophists did. The way Socrates conducted these conversation was as if he were the one being instructed instead of being the one instructing others. Although the Delphic oracle recognized him as the wisest person of all, Socrates, studying himself in accordance with the rule written in the Delphic temple, "Know

* The text appeared in Polish as "Sokrates" in *Filomata* I (1931), No. 29, 590-599 [B&J].

yourself,” concluded that he must have been recognized as wiser than others because he knows that he knows nothing, whereas others do not even know that much. Therefore, he analyzed his mind and the minds of others, thus making them aware of their own ignorance. Therein lay the irony characteristic for Socrates’ conversations; although he was in fact the one instructing, he acted as a person who seeks instruction, so that those who were certain of their knowledge and prepared to instruct others soon discovered that their knowledge was illusory. Yet, when a conversation reached this point, it began to be really instructive, since at this point Socrates, asking question after question, led those involved in the conversation to the appropriate approach to the problem and extracted the views from them which he himself meant to convey. He used to say then that he aided in the birth of latent thoughts in the minds of the participants just as his mother, a midwife, aided in childbirth.

This fundamental difference regarding the form of instruction between the teachings of Socrates and the teachings of the Sophists went hand in hand with a vital difference in the content. Socrates was firmly convinced that man could strive for absolute truth in the scope of human affairs and attain it. He held an equally strong conviction that there were universally applicable principles of conduct and that man could learn them. He opposed the relativism and subjectivism of the Sophists with absolutism and objectivism, both intellectual and moral. One could say he was a fanatic of the mind and conscience, of knowledge and righteous conduct, of truth and good. The knowledge he sought throughout his life, in solitary meditation and in lively conversations with others, was meant to create an unshakable foundation for the only correct manner of conduct.

Socrates contrasted the individual and subjective ‘truth’ of the Sophists with objective and common truth, and thus, he claimed that the object of absolutely true knowledge, knowledge of general value, cannot be anything individual, changeable, or accidental, but only that which is general, constant and essential. One must capture in one word the essence of things, their actual form, which is common to all individual things of the same kind and which is present within them constantly and unchangeably, although otherwise the appearance of these individual things may be very different. Therefore, nobody will attain true knowledge of, for instance, what we call “courageous,” as long as they only know individual courageous people, or individual courageous words or acts; this knowledge can only be attained by a person who is able to capture the common feature of these people, words and acts, something which constantly occurs in whatever is called “courageous,” which forms the true shape of courage – its essence, and which we perceive as a universal notion of courage, which encompasses various specific instances of courage. Perceiving universal notions as the

necessary condition of true knowledge, knowledge which possesses objective value, Socrates made one of the greatest discoveries in the history of human mind; namely, he discovered one of the most essential features of scientific cognition, of scientific knowledge, whose core is universal truths and laws. Henceforth, the issue of universal notions and their subjects has never ceased to absorb philosophers, often sparking heated controversies.

All the LEADING questions which Socrates addressed to his students were aimed at capturing things, grasping the actual form of them, attaining a general concept which certain individual objects were subordinate to, and determining the content of this concept by determining or defining it. Since he started with particular cases in his conversations, for instance, particular cases of courageous people, courageous words and courageous acts and, considering them, guided his students toward a general and universal concept of courage, thus this manner of pursuing the truth, proceeding from individual cases to a general approach, has been named “induction” (επαγωγή, *inductio*).

Admittedly, this guiding discourse did not usually lead to a final result, as the definitions of terms emerging from it did not usually satisfy Socrates. Nevertheless, it was immensely productive. First of all, the dialogues taught self-criticism and modesty by making Socrates’ conversation partners aware of the degree to which their judgments, views, concepts and principles were superficial, unconsidered, and vulnerable to any objection which came their way. Secondly, they discussed conscience, demonstrating that what everyone perceives as the purpose of life, that is happiness, is not achieved in the ways which are usually chosen by the thoughtless crowd, but in other ways – more thorny but more certain. Only those who choose the right way will act truly courageously and attains perfect satisfaction. Therefore, the outlook on life of many youths was shaken under the torrent of Socrates’ questions, even if at first they held it against Socrates that he mercilessly revealed their inner emptiness, yet simultaneously they felt purified and elevated in this torrent, and for this Socrates was loved or even worshipped, with the youths attempting to imitate him.

It was not easy to imitate Socrates and be a courageous person in his understanding, although he himself believed that anyone could be taught courage and a proper code of conduct. Starting from the assumption that any man wants to be happy, enjoying lasting satisfaction and serenity, he was also convinced that it is enough to know what kind of behavior leads to this aim in order to behave in this very way, that is, to behave properly, courageously and well. After all, nobody would want to act against their own satisfaction and happiness. The fact that Socrates considered courageous and good such behavior which leads to happiness can be explained with the fact that in Greek, one phrase denotes “feel good,” and “behave well” (πράττειν,

εὐ πράττειν), as well as with the fact that Socrates found the greatest personal gratification in such behavior, which was good in the ethical sense according to his deep conviction, which flowed from moral courage and testified to it. Thus, Socrates was able to claim that courage, that is, a successful inclination toward good behavior, consists in knowledge; that is, that the courage in its essence is the knowledge of what behavior is good, that is, leads to happiness, and a simple consequence of this standpoint was his conviction of the ability to teach courage; after all, knowledge can be granted to others. Another important consequence of this view was the conviction that the source and basis of all true courage is the mind, to which man owes all his knowledge. This corresponded fully to the prevailing views of the day, when so much emphasis was placed on education and the enlightenment of the mind, and especially to Socrates' steadfast belief in the cognitive ability of the mind in the scope of human affairs. A third consequence flowed from reducing courage to knowledge, that is, the view that there is only one courage, and that all the other seemingly different kinds of courage, various virtues and merits are in their essence one and the same courage, namely, the knowledge of how one should act. The need to unify the notion of courage once again revealed Socrates' tendency to capture the general in the particular, a tendency which made him seek what constantly repeats in particular manifestations of courage as courage in general, as its innermost essence. As a teacher of thus interpreted courage, and contrary to the Sophists, Socrates did not teach his students knowledge which would ensure their inner success only within a certain scope of public activity, but instead, he aimed to make them courageous people in general, that is, people who would always behave well regardless of the kind of activity and who found the greatest inner pleasure in that kind of behavior.

Through analyzing and describing ethical concepts, Socrates became the creator of scientific ethics. The fundamental idea of his ethics, which establishes a close relationship between the mind, courage and good behavior on the one hand and happiness on the other, greatly influenced further development of Greek ethics in general, giving rise to the notion of the sage, that is, a person who is perfect in his mind and virtue, and thus, happy.

Therefore, as Socrates taught, whoever wants to be truly happy must first surrender all his actions and behavior to the mind. He must be the master of himself and practice moderation in everything. Whoever chases pleasures disrupts his inner peace, as well as those who get attached to their material possessions, their property, fame etc., and thus create for themselves various needs whose satisfaction does not depend on them alone. After all, it is a divine thing not to have any needs, and having as few of them as possible gets us this much closer to gods. One should also

avoid harming anyone; one must be righteous and endure harm rather than cause it. Although the law of the country one lives in is not always the best possible, we owe it obedience and strict adherence.

Yet, these and similar principles did not prevent Socrates from a tragic conflict with the authorities of Athens. He was seventy years old when he was accused of not acknowledging the official gods and introducing new gods, as well as having a bad influence on the youth. Socrates was probably not an uncritical confessor of the official polytheism, although he recommended performing the traditional religious practices, but apart from the gods worshiped according to the old customs he assumed the existence of a higher being to whom the world owed its intentional design and providential reign for the greater good of humanity. He also believed that God's voice, which he called *δαίμωνιον*, sometimes spoke in his soul, thus warning him against improper steps. Perhaps this faith was what scandalized Socrates' accusers the most. The antipathy toward Socrates also had other sources. Even his appearance was repulsive. After all, he was exceptionally ugly, which was definitely not alleviated by his poor and unkempt attire. Yet, this shabby man did not hesitate to teach others lessons, humiliating them with persistent interrogation to which they could not even find a response. He did not only criticize the views of those around him; he also criticized the political system, pointing out the main failing that it was governed by people who were not appointed to their offices because of great virtues of mind and heart, but rather, through election or even lottery. He analyzed everything, he attempted to convert everyone, opposing the public opinion and provoking their representatives. In this, he did find faithful and devoted disciples, among whom he spread his views which were so destructive according to the general public! Thus, he was found guilty of the crimes he was accused of, albeit only by a slight majority of votes. Yet, when asked to present his own comments on the sentence and he expressed the view that he deserved public praise rather than punishment for his activity, a greater majority of judges opted for the death penalty. While waiting for the execution of the sentence for thirty days for religious reasons, he remained faithful to the principle of obedience to the law of the country and did not accept help in escaping from prison offered to him by his friends. When the time came, he drank the cup of poison. It took place in May 399, B.C.

Socrates did not write. His person and his teachings were described in writing by his two disciples, Xenophon, the famous commander and historian, and Plato, the philosopher.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

THOMAS AQUINAS*

The first half of the 13th century was the beginning of a new period for the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages when, as it had happened with Arabs and Jews before, Aristotle gained dominance. And even if the Church had accused the philosophy of Aristotle of having pantheistic attributes and banned people from reading his writings [...], it was soon realized that these attributes actually came from Arabian commentators; therefore, there was nothing then to prevent that philosophy from being spread, especially, when specific admirers of this Greek philosopher, namely, Dominicans and Franciscans, earned separate faculties in the University of Paris.

[...] Thus, it is not surprising that Alexander of Hales, an Englishman living in Paris (died in 1245), the first Christian scholar to use the whole of Aristotle's philosophical notions in his theological lectures was a Franciscan. On the other hand, a German scholar Albert the Great (died in 1280), who was the first to take both an exhaustive presentation of the philosophy of Aristotle and, by means of it, the establishment of a religious and philosophical system that would embrace, as with Saint Augustine, the whole of created and uncreated being, upon himself [...] – was a Dominican.

[...] It was a difficult task, and Albert the Great was not entirely successful in managing it. A surplus of information and materials found in Aristotle's writings and his Arabian and Jewish commentators overwhelmed Albert the Great; and the resulting defects in the works of Albert were especially evident as he attempted to avoid them – the plans of Albert

* The text is a fragment of the book *O filozofii średniowiecznej wykładów sześć* [*Six lectures on medieval philosophy*] (H. Altenberg & E. Wende i Sp., Lvov & Warsaw 1910), 60-68 [B&J].

the Great were thoroughly realized by his disciple, Thomas Aquinas, who surpassed his master. However, Albert the Great not only formulated the task, subsequently executed by Thomas, but also attempted to execute it himself in his comments on Aristotle's works in his own philosophical and theological works where he included a number of thoughts which were then eagerly assimilated by his disciple. One of these thoughts concerned the problems of *universalia*, which was solved by Albert the Great in the spirit of MODERATE REALISM; still, giving up neither EXTREME REALISM nor CONCEPTUALISM, and only considering NOMINALISM as a completely false science. According to Albert the Great, *universalia* exist before as well as in and after things. They exist in God's mind before things as prototypes of things to be created; they exist in things as it was understood by Aristotle, who saw in every concrete being – apart from its individual features – the essence, the idea materialized in it; they exist after things as, understood according to our perception, common features of similar concrete things. By rejecting only NOMINALISM from among the possible trends of considering the problem of *universalia*, Albert contributed to the fact that it was exactly NOMINALISM that later insistently demanded more extensive consideration and constituted a serious opposition to REALISM and its representatives, Albert's followers. Similarly, the second conclusion of Albert later caused unrest affecting the unity of Church doctrine, although, according to Albert's intentions, as with the reconciliation of REALISM and CONCEPTUALISM, it was supposed to appease disputes and prevent resulting risks. This second view concerned the relations between philosophy and religion, knowledge and faith, reason and revelation.

[...]. In this scope, a significant evolution took place in the first period of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. Johannes Scotus Eriugena claimed, as we all know [...], that real philosophy and real religion are always consistent with each other. However, Anselm of Canterbury perceived that matter rather differently. Admittedly, he believed that it is our duty to try to understand in what we have faith; faith should be the first level, and understanding the second in assimilating divinely-revealed teaching; I believe so that I may understand, he claimed (*credo ut intelligam*); still, he did not rule out the possibility of the mind not being able to sufficiently encompass divinely-revealed teaching, or that, in its attempts to grasp it, the mind could come to different results. In both cases, one should absolutely submit oneself to the authority of the revelation, the Fathers of the Church, and the Church itself. Any inconsistency between religion and philosophy must be eliminated by concession on the side of philosophy.

Abélard showed different perception of this matter. Believing, as Anselm did, that the consistency of philosophy and religion is the most desirable issue, and even submitting himself to disapproving the judgments

of Church authorities according to Anselm's principle, he, contrary to Anselm's beliefs, held the opinion that only philosophical understanding and deliberation could pave the way for faith, and that any doubt concerning faith was dispelled not by the authority of the Church fathers but by arguments, reason, and when it was not enough, one should use one's sense of morality [...].

On the other hand, the mystics of the 12th century took, in a way, the middle ground in relation to the argument concerning knowledge derived from reason and religious faith since they did not juxtapose knowledge and faith in a way that would cause the occurrence of contradictions between them either, according to Anselm's beliefs – by submitting reason to faith, or according to Abélard's opinions, by submitting faith to reason, but instead they considered knowledge derived from reasoning as a lower level of discovering the truth, and faith stemming from direct revelation through ecstatic contemplation as the most perfect.

What is more, Albert the Great attempted to mediate between the rights demanded by reason, and the divinely-revealed doctrine which forbade breaking with its dogmas. Following Maimonides' instructions, he tried to mark the border between what could be a subject of knowledge, and what must remain the matter of faith due to the imperfection of the human mind. Therefore, he posited a twofold theology: a natural and a revealed one. The former included all the truths that could be grasped and justified by a human mind equipped with the tools of philosophy; the latter was composed of the mysteries of faith which cannot be understood by anybody and should be accepted with humble faith as revealed. And these mysteries are, above all, the dogma of the Trinity, the dogma of the incarnation of the Son of God, and the dogma of human redemption.

[...] When adopting fundamental thoughts and a number of others from his master, Thomas Aquinas was able to integrate them harmoniously and consistently with the results of his own constant reflections, along with the whole system of theology of that time and the collection of notions drawn on Aristotle's works. During the nearly fifty years of his life (1225-1274) devoted to teaching philosophy and theology in Cologne, Paris, Bologna, Rome, Naples and other cities, this descendant of Italian noblemen from Aquino (near Naples), and, simultaneously, a Dominican monk, was able not only to completely grasp the philosophy of Aristotle, write a number of brilliant commentaries on his works, and form a philosophical and religious uniform worldview, but also to present this view in two works *Summa philosophica* and *Summa theologiae*, which; until today, have been perceived as the ultimate expression and philosophical formulation of Catholicism.

The whole system of Thomas Aquinas can be described as the science of Catholic faith expressed by means of Aristotelian notions, and, at the same time, as the philosophy of Aristotle expressing Catholic science. As with Saint Augustine, philosophical words are not only forms, signs of speech used to utter content totally independent from this external form, that might as well take any other form, with Thomas Aquinas, philosophy becomes an important component part of science, it becomes scientific content. And precisely thanks to this fact, this science is expressed in philosophical words. The only difference is that, with Saint Augustine, the science of faith was related to the philosophy of Plato and Neo-Platonic philosophy, and with Thomas Aquinas, one is presented with the philosophy of Aristotle, still, it was not entirely devoid of Platonic and Augustinian elements which had previously been adopted in the established composition of Church teachings. As the Sun and its warmth cannot be separated since they form an inseparable whole, the teachings of the Church and the philosophy of Aristotle were integrated in the mind and writings of Thomas Aquinas. And thanks to the above-mentioned, some expressions formulated by a Greek and a pagan, Aristotle, became Church dogmas as had happened with other expressions formulated by a Jew, Philon.

The fundamental thought of Aristotle's worldview is that the world itself shows its entirety in an uninterrupted chain of beings, from the lowest to the highest, and the higher the being, the more prevailing is an active element, form or essence of things, found in it over a passive element, matter [...]. This thought also penetrates the worldview of Thomas Aquinas. As the result, things presented as antitheses by others, are introduced as a number of different levels leading to the highest objective by Thomas Aquinas. For instance, according to the Neoplatonians and those still influenced by them, spiritual and physical worlds are like the light and the darkness, they are in striking contrast with each other. However, according to Thomas, there is an uninterrupted chain of beings that starts with the lowest beings, plants and animals, through human beings, in whom; in some way, the advantage of a sensual element is replaced by the advantage of a spiritual element, and it goes higher and higher up to Angelic Choirs and ends with God, the highest being.

In a similar way, Thomas eliminated the opposition of the City of God and the City of Satan, clergy and laity, which cast a somber light on Saint Augustine's views on the philosophy of history. Thomas was the first among Medieval philosophers to discuss the theory of the state; in this way, also integrating political views of Aristotle into his system that were ignored by Albert the Great, who, on the other hand, was considerably interested in Aristotle's writings on natural science, passed over by Thomas. Therefore, according to Aristotle, people are beings created to have

a social life and to organize themselves into cities; the task of the city, as Aristotle claimed, is to promote the virtues of its citizens. Thus, a secular city is not the work of Satan, but an essential link in the plan of creation. Still, this plan does not show human beings earthly limits, but it shows the ways of eternal salvation in relation to human virtues. So it is not the civil virtue which is the highest, but rather it is the virtue given by divine grace. Therefore, the city, by cultivating civil virtues in its members, should prepare them to obtain God's grace, to higher virtues and to eternal salvation. A secular city is no longer an opposition to the city of God as it becomes a certain state of preparation to enter into the latter. And since the city of God is of a higher level and a secular city is of a lower level, the clergy should be superior to the laity, which is used by the former to achieve its own, higher objectives.

This theory of the city is simultaneously a very clear example of the interpenetration of the philosophy of Aristotle and Catholic theology in the system of Thomas Aquinas. And regardless of different opinions on the absolute value of this system, one thing is certain: Christian thought and Greek thought had never before and never again been so harmoniously integrated into one whole, and that the one who was able to assimilate everything that was discussed by Aristotle and everything that was codified by the Church, and then share it all with posterity in this apt form, must have been an exceptional man of a brilliant mind.

[...] So the edifice was erected, what should be done next? There remained one very important task to be done: making that edifice available to everybody so that the greatest possible number of people could live there. Therefore, the system of Thomas was planned to be disseminated, to be taught at schools. And a method of lecture, a scholastic method in its more strict sense [...], which was also used by Thomas himself in his lectures, was developed further at that time; thus, it was even more formalized. Peter of Spain (died in 1277 as Pope John XXI), who was contemporary to Thomas, wrote a handbook on Logic, which offered the first formulas of *Barbara*, *Celarent* etc. syllogisms. Since that time it has been easier to learn how to use syllogisms in lectures and disputes; therefore, the charge of impersonal formalism against the scholastic method has become more and more justified.

[...]. The difference between this scholarly method of disseminating the system of Thomas and the path chosen by Dante, who had been born 9 years before Thomas Aquinas died, is similar to the difference between heaven and earth. Whoever knows the teachings of Thomas, will find them in the Divine Comedy clothed in poetic language; starting with the characters of Virgil and Beatrice as symbols of natural and revealed knowledge, and ending with subtle philosophical deliberations included in brilliant

verses. Still, in his views on the relation between clerical and secular authorities, Dante opposed Thomas philosophy.

[...] Apart from dissemination through dry lectures or through brilliant poetry, there was nothing left for THOMISM to be done. The system, so coherent and uniform, did not allow for further development; any modification, any attempt of further improvement, even out of the best intentions, would shake the edifice and cause the appearance of cracks on its walls.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

SPENCER AND LEIBNIZ*

I read once that Leibniz was the last philosopher of the Aristotelian kind, that is, a philosopher who embraces the whole of knowledge contemporary to him, not only working in the scope of purely philosophical sciences, but also enriching other fields of knowledge with the power of his thought. I read on to learn that today such a polymath could not exist; the great growth and specialization of knowledge has set narrower limits even to philosophy, assumed to be omniscient. No Leibnizes are born any more.

Yet, when I pondered upon Spencer's activity and recalled his work upon hearing of his death, when I heard and read on all sides that he was one of the most illustrious representatives of his, that is the 19th, century, when I attempted to capture the essence of the content of his mental activity, there continued to arise and persistently impose itself a similarity between the spiritual countenance of the pure blood English philosopher and the philosopher of Slavic descent, that is, between Spencer and Leibniz.

Once I noticed the similarity, I detected it and ascertained it in more and more different areas. They can all be reduced to three main characteristics.

The first of them is universality. Leibniz was not the last of the polymaths. Spencer also embraced the entirety of contemporary knowledge. Spencer also presented original work, often seminal in the field of science, which does not belong to the scope of philosophy in the strict sense of the term.

Whoever has read Spencer's work is aware that the scope of his knowledge is vast. There is no science which would not provide examples and

* The text appeared in Polish as "Spencer i Leibniz" in *Słowo Polskie* IX (1903), No. 600 (24th December), 7-8 [B&J].

ways to apply his theories. Drawing freely from the repository of all sciences, he demonstrates that he is more than superficially familiar with them, and that he has drawn from each of them and extracted whatever is their most significant and essential content. This constant relationship of Spencer's reasoning with all sciences, this bond between his philosophical line of argument and the concepts and facts of particular sciences is only the least of the factors which make Spencer's work so enticing, and simultaneously so instructive.

However, Spencer, as was Leibniz, is not only very well versed in the field of contemporary knowledge, but has also contributed to its development. Just as Leibniz creates infinitesimal calculus besides Newton, also Spencer works alongside Darwin and others to lay the foundations of one of the most significant forms of the theories of development. Leibniz's fame is not only due to his work as a philosopher and a mathematician, but also as a historian, by publishing sources and making compilations on certain historical periods on his own. Similarly, in the field of sociology, Spencer laid the foundations of the contemporary view of the beginnings and the laws of social life. However we interpret Spencer's activity, we must admit that his mind possesses all the characteristics of the universality usually ascribed to Leibniz. Neither of them was omniscient; yet, neither lacked this omniscience in a greater degree than the other.

This mental universalism and these exceedingly broad views resulted in both of them choosing the same direction, which constitutes another common feature for both of them.

The said second common feature is the desire and need to reconcile opposites, to eliminate contradictions and to remove all that which divides and instead, to seek all that which is shared. To understand everything is to forgive everything; this principle of life, translated into the language of scientific research, reads: to understand everything means not to condemn anything in advance. Both of the philosophers strictly adhered to this rule in their research and in the formation of their views. By not condemning any claim in advance, and instead examining all ideas without prejudice, they gained a strong conviction that truth is scattered everywhere, and that there is no claim so outlandish that it does not contain even a tiny grain of truth. What is interesting is that there is one exception from this rule in Leibniz's work, that is, in his description of Spinoza's system, where he is unable to find words of reprehension which would be severe enough. Spencer also has his own *bête noire*, which is the view of the social system professed by social democracy. Both of these exceptions are anti-individualist trends!

Yet, apart from these two examples, there is an obvious and quite conscious tendency to unity and reconciliation, even in the same topics for

both of the thinkers. Both of them wish to reconcile empiricism with apriorism. Leibniz does it with the help of a theory which can be summarized in one sentence: there is nothing in the mind that had not previously been in the senses, apart from the mind itself. On the other hand, Spencer does it with the help of theories inherited from the predecessors of forms of thinking, achieved empirically by these predecessors. Both of the scientists assume the existence of an infinite line of gradually higher and higher developed beings, in order to tie together the highest and the lowest forms of being, according to the rule "*natura non facit saltus*." Both claim, and perhaps thus reveal their reconciliatory tendencies the most fully, that religious faith and scientific knowledge are equally important fields of human experience, that they can and should coexist peacefully alongside each other, complementing each other in satisfying the most vital and precious needs of the human mind.

Whoever displays such a burning desire to attempt to connect and unify things and views which are, at least at first sight, contradictory and enemy with each other, must live with the hope that despite the obstacles inherent to the nature of man and those originating in external circumstances, such a reconciliation and equalization of opposites will ultimately prove to be feasible. In other words, he must be an optimist. Thus, both of the philosophers were true optimists.

The above is their third common feature. Leibniz not only believes that this is the best of all possible worlds, but is at the same time convinced that the road to ever greater happiness is open for every human being, and perceives that road as the constant betterment of the spiritual faculties. Thus the tendency to enlighten himself and others, identified with striving for one's own happiness as well as the happiness of others. The dogma professed by almost all civilized societies without exception that by enlightening the masses, we thus contribute to their happiness, dates back to these times. As for Spencer, does he not claim that gradual, unerring development, taking place according to the laws of evolution determined by him, will lead to perfect happiness? After all, happiness consists in perfect adaptation to the conditions of existence, and any development seeks to achieve this aim and brings us closer to it. When human being as well as whole societies are perfectly adapted to the conditions of living, all evil and misfortune will disappear, as it is only the result of imperfect adaptation. Then fighting between individuals will cease, the interests of the individual and the society will cease to be in conflict and there will be no contradiction between altruism and egoism, all complaints will subside and all suffering will be gone.

In order to have such a bright view of the future, one must be an optimist; in order to be an optimist, one must believe that what is in conflict

and clashes today can be reconciled; in order to believe that, one must embrace issues which reveal to the mind which penetrates them deeply that, contrary to appearances, they are peacefully coexisting factors of one vast, universal world.

Both Leibniz and Spencer had the gift of such a view of the world. I realize that there are great, often huge differences between these two thinkers, despite all the mentioned similarities. Yet, they are still kindred souls. After all, the similarity between them does not consist in secondary and superficial characteristics. Instead, it lies in what constitutes the basis and the source of the direction of philosophizing and determines it at the same time.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE*

*„Jeder tiefe Denker fürchtet mehr das Verstanden-werden,
als das Missverstanden-werden. Am Letzteren leidet vielleicht seine Eitelkeit;
am Ersten aber sein Herz, sein Mitgefühl, welches immer spricht:
Ach, warum wollt Ihr es auch so schwer haben wie ich?“
Jenseits von Gut und Böse.*

A theory of authorial success has not yet been developed; the reasons and means for giving wide publicity, either long-lasting or short-lived, deserved or undeserved, to an author have not been organized into any system. Still, in this case, as in any other case, the beliefs formed through experience, and opinions based on observations of certain facts precede a scientific theory. Therefore, we know that in order to be read, to make a great uproar in the modern public sphere, and to form a certain literary party, one does not necessarily have to write something truly beautiful, judicious and lofty. Quite the contrary: the best way to achieve those aims is to advance ideas which either tickle society's fancy or arouse its indignation. And the one who can both flatter and outrage becomes the most widely-read.

One of these authors is Friedrich Nietzsche, who is perceived by some as God's creature, and by others as the spawn of Satan. One of Nietzsche's admirers claims: "I had a strong desire for a new divine being... and I have found it in the personality of Friedrich Nietzsche." Others, such as Professor L. Stein, attempt to frustrate the influence of Nietzsche in their separate works, as they consider it highly dangerous and destructive. And

* The text appeared in Polish as "Friedrich Nietzsche" in *Przełom* I (1895), No. 2-3 (8th June), 71-91 [B&J].

a list of works defending and opposing Nietzsche would be a pretty sizeable volume.

This interesting phenomenon has not been a subject of many investigations in Poland despite the fact that Nietzsche, as Achelis¹ claims, came from a Polish family, and willingly considered himself a Pole. His great-grandfather spelled his name "Niecki" and left Poland in 1715 as a result of political circumstances. The aforementioned biographer of Nietzsche maintains that in his temperament and views one can find numerous distinct traits of a Slavic character: among those he mentions

melancholy joined with day dreaming; also visionary elation occurring interchangeably with the strongest outburst of passionate hatred and bitter contempt; in general, the great rule of instincts hidden in the depth of the soul and showing themselves in a horrifying way. What is more, a purely Slavic trait is a merciless disregard for the crowds and a blind, almost barbaric, adoration for a wild, brute force destroying whole nations for selfish reasons; another purely Slavic feature is a contempt for understanding life clearly and rationally, which results in the immense glorification of unlimited joy perceived by Nietzsche as incarnated in the god Dionysus.

I do not know whether Nietzsche actually considered himself to be a Pole; neither do I intend to discuss the question of whether the traits mentioned by Achelis are typical of a Slavic temperament. The fact is that Nietzsche despised Germans, although his writings were in German; thus, they were addressed mostly to Germans, and despite the fact that his German style is brilliant, forceful, beautiful, and full of this mysterious power that rivets a reader's attention to the contents, those contents are often repulsive in their harsh ruthlessness.

Admittedly, it is hard to find greater, bolder and more insolent ruthlessness than the one Nietzsche showed in his sentences. And yet he did not mean to justify his statements. According to him, what requires proof is worth little. The precision of definitions and logical conclusions, logical reasoning, which was called "dialectics" by Nietzsche, were repulsive to him. Therefore, he could not stand Socrates, perceiving him as the reason for the collapse of the spirit of Greece. "With Socrates" as we can read in *Twilight of the idols*,

Greek taste undergoes a change in favor of dialectics: what is really happening when that happens? It is above all the defeat of a NOBLER taste; with dialectics the rabble gets on top. Before Socrates, the dialectical manner was repudiated in good society: it was regarded as a form of bad manners, one was compromised by it. Young people were warned against it. And all such presentation of one's reason was regarded with mistrust. Honest things, like honest men, do not carry their reasons exposed in this fashion. It is indecent to display all one's goods. What has first to have itself proved

¹ Cf. [Achelis 1894], p. 102.

is of little value. Wherever authority is still part of accepted usage and one does not “give reasons” but commands, the dialectician is a kind of buffoon: he is laughed at, he is not taken seriously. – Socrates was the buffoon who GOT HIMSELF TAKEN SERIOUSLY: what was really happening when that happened? [...] One chooses dialectics only when one has no other expedient. One knows that dialectics inspire mistrust, that they are not very convincing. Nothing is easier to expunge than the effect of a dialectician, as is proved by the experience of every speech-making assembly. Dialectics can be only a LAST DITCH WEAPON in the hands of those who have no other weapon left. One must have to ENFORCE one’s rights: otherwise one makes no use of it. That is why the Jews were dialecticians; Reynard the Fox was a dialectician: what? and Socrates was a dialectician too?²

Therefore perceiving any strictly logical thinking as nothing but dialectics in its pejorative meaning, namely sophistry, Nietzsche expresses his opinions apodictically: he does not “give reasons” but “commands.” So let us take a closer look at his commands.

History has shown that the course of mankind is leading to a more and more effective mastery of the physiological instincts and desires resulting from the bodily nature of man for the benefit of the spirit and our comprehensive development. Civilization’s progress and level are measured by the yardstick of the human ability to capture nature in a spiritual sense, and not only the surrounding nature but also the one constituting a part of every human being. Infusing humanity with spirituality is the real goal of the civilization; and nature is simply a means to an end, not the end itself. We are still far from achieving our goal; humanity is composed of individuals differing in their level of progress in mastering nature; to some it is the spirit that prevails, to others it is nature; and often first the spirit, then the body gets the upper hand for one and the same human being. And those whom we consider as masters of humanity continue to tell us to aim at the prevalence of spirit.

Nietzsche sounds the retreat; he reverses the range and measure of progress; he wants to introduce “*die Umwerthung aller Werthe*.” What we call “progress” is really decadence; humanity should not aim at the Kingdom of God; that is, justice and peace, but at restoring the original state of humanity; according to evolutionary theories – the state of letting a brute and ruthless force decide, the state where everyone, who is capable of it would be able to satisfy the desire for power (*Wille zur Macht*), which is exactly the desire for life. And those who are not capable of it, let them die; their only task is to serve those giants who will turn out to be the strongest as the manure of civilization (*Kultur-Dünger*).

² Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], pp. 31-32.

Nietzsche divides all of the ethical systems that have ever existed or still exist in the world into two classes, two types: ETHICS OF MASTERS (*Herrn-Moral*) and ETHICS OF SLAVES, HERDS (*Sclaven-, Heerdenthier-Moral*). In every epoch, there were attempts to reconcile these two types of ethics; there is often a certain mixture of two ethics; and often these two ethics exist in tandem without mutual understanding, even in one and the same human being, in one soul. The difference between these two types of ethics lies in a yardstick used to measure human deeds and to judge human beings themselves. One method of judging people was created among the ruling classes, taking pride in their superiority over enslaved people; another method was established by slaves, the dependent, the overpowered. In the first case, masters' character and behavior is sometimes a yardstick used to measure people; human beings showing this superior manner stay away from people with different manners, they despise them. The ethics of that kind divides people into "superiors," masters, and those worthy of contempt, peasants; the difference between good and evil is of different origins here. The ethics of masters despises faint-hearted, meticulous human beings, also, the distrustful, with their constrained glances, the self-abasing, the dog-like kind of men who let themselves be abused, and above all, the liars; it is a fundamental belief of all masters that the common people are untruthful. In the foreground there is the feeling of power, plenitude, which seeks to overflow. And the master also helps the unfortunate but not out of pity or mercy but from an impulse generated by the super-abundance of power. People acting according to the ethics of masters are the farthest from the ethical system which sees in sympathy, in acting for the good of others and in unselfish deeds that which is characteristic of morality; they scorn pity and a "warm heart," which they, by the way, avoid. These are the characteristics of the ethics of masters.

It is different with the second type of ethics, the ethics of slaves. Supposing that the oppressed, the suffering, and those uncertain of the future start to consider ethical problems, there will be some pessimistic feeling telling them that masters do not know what true happiness is. A slave does not appreciate the qualities of masters but those which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers; thus, a slave honors pity or mercy, the warm heart, patience, diligence, humility, and friendliness for these are almost the only means of enduring the burden of existence. Therefore, the ethics of slaves essentially seems to be utilitarian ethics. In the ethics of slaves there appears the opposition of good and evil. To slaves, everything that threatens them with its power is evil; for masters it is the opposite – they see good in power; and a powerful man who is adored by them is not evil; it is rather the men from the crowds who are the evil ones, villains of whom they are not afraid but whom they despise. A fundamental feature

distinguishing the ethics of slaves from the ethics of masters is also the desire for freedom which we see in a slave while a “master” is the best in terms of reverence and making sacrifices for other people. It is not hard to guess that the ethics of modern Europeans is of this latter type, that it is the ethics of slaves, crowds, herds, an ethics which shows the difference between good and evil.

Nietzsche knows no bounds in expressing his disdain for this type of ethics – the ethics of slaves. An implacable hatred for this ethics and its two trends is visible in all his works, on almost every page. He cannot stand Christian ethics, utilitarian and democratic ethics, and even Schopenhauer, whom he cannot forgive for attributing significance to pity in his ethics. Since democratic ideas can eventually be found in Christian ethics to the same extent as sympathy, determining Nietzsche’s stance toward Christianity would be exhaustive. The last work which Nietzsche had prepared for publication before he sank into madness (in 1888) was entitled “The Anti-Christ” [1895]. This book was supposed to be the first part of an extensive piece of work estimated at four volumes. Nietzsche conducted research for and prepared drafts of the last three volumes. The second part was to be entitled: “The free spirit. A critique of philosophy as a nihilistic movement,” the third part: “The immoralist. A critique of the most fateful form of ignorance”; the fourth part was to be named after Nietzsche’s favorite character from pagan Greece: “Dionysus.” Nietzsche only managed to finish the first part, and it was only recently published under the title of “Anti-Christ” as the eighth volume of a joint publication of Nietzsche’s works just being issued. The foreword reads: “This book belongs to the very few. Perhaps none of them is even living yet. [...] Only the day after tomorrow belongs to me.”³ It is solely about the declaration of war against Christianity itself as a religion and ethics, and the whole of Christian civilization. “The weak and ill-constituted shall perish: first principle of *OUR* philanthropy. And one shall help them to do so.”⁴ The sick are, according to Nietzsche, parasites of humanity. In certain circumstances, it is improper to prolong one’s life. If one cannot live holding one’s head high, one should at least die that way. One should die at the right time, voluntarily, cheerfully, among children and witnesses, to be able to say goodbye to everybody, examine one’s deeds and intentions,

in contrast to the pitiable and horrible comedy Christianity has made of the hour of death. One should never forget of Christianity that it has abused the weakness of

³ Cf. [Nietzsche 1902], p. 114.

⁴ Cf. [Nietzsche 1902], p. 116.

the dying to commit conscience-rape and even the mode of death to formulate value judgments of men and the past.⁵

Already Plato was not to Nietzsche's liking; he perceived him as a man who "deviated so far from all the fundamental instincts of the Hellenes, so morally infected (*sic!*), so much an antecedent Christian"⁶ – Plato even "has the concept "good" as the supreme concept"⁷ and Nietzsche would prefer "the harsh term "higher swindle" or, if you prefer, "idealism" [...] [for] the entire phenomenon «Plato»."⁸ Christianity democratized the old, strong, national God of Israel, of "the chosen people"; God "declines step by step to the symbol of a staff for the wary, a sheet-anchor for all who are drowning; [...] he becomes the poor people's God, the sinner's God, the God of the sick *par excellence*, and the predicate "Savior," "Redeemer" as it were remains over as the predicate of divinity as such."⁹ And God has become the opposition, negation of life, instead of being its essence. He is not this proud Pagan god, but a democrat among gods, and Christianity has been controlling the world ever since, and as the result, a dwarfed, almost ludicrous species has been produced "a herd animal, something eager to please, sickly, and mediocre has been bred, the European of today."¹⁰

Christ himself, this "Saint Anarchist" as Nietzsche calls him, is not responsible for all of this. Surprisingly, Nietzsche speaks of him with reverence and respect; but according to the author there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross. "What was called "Evangel" from this moment onwards was already the opposite of what he had lived: [...] a DYSANGEL."¹¹ A man who distorted the Gospel, making it a dysangel was Paul the apostle, the "inventor" of personal immortality. Saint Paul is – in the eyes of Nietzsche – the Anti-Christ. And the doctrine of personal immortality is "the greatest and most malicious outrage on noble mankind ever committed,"¹² since it assumes the equality of souls before God. Paul's Christianity democratized civilized humanity, and here lies the *peccatum originale*. "No one any longer possesses today the courage to claim special privileges or the right to rule [...] The aristocratic outlook has been undermined most deeply by the lie of equality of souls.

⁵ Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], p. 88.

⁶ Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], p. 106.

⁷ Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], p. 106.

⁸ Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], p. 106.

⁹ Cf. [Nietzsche 1895], p. 127.

¹⁰ Cf. [Nietzsche 1886], p. 76.

¹¹ Cf. [Nietzsche 1895], p. 151.

¹² Cf. [Nietzsche 1895], p. 156.

[...] Christianity is a revolt of everything that crawls along the ground directed against that which is ELEVATED.”¹³ “Whom among today’s rabble do I hate the most? The socialist rabble [...] Injustice never lies in unequal rights; it lies in the claim to «equal» rights.”¹⁴ So what should we aim at? Getting rid of the ethics of slaves, getting rid of Christianity and its fruits, and our ideal should be the fact expressed in the following words: “Cesare Borgia as Pope!”¹⁵ He is a man-giant. If Cesare Borgia was a pope, “Christianity no longer [...] [would seat] on the Papal throne! Life sat there instead! the triumph of life.”¹⁶ As head of Christianity, desiring life and power, he would sweep away Christianity; the one who would be expected to be the first preacher of the ethics of slaves, would abandon it, and preach the ethics of masters by his deeds. So let’s follow him!¹⁷

So this is the system of the Nietzsche’s ethics, which I have attempted to summarize in the author’s own words where it was possible. This whole ethics can be presented by means of several sentences, on several pages; so one might ask what is really included in this vast collection of eight volumes Nietzsche gave to the world? Their contents are in no way a thorough and systematic exposition of the ethics, but, mostly, a deliberation on social, philosophical, and political questions from the perspective of the ETHICS OF MASTERS. There is a merciless criticism of civilization’s symptoms and facts, in which today’s world takes pride, a ruthless characterization of the great geniuses of all time as representatives of the ETHICS OF SLAVES, and all this is mostly written in the aphoristic mode, in which Nietzsche, also according to his own opinion, is at the forefront among Germans. All these sentences, devastating and surprising with their boldness, consistently stem from the stance adopted by Nietzsche in ethics, condemning the ethics of brotherly love and defending the ethics of egoism.

If I can clearly explain the leitmotif of Nietzsche’s works, I do not need to give detailed reasons for the statement that this “philosopher of *fin de siècle*” gained his popularity thanks to the aforementioned circumstances. I think no one is as dexterous in tickling one’s dormant wild instincts and, simultaneously, offending all lofty feelings that one has thanks to the higher element in him, as Nietzsche is. This writing style is going to win every writer a considerable number of readers.

¹³ Cf. [Nietzsche 1895], pp. 156-157.

¹⁴ Cf. [Nietzsche 1895], p. 179.

¹⁵ Cf. [Nietzsche 1895], p. 185.

¹⁶ Cf. [Nietzsche 1895], p. 185.

¹⁷ Cf. [Stein 1895].

Several words of criticism concerning Nietzsche's philosophy should be offered here. I do not share the views of those who tend to emphasize the mental collapse that he suffered and think that the later mental illness is enough to criticize his previous opinions. Avoiding the duty of a critical deliberation of the foundations of Nietzsche's ethics in this way is inappropriate and pointless since it is really easy to demonstrate a fundamental error in Nietzsche's assumptions. We should choose between two types of ethics: the ethics of altruism and the ethics of egoism. One defends the former, the other defends the latter. Which one of these is right? Either it is true that one should be a selfish person, or that one should be an altruist. What is the decisive factor here? According to Nietzsche it is the desire for life; that is, the desire for power, which affects every human being, and works to the advantage of egoism. Still, everything depends on the understanding of this power. After all, there is physical power and there is mental power. Which power does Nietzsche mean? Everything tells me that he means physical power: FORCE. One of the passages of his *Twilight of Idols* is very enlightening in relation to this matter:

As regards the celebrated «struggle for LIFE», it seems to me for the present to have been rather asserted than proved. It does occur, but as the exception; the general aspect of life is NOT hunger and distress, but rather wealth, luxury, even absurd prodigality – where there is a struggle it is a struggle for POWER... [...] Supposing, however, that this struggle exists – and it does indeed occur – its outcome is the reverse of that desired by the school of Darwin, of that one OUGHT perhaps to desire with them: namely, the defeat of the stronger, the more privileged, the fortunate exceptions. Species do NOT grow more perfect: the weaker dominate the strong again and again – the reason being they are the great majority, and they are also CLEVERER... Darwin forgot the mind (– that is English!): THE WEAK POSSESS MORE MIND... To acquire mind one must need mind – one loses it when one no longer needs it. He who possesses strength divests himself of mind [...]. One will see that under mind I include foresight, patience, dissimulation, great self-control, and all that in mimicry (this last includes a great part of what is called virtue).¹⁸

Therefore, it is about a physical power, physical advantage, about improving a zoological “homo” species; and mental power only hinders this improvement and a physical development of the species characterized by natural excellence that provides also for the physically weak. And if anyone still has any doubts about it, if anyone thinks that this is not an appropriate way of perceiving Nietzsche, let me offer the following aphorisms for the further consideration, and there are many more of these.

¹⁸ Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], p. 59.

But to attack the passions at their roots means to attack life at its roots: the practice of the Church is HOSTILE TO LIFE.¹⁹

Or:

To HAVE to combat one's instincts – that is the formula for DECADENCE: as long as life is ASCENDING, happiness and instinct are one.²⁰

Or:

The criminal type is the type of the strong human being under unfavorable conditions, a strong human being made sick. What he lacks the wilderness, a certain freer and more perilous nature and form of existence in which all that is attack and defense in the instinct of the strong human being COMES INTO ITS OWN. His VIRTUES have been excommunicated by society the liveliest drives within him forthwith blend with the depressive emotions, with suspicion, fear, dishonor. But this is almost the RECIPE for physiological degeneration.²¹

Or:

We misunderstand the beast of prey and the man of prey (for example, Cesare Borgia) thoroughly, we misunderstand “nature” as long as we still look for something “pathological” at the bottom of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growths.²²

It is clear what force Nietzsche dreams of. Still, it also goes without saying that human beings who differ from others only in developing their physical condition to the highest degree, cannot be put forward as a model for mankind. The harmonious development of humanity, both in relation to the body and the spirit has always been more desirable than a unilateral development, focused on one side only, at the expense of the other. And the one who opposes this principle can be told that: “*contra negantem principia non est disputatio.*”

And what is Nietzsche's evidence to support his claim of physical development's superiority over mental development, even when it is coupled with physical development? There is none. He does not present evidence, he commands; this is what I want and that's the end of it: *stet pro ratione voluntas*. Any polemic would be useless; to engage in polemics with Nietzsche would be ridiculous to the same extent as arguing with a stubborn child or a despot whose only wish is to impale me just on a whim.

One should choose another path to show that Nietzsche went astray. When one manages to discover the path that led Nietzsche to his Dysangel, it will be clearly and irrefutably confirmed that Nietzsche was LED ASTRAY.

¹⁹ Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], p. 42.

²⁰ Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], p. 34.

²¹ Cf. [Nietzsche 1889], p. 98.

²² Cf. [Nietzsche 1886], pp. 108-109.

On a gate found at the beginning of that path are two aphorisms to be quoted here. The first one is:

Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants – love God as I love him, as his Son! What are morals to us sons of God!"²³

And the second one is:

Whatever is done from love occurs beyond good and evil (*jenseits von Gut und Böse*).²⁴

And what did Christ say? He told us to love our God and our neighbor and he added: "On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets." This means: Love God and thy neighbor, and do what this love tells you to do, and then you do not have to ask whether it is right or wrong, whether your deeds are consistent with the moral principles given by Moses and the prophets. If your actions spring from love, they will be good actions.

As the French saying goes: "*les extrêmes se touchent*," and there is a great deal of truth in it. Two extremities often have some common features. For instance, the common feature of black and white is the fact that they are both colors. And a point of contact between the teachings of Christ and the doctrine of Nietzsche are the words of the following phrase: "*jenseits von Gut und Böse*." And I said words because when it comes to the meaning of this phrase in relation to the teachings of Christ, one can discover an enormous chasm between these extremities.

When I say that Christ is beyond the world of good and evil, I use the principle according to which every being surpassing its surroundings adopts a different stance toward the rules and laws of these surroundings than all others. Artistic geniuses do not ask questions about aesthetic rules and formulas; they do not ask whether something is beautiful or ugly, but instead they create works according to their inspiration, knowing that they are about to create something beautiful. In this sense, an artistic genius is "*jenseits von schön und hässlich*." And the same can be said about geniuses in the field of ethics who are called saints. And saints do not ask about a legal or customary definition of good and evil, but instead they act according to their inspiration, and they always act well, morally; an ethical genius will always instinctively, so to speak, know what to do.

If Nietzsche, by aspiring to the country located beyond evil and good, meant the way in which moral geniuses are beyond this place, if Nietzsche, by his love for instinct, meant the subtle instinct of geniuses and saints

²³ Cf. [Nietzsche 1886], p. 91.

²⁴ Cf. [Nietzsche 1886], p. 90.

– who would be indignant with him? In my opinion, at first, he meant exactly these things. The first stage of development of Nietzsche's theory was a presentation of the ideal of the human-giant, surpassing every other human being with his ethical genius, moral instinct; consequently, not caring about moral principles provided by ethics. Unfortunately, that first stage did not command much of Nietzsche's attention. The second stage was replacing the instinct in the aforementioned sense with a physiological instinct. It was about intuition before, now it was only about an animal instinct. How could Nietzsche not see that he attributed a twofold meaning to one word? This replacement, made *bona fide* – of this I am sure – was facilitated by the fact that by giving a real instinct and not intuition to his human-giants, he still perceived them as the ones standing "*jenseits von Gut und Böse*"; however, he did not notice that they, in fact, were not standing at the same side of the country of good and evil anymore. An ethical genius stands where one does not have to ask about the difference between right and wrong ANY MORE; a being acting solely according to a physiological instinct stands where one does not have to ask about this difference YET. The man of prey does not have a sense that would enable him to distinguish between right and wrong yet; instinct is enough for him to live; a saintly man, an ethical genius does not need the sense of distinguishing between right and wrong anymore; this sense is replaced with love, and by acting out of love, he is never wrong. A moral genius stands "*jenseits von Gut und Böse*" to the same extent as the man of prey; Christ was in the last stage of his mental development just as Nietzsche was; but Christ stands on the one side and Nietzsche on the other; Christ is above and Nietzsche is below; Christ was the greatest saint, the greatest ethical genius; and Nietzsche thought he was equally a genius, standing "*jenseits von Gut und Böse*"; still, he forgot he was standing at the opposite end.

When Nietzsche talks about instincts he uses this word in the two mentioned senses alternately; first, he talks about physiological drives, then about intuitions of genius, and both are called instincts by him. And when he mentions "*jenseits von Gut und Böse*," he talks about the one and the other side alternately, first he mentions those to whom ethical evaluation does not apply, then about those who act according to their genius, and not according to some clichés out of a handbook of morality. As a consequence, Nietzsche's sentences could apply both to the one and the other side of this "*jenseits von Gut und Böse*"; another consequence is that one often does not know whether Nietzsche talks about natural drives or an intuition of genius, when he worships the blessed consequences of acting according to the instinct. And this is the source of paradoxical force in his writings.

In my opinion, this is the key to the riddle told by the mind of Nietzsche. The ambiguity of his own watchword confused Nietzsche himself. This is not the first nor the last example of a philosopher whose system is based on the unrecognized ambiguity of some fundamental word or fundamental formula. Therefore, scientific philosophy will continue to demand severely and unrelentingly that the first condition of philosophical investigation is precision of expression. And the one who does not accept it is lost for philosophy. And the one who indulges in reading Nietzsche's works without a logical argument, so despised by Nietzsche, without this "instinct of precision" that we admire in Socrates' works, will never solve this riddle, will never outsmart this sphinx; on the contrary, it will push him out in the depths of darkness which is not reached by the light of mind, as it did with the one who told this riddle, who was a riddle himself.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

BERGSON'S OXFORD LECTURES*

I. In two of his lectures presented in May of this year at Oxford University, where he has an honorary PhD, Bergson developed two fundamental concepts of his philosophy which are very closely connected with one another. These are the concepts of intuition and change, and the intuition under discussion is the intuition of change, since this is what he means when speaking of perception. Bergson states that we constantly look at the changes perpetually occurring around us but do not see them; we speak of changes but we do not think about them. We accept the existence of changes but we reason and philosophize as if they did not exist. Thus a number of philosophical difficulties emerge, which disappear as soon as we learn to take the only feasible standpoint toward changes. In this way, we shall also remove numerous misunderstandings and gradually achieve a philosophy everyone can agree with.

There is already accord in certain points nowadays. According to Bergson, everyone agrees that abstract reasoning, thinking and understanding is merely an auxiliary agent, an evasion which we use whenever we are unable to define an issue directly, perceive it specifically, know it intuitively and observe it through experience. This is why most sophisticated conceptual constructs are made and all metaphysicians and theologians consistently seek one of the manifestations of the highest being in its ability of direct and intuitive cognition, rather than indirect and discursive cognition.

* The text appeared in Polish as "Odczyty oksfordzkie Bergsona" in *Słowo Polskie* XVI (1912), No. 584 [evening] (15th December), 1-2; No. 586 [evening] (16th December), 1-2 [B&J].

Moreover, everyone agrees that the source of all philosophizing lies in limiting our ability to grasping things and the necessity of resorting to conceptual cognition. After all, any philosophical concept replaces direct data of experience with certain concepts in order to thus complete and round out the knowledge drawn from that direct but limited experience.

Thus we proceed to the resulting third remark, which is also not under dispute. Since these auxiliary concepts are made from the material supplied by experience, therefore these concepts will also differ depending on which fragment of experience they were created from. Since the choice of this fragment is an individual matter and is quite arbitrary, there must emerge a number of warring methods of philosophizing and philosophical views. Still, what is common for all these methods and views is that they all turn against their primary aim. The aim was to systematize the whole of experience, to unify all the information drawn from experience, whereas all philosophy, having conducted the systemization and unification with the help of concepts provided by only a certain fragment of experience, confines it and removes a number of elements provided directly with perception, in favor of those privileged elements, elevated to the rank of concepts.

This discrepancy between the aim and the result of any kind of philosophy, as well as a discrepancy between various philosophies, could be removed if only instead of soaring to new heights of abstract concepts, above experience and direct perceiving, we could plunge into experience direct perceiving in a way and thus expand it so that it encompasses all of reality, without leaving any gaps in it or selecting fragments of it, or rejecting certain elements of it. Such a philosophy, that is, philosophy based on experience which includes everything and observation which does not omit anything, a philosophy based, to say it shortly, on an intuition of the whole of reality, would have to triumph over all the other philosophies.

Yet, is such intuition of the whole of reality possible? Is it at least possible to expand the field of experience and perception? Can we see something more than we have already seen in the reality which lives in us and surrounds us? Yes, this is definitely possible, and the proof of this possibility is the fact that there are people whose calling is to teach us to perceive what we have not noticed. These are artists. They are the ones who can see things we do not pay attention to in ourselves and in our surroundings. They extract unnoticed details from the plethora of events and sights. They put before our eyes and the eyes of our soul the known reality – all the more real, the more *TRUTH* there is in their work. Nevertheless, reality is at the same time something new for us, almost unexpected, as we only carelessly pass it, only casting a casual glance at it. Thus, we can indeed learn how to see in what we have seen, things which we have not

seen, and therefore expand the scope of experience and direct perception. This we can learn from artists.

Yet, how do they do it? Very simply. Thanks to their particular organization, they can observe reality calmly. People like us cannot do it. Forced to act, compelled to fulfill practical needs, influenced by life necessities, we have no time nor do we care to watch reality calmly. What interests us in it is what can be useful for us in our lives and for our lives. Even that part is not our main focus; it is sufficient that we know more or less what something is and whether it may bring any benefits or harm to us, and we care less about what this thing LOOKS LIKE. An artist is an idealist, an impractical person, who does not care much about the necessities of life. He much prefers to watch what occurs in the soul and in the world, and the watching itself amuses him. This is why he sees plenty of things which we do not see, and notices plenty of details which we, practical people, do not notice.

What artists do half unwittingly in a way, philosophy should do quite intentionally. By directing our attention away from what has purely practical significance and toward what has no practical value, it should lead us to a more exhaustive perception of reality and to grasp in a direct way the full scope of this reality. One would think that philosophy has been on this track for quite a long time. After all, philosophers repeatedly contrasted speculation and contemplation with practical life and told us to turn our backs on the world of vague phenomena, and instead, to turn toward reality in its full, which is either the world of ideas or some other transcendent being. However, they were mistaken in that they sought this reality beyond what was given to us through direct experience; this led some, like Kant, to deny the feasibility of philosophy as metaphysics. For, Kant believed that the fullness of being could only be grasped thanks to some non-sensory observation, some sort of intellectual intuition, and since he discovered that we are incapable in this respect, he also deemed metaphysics unattainable.

We must agree with Kant's claim that we are unable to form such an intellectual intuition which sees and watches an extra-empirical entity. Yet, Kant was mistaken, and with him, all those who claim that such an intuition is a necessary condition for metaphysics. They start from the false assumption that full reality, true being, lies beyond experience, and this is their *πρώτον ψεύδος*, a mistake in the assumptions.

Where did this mistake come from? It came from the fact that the proponents of the theory of the transcendent nature of true being believed that common experience, which we rely on in everyday life, lets us directly describe movement and changes which take place in us and in our surrounding. They drew conclusions from what experience states about movement and changes and they reached inner contradiction. This is but a step from

the final conclusion, which is that the empirical world, which contains such contradictions, cannot truly be the real world. Therefore, true being must lie beyond what undergoes changes, and must rise above what changes occur in, that is, to rise above time.

What if it turned out that this incentive for seeking true being in the extra-empirical sphere is illusory? What if it turned out that our everyday experience does not allow us to describe directly either movement or change, and instead, replaces movement and change with something that does not move and does not change? What if it turned out that what we believe to be direct and full of perception of movement and changes was in fact a solidified form which preserves our perception because of the aims and needs of our practical lives? Then we do not have to accept the consequences the other philosophers came to. Then we do not have to rise above time and go beyond changes in order to describe true being, but instead, we must make an effort to grasp essential movement and essential changes directly. Having thus expanded and refreshed our ability to grasp and perceive things directly, we would perhaps be able to piece together our cognition and make it continuous and rounded whole, which would then be something based on what we experience and undergo, rather than something based on some hypothesis or construction.

If we make an effort toward a direct, primary grasping and perception of movement and changes, we must come to the conclusion that any change and any movement must be presented as something absolutely indivisible and simple. This is contrary to the common opinion, as we believe all movement to be divisible to infinity. In this we are mistaken, and our mistake is derived from two sources.

The first one is the fact that any movement can be arrested at any point. For instance, making a movement with our hand from *A* to *C*, we can then commence «the same» movement, except we arrest it in some point *B* between *A* and *C*, and it seems that also the initial movement from *A* to *C* is divided into two parts, from *A* to *B* and from *B* to *C*. Still, it only seems so to us. After all, the movement from *A* to *B* and then from *B* to *C* is not the same as the movement from *A* to *C*. The former consists of two different movements, which could have the same final result, that is, transferring our hand from *A* to *C*, but this transfer was different in the initial example, when the movement was executed with just one indivisible movement from *A* to *C*, from the following example, where the movement was executed with two, equally indivisible stages, from *A* to *B*, and then from *B* to *C*.

The second source of the conviction that movement is divisible lies in the idea that the distance between two places in which movement occurs is divisible, and this divisibility of the distance is transposed onto the movement with which we traverse it. Thus we attach each phase of

the movement to the corresponding part of the distance, forgetting that distance is something stationary and constant, whereas movement is constant change... so that never and at no time does a moving body find itself in any, even infinitely small, part of that distance, but instead, it moves through it constantly. Therefore, we are not allowed to state that the moved body finds itself in given positions one after another, since it does not find itself in any of them, but only constantly moves through these positions. It is only for practical reasons that we speak in such an imprecise manner, since from the practical point of view we are mostly concerned with positions which bodies assume before or after a movement, or those which they could assume in case of arrested movement. Thus we divide movement into a series of positions, adding that a body in movement passes from one position to another, but we do not in fact consider this passing, or the essential movement. We dismiss this passing to smaller and smaller distances along which the movement occurs, to infinitely small distances, at the same time splitting movement into infinitely small movements, but we forget that every movement is one indivisible movement, from the moment it begins to the moment it ceases, whether it last a second or years on end. This is because only the traversed space consists of parts, but there are no parts in movement. It is indivisible. If we do not accept this, we fall into the difficulty and contradiction which was first demonstrated by Zeno of Elea.

II. We can make a similar statement about any kind of change as about movement. Any change is also something indivisible, simple. Indeed, we visualize it as a succession of different states. Yet, also in this matter we are influenced by the practical necessities of our lives. In order to understand this idea, let us use a comparison. If we assume that everything is in constant movement and constant change, it may occur that changes are parallel to each other and correspond to each other. Such is the case with two trains running parallel to each other, with unchangeable speed and distance from each other. In that case, two people on those two trains who happen to look at each other get the impression that they are not moving, as they indeed are not changing their position in relation to each other. This correspondence and parallelism of changes is simply the condition of practical functioning. Only when the two trains move in this parallel and equally fast manner can the passengers of these two trains interact with each other, shake hands or talk to each other. To return to our comparison, we are like one of these trains, with our constantly changing psychical lives, whereas the other train is our surroundings, which also undergoes constant change. Colors and sounds, and all the other sensory qualities, are in constant change, are in constant fluctuation of intensity and saturation

etc. On the other hand, we also constantly change accordingly, corresponding to the constant changes of the surroundings. Thus an illusion is created that we and our surroundings are in certain consecutive states, since as long as this correspondence and parallelism of changes of our minds and our surroundings lasts, it seems to us that changes do not occur and that some kind of fixed state continues. These apparent states are very important to us since, as the image of the train demonstrates, they enable us to interact with our surroundings, and therefore, they absorb all our attention, we consider them as something real, and from all those various real states we then assemble all changes which present themselves as something less real, as something *TRANSITORY*. Meanwhile, movement and change are essential reality. Therefore, whoever attempts to define change directly and specifically must discover that any change is as simple and indivisible as any movement.

This claim is closely connected to another, which perhaps only expresses the same truth as the first one in a different form. It reads: changes exist, but there are no changing things. Change does not require a base. There are movements but unchangeable things which move do not necessarily exist. Movement does not presuppose that something has stirred.

This claim also seems inconsistent with experience at first; unjustly so. This is most apparent when we take as an example the sense of hearing. We hear a melody. Therefore we hear changes and a certain movement. Yet, what changes? What moves? Nothing. Pure change itself creates what we call melody. The case is similar, though perhaps not as apparent, with the sense of sight. Here, we tend to consider slower, less conspicuous changes as something constant, as a base for faster changes. Yet, if we look more closely, we notice that there is no base, there is nothing constant. This idea is offered by contemporary physics, which moves further and further from the concept of the alleged base. Solid mass dissipate into particles, particles disperse into atoms, and atoms into electrons etc. In the end, the base of movement becomes something infinitely small, and is probably only a concession made by physicists to the petty habits of everyday thinking. Still, apparently this redundancy of a base occurs in inner experience. There are no unchangeable states, whose succession introduces changes into some sort of a durable base, into a spiritual substance, just as there is no such substance. There is only constant change, the continuous flow of our inner lives, which constitutes our egos. Therefore, both within us and on the outside, reality is change, and change is the only reality.

Yet, do we not abolish any reality if we perceive reality as change? If only changes exist, nothing permanent exists. Can anything exist at all if nothing permanent exists? These objections also vanish when we take

a more reasonable standpoint toward this issue, and are consistent about following the chosen path.

The objections have their source in the idea that we consider as real only that which is actually present, and whatever is past is considered unreal. Yet, what is the present moment? If it is a moment from the mathematical point of view, it is merely an abstraction. Therefore, when we say "now," we mean a certain period of time rather than a point in time. What kind though? How long? This is very unstable. My «now» is, for instance, the sentence I am uttering now. I call it "my now" because I am aware of this sentence and pay attention to it right now. Yet, this attention may encompass a great deal more. It may also encompass the previous sentence, several previous sentences, and so on, as far as I can reach back with the act of my paying attention. What we can include in our act of attention constitutes our «now», our PRESENT moment. All of this is present to us. What our attention releases sinks into the past, belongs to history, both for individuals and for nations, where everything that ever was also lives and is present, as long as it continues to attract attention. Whatever does not exist for us any more belongs to the past. Again, the decisive factor here is vital value.

Attention which is sufficiently freed from these vital considerations could therefore keep as present all that has ever occurred within our consciousness. Such cases indeed occur for some people facing death, when their whole life flashes before their eyes, not in one moment, but like when we listen to a melody, it is present with us as a whole from the beginning rather than just the last moment of the last sound. Otherwise we would not hear melody at all.

This sheds a lot of light on our memory. It ceases to be a mystery. Whatever was will not vanish. It does not require any special skill of re-creation. Whatever exists continues to exist and acts automatically in a way. Therefore, it is not memory which demands explanation, but the fact that we forget so much and that we are not always aware nor do we pay attention to what was. This can again be explained with practical reasons, which the structure of our brains and the function they serve. The task of the brain is to direct our attention toward the future, toward our actions, and to provide us with simplified elements from the past which could be useful for acting in the present. The brain is not a repository where everything we have ever experienced is stored for future use. All of the information perpetuates and is stored by itself. The brain is only a tool which chooses that among the experiences which is useful at any given moment and applies these past experiences to future actions.

This is the case not only with our past, but also with the past of any change, as long as we are concerned with one and indivisible change. The

presence of what was in that which is now is only a simple consequence of the indivisibility of change.

From this point of view, a series of difficulties and problems vanishes. Plenty of difficulties and problems still lie in the notion of substance, the durable base of changeable attributes. The attributes are properties or states which we ascertain one by one, and in order to bind them together, we need substance. But we do not know what the substance should be as it cannot possess any of the properties noticed by us, as they are, after all, something unstable! Yet, if we remember that there is no succession of consecutive states but only indivisible change, we cease to require a substrate in order to grant it its continuity, as change itself is something permanent and continuing, and change becomes substance, a true being. Then, change ceases to be elusive, as it is something which truly lasts forever, and substance, which this change is, ceases to be inaccessible. Both the difficulties which have been piling up around the concept of movement since antiquity and those which have piled up around the concept of substance in contemporary philosophy, thus vanish.

Numerous and various problems are clarified as well. For instance, the problem of the freedom of will. In view of the fact that the whole past is constantly present, the issue of a necessary determination of our resolutions as well as its antecedents loses all significance. After all, the past, which forms a single entity with the present, never ceases to produce the constant development of new changes.

Finally, everyday life also gains something from this view. Thanks to this view, we look at reality with the eyes of an artist, and even more so, as an artist only superficially demonstrates to us things which we have not seen, and philosophy reveals their depth to us. It ties our present inherently with the past, and depicts the future as a product of the present which encompasses the past. Reality ceases to be something static and assumes a dynamic, constantly changing form. Whatever was fixed and solidified acquires movement and life, as well as great momentum, which elevates us and everything else with it. Thus we feel liberated from these horrible crushing problems and mysteries of the universe, which we do not even pose any more, perceiving them as an expression of the artificial weakening of our vitality. The more we immerse ourselves in this perpetual change of the universe, the more we look at it *sub specie durationis*, and the closer we approach the law of the universe in which we also take part and which cannot be envisaged as immutable, but rather, as eternal life and eternal movement. Otherwise, how would we be able to move and live in it? We say, "*in ea vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.*"

* * *

With this Bergson ends his lectures.

Upon reading them, one has the impression of a finished form, characteristic of whatever Bergson writes and says, which partly explains the popularity and the influence of this metaphysician, perhaps the most popular one nowadays. Still, Bergson does not only owe his success and wide influence to the beautiful form in which he expresses his thoughts, but also, or perhaps most of all, to the richness of ideas present in his philosophy and to the open-mindedness apparent in his views. This is clear even from these two brief lectures whose content we have attempted to present here in an overview.

Bergson's views recall Heraclitus' views as well as the views of contemporary empirio-criticism, and therefore they can count on favorable treatment from the positivists. At the same time, however, they recall Fechner's philosophy, who wished to build a worldview based on scientific knowledge which would satisfy the greatest needs of human spirit. At times, a detail comes into view as if written by Fichte, at other times a view of Spinoza or Leibniz is recalled. Indeed, the multitude and variety of the collected thought elements is immense.

This is not supposed to be an objection, only a recognition of the state of affairs. After all, creating a new and original thought construct with a distinct countenance from all of these elements indicates a bold and vigorous intellectual effort. Including numerous other factors of past views into his thought construct and developing them into a new whole, Bergson validates his own theory, according to which the past continues in the present, and forms with it the development of the future.

A critical analysis will definitely encounter causes for objection. The question may be asked of whether the aforementioned view of the presence of something which was in that which is, and the conclusions about the relationship of the present to the past based on it, perhaps draw most of their strength, so convincing for Bergson himself as well as his proponents, from the ambiguity of the French word "*présent*," which indicates both what is present from the past thanks to memory, and that which actually belongs to the present. Proceeding to Bergson's methodological assumptions, we may pose the question through critical analysis of whether Bergson, who professed the reality of change and change alone, did not intuitively describe only a section of reality, from which he created his notion which is supposed to systematize and unify the entirety of knowledge drawn from experience. After all, others claim that such a full, direct, unblemished approach to reality, which this new intuition is supposed to be, evokes a substantial being in their own consciousness, although it was in fact eradicated by Bergson. Perhaps Bergson committed the same error with which he imputes earlier philosophers?

However, such questions and doubts arise in relation to any world-view. If anywhere, this is where Bergson is correct, stating after Heraclitus that everything is in constant flux, and there is nothing permanent except change itself.

Translated by Katarzyna Janeczek

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The volume contains almost thirty papers by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The papers are published in English for the first time. They stem from the Lvov period, which is often contrasted with the earlier Vienna period of Twardowski's scientific activity. Contrary to received opinion, the editors argue that the Lvov period is just as important as the Vienna period. Indeed, the scope of Twardowski's investigations was much broader and more profound in later years. The papers concern fundamental problems of philosophy: the methods of philosophizing, the boundary of psychology and semiotics, the conceptual apparatus of metaphysics, ethical skepticism, the question of free will and ethical obligation, the aesthetics of music and so on. The systematic considerations are complemented by concise but excellent sketches of the philosophical views of Socrates, Aquinas, Leibniz, Spencer, Nietzsche, and Bergson.

Kazimierz Twardowski

Born 1946 in Puchaczów (Poland). A pianist and a philosopher; titular professor of philosophy. He graduated from Music Fryderyk Chopin Music University in Warsaw (Piano Class) and from University of Warsaw (Institute of Philosophy). He is the author of many books on philosophy, logic and their history (among others: *Possible Ontologies*, Rodopi 1993 [together with Zdzisław Augustynek]; *From the Viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Rodopi 2003; *Polish Analytical Philosophy. Studies on Its Heritage*, Semper 2009; *Being and Duty. The Contribution of 20th-Century Polish Thinkers to theory of imperatives and norms*; Copernicus Center Press 2013) and a few hundred papers of logical semiotics, methodology, ontology, axiology, and history of Polish philosophy.

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